translation:I can't make heads or tails of postmodern discourse. — Joshs

Then why don't you enlighten me?

Are you just saying people don't actually love one another without condition? And that consumerism encourages that?

Subjective experience is phenomenal. The object of the phenomenon is noumenal. If you say the noumenal is knowable, reading generously, I read that as rejecting Kant as opposed to misunderstanding Kant, but I can't follow your suggestion that the subjective is noumenal (i.e. the phenomenal is noumenal). — Hanover

I get what TimeLine is trying to get at, but she's still wrong that we can have access to the noumenon. Contrary to the Cartesian version, in Kant, the subjective is not prioritised over the objective as giving us access to knowledge that is more "certain", since the subjective is still mediated through the pure internal intuition of time, and hence is not given to us as it exists in-itself. I don't have direct access to either external objects or to myself. So just like the noumeon corresponds to an "object in-itself", it must also correspond to a "subject in-itself". These two are both inaccessible. In fact, the whole talk of "object in-itself", even though Kant uses it, makes no sense, since objects always exist for subjects, and the noumenon does not have the forms of space and time which permit for the individuation of existence into the poles of subject and object.

However, just like how we come to learn about external objects, we also come to learn about who we are (our subjectivity). This is not something that we see clearly - we can (and often are) wrong about what we want, who we are, what we react like, what will make us happy etc. It is only by going through phenomenal experience that we come to learn more (hopefully) about who we (phenomenally) are. But we are often deceived about our intentions, our desires, and our inner states. Often, we also deceive ourselves into thinking we are so and so, or we are capable of so and so, when in truth we aren't.

So yes, TimeLine is right that there is a subjective "in-itself" - but she's wrong that we have access to it.

m

Never mind. Turns out he was just babbling.

Our awareness to exercise moral law that is authentically willed and therefore real is based on our understanding of ourselves as one that establishes this law, the world of understanding that is grounded in the transcendental 'I' and this does not follow if the things-in-themselves cannot be known. — TimeLine

We never know ourselves as we are. We know THAT we are, but not WHAT we are. The access we have to our own subjectivity is also given mediately, through the pure intuition of time.

What I am attempting to convey is that there is no exclusion from accessing the noumenal because we have practical reason to postulate that free will exists there and presume that it is the location that constitutes reality even if it can be experienced only qua appearance. — TimeLine

While I am not as familiar with Kant's ethics as I am with his metaphysics, I don't quite follow you here. Through practical reason we postulate those that we cannot know through pure reason, but which are needed in order to act. I don't see how this "gives us access" to the noumenon.

Overall, understanding of the ultimate nature of reality remains unknown, but we are nevertheless capable of regulating using reason the principles that govern our experience that is constitutive of this free will. — TimeLine

The argument goes more like this: we can presume, if you want, that the noumenon is the location of freedom because causality is a category imposed by the understanding, and the noumenon stands outside of it.

We never know ourselves as we are. We know THAT we are, but not WHAT we are. The access we have to our own subjectivity is also given mediately, through the pure intuition of time. — Agustino

This is the most controversial aspect to Kant' thesis because the noumenal self is not subject to deterministic laws and therefore not bound by time, which is where this distinction is made since understanding is always subject to nature. Whereas free will is not bound by nature and if we know what we ought to do, we choose to do what is right; if nature is deterministic and where our understanding is subject to vis-a-vis categories, freedom is noumenal and so is our morality. You are saying that we do not have access to it, but we do, we just don't know how we have access because it is not bound by categories since free will can causally influence nature. That means that we know once we experience the effects from noumenal causality.

This is the most controversial aspect to Kant' thesis because the noumenal self is not subject to deterministic laws and therefore not bound by time — TimeLine

I think that's the other way around - not bound by time, and therefore not subject to deterministic laws which can only apply within time.

Whereas free will is not bound by nature — TimeLine

But free will is noumenal - we cannot empirically know it.

if we know what we ought to do, we choose to do what is right — TimeLine

Except that we don't "know" what we ought to do, at least we don't know with certainty.

