An esoteric metaphysical view

_db

The mind-body problem is probably the single most devastating criticism to be made of physicalism, materialism and/or naturalism. How consciousness, the mode of intentional, qualitative appearances, is derived from a mundane, mechanistic matter continues to be a complete mystery. This is not a god-of-the-gaps argument: the existence of consciousness (an indubitable fact, contra eliminative materialism), which is the mode in which metaphysical speculation occurs, directly contradicts the thesis that only matter exists. It makes no sense to deny the existence of the very thing that makes this denial even possible, i.e. it is a performative contradiction. The only way out of this is to see mind as ontologically primary and matter as derivative (idealism), or re-configure our understanding of what "matter" is (so that we get something like neutral monism, or Aristotelian hylomorphism, etc).

The postulate of the mind as something other than matter, which is organized only by efficient and material causation, brings with it the possibility of religion. That materialism coincides with atheism is no coincidence. In my opinion, the death of religion leads to the estrangement of consciousness from the rest of the world; religion is a plea for a home. Religious experience is the feeling of "belonging" to the Real. Now the question is: how does consciousness "fit" into the rest of reality? If it fits, then there must be a function, which implies teleology, which typically implies some form of divinity. If it doesn't fit, then the only way of describing the world so far as I can tell would be to call it weird. Very weird; disjointed, broken, falling apart, irrational. What we call "science" is I think perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. Map vs territory; I think the excessive confidence we put in science is a leftover from the faith we had in God.

At dusk, we may experience what Levinas calls the il y a - the "there is" without anything being. We are bewildered that a world exists that transcends our experience, with unfathomable depths where no understanding can penetrate. The il y a refutes idealism. This is the border between the light and the dark, the cliff separating sanity from panic. There is "something" churning behind the appearances, insidiously striving, creating in order to destroy. Existence is a painful process of decay that begins at the very genesis of being. What exists must always die, which is why it may be called the "second nothing-ness", i.e. the return-back-to-nothing. We all were nothing before, and we will all return to being nothing shortly - existence is but a sojourn from non-existence.

At least that's my esoteric metaphysical outlook.

schopenhauer1

The mind-body problem is probably the single most devastating criticism to be made of physicalism, materialism and/or naturalism. How consciousness, the mode of intentional, qualitative appearances, is derived from a mundane, mechanistic matter continues to be a complete mystery. This is not a god-of-the-gaps argument: the existence of consciousness (an indubitable fact, contra eliminative materialism), which is the mode in which metaphysical speculation occurs, directly contradicts the thesis that only matter exists. It makes no sense to deny the existence of the very thing that makes this denial even possible, i.e. it is a performative contradiction. The only way out of this is to see mind as ontologically primary and matter as derivative (idealism), or re-configure our understanding of what "matter" is (so that we get something like neutral monism, or Aristotelian hylomorphism, etc). — darthbarracuda

Yes, people trip over the hard questions of consciousness. They assume the very thing they are explaining and often confuse the easy questions for the hard one. That's great that it is X, Y, Z phenomena that correlates with mental events. How is it the same thing though? If that becomes a category error, then we are already doing too much furniture rearranging for this to be straghtforward science.

The postulate of the mind as something other than matter, which is organized only by efficient and material causation, brings with it the possibility of religion. That materialism coincides with atheism is no coincidence. In my opinion, the death of religion leads to the estrangement of consciousness from the rest of the world; religion is a plea for a home. Religious experience is the feeling of "belonging" to the Real. Now the question is: how does consciousness "fit" into the rest of reality? If it fits, then there must be a function, which implies teleology, which typically implies some form of divinity. If it doesn't fit, then the only way of describing the world so far as I can tell would be to call it weird. Very weird; disjointed, broken, falling apart, irrational. What we call "science" is I think perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. Map vs territory; I think the excessive confidence we put in science is a leftover from the faith we had in God. — darthbarracuda

I think the unreasonableness effectiveness of math and the study of its patterns in nature since Galileo has made science compelling, so I can see why there is so much confidence. Also, technology seems to indicate validation of some sort of its rightness.

_db

I think the unreasonableness of math and the study of its patterns in nature since Galileo has made science compelling, so I can see why there is so much confidence. Also, technology seems to indicate validation of some sort of its rightness. — schopenhauer1

Mathematics has fascinated people for longer than Galileo's rhetorical success. Pythagoreans worshiped mathematics. Mathematics was the model Platonic form and somehow was integral to the entire cosmological scene.

Yes, we have global communication networks and vaccines, transistors and atomic bombs. Good job everyone, rah rah rah, we're the best, I guess.

schopenhauer1

Mathematics has fascinated people for longer than Galileo's rhetorical success. Pythagoreans worshiped mathematics. Mathematics was the model Platonic form and somehow was integral to the entire cosmological scene. — darthbarracuda

True, but I mentioned Galileo in conjunction with science because it seemed with him to have been the start of connecting math with the natural world (rather than engineering or pure math), in ways that worked out extraordinarily for physics and other sciences later on. Actually one can argue maybe it was Copernicus.

