Thanks for the reply. It seems that you are of the view that I cannot really get what I am asking for. You might be right. — PossibleAaran

Well, honestly I'm not sure if I really know what you are asking for. You asked for a reliable method that yields realist beliefs about macroscopic objects, where "reliable" just means "likely to produce true beliefs when used under the right circumstances". But this is all very vague.

Suppose that I come to hold realist beliefs about macroscopic objects on the basis that my parents told me so. My parents tell me the truth far more often than not and so this satisfies your criteria, but something tells me this won't satisfy you. Why or why not?

I think our discussion has spun off in too many different directions to be useful. I'll try to simplify, if you will follow me in this. Imagine a dialogue between you and I:

PA: What reliable method is there for determining that things exist unperceived?

GG: If you want to know whether a piece of paper in the drawer exists when you aren't perceiving it, put a camera in the drawer and take a picture.

PA: A camera is an extension of perception. Your camera procedure shows that the paper exists when photographed. Does the paper exist when unperceived and un-photographed? How can that be reliably determined?

I am not sure what you would say at this juncture. — PossibleAaran

It depends on what you mean by "extension of perception." The photograph could be taken and it might never be seen by anyone. Would it still be an extension of perception then? So obviously the camera's being an extension of perception isn't an intrinsic feature of the camera, it's a corollary of the camera's being used as an extension of perception.

But if it isn't an intrinsic feature of the camera, then surely taking a picture can function as an independent test of the existence of the object, while the object is unperceived. Whether the photograph is in its turn unperceived or perceived, it independently "testifies" to the existence of the object via causal chains (light, etc.). The material, causal processes that result in the photograph of the paper in the drawer are not themselves perceptions, and you can't magically make them such simply by calling the camera "an extension of perception."

All this bizarrerie can be gotten rid of by understanding that we punt essences, natures and characters for the objects we perceive, and by extension for the wider context of the perceptual process (the world in general). We just throw possible natures, possible essences out there and see what sticks - and by this, I mean that we can devise tests on the hypothesis that the object has the nature we project for it, and if those tests pan out then we can say (with whatever degree of confidence, depending on the rigour of the tests) that the object has that nature. And howsoever rickety and lacking in absolute certainty that process is, well we're stuck with it, we have nothing better, and the standards of the process are the standards of the only process we've got, there are no other standards to fish around for.

What's not the case is that we are given the nature of the object in perception.

What one might call the "bare kaleidoscope" given in present perception has no implications of it, or any portion of it existing outside the present apprehension of the kaleidoscope. That much is true.

But that just means that everything above imputing "bare kaleidoscopiness" to the kaleidoscope is itself a punt of some kind, a projection - even calling the kaleidoscope, or a portion of it, a "perception." Because calling the kaleidoscope (or a portion of it) a "perception" actually carries with it the normal backstory implications (of unperceived objects existing while unperceived). But at that point, since you've already started punting, you can't then help yourself to the previous lack of implication that any portion of the kaleidoscope exists outside of present apprehension - you gave up that right as soon as you started calling a portion of the present kaleidoscope "a perception."

Or to put it another way, the lack of necessary implication that any portion of the kaleidoscope of present experience exists outside its present existence as part of the kaleidoscope, lives and dies with one withholding judgement that the present kaleidoscope is anything more than the present kaleidoscope of experience, without any further qualification. As soon as you go beyond that, to giving the kaleidoscope any character that might refer to anything outside it (even if you were to go the Berkeley route of it being "in a mind, any mind"), then you've lost the right to say "this might not exist outside perception," because you've already started punting beyond the present apprehension, you're already starting to impute nature, character, etc., that goes beyond sheer momentary, present apprehension.

Not sure why that exchange you had with PA is attributed to me.

woops! Sorry, corrected (butterfingers :) ).

I see you have continued to stress that the ordinary meaning of "perceived" entails that what is perceived exists when unperceived. I say again that I have never used the word "perceived" in that way, nor any of its relatives, "saw", for example. Wholly apart from that, what is ordinarily meant (by the population at large) by "perceieved" is an empirical question which I don't have the means to settle.

You know by now that what I mean by perceieved is what is given to conscious awareness, and you understand that notion perfectly well since you talk about it extensively in your last post. So I don't see the point of going over this ordinary meaning stuff again. Let's go back to calling it "schmerception".

Does the paper exist when unschmerceived and unphotographed? How can you tell?

We just throw possible natures, possible essences out there and see what sticks - and by this, I mean that we can devise tests on the hypothesis that the object has the nature we project for it, and if those tests pan out then we can say (with whatever degree of confidence, depending on the rigour of the tests) that the object has that nature. And howsoever rickety and lacking in absolute certainty that process is, well we're stuck with it — gurugeorge

It isn't merely that we can't be absolutely certain. It's worse than that. There is no means at all, even a fallible or merely probabalistic one, of establishing that the paper exists when unschmerceived and unphotographed. At least, that's the case if your above quote is a correct account of our situation. If that account is right, the best we can say about the paper is that it exists when schmercieved. It exists when photographed. Maybe it exists when neither of those things is going on. There is no evidence against that hypothesis, but no evidence for it either.

Forgive me for now. I will reply to you tomorrow, since I am out for the day and your post raises some difficult issues.

PA

I see that I have spelt perceived several times woth an extra e. Replying on a phone is maybe not ideal.