You are saying that we do not have access to it, but we do, we just don't know how we have access because it is not bound by categories since free will can causally influence nature. — TimeLine

Where do you get the idea that free will can causally influence nature from :s ? I think this is wrong, because, once again, causality is imposed on the phenomenon by the understanding. So you cannot infer causality outside of the domain of application of the understanding, meaning outside the phenomenon. I think it is fair to say that the phenomenon as a whole is some kind of "reflection" if you want of the noumenon, but not that one causes the other.

That means that we know once we experience the effects from noumenal causality. — TimeLine

I disagree we can experience effects FROM noumenal causality. Effects are always given from within the pheonomenon - one experience is given to us, presented to us, as the cause of the other. But both experiences are necessarily within the phenomenon.

You're asking how moral atheists ground their morality without God? They pretend like they're not relying on God even though they are. Maybe that answer is personal commentary, but I'm open to hearing your answer. — Hanover

I don't know, that's why I was asking. I suppose one might turn to intuition on that matter.

I get what TimeLine is trying to get at, but she's still wrong that we can have access to the noumenon. — Agustino

Actually I think it's Kant who is wrong on this point. From the Platonic tradition, we have direct access to apprehend intelligible objects (noumena) directly with the intellect, through intuition. That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon.

That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Kant is right on the point that we can't know an object freed of all subjective interpretation. The perspective from nowhere makes no sense.

Actually I think it's Kant who is wrong on this point. From the Platonic tradition, we have direct access to apprehend intelligible objects (noumena) directly with the intellect, through intuition. That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon. — Metaphysician Undercover

You should open a new thread about this, it would be interesting to discuss. A direct confrontation between Kant and Aristotle/Plato/Aquinas is never brought about, and, usually, participants on both sides only skirt around the issues and dismiss each other. I have yet to see a rigorous treatment of Kant from a Thomistic perspective (for example), or a rigorous treatment of Aquinas/Aristotle from a Kantian perspective.

I'm not sure Kant is wrong. For Kant to be wrong, I think the transcendental aesthetic must fall - without collapsing the transcendental aesthetic, I don't think it's possible to show that Kant is wrong.

From the Platonic tradition, we have direct access to apprehend intelligible objects (noumena) directly with the intellect, through intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

For example, given the transcendental aesthetic this is wrong. Those "intelligible objects" are given at minimum mediately, through the pure intuition of time. Thus, they are not given as they are in-themselves, but as they are in time.

However, just like how we come to learn about external objects, we also come to learn about who we are (our subjectivity). This is not something that we see clearly - we can (and often are) wrong about what we want, who we are, what we react like, what will make us happy etc. It is only by going through phenomenal experience that we come to learn more (hopefully) about who we (phenomenally) are. But we are often deceived about our intentions, our desires, and our inner states. Often, we also deceive ourselves into thinking we are so and so, or we are capable of so and so, when in truth we aren't.

So yes, TimeLine is right that there is a subjective "in-itself" - but she's wrong that we have access to it. — Agustino

This question, like all things Kant, is complicated. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/#4.6

If you want to go through all this, I could try, but I think it deserves a different thread.

@Baden @Hanover

Can we have the above comment moved to a different thread please, and I will reply there? Thanks!

I moved it. It's called Kant's Noumena. If you don't like the name, I'll change it.

Actually I think it's Kant who is wrong on this point. From the Platonic tradition, we have direct access to apprehend intelligible objects (noumena) directly with the intellect, through intuition. That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up:

But free will is noumenal - we cannot empirically know it. — Agustino

That is why I said it is not bound by nature; nature is deterministic.

I think that's the other way around - not bound by time, and therefore not subject to deterministic laws which can only apply within time. — Agustino

You just repeated exactly what I said. There is no other way around.

Where do you get the idea that free will can causally influence nature from :s ? I think this is wrong, because, once again, causality is imposed on the phenomenon by the understanding. So you cannot infer causality outside of the domain of application of the understanding, meaning outside the phenomenon. I think it is fair to say that the phenomenon as a whole is some kind of "reflection" if you want of the noumenon, but not that one causes the other. — Agustino

https://rd.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_45

So, consciously, you are told that getting married to a trophy wife, working in a secure job, having two kids and living in the suburbs will bring you happiness. You do what you are told. You find that attractive wife, but she is mindless, you cannot have great conversations with her or laugh with her about similar jokes, but you think she is right for you because she epitomises what you are told to find attractive. You are silently suffering because you are blindly following, but you cannot articulate why because there is a totality in your conscious thoughts as dictated by your environment that you actually think that you are supposed to be happy because that is what you are told will bring you happiness. .