Yes, we have global communication networks and vaccines, transistors and atomic bombs. Good job everyone, rah rah rah, we're the best, I guess. — darthbarracuda

Yes, but these are the things that make people not look too far outside science for their metaphysics, so what do we do about this? What is the response?

Thorongil

The il y a refutes idealism. — darthbarracuda

Even granting this (which I do not; I would have to know more about what is meant by and how Levinas argues for this notion), it would only refute a certain type of idealism. For example, it seems to me that theism is by definition a form of idealism. Even if one posits a world existing independently of the mind (realism), still this world does not exist, on theism, independently of all minds. It still very much depends on one mind, namely God's, for its existence.

i.e. the return-back-to-nothing. We all were nothing before, and we will all return to being nothing shortly - existence is but a sojourn from non-existence. — darthbarracuda

I don't think we can make either claim here. If the nothingness spoken of is absolute, then we run into the argument of Parmenides on the impossibility of such a sojourn (which is another defeater of materialism, by the way). If it is relative, then the goal should be to determine if there are modes of contact between this mysterious reality beyond the world and the world rather than throw up one's hands at the suffering and absurdity on this side of the dichotomy.

_db

Even granting this (which I do not; I would have to know more about what is meant by and how Levinas argues for this notion), it would only refute a certain type of idealism. — Thorongil

I grant this. Levinas attempts to refute egological or solipsistic idealism, the metaphysics of the totality where everything that exists must be discernible by the understanding. That there is Other that resists this assimilation into the totality is what Levinas is focused on.

I don't think we can make either claim here. If the nothingness spoken of is absolute, then we run into the argument of Parmenides on the impossibility of such a sojourn (which is another defeater of materialism, by the way). If it is relative, then the goal should be to determine if there are modes of contact between this mysterious reality beyond the world and the world rather than throw up one's hands at the suffering and absurdity on this side of the dichotomy. — Thorongil

Can you elaborate? I don't see anything wrong with talking about non-existence. The fact is that some things exist and some things do not, but we can still talk about either.

Janus

↪darthbarracuda

If we think matter is mechanical rather than organic (or semiotic, which is arguably the same thing) then of course the hard problem arises. The hard problem is utterly insoluble because it is based on the presupposition that matter is mechanical. The hard problem can only be dis-solved by considering matter to be fundamentally semiotic.

The alternative is a monistic theism such as Spinoza's, where the problem also dissipates.

_db

↪Janus

Yes, this is why I said that the hard problem cannot be "resolved" given the current vogue metaphysics; it must be dissolved as a non-question through the re-interpretation of what "matter" is (by either merging mind and matter or reducing matter to mind).

apokrisis

. The only way out of this is to see mind as ontologically primary and matter as derivative (idealism), or re-configure our understanding of what "matter" is (so that we get something like neutral monism, or Aristotelian hylomorphism, etc). — darthbarracuda

There is yet another way. And that is to talk about complexity. Mind arises due to the complexity of a sign relation that organises matter into a form. Consciousness is then just what it is like to be doing that at a massively complex level of development and evolution - one in which a self is modelled in contrast to a world to result in an embedded sense of autonomy or agency.

That semiotic view would also reconfigure our understanding of matter.

Our ordinary physics is constructed as a story of observables. The observer is not part of the model. Leaving out the observer is how we get really simple models of material reality.

So a semiotic view of matter would have to put the observer back into the system being modelled. Even at its simplest possible level, existence would have the logically irreducible complexity of a sign relation.

People think this a really esoteric metaphysics for some reason. :)

apokrisis

↪Janus

Beat me to it this time!

Thorongil

I don't see anything wrong with talking about non-existence. — darthbarracuda

Ask yourself what it is you're "talking about."

The fact is that some things exist and some things do not, but we can still talk about either. — darthbarracuda

We can speak about things that have existed but no longer do, but we can't speak of that which never was, nor is, nor ever will be.

_db

Ask yourself what it is you're "talking about." — Thorongil

Possibility.

We can speak about things that have existed but no longer do, but we can't speak of that which never was, nor is, nor ever will be. — Thorongil

I think we can. That which does not exist and never has is possibility. That which existed but no longer does is a failed possibility.

