Deal? — Mongrel

Sure, if you wish. But give them a pointer to this thread so that your paraphrase of our disagreement doesn't misrepresent its nature. You still seem to be taking me to be denying truisms when I am rather questioning the implications that you are deriving from them.

I wouldn't ask Scott Soames to read this thread.

I'll write it out and give it to you for approval. OK?

And if you have any philosophers you want on the list, just let me know where they work.

It's only in the light of aposteriori necessity that we limit our assessment.

Traditionally, there was no limitation. There is no possible world where a bachelor is not an unmarried man.... you don't need the existence of bachelors in a world for that statement to be true. — Mongrel

So, you are again pointing to a limitation agreed upon by everyone. This is the limitation to worlds in which the relevant objects (that are targets of de re a posteriori necessities) exist. In the case of France having Paris as its capital, that would be a limitation to worlds in which France exists. In the case of water being essentially composed of H2O, that would be worlds in which water exists. In the case of Samuel Clemens being Mark Twain, that would be worlds in which Samuel Clemens exists. In all of those cases, the relevant modal truths are a posteriori (and thus a matter of empirical investigation) precisely because it is not simply up to us to stipulate some arbitrarily range of possible worlds such that the modal claim would come out true. If we do so, in the way you are proposing, then it isn't France, water or Samuel Clemens that we are talking about, unrestrictedly, but rather what is true of them, tautologically, in those circumstances only where it is assumed to be true of them.

Again, you are missing that a posteriori necessary statements are empirically falsifiable. They aren't true by fiat, as they would be according to your analysis in terms of speaker intended limitation.

I wouldn't ask Scott Soames to read this thread.

I'll write it out and give it to you for approval. OK?

And if you have any philosophers you want on the list, just let me know where they work. — Mongrel

I wouldn't want you to ask him to read the thread -- just provide the link for reference. I wouldn't want to bother any of them, myself. But sure, if you want to submit a paraphrase of our conflicting positions, and submit it to me first, go ahead. You can post it here.

How about I write out my position and you add yours?

They aren't true by fiat — Pierre-Normand

Of coarse not. The speaker I mentioned doesn't know apriori what the capital of France is.

And the question being evaluated wouldn't be about what the capital of France is. It would be about something else.. like the possibility of Paris, France hosting the Olympics.

.

Yes, and I do appreciate that Paris is not the capital of France, in a 'fully' analytic sense, that is strictly by definition, inasmuch as the word 'Paris' does not definitively mean 'capital of France'.
Oh, the ambiguities of language! But, I wouldn't have it any other way; else we would have no poetry...

Of coarse not. The speaker I mentioned doesn't know apriori what the capital of France is. — Mongrel

The fiat at issue concerns the claim about France* (or whatever the speaker means to be referring to as "France") having Paris as it capital necessarily. If this sort of relativized necessity is merely a matter of interpreting the speaker's intention, then it is not a posteriori.

And the question being evaluated wouldn't be about what the capital of France is. It would be about something else. like the possibility of Paris, France hosting the Olympics.

When you inquire about the possibility that Paris, France, hosting the Olympics, the country, France, that is at issue, still has Paris as its capital contingently. It just so happens that you are not interested in what would happen if Paris would lose its status as France's capital. Just because this possibility is irrelevant to your inquiry hardly makes is necessary (let alone a posteriori necessary) that the object, France, being considered in those counterfactual scenarios, has Paris as its capital.

You seem to be conflating the following two claims:

(1) Necessarily, if I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then in all those circumstances, France has Paris as its capital.

(2) If I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then, France, as I am thinking about it, necessarily has Paris as its capital.

The first claim is a truism that fails to entail the second. The second claim is false since disregarding a possibility doesn't make it an impossibility, let alone an a posteriori impossibility.

Yes, and I do appreciate that Paris is not the capital of France, in a 'fully' analytic sense, that is strictly by definition, inasmuch as the word 'Paris' does not definitively mean 'capital of France'. — John

I think the smoking gun is that Paris preexists the time when Clovis made it the capital of his Kingdom. But what has mainly been at issue in my discussion with Mongrel isn't the de re modal status of Paris's being France's capital, but rather the de re modal status of France's having Paris as its capital city. It is the a posteriori necessary status of this latter de re claim that is a issue. The claims are independent. Likewise, you arguably have the natural parents that you have essentially (i.e. it is a de re necessity, on some reasonable accounts of personal identity) but it is a contingent fact about your natural parents (de re contingency) that they have had you as a child.

(1) Necessarily, if I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then in all those circumstances, France has Paris as its capital.

(2) If I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then, France, as I am thinking about it, necessarily has Paris as its capital.