We are told that selling ourselves as objects - to be attractive, powerful, wealthy - is the requisite for this success, that we feel accomplished when we post a photo on Instagram and get likes for it despite the fact that it is completely meaningless. The more likes, the more worthy the object. There is an inherent emptiness in this, a lack of relatedness, or substance that despite the fact that we are dynamic, active, energetic and doing things, all of it is really nothing.

The congratulations that we receive from others who are also experiencing the symptoms of this pathology satisfy us consciously because we think there is some unity in this approval, but deep within we understand the self-deceit or the sacrifice to our own self-hood, but we simply cannot articulate it. — TimeLine

This is very well written, and I think I know what you mean. This is a great description of erring on the side of a kind of conformity (a conformity to billboards and perfume ads, which is now probably a conformity to the Instagram feeds of those who strive to incarnate such ads.). John Berger comes to mind on this: "Glamor is the happiness of being envied." On the other side we find a disagreeable insistence on 'individuality' that is little more than transgression, a mere negation of the norm which conforms in its own way.

I've tried to learn to trust my own first-hand experience. The photoshopped ads say one thing. The public sentimentality say something similar. The fullness of life, however, says things that cannot be fit conveniently into particular manipulative/marketing strategies. Even benevolent manipulation (political activism) tends to hide the part of the truth that muddies its message.

This is very well written, and I think I know what you mean. This is a great description of erring on the side of a kind of conformity (a conformity to billboards and perfume ads, which is now probably a conformity to the Instagram feeds of those who strive to incarnate such ads.). John Berger comes to mind on this: "Glamor is the happiness of being envied." On the other side we find a disagreeable insistence on 'individuality' that is little more than transgression, a mere negation of the norm which conforms in its own way.

I've tried to learn to trust my own first-hand experience. The photoshopped ads say one thing. The public sentimentality say something similar. The fullness of life, however, says things that cannot be fit conveniently into particular manipulative/marketing strategies. Even benevolent manipulation (political activism) tends to hide the part of the truth that muddies its message. — foo

Are you saying that it's not conformity that's the problem, it's inauthenticity? If so, I agree. When it comes to conforming with societal or cultural expectations, you pick your fights. Much of conformity is the grease that keeps the wheels turning. Take your stands when it really matters, either personally or morally.

This is a great description of erring on the side of a kind of conformity (a conformity to billboards and perfume ads, which is now probably a conformity to the Instagram feeds of those who strive to incarnate such ads.)... On the other side we find a disagreeable insistence on 'individuality' that is little more than transgression, a mere negation of the norm which conforms in its own way. — foo

This conformity is intelligently marketed as compelling by the simple fact that people believe that they are 'individual' despite blindly moving in masses. 'Individuality' is a collectivist ideology constructed to overcome barriers to the system, just as we have laissez-faire to promote capitalism. Social media like instagram enables the platform for a person to promote or sell this false individuality - since it is their account and their name and their selfies - while underlying motivations is social unity where one forms meaning through 'likes' and congratulations as though the quality of their existence is levelled by how well they mimic this pattern. People are doing the same thing while saving themselves from criticism by behaving in a pleasant manner, but all it inherently is are automatons pretending to characterise liberalism and thrives since this individuality is believable.

I've tried to learn to trust my own first-hand experience. The photoshopped ads say one thing. The public sentimentality say something similar. The fullness of life, however, says things that cannot be fit conveniently into particular manipulative/marketing strategies. Even benevolent manipulation (political activism) tends to hide the part of the truth that muddies its message. — foo

I don't necessarily think it is about the tools that are available, but how those tools are used. I know this young man who has a very overweight girlfriend and he is consistently criticised because he is intelligent and attractive, but he says that he is fighting the system by constantly challenging himself against public scrutiny and opinion. What he is challenging, really, is not public but within, his own cowardice and ultimately his own perceptions that determine his experiences and identification with the external world.

Is there any authenticity in individuality, is it even possible?

Is there any authenticity in individuality, is it even possible? — TimeLine

Emerson:

To believe our own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, -- that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,--and our first thought, is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment.