Janus

↪apokrisis

:cool:

Thorongil

The hard problem is utterly insoluble because it is based on the presupposition that matter is mechanical. The hard problem can only be dis-solved by considering matter to be fundamentally semiotic. — Janus

That semiotic view would also reconfigure our understanding of matter. — apokrisis

This further highlights the problem with materialism. To believe that "only matter exists" begs the question. A materialist in the 17th century and a materialist in the 19th century both believed this, but the matter they believed in was not the same.

schopenhauer1

↪darthbarracuda

I also thought this quote was good about science and math:

Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover- Bertrand Russell

_db

People think this a really esoteric metaphysics for some reason. :) — apokrisis

Probably because, as Heidegger says, all metaphysical questions put the questioner themselves into question. That the world exists "over there" and we exists "over here" is the duality from which the mind-body problem arises. So yes, a synthesis of mind and matter dissolves the problem, as does eliminative idealism (since we can be sure that we exist). It is this egological idealism that is immediately punctured by the il y a and our knowledge that the world transcends a total understanding.

Thorongil

Possibility. — darthbarracuda

Which is not nothing....

That which does not exist and never has is possibility. — darthbarracuda

Nonsense. A square circle never has, nor does, nor ever will exist. It is not a possibility.

_db

Nonsense. A square circle never has, nor does, nor ever will exist. It is not a possibility. — Thorongil

Then what exactly is it? You said it yourself: "It is not a possibility." Then what is it?

Thorongil

Then what exactly is it? You said it yourself: "It is not a possibility." Then what is it? — darthbarracuda

Nothing. To speak of a square circle is to speak of nothing at all. It is synonymous with nothingness.

_db

↪Thorongil

Right, but I wanna know what nothing is. If a square circle is synonymous with nothing, then what does nothing mean? What is nothing?

Thorongil

but I wanna know what nothing is — darthbarracuda

To know what is not is a contradiction in terms.

_db

↪Thorongil

How do you know what a square circle is, then? Fine, let me ask you this: do you recognize the ontological distinction between a being and its Being?

Thorongil

How do you know what a square circle is, then? — darthbarracuda

I don't, that's the point. And not only don't I know it, I can't know it.

Fine, let me ask you this: do you recognize the ontological distinction between a being and its Being? — darthbarracuda

I don't know. Maybe. I'd have to know more about what you mean by these terms. I acknowledge, by the way, that things can come to be having once been not. You can call this becoming or actualizing a potential or manifesting an essence or whatever. All that means is that it was possible for that thing to be. But that's different from absolute nothingness, which it is not even possible to be.

apokrisis

At dusk, we may experience what Levinas calls the il y a - the "there is" without anything being. We are bewildered that a world exists that transcends our experience, with unfathomable depths where no understanding can penetrate. The il y a refutes idealism. — darthbarracuda

To address this bit, what are you actually experiencing but some counter-image, some umwelt, of your own imagining? It doesn’t escape the charge of being idealistic.

Consider what science says is the actual material story. There was a Big Bang. Now it is trailing away into a generalised Heat Death. That is a truer image. At least in terms of mathematical concepts cashed out in controlled acts of measurement.

So that more concrete story now gives us complementary forms of states of nothing. One is so hot that nothing material has stable form. The other is so cold that all material differences are statically frozen.

So how accurate is your il y a in the light of the scientific facts? (Talk of decay may be a nod to them.)

But then do those facts transcend our experience? No. They are also just the construction of another umwelt, another interpretation, another idea that has meaning for us ... an idea that actually is constructing “us” also, as that kind of observer of those kinds of observables.

The point is that idealism can’t be refuted by some sudden transcendent access to the thing-in-itself. But then idealism itself loses its troublesome aspect - the claim of mind being primal being - when the situation is understood semiotically. The very act of trying to grasp that which is beyond in a usefully meaningful way results also in their being some particular “us” existing in that particular unwelt, or state of interpretance.

That is why existence has to be understood semiotically as a recursive and irreducible complex thing. No simple metaphysics can free us from that. We have to see ourselves as part of the creative equation.

The difficult next step is to work towards an umwelt that is the most objectively minimal kind of idealism. Which is what science should be doing.

_db

I don't, that's the point. And not only don't I know it, I can't know it. — Thorongil

So because you can't know it means it is...what? Nothing? What do you mean by nothing?

I want to know what you mean when you say something is nothing, i.e. what it means to not-exist. That we can coherently predicate certain things that do not exist is clear enough - for we can already say that such-and-such does not exist, or that it did exist but no longer does, or that it never existed. Many factual claims depend on the reality of nothing.

What I want to know is what this nothing is. Distinguishing between a being and its Being is necessary for this question to make sense. For even if we say something doesn't exist, i.e. it is not, we are still saying something about the being in question.

The point I'm trying to make is that "nothing" is still "something", just not the something we are used to in the everyday world of existing things.

