Some philosophers identify "states of affairs" with facts. Others (I presume Wittgenstein among them) seem to treat "states of affairs" as properties or propositions (propositions themselves can be seen as a kind of property), and in that case a fact obtaining from a state of affairs is an instance of a property.

It seems from what I gather, is that when a state of affairs, obtains, then it becomes truth-apt.

Is that correct?

It seems from what I gather, is that when a state of affairs, obtains, then it becomes truth-apt.

Is that correct? — Posty McPostface

Whence do you gather that? And why would it be correct? If only statements can be truth-apt, and a state of affairs is not a statement, then a state of affairs cannot be truth-apt.

If only statements can be truth-apt, and a state of affairs is not a statement, then a state of affairs cannot be truth-apt — Sapientia

Well, if we say: It is true, that, the cat is on the mat, then doesn't that sound redundant?

In ordinary language 1) "if that were true, then I'm a monkey's uncle" and 2) "if that were a fact, then I'm a monkey's uncle" are pretty much equivalent, which makes it look like identifying something as a fact and describing it as true might amount to one and the same thing. What, though, is the something thus described/identified? It cannot be a fact in these kinds of cases, since the use in 1 and 2 is counterfactual. So we might suggest statements as doing the job. But then it looks as if we are allowing in (2) that statements can sometimes be identified with facts, rather than being thingsmade true by facts.

Eh? So what if it does sound redundant? What's your reasoning in full?

My understanding is that logical space is something like digital space, an arena of representation as language, picture, thought, or whatever, and 'facts' abide in logical space. So when, as investigating officer, you say to me "Give me the facts", you expect me to tell you that the cat is (or is not) on the mat. On the one hand, you do not want me to speculate about whether that is the most comfortable place and the cat has chosen it for that reason, and on the other, more obviously and forcefully, you do not want me to pick up the mat with the cat on it and hand it to you.

The facts represent the state of affairs, and I give you the verbal representation of the cat's relation to the mat, not the cat and/or the mat. That is the state of affairs, that I leave well alone for now. Another way I could give you the facts would be to show you a photo of the cat. Or, if I opened the door, saying, " See for yourself, Sarge", I would, instead of giving you the facts, be giving you access to the state of affairs.

That's largely an issue of definitions, what we mean by those words.

I'd say that there's no such thing as a state of affairs that doesn't obtain. if a supposed "state of affairs" doesn't obtain, then obviously it isn't a state of affairs.

Doesn't it make more sense to just say that a fact is a state-of-affairs, an aspect of how things are?

...a relation between things or a possession of one or more properties by one or more things?

(...but, because a property is a thing, then that's just an instance of a relation among things.)

...where "things" are what can be referred to, meaning that facts are things too.

Michael Ossipoff