[Disregard]

Anyone?

Nice corner. The paint is still fresh. How long has it been? A thousand years?

I like the following version. Allegedly it is the most general formulation of the problem:

(1) Which propositions are true?

(2) How can we tell which propositions are true?

Both 1 and 2 can be answered with "LOGIC" - the ultimate and only truth determiner in our world.

Of course, the problem loops back and asks how one determines the truth of LOGIC itself? The answer is LOGIC is self-proving mechanism.

SELF-PROVING MECHANISM:

1. If MOST/ALL predictions of LOGIC come true then LOGIC is true
2. MOST/ALL predictions of LOGIC come true
Therefore,
3. LOGIC is true

We move from a vicious circularity to a benign one.

Of course, the problem loops back and asks how one determines the truth of LOGIC itself? The answer is LOGIC is self-proving mechanism. — TheMadFool

Not sure about that last part, but I like where you're taking this. :smile:

Not sure about that last part, but I like where you're taking this. :smile: — Posty McPostface

We know a proposition to be true because we have the method of logic.

The criterion problem spills over into logic as logic itself is in a similar circularity. We can't prove logic is true because we would be assuming it's true if we do that.

But...

We can employ a strong argument in favor of logic which depends on its predictions coming true in every field of knowledge we know of since we even began thinking.

We can employ a strong argument in favor of logic which depends on its predictions coming true in every field of knowledge we know of since we even began thinking. — TheMadFool

Oh, well that's a monumental task at which Russell and the positivists have tried approaching. The positivists tried to tackle the problem through devising a method without addressing the particular, I think. You have to address both at the same time to not fail. Not sure. If you address the issue with logic alone you fail to address how we can pick out particulars, I think.

Wondering what others think about this...

Edit: You can see the culmination of the failure the positivists had, in the verification principle, in my opinion.

On the other hand, it seems like the particularistic aspect of addressing this problem has been easier to appeal to.

Anyone think science is a particularistic or methodist approach to the problem of the criterion?

What I'm saying is there's a plethora of ''particulars'' in favor of the logical method. Using another logical progeny - mathematical probability - we see that the consistent performance of logic can't be a coincidence. Said differently, logic works as the method to prove the truth of propositions.

I guess the key ingredient in my argument is mathematical probability.

What I'm saying is there's a plethora of ''particulars'' in favor of the logical method. — TheMadFool

How so?

Said differently, logic works as the method to prove the truth of propositions. — TheMadFool

Yes, but knowledge and truth aren't the same. So no cigar, yet...

How so? — Posty McPostface

There are truths and falsehoods. In the beginning we have a method or a few particulars, it doesn't matter.

Say we start with particulars and we develop a method. As we accumulate more particulars the method gets automatically verified. The more particulars, the more stronger our method.

Now, imagine we had a method. We accumulate particulars. As we accumulate more particulars the method, again, gets automatically bolstered.

I guess I'm saying the required distinction for the Criterion problem to be a problem, viz. Particular vs method, isn't that clear enough. They seem to be in some kind positive loop instead of a negative one.

Hmmm... So, to win you have to have each complementing the other?

If there's a failure in either of the two (particular or method) inconsistencues would pop up every now and then and we wouldn't be able to comprehend the world. The fact that we do (most people think so) implies that the circularity is a positive feedback loop.

One could say that many of the problems in the world stem from the Criterion problem. Not enough particulars to go on to devise a suitable method or not good enough a method to cover all particulars.

So, science is a method, hence; the scientific method...

Can you name any particular stances?

And, is the method approach winning against the particularistic one?

So, science is a method, hence; the scientific method...

Can you name any particular stances?

And, is the method approach winning against the particularistic one? — Posty McPostface

Both are two sides of the same coin and only together can we make a purchase.

Both are two sides of the same coin and only together can we make a purchase. — TheMadFool

Hmm, unsure about that. I think both cannot be spoken without the other. Kind of like dialectics?

Hmm, unsure about that. I think both cannot be spoken without the other. Kind of like dialectics? — Posty McPostface

I don't know. I can see them both come together like yin and yang; the parts may be confusing but the whole makes sense. I wonder what others have to say about this.

If I knew, or even hypothesised, what Roderickite was - say that it was heavy and shiny - I would have a method, 'panning', for separating it from the sand. And I would have a criterion for recognising it when I obtained a sample. Marie Curie hypothesised radium an unknown element as something with distinguishing properties (atomic weight) that gave her a method of distinguishing and separating it. Application of the method produced a substance with distinguishing properties, one of which was that it radiated light, and so the name, Radium.

But perhaps Roderickite is less like gold, and more like salt. In that case, the method would be to try and dissolve the sand in water and then filter and evaporate. If I have no idea what Roderickite is, then not only do I not have a method of separation, but I have no way of knowing whether any separation I might make has separated out Roderickite, or Unenlightendite, something completely different.

I think I am a dissolutionist about this problem. To pose the problem is already to have distinguished properties of knowledge that make it different, and thus to already have both a sample and some criteria and a method. To deny it is to deny knowing what the problem is that one is posing. It is to talk of 'knowledge' whilst denying that there is knowledge. That's nonsense.

I think I know where you're going with this. You mean to highlight how do names attain/obtain their meaning? Kripke might have the answer to this question, if anyone here is knowledgeable enough on Kripke... I ain't unfortunately.

I think I am a dissolutionist about this problem. To pose the problem is already to have distinguished properties of knowledge that make it different, and thus to already have both a sample and some criteria and a method. — unenlightened

Then, taking a step back, what does 'properties of knowledge' entail or mean to you? I feel as though we're setting the horse behind the cart here.