_db

To address this bit, what are you actually experiencing but some counter-image, some umwelt, of your own imagining? It doesn’t escape the charge of being idealistic. — apokrisis

Nor was it supposed to. Specifically, the il y a refutes egological idealism, procedural solipsism in which something only is when the ego assimilates it into the totality. That there is Other that resists this assimilation is what is understood via the il y a. It is a "primordial", pre-theoretical encounter with something transcending ourselves. Dusk is a good time for such an encounter since it's often filled with shadows, representing objects that cannot be fully seen. There is mystery, unknowability. There is a world that eludes our total comprehension and which will always be alien in some way. That dusk is a good time to experience the il y a does not mean it is a psychological illusion rooted in some way to contingent states of the world. I only use dusk as a example.

The il y a identifies that which cannot be assimilated to our conceptual system. We can talk about Big Bangs, supermassive black holes, vibrating strings or strange quarks, but we are still talking about something. Something that exists. We "know" what existence is - look outside! See all the things that exist!, you may say. Yes, many things exist, but I want to know what it means to exist. What the Being of a being is.

You are probably aware that Heidegger and his contemporary philosophical phenomenologists were aware of semiotics and worked on sign theory themselves. Semiotics is not a replacement for the question of Being, although it certainly is relevant.

Thorongil

What do you mean by nothing? — darthbarracuda

Nothing.

I want to know what you mean when you say something is nothing — darthbarracuda

Language is playing tricks on you. Absolute nothing cannot strictly be thought or even spoken of.

Do you accept the principle of sufficient reason? I'm curious, as one way of formulating it is to say that from nothing, nothing comes.

The point I'm trying to make is that "nothing" is still "something", just not the something we are used to in the everyday world of existing things. — darthbarracuda

That's a relative nothing, which I agree is conceptualizable.

_db

Language is playing tricks on you. Absolute nothing cannot strictly be thought or even spoken of. — Thorongil

Yet here you speak of it. Clearly we can speak of something about absolute nothing, if we are to say it cannot be spoken of. For this to be true would require that there be something about absolute nothing that makes it impossible to think or speak about. If we cannot speak about nothing, then we cannot speak about how we cannot speak about nothing, because the fact that we cannot speak about nothing is, itself, about nothing, so we have fallen into a performative contradiction,

As it stands, Heidegger was acutely aware of the charge that Being, the is, is merely a linguistic copula. He obviously denied and in my opinion thoroughly refuted that view.

apokrisis

Semiotics is not a replacement for the question of Being, although it certainly is relevant. — darthbarracuda

But Peircean semiotics gave a credible model of being as pure naked spontaneity. It supplies a mathematical, hence scientific, image. That gives a better purchase on the issue than a poetic description. The poetic view already presumes an experiencer as part of the equation - the story of this vague nothingness that is beyond any determinate somethingness.

The Il y a fails to de-subjectise the issue. So I agree about the direction it might signal for our metaphysical thoughts, but to cash that direction out, I find semiotics goes the furthest in striving for a mathematical level of abstraction.

Thorongil

Yet here you speak of it. Clearly we can speak of something about absolute nothing, if we are to say it cannot be spoken of. For this to be true would require that there be something about absolute nothing that makes it impossible to think or speak about. If we cannot speak about nothing, then we cannot speak about how we cannot speak about nothing, because the fact that we cannot speak about nothing is, itself, about nothing, so we have fallen into a performative contradiction, — darthbarracuda

Yes, this eloquently describes the trap I spoke of. When we speak of absolute nothing, we're not talking about "something" to which these words refer, because an absolute nothing cannot be referred to by definition. Absolute nothing is not a funny kind of something. It is the complete absence of anything and everything. I wouldn't call this a contradiction so much as a paradox or a quirk or language.

As it stands, Heidegger was acutely aware of the charge that Being, the is, is merely a linguistic copula. He obviously denied and in my opinion thoroughly refuted that view. — darthbarracuda

Where does he refute it? This interests me because Schopenhauer is adamant that being is merely a linguistic copula (although I'm not sure he's consistent about this).

_db

Yes, this eloquently describes the trap I spoke of. When we speak of absolute nothing, we're not talking about "something" to which these words refer, because an absolute nothing cannot be referred to by definition. Absolute nothing is not a funny kind of something. It is the complete absence of anything and everything. I wouldn't call this a contradiction so much as a paradox or a quirk or language. — Thorongil

But again: you tell me that "absolutely nothing" cannot be referred to by definition, yet all around do just exactly that. It's not a funny kind of something. It is the complete absence of anything and everything.

It seems clear to me that when you say we cannot refer to absolutely nothing by definition and thus cannot be referred to at all makes the same error the atheist does when insisting the god of Thomas Aquinas adhere to man-made languages. It is inappropriate to see the nothing as something - yet it is still "something", just as God is not a thing but is still "something".

Where does he refute it? This interests me because Schopenhauer is adamant that being is merely a linguistic copula (although I'm not sure he's consistent about this). — Thorongil

Most prominently in his magum opus Being and Time. The ontological difference is crucial to his entire system of thought.

An esoteric metaphysical view

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