The problem isn't that no one is happy, the problem is that so many people think that they're supposed to be. — Wosret

This is such a great insight, Wosret. I wish I had said it myself ;)

Pleasure and pain are indicators of general well-being. The value placed upon these feelings, and others, such as meaning, eudaimonia, happiness, etc, is up to the person themselves to determine. For example, I think there are different types of pleasures, one that simply stimulates the nerve endings, and one that is actually meaningful. The former leaves the person in a state of emptiness after it goes away, while the latter is something that simply complements the feeling of happiness. But perhaps you are right in that this belongs in a different thread. — darthbarracuda

But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place.

Pre-Socratic philosophy explored the ideas of free will long before Christianity. In fact (correct me if I am wrong here), Christianity's "free will" ideas came from the influence of the Mediterranean region. — darthbarracuda

You may be right, but I don't know what pre-Socratic philosophy you would be talking about here.

But the fact of the matter is, we are, at the bare minimum, trapped within an illusion of having free will. There's no escaping it. Every action we do feels like we have actively had a role in it. This kind of fictionalism, in my opinion, is compatible with the existential heroism you speak of. — darthbarracuda

Existentialists do not talk about delusions of freedom as liberating. Certainly Sartre would not, anyway.

But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place. — The Great Whatever

But like I said above, the existence of pain and happiness are not mutually exclusive. I agree that pain is inevitable. But there is a certain amount of control someone has over the amount they receive and how much the pain affects them.

You may be right, but I don't know what pre-Socratic philosophy you would be talking about here. — The Great Whatever

Neither do I, I just remember reading that somewhere. :P

Existentialists do not talk about delusions of freedom as liberating. Certainly Sartre would not, anyway. — The Great Whatever

Camus at the very least talks about rebelling against life regardless of reality.

But like I said above, the existence of pain and happiness are not mutually exclusive. I agree that pain is inevitable. But there is a certain amount of control someone has over the amount they receive and how much the pain affects them. — darthbarracuda

What control do you have over how much pain affects you? You mean, you can will it to be less painful? If you mean something else, then what?

What is happiness, if not pleasure? And if it is something distinct from pleasure, what makes it worthwhile? Pleasure is intrinsically worthwhile, i.e. good by its own standards.

Someone can obviously not just turn off nociceptors, or just "stop" feeling anxiety or any other kind of mental disturbance.

What you can do is to accept the pain that is present, limit your desires and strivings, and focus on fulfilling lasting goals and achievements.

As I said earlier: I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.

If you experience happiness, you know why it is worthwhile.

But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place. — The Great Whatever

But then why do people choose to do painful things such as running or climbing tall mountains? It seems like the suffering accompanied with such endeavors is worth it to them. Why would anyone climb Everest or run ultramarathons if suffering was the only thing that mattered? Clearly, it isn't.

I can't psychologize everyone as to why they do everything. Presumably if they're sane there's some pleasure of accomplishment attending it. But I don't see any contradiction with my position to say either that (1) the efficient causes of pleasure may themselves be painful, or that (2) one may take a separate kind of pleasure in a certain kind of pain (as a masochist might). That doesn't change what's at stake.

If there's no pleasure to doing such things at all, then I would agree there's nothing "good" about doing them. That doesn't mean people won't do them, of course -- it's not like people gravitate toward living great lives or anything. For the most part they're miserable, and some of that misery is generally self-inflicted.

@The Great Whatever You've made 15 posts on this thread in the space of a day or so. This is clearly an issue you care about? Why?

I think it's important. Generally my interests have drifted away from epistemology and toward ethics, especially pessimism. Other philosophical issues seem not that important by comparison.

I don't think anyone takes seriously the idea that life is not full of suffering. What may be more disturbing to people is, having realized this, coming to understand that they approve of life in spite of this, and therefore approve of other people's suffering, as well as forcing that suffering on further generations, perhaps in perpetuity. In other words, their ideals are internally inconsistent, which causes a Socratic pain: they nominally 'don't want people to suffer,' but deep down there is a very real sense in which they do want that. — Great Whatever

I don't think it is a question of thinking as life absent suffering. What strikes me about many people is not that they actively proclaim nobody suffers with any seriousness, but rather that their minds are frequently filled with other thighs and feelings. It's more a question of not recognising the presence of suffering because you are too busy doing something else. The distress at noting the inevitability of suffering seems to a morning for a time when someone was so caught-up with other ideas they didn't notice. In their heart, they wish the world was just made-up of joy, like they perceived for am moment in the past.