Isn't he talking about both authenticity and individuality? Aren't both together the essence of self-reliance?

This private heart is an attempt to advocate individuality over the primacy of institutions and so the authenticity is the belief or recognition of this intersubjective domain that then shifts to social action; to overcome the inauthentic ideas present in conventions that fuels this assertion of institutionalism over the self.

But the dichotomy between autonomy and authenticity is not satisfactorily answered by the transcendentalists, that being true to who you really are is much more complex considering any understanding of the self could be motivated by a number of factors that stand against this authenticity. There is an imperfection of sincerity there that is addressed with much more duress by Kant than Emerson, though I do respect the latter.

There is an imperfection of sincerity there that is addressed with much more duress by Kant than Emerson, though I do respect the latter. — TimeLine

I've tried to follow the various discussions of Kant in this post and gotten lost. Where in Kant should I look for what he has to say.

I've tried to follow the various discussions of Kant in this post and gotten lost. Where in Kant should I look for what he has to say. — T Clark

His moral theory is the best starting point and the concept of autonomy and the transcendental argument vis-a-vis reason or practical reason, but I would recommend more introductory explanations as it is easy to get confused by him. You can start here and progress to his work later. As stated: "Put most simply, to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one's authentic self." The footnotes also offer some good links to other titles, such as Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity, and The Ethics of Authenticity, amongst Kant' moral and ethical works.

His moral theory is the best starting point and the concept of autonomy and the transcendental argument vis-a-vis reason or practical reason, but I would recommend more introductory explanations as it is easy to get confused by him. You can start here and progress to his work later. — TimeLine

I read the entry you linked at the Stanford Dictionary. The approach to morality and authenticity is really different from how I see it. Not just different, contradictory. The idea that being autonomous means having to make moral decisions based on will and reason and that will lead to a universal moral law is completely opposed to my personal experience. I pay attention to where my moral values come from. I can feel them bubble up from a well inside me. From that dark center where reason never could go.

From the Stanford Dictionary - "Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one's own person, to live one's life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces." How can that be consistent with a requirement that people come to the same moral decisions?

One of my favorite quotes from "Self-reliance:"

Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world. I remember an answer which when quite young I was prompted to make to a valued adviser, who was wont to importune me with the dear old doctrines of the church. On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? my friend suggested,--"But these impulses may be from below, not from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil."

That is the most radical statement I can imagine. Why does autonomy, authenticity have to lead to moral behavior? The philosophers referenced in the Dictionary seem to be using convoluted arguments to avoid that question.

Anyway. Thanks for the reference. It was interesting.

I was thinking about this more. I think it explains a lot of the differences of opinion and misunderstandings you and I have had about autonomy and authenticity. I don't see it as having a moral dimension. You do.

'Individuality' is a collectivist ideology constructed to overcome barriers to the system, just as we have laissez-faire to promote capitalism. — TimeLine

I think that's part of the truth. But we do have unique bodies and unique formative childhoods, so that we are indeed distinct. I agree that this distinctness can be exaggerated or feigned for ideological reasons, but what I have in mind is the genuine uniqueness that is allowed to manifest itself in a person who is not being self-conscious, who is not performing. Let's imagine the differing behavior of those who are not being watched. Maybe the rest of humanity is somehow gone. No one will ever know how they choose to pass their time in this thought experiment. I'll grant that we carry virtual societies within ourselves, and that selves are largely constructed in relation to and dependent upon other selves. Nevertheless, I think you can see the continuum I'm pointing at. In short, I think that people can indeed more or less authentic, which is roughly to say more or less flowing, trusting, uncensored.

Yes, I agree. Conformity is mostly grease on the wheel. 'Bad' individuality involves a vain transgression for transgression's sake, whereas 'bad' conformity is perhaps attempted conformity to the 'lies' of advertisements.

To be clear about 'the problem,' I think about it from an individual's point of view. For some individuals, there must always be a social problem as a prop for their role. As I see it, life is difficult sometimes even for the relatively enlightened. Also, social problems are often directly related to individual freedom. If we want freedom, we will pay for it by tolerating the freedom of others (to be stupid, etc., by our lights.) So the 'broken' world is a mirror of our broken selves (our own ambivalence as complicated creatures.)