To deny it is to deny knowing what the problem is that one is posing. It is to talk of 'knowledge' whilst denying that there is knowledge. That's nonsense. — unenlightened

Again, we don't first arrive at knowledge without having some method or criteria for considering first as knowledge. So, maybe those have to be addressed first before we can talk about particulars instead of method. But, again, we're stuck in a loop again.

You're stuck in a loop, because you think you know what a loop is and how to be stuck in it. Don't start with knowledge at all, start with a method - the method of no method. "Fuck about and see what happens." There's your solid foundation. Then start giving names to what happens when you fuck about like this. Call that naming 'knowledge'. Only then can you even ask the question about samples and criteria. Otherwise, you are dealing with Roderickite and unenlightenedite, made up stuff devoid of meaning - so of course knowledge of it is impossible.

Don't start with knowledge at all, start with a method - the method of no method. — unenlightened

Oh, well I have nothing to go about on here. It's just nonsense all the way down from this starting point.

"Fuck about and see what happens." There's your solid foundation. Then start giving names to what happens when you fuck about like this. — unenlightened

Can we lay off the F-bombs? Seriously @unenlightened...

Yeah well Posty McPostface that's the problem with framing these problems as logical problems in a vacuum. We start with a method allready build-in, our biology, and are taught language that has allready been develloped over the ages. We never start from a situation like proposed in the problem of the Criterion, it's an imaginairy problem.

The method of F-ing about is how it actually works.

The method of F-ing about is how it actually works. — ChatteringMonkey

Hu? Hows does that work out?

We don't entirely know how the brain works, something with neural networks is the short of it... So we do things, information gets inputted in the brain via the senses and neural networks in the brain do their magic... rinse and repeat => knowledge.

It's just nonsense all the way down from this starting point. — Posty McPostface

If I put it politely for you, it is play that is the beginning of knowledge. Play is imitation, recitation, messing about. This is not nonsense at all, it is the creativity of experimentation and exploration that starts without goal as purpose and becomes purposeful. The joy of smearing mud on a rock becomes the joy of art; playing dollies tea party with mud and water becomes panning for gold, or running a restaurant. Babble becomes philosophy.

One does not go looking for Roderickite that one has no idea what it is, one plays in the sand and something different comes out of that, and one calls it Roderickite.

If I put it politely for you, it is play that is the beginning of knowledge. Play is imitation, recitation, messing about. — unenlightened

Yes, but we do have to know the rules of the game first, if we want to play...

One does not go looking for Roderickite that one has no idea what it is, one plays in the sand and something different comes out of that, and one calls it Roderickite. — unenlightened

I feel as though we're getting lost here. Here is the gist of the criteria for determining knowledge:

If there is any knowledge which bears the mark of truth, if the intellect does have a way of distinguishing the true and the false, in short, if there is a criterion of truth, then this
criterion should satisfy three conditions: it should be internal, objective, and immediate.

It should be internal. No reason or rule of truth that is provided by an external
authority can serve as an ultimate criterion. For the reflective doubts that are essential to
criteriology can and should be applied to this authority itself. The mind cannot attain to
certainty until it has found within itself a sufficient reason for adhering to the testimony
of such an authority.

The criterion should be objective. The ultimate reason for believing cannot be a
merely subjective state of the thinking subject. A man is aware that he can reflect upon
his psychological states in order to control them. Knowing that he has this ability, he
does not, so long as he has not made use of it, have the right to be sure. The ultimate
ground of certitude cannot consist in a subjective feeling. It can be found only in that
which, objectively, produces this feeling and is adequate to reason.

Finally, the criterion must be immediate. To be sure, a certain conviction may rest
upon many different reasons some of which are subordinate to others. But if we are to
avoid an infinite regress, then we must find a ground of assent that presupposes no
other. We must find an immediate criterion of certitude.

Is there a criterion of truth that satisfies these three conditions? If so, what is it? — Cardinal D. J. Mercier

Found in the paper referenced in the OP.

It seems clear, elegant, and simple enough, yes?

Shameless bump.

Heh. I've read this thread a few times over and just couldn't think of a good response. Sorry posty. I know that my inclination is to say we know things, first. But I don't have much more than that to say.

Well, yes, We do use knowledge about assessing the true and falsity of determinating knowledge. I was wondering about what criteria we use in determining knowledge.

Aren't the criteria multifarious? It seems so to me. We can divide knowledge, roughly, into know-that and know-how -- but it is a rough division when we come to experience knowledge, I think. We can know-how to act in a play, we can know-that when acting we do this that and the other. We can know-that elements behave in a certain way under certain conditions, and we can know-how to demonstrate said knowledge.

But in both cases the knowledge we obtain isn't exactly commensurate, though we call both knowledge -- one is artistic and one is scientific; just to create another division of sorts.

It seems to me that the criteria of knowledge are highly specific to not just area of study but even time and place. Acting in a Shakespearean play when Shakespeare was alive would be different from acting in a Shakespearean play today. Doing chemistry in the time of Lavoisier differs from doing chemistry now. It all depends on our social arrangements, in a way, which are highly specific. Lavoisier could prove atoms existed through a fairly basic electrochemical reaction, and that mattered to the time because of the conflict between materialism and religion. Nowadays? You are kind of appealing to different groups. We are divided due to our experiences.

As to which starts first -- I don't know. I start with knowledge, but even starting with knowledge presupposes some element of what it is we know. Just as starting with a method presupposes some element of how we know.

How could you sort such a conundrum?