Ha. I doubt they even work on that level. They're just dumb phrases. It's like Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. Nobody 'loves' McDonalds. That's just something they say in the commercials. Likewise with the aphorisms about suffering. — Great Whatever

That certainly worked on me. Reading "Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. " was nice. The saying consumed my mind for couple of seconds and I thought of nothing else. Suffering become invisible for a moment.

Nobody loves McDonalds. But then that's not what is at stake. What matters here is not a representational point (what does "loving McDonalds (or life)"even mean? It is an all together meaningless statement). Rather it is the act of "Ba da ba ba, I'm lovin'it" itself: the making of or hearing of the statement, which pushes aside all other thoughts, including those about suffering, to give a brief moment without any anxiety about anything. Moment where suffering becomes invisible, where anyone can take a break from the pain of worrying about it. That's is something just about everyone loves.

What you can do is to accept the pain that is present, limit your desires and strivings, and focus on fulfilling lasting goals and achievements. — darthbarracuda

How does one 'accept' pain? Clearly that must mean something else besides feeling it, because then there would be no distinction to make, since for there to be pain is simply to feel it already (you cannot 'fail to feel' pain; the extent to which it's not felt is simply the extent to which there is none).

In accepting pain, do I think, 'alright, I'm in pain?' But how does that help?

As I said earlier: I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself completely a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent. — darthbarracuda

So one can be happy without feeling any pleasure whatsoever? What sort of feeling is happiness, then? If it is not a feeling, why is it worth pursuing, since it seems that feelings are all that can possibly matter to us? And since if a feeling is good in its own right, it seems just to be pleasure, in what sense can we say happiness is worthwhile insofar as it is not pleasant or identical with pleasure?

What is worthwhile is worthwhile in its own right, not for the sake of anything else (if it is for the sake of something else, then we simply say that other thing is worthwhile, with the former simply being an efficient cause of it). So if happiness is worthwhile, it must demonstrate its own worth in such a way that the idea of it being regarded as not worthwhile doesn't make sense. But I do not know of anything that does this, other than pleasure. In fact, that seems to be what 'pleasure' means, in a sense.

I don't think that feelings, positive or negative are worth pursuing. I know a religious person, they like to have big inspirational conversations with people, where they use lots of words and ideas that elevate them. I find this is be chasing feelings.

I think that things are worth pursing, regardless of how they feel. Justice for someone else, even when you're the one that wronged them, for instance. I think that it is worth while to admit to doing wrong, even when it feels awful, and it isn't worth while to simultaneously think that you must be great, and doing the right thing for doing all that.

Do you not think that knowing what the truth is, is a desirable thing, TGW, regardless of how it makes you feel?

I think it's important. — The Great Whatever

OK, so it's important why? What's the goal? Catharsis? Intellectual distraction? Or are you engaging in a kind of dark evangelism? Saving our souls by informing us of how worthless they are. I'm genuinely curious as to what motivates you. The depressed people I know aren't too bothered about spreading the bad news. They're more concerned about just being able to function.

Is the question, why is ethics important?

Do you not think that knowing what the truth is, is a desirable thing, TGW, regardless of how it makes you feel? — Wosret

This is the opening question of the Philebus. Is what is good, knowing true propositions, as Socrates maintains? Well, suppose I know how many hairs are on my head. That's the truth, right? Is that truth desirable? On most days anyway, not really.

So your question must be at least, what sorts of truth are desirable?

Is the question, why is ethics important? — The Great Whatever

Let's do that one too: Why is ethics important to you? The original question was: Why is talking about your philosophical worldview important to you?

I think TGW's goal is to convince people to stop procreating. Now I don't think the antinatalists have a snowballs chance in hell of stopping the entire human race from procreating, but they might convince some people. That brings up the question of what a practical antinatalist hopes to accomplish. If you can't convince everyone to stop giving birth, then how about plan B where you convince people to make a world that's less terrible to be born into?

I don't think properly speaking ethics can be important 'to someone,' as if it were a personal choice. Rather ethics already is important regardless of your opinion on the matter, since it concerns adjudication of things that matter by their own lights, again regardless of your opinion.

I don't have any particular goal here except to discuss philosophy, which I assume is what everyone's goal here is. The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is).