I was thinking about this more. I think it explains a lot of the differences of opinion and misunderstandings you and I have had about autonomy and authenticity. I don't see it as having a moral dimension. You do. — T Clark

All of this is discussed by Kant; moral psychology and epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics and it is true that I favour psychology because without this subjective moral dimension, without authenticity of this moral consciousness or 'love' then we are no longer human. Without our humanity, we are just automatons. His ethics are all about our motivation and the mind or our cognitive capacity to me is a tool that enables agency and therein the very freedom that allows us to recognise our own selfhood. It is psychological and while I understand the metaphysical considerations, being moral cannot be performed without consciousness, that our instinctual drives or impluses contain nothing of substance and as such conformity is acting on impluse; you do 'good' because that is what you are told and because that is what is expected and not because you consciously will to act.

It is rational thought or reason that gives us the capacity to structure our phenomenal experiences and even if there are properties that transcend this, accessing objects through spatial and temporal representations is a sensibility that allows us to understand and experience and that is all that really matters. Everything - being your identification to and experience with the external world - requires rational clarity.

I tend to think of this like idealism: there are some religious people that place emphasis and worry about the afterlife - heaven and hell - but since it is our moral behaviour that channels the prospect of transcending to heaven, thinking about the afterlife is pointless. All that is necessary is focusing on our moral behaviour. Indeed, the metaphysical realm or intuitive consciousness is valuable and perhaps the subconscious allows us to explore concepts, nevertheless we bound by the conditions of sensibility. My favourite Kantian statement:

Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.

being moral cannot be performed without consciousness, that our instinctual drives or impluses contain nothing of substance — TimeLine

Then how do you explain the fact that literally every act we consider moral has a parallel in the animal kingdom? Are you suggesting this is just coincidence?

I think that's part of the truth. But we do have unique bodies and unique formative childhoods, so that we are indeed distinct. I agree that this distinctness can be exaggerated or feigned for ideological reasons, but what I have in mind is the genuine uniqueness that is allowed to manifest itself in a person who is not being self-conscious, who is not performing. — foo

This distinctness is really the cognitive capacity to rationalise and reason with common sense, but central to this prospect is the autonomy that wills such agency, so it is not really about the separate and unique body that we possess - aside from the health of your brain - neither is it entirely our formative and unique childhood but autonomy is the motive or will that we possess that gives us the capacity to regulate our own behaviour and therefore legitimacy or authenticity to our moral actions; it is moral actions that make us human or good. There needs to be some sort of grounding, though, in this will or autonomy and that is our rational capacity where the mind regulates our decisions and opinions and therefore the obstacles that we face are psychological. We need to overcome these obstacles that enables this continuity of irrational behaviour, such as self-defence mechanisms, fear, negative childhood experiences, self-esteem etc &c., and it doesn't help that these vulnerabilities we possess advantageously complicate the process of transcendence, the latter of which is possible cognitively or psychological and not mystical.

Let's imagine the differing behavior of those who are not being watched. Maybe the rest of humanity is somehow gone. No one will ever know how they choose to pass their time in this thought experiment. I'll grant that we carry virtual societies within ourselves, and that selves are largely constructed in relation to and dependent upon other selves. Nevertheless, I think you can see the continuum I'm pointing at. In short, I think that people can indeed more or less authentic, which is roughly to say more or less flowing, trusting, uncensored. — foo

Language is fundamental to our understanding since our capacity to describe, articulate and communicate to one another provides us with subjective meaning as we contrast this experience and internalise it back to ourselves. While I believe that we have an internal language - unconscious - that speaks to us intuitively through feelings or emotions including anxiety or depression, language is the very tool that allows us to articulate our engagement with ourselves and the external world. Children who were raised severely neglected and abused in Romanian orphanages, for instance, continue to struggle mostly because of the lack of contact and emotional care or love so much so that the severity of this neglect or lack of human contact made these children incapable of even walking. We are dependent on this contact or interaction as contrasting contains the very dynamism needed for rational thought.

The point, however, is when this engagement fails to transcend to the next level that we are capable of achieving, this capacity to calculate and correspond and independently ascertain the difference between fact and fiction and the predominate population fails to do this. Heidegger and many more attempted to explain why, mostly fear, and that is the purpose of the OP - what is it that stops us from engaging authentically?