The first claim is a truism that fails to entail the second. The second claim is false since disregarding a possibility doesn't make it an impossibility, let alone an a posteriori impossibility. — Pierre-Normand

If I'm thinking of the actual France, it has Paris as its capital in all possible worlds where the actual France exists (which is exactly how many?)

And I learned aposteriori that the actual France has Paris as its capital.

Problem?

Yes, I think I see what you mean, you seem to want to say that it is an essential part of my identity that I have the parents that I have, but not an essential part of their identities that they had me a child, just as it is an essential part of the identity of Paris to have been the capital of France; whereas it is not an essential part of the identity of France to have had Paris as its capital.

I'll have to think more about this. It seems to rely on the idea of 'identity as existence'. So, it is an essential part of my identity to have had the parents I had, because it is not plausible to think that I could have existed otherwise; whereas it is not an essential part of my parent's identities to have had me, because their existence is not dependent on it.

When it comes to towns and countries, though I'm not sure such analogies follow, because towns and countries do not seem to be entities as precisely determinable, critically self-organizing or self-contained in the sense of being ontically bounded, as people are. For a start, the existential status, as opposed to the bare existence, of people does not seem to be subject to designations of thought, in the kind of way I pointed out earlier towns and countries are. On the other hand I can also see, that if Paris was suddenly declared not to be the capital of France, then it would not immediately change its character, although its character would rapidly diverge over time from what it would have been if it had remained capital. It is a very complex issue involving both empirical states of affairs and semantic determinations.

If I'm thinking of the actual France, it has Paris as its capital in all possible worlds where the actual France exists (which is exactly how many?)

And I learned aposteriori that the actual France has Paris as its capital.

Problem? — Mongrel

There are two problems. First, the "actual France" and some "alternative France" (as you might contemplate it in some possible world) are not distinct objects. If there exists a possible world where France has Toulouse as its capital, this simply means that France (the very same object) could possibly have had Toulouse as its capital. Likewise, in the actual world, me, being 6 feet tall isn't a different person from me, being Canadian. And if I cease to be Canadian, it doesn't follow that "me, being Canadian", some queer object with just one arbitrary determination tacked onto it by fiat, goes out of existence, but merely that, I, the flesh and blood individual, who was contingently Canadian all along, have lost my Canadian citizenship.

The second problem is that the question of the epistemological status (i.e. its being known a priori or a posteriori) of some proposition "X is F" that it is true, and of the de re modal claim "X necessarily is F" that it is true, are two distinct questions. So, that you learned the first sort of claim (factual) a posteriori doesn't get you off the charge that your procedure for establishing the second sort of fact (modal necessity) is not a posteriori. It is still by fiat that you are establishing the second sort of claim.

There are two problems. First, the "actual France" and some "alternative France" (as you might contemplate it in some possible world) are not distinct objects. — Pierre-Normand

I disagree. The actual France exists in a particular possible world.. the actual world.

That's not how it works in standard modal logic. Individuals are not 'in' worlds, they are assigned properties relative to worlds, while the domain of individuals is world-independent. An individual might not exist in some of those worlds, but it does not 'belong' to any of them.

To introduce that you'd have to have some kind of relative domain, and if you want to make the even stronger Lewisian claim that each individual belongs only to one world, then it becomes possible to spea of the world in which an individual is. But, like Lewisian metaphysics generally, I think this is a profoundly confused way of looking at things.

Ok.

If you notice, my view is deterministic. Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true. It's fun to think about how that works out in modal logic... for me, anyway.

If you notice, my view is deterministic. Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true. It's fun to think about how that works out in modal logic... for me, anyway. — Mongrel

That would make you a necessitarian rather than a determinist, although you may be a determinist as well. Necessitarianism is the view that everything that is actual is necessary. Determinists may hold that although only one future is consistent with the actual past, the whole history of the world isn't necessary, and hence they need not be necessitarians as well. This view (necessitarianism) had sometimes been called actualism in the older literature (e.g. by M. R. Ayers in his The Refutation of Determinism, Methuen, 1968) but now, the label actualism rather is used by analytic philosophers to refer to the denial of possibilism (or of 'modal realism', which is a sort of possibilism). Many things you said in this thread seem to stem from your being a necessitarian (or "actualist" in Ayers' sense), but also to be inconsistent with actualism in the new sense.

This would also explain why some of the things you say may seem to clash with what TGW, or Kripke, or Soames, or I myself, would say, since none of us are necessitarians.

Nope. It's deterministic.