So ethics is important/worthwhile in itself, right?

It's an interesting question. I would say that the only thing worthwhile in itself is pleasure. But insofar as one's goal is to live well, ethics always becomes a demand. Without ethics, there is a sense in which things continue to matter, of course, but it will cease to matter 'what you do,' because you'll just do whatever, indifferent to whether it's worthwhile or not. And if it doesn't matter what you do, well then, that's another sense in which 'nothing matters,' because if you have no capacity to do anything that will change anything in a worthwhile way, then all discussions about anything might as well not be had.

This is what I'm trying to get at. There seems to be a tension in your joint claims that the only thing worthwhile is pleasure and that ethics is objectively important. I don't think you've really resolved it with your last comment. But I'll have to think some more on the issue.

Something can be worthwhile extrinsically, as an efficient cause of a good. It's not hard to see why ethics would relate interestingly to pleasure in this way.

Of course, if you were a Kantian ethicist for example, I'd say there's a very real sense in what you do/theorize about is completely unimportant. Nothing hinges on it, except perhaps negatively insofar as your mistaken opinions cause you to harm people.

The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is). — The Great Whatever

I think you suffer your views to be challenged. You answer questions. You are capable of communication in a way that others find hard.

I think Hume's idea that if you keep asking 'Well, what's good about that?' you eventually end up with pleasure = good and pain = evil is a very interesting and robust position. Despite it being very philosophically strong, for some reason many people don't like it or they don't think it true, so I guess people argue against it.

I don't think I agree with it either, by the way, but I am nevertheless very sympathetic to TGWs Humean position.

All truth is clearly desireable, males in particular love to know tons of useless facts, and can seem to never get enough of them. You already agree in suggesting a truth that you believe to be of no consequence, suggesting by exclusion the realm of truth that is of consequence.

Happiness is play, art, pretend, imagination, fun times with good friends, family, and even strangers -- but life is serious. and seriousness is more important than happiness.

Consider what life on average must be like in order for the humor in this video to be intelligible.

I don't currently consider life generally to be all sunshine lollipops and rainbows,

I think TGW's goal is to convince people to stop procreating. Now I don't think the antinatalists have a snowballs chance in hell of stopping the entire human race from procreating, but they might convince some people. That brings up the question of what a practical antinatalist hopes to accomplish. If you can't convince everyone to stop giving birth, then how about plan B where you convince people to make a world that's less terrible to be born into? — Marchesk

Why not try for plan A and B at the same time?

All truth is clearly desireable, males in particular love to know tons of useless facts, and can seem to never get enough of them. — Wosret

Isn't a truth's value relative to it's perceived usefulness? As TGW said, he could know the number of hairs on his head, but unless he's a scientist doing a study on hair follicle counts what is the value of that information?

I think the reason we say things like "all truth is desirable" and "I'm a seeker of the truth" is because understanding how the world is or works is and has been a useful survival tool. Learning a ton of useless facts might actually have more to do with a person wanting to be perceived as knowledgeable or smart rather than those facts being intrinsically valuable.

For instance, what if a loved one got lost in the woods and died. Would the truth about how much they suffered at the end be desirable? The only way one could answer yes to that is if they tell themselves the truth for the sake of knowing the truth is worth it. Cold comfort, I think.

No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful.

As I pointed out to TGW, that there are useless facts is not relevant to my point, but contested none the less that people have no interest in facts regardless of their perceived usefulness.

I'm not interested in speculating as to why knowing any fact is desireable, but I suppose that facts are generally useful, and authoritative, and we cannot always see in advance whether or not a fact will be useful in the future or not.

The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park?

This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything.

Something can be worthwhile extrinsically, as an efficient cause of a good. It's not hard to see why ethics would relate interestingly to pleasure in this way. — The Great Whatever

The problem is an effect is never given without its cause. In an instance of a pleasure causing action, there is no way to separate performing that action and obtaining the pleasure.

So to consider the action only "extrinsically" important is to miss a most critical aspect. There is no question of judgement to be made. You don't have any sort of choice whereby you get to measure whether it is valuable to take the pleasurable action or not. If this is instance of pleasure matters, so must the taking of the action. Both must matter for themselves. That is to say, it is important that each of the states exists. Good is not some justification, some excuse for doing something. It is a state of being. It is about existing, about acting, in some way.