Nope. It's deterministic. — Mongrel

Determinism doesn't have the implication that whatever is actual is necessary. Determinism rather is the weaker thesis that the state of the world at any given time, in conjunction with the laws of nature, determines uniquely the state of the world at any other time. Hence, if determinism is true, and P and Q are 'maximal' propositions that express the actual states of the world at times t1 and t2, respectively, then it follows that, necessarily, if P then Q. However, if P is actual (and t1 is some time in the past), it doesn't follow from determinism, in conjunction with P and the laws of nature, that Q is necessary. That's an elementary blunder in modal logic that leads some people (mainly in philosophy forums) to slide fallaciously from determinism to necessitarianism.

From the two premises

(1) P is actual,

(2) if P then Q

doesn't follow

(3) nec(Q)

In order to derive the conclusion (3) validly from something like (1) and (2) you would need to modify the first premise to read

(1b) nec(P).

But it doesn't follow from the thesis of determinism that the state of the world, at any given time in the past, necessarily obtains. Hence necessitarianism, the thesis that you are endorsing, doesn't follow from determinism. You also need the thesis of the necessity of the past, and this thesis is independent from determinism.

Notice also that the same sort of mistake in modal logic can lead one fallaciously to infer the thesis of the necessity of the past from true premises.

Let P be a proposition that expresses the state of the world at some past time t.

The following two premises are true:

(1) P is actual

(2) nec(if P is actual, then P)

But it doesn't follow from those two premises that nec(P).

If earlier states exhaustively and rigidly determine later states, then the later states are, by definition, necessary given the earlier states. But all earlier states are themselves, in this scenario, the necessary outcomes of even earlier states. So it would follow that all states are necessary except perhaps an initial state, if there were one.

So determinism, at least in this strong sense that allows for no true randomness, is coterminous with necessitarianism.

So determinism, at least in this strong sense that allows for no true randomness, is coterminous with necessitarianism. — John

That's only true if the first state of the world (if there is one) obtains not just actually but necessarily. This additional premise maybe something that you believe to be true, but it isn't part of determinism as ordinarily conceived.

Yes, but for all intents and purposes the origin must be thought to be necessary since it cannot be thought as being dependent on anything that we could be justified in calling contingent. IF there is no origin, and determinism obtains, then all states are necessary, by virtue of being determined by earlier states; in that scenario there never could be any contingent states at all.

In any case, if determinism obtains and the origin is not determined then it is still the case for all epistemological,semantic and ontological intents and purposes that all events are as good as necessary, because they are necessary given the actuality of the origin. And that would mean that Paris is necessarily the capital of France.

Note: I don't personally believe determinism obtains.

Determinism doesn't have the implication that whatever is actual is necessary. — Pierre-Normand

This is where your fascination with jargon is letting you down. Determinism is a concept that predates analytic philosophy. And yes.. it most certainly can be the thesis that every actuality happens necessarily.

IF there is no origin, and determinism obtains, then all states are necessary, by virtue of being determined by earlier states; in that scenario there never could be any contingent states at all. — John

Even if determinism is true, the state of the world at any time could still have been different if the state of the world as a whole had been different. If it is just an unquestionable premise for you that the state of the world as a whole is necessary, and not merely actual (and hence, conceivably, contingent), then you are simply assuming the truth of necessitarianism without argument. You don't even need to rely on the thesis of determinism. This also has nothing to do with randomness. Contingent occurrences need not be random. Being determined by the past, and being necessary, are two different things.

Yes, but that doesn't mean is is in conflict with possibility. Modern forms of determinism frequently drop (and rightly so) pre-determinism. Necessity is only a question of actually-- if X exist, then X must exist. Possibility remains throughout. For any necessarily state of actuality, there is the possibility something else could have been.

I think you're both conflating the notion of logical possibility with the notion of actual possibility here.
;)

Actual possibility is an incoherence. Possibility is, by definition, not an actual state. We can't have X which exists as maybe X or distinct state of Y. For X to Y is a contradiction. If it is true, I made this post, then there no possibility that making his post is not making this post.

All possibilities are logical. Some are just expressions of particular existing states-- e.g. a six sided die having six possible outcomes.

This is where your fascination with jargon is letting you down. Determinism is a concept that predates analytic philosophy. And yes.. it most certainly can be the thesis that every actuality happens necessarily. — Mongrel

Have it your way then. "Determinism" in your sense is equivalent to necessitarianism, or to actualism in M. R. Arers's sense. It is a contentious metaphysical doctrine that I dont know any living analytic philosophers to be endorsing. I wonder what your ground might be for endorsing it, if it isn't the mistake in modal logic that I have highlighted.

Of course there are actual possibilities. It is an actual possibility that you will respond to this post, Of course it is also a logical possibility. It is a logical possibility that you might transform yourself into a tiger tomorrow morning at 8 AM, but that is only an actual possibility if such a contravention of what we call natural law might really happen. If determinism obtains what is actually possible now is what actually happens later; that and nothing else. But if indeterminism is true then that no longer holds, but then nor does necessity.