Does the paper exist when unschmerceived and unphotographed? How can you tell? — PossibleAaran

There can be no "paper" for schmerception, nor does "photograph" make any sense either. You might be able to single out some portion of the schmerceptual field (my "present kaleidoscope" idea) in some way (perhaps by awareness of shifting boundaries or something like that), but you can't help yourself to the idea that the "paper" portion of the shcmerceptual field has any physical qualities at all, far less the possible absence or presence of the possibility of existing unperceived. Therefore the question of whether "it" "exists unperceived" doesn't even make any sense UNTIL you bring in the normal physical backstory - but then if you do, then you're talking about perception as normally understood, the normal meaning of "exists unperceived" applies, and the normal tests are sufficient.

This is what I mean by the Chinese Finger Puzzle idea - the criteria grow or shrink with your presuppositions, if you shrink the criteria to being criteria for schmerception qua schmerception, then you've imprisoned yourself in a fly bottle of your own making, that you can't get out of until you relax the presuppositions back to the normal backstory.

Another way of saying this might be that the more you chase absolute certainty, the thinner the possible content about which you can be certain. (Which is something we already learned from Descartes' meditations - the cogito is a dead end, or as Schopenhauer said, solipsism is an impregnable castle, but we can easily bypass it because nobody sallies forth from it, or words to that effect).

If that account is right, the best we can say about the paper is that it exists when schmercieved. — PossibleAaran

Not really, because at that level of presupposition, at the level of punting a nature or character, we're already taking it for granted that there's some "outsideness" quality to be discovered, about which we're punting some possible nature or character, meaning that we've already left the narrow, presuppositionless realm of schmerception, we're already positing that there's more to the world than just schmerception, just the present kaleidoscope.

There can be no "paper" for schmerception, nor does "photograph" make any sense either. You might be able to single out some portion of the schmerceptual field (my "present kaleidoscope" idea) in some way (perhaps by awareness of shifting boundaries or something like that), but you can't help yourself to the idea that the "paper" portion of the shcmerceptual field has any physical qualities at all — gurugeorge

Of course I can say that the thing which I am aware of is a piece of paper. I am aware of something, and that thing is what I call a "paper". If you don't like my calling it "paper" because you think the ordinary meaning of "paper" presupposes the whole physical backstory, then call it schmaper. I will continue to use the word "paper" and stipulate that I mean the thing that I am aware of, without any physical presuppositions. (I do grow tired of these ordinary language arguments).

Of course I can say that the paper has qualities. It has the qualities I am aware of it having. Squareness, whiteness, thinness, for example.

Therefore the question of whether "it" "exists unperceived" doesn't even make any sense UNTIL you bring in the normal physical backstory — gurugeorge

I really don't see why not.

the normal meaning of "exists unperceived" applies, and the normal tests are sufficient. — gurugeorge

I was always using "exists unperceived" in the normal way". My whole case has been that the ordinary tests are not sufficient to determine that the paper exists unschmerceived and unphotographed. They show only that it exists schmerceived and photographed. Just as looking at the paper cannot establish that it is made of atoms, because merely looking at the paper does not reveal to you the atoms, so too being aware of and photographing the paper does not reveal to you that it exists when you are neither aware nor photographing it.

Another way of saying this might be that the more you chase absolute certainty — gurugeorge

I am not chasing certainty. I am saying that the ordinary test you propose isn't any reason at all, not even a probabalistic one, for thinking that the paper exists unschmercieved and unphotographed.

about which we're punting some possible nature or character, meaning that we've already left the narrow, presuppositionless realm of schmerception, we're already positing that there's more to the world than just schmerception, just the present kaleidoscope. — gurugeorge

I don't really know what "punting" is, but I don't think that is what I do when I say that I am aware of a thing which is white, thin and square. When I say that I simply report what I am aware of, and then I ask whether the thing I am aware of exists when I am not aware of it.

Again, you keep helping yourself to terms that can't possibly have any fixed meaning from a Schmerceptionist point of view. Even "white," "thin," "square" - what the hell can those words possibly mean to you, if you're conceiving of what's happening for you right now as schmerception? Then it's not "white" but "schmite" , not "thin" but "schmthin", etc., etc .

But if it's those, then it's also "schmexisting un-shcmercevied" as well - i.e. by reducing the way you conceptualize what's happening right now to shcmerception, you have automatically forbidden yourself from ever having heard of the possibility that anything COULD POSSIBLY EXIST OUTSIDE your present schmerception, so therefore, not having heard of the possibility (so to speak - i.e. without already preconceiving what's happening for you right now as perception with the normal backstory) you have no criterion that you can use to test the possibility; so whatever sense you think you're attaching to "exists unperceived", you're actually borrowing from the higher, more presupposition-laden level of perception, while at the same time believing you're applying it to the presuppositionless level of shcmerception.

IOW, you can only get to a place where you can doubt the existence of unperceived things by narrowing down the way you conceptualize your experience to it being schmerception, but if you're conceiving what exists for you as bare shcmerception, then the words you are using in that context can't possibly have the same meanings as they do if you're conceiving of your experience in the ordinary way (as perception of a stable physical world that exists whether you're perceiving it or not, which therefore contains objects that also exist whether you're perceiving them or not; a world that also has other people who use language in stable ways with shared meanings - like "white", "thin", "perception" - that you were inducted into from a young age).

So in that case, you literally don't know what you're talking about, i.e. you don't know what the object of perception is, you're simply labelling portions of schmerception with tracking labels. (And then you get to Wittgenstein's point - you can't be sure you're using the same tracking label in the same way now as you did 5 minutes ago, in fact you can't even help yourself to any normal notion of time.)

This is why, in fact, the philosophical reduction to schmerception is kind of a half-baked mysticism. In effect you are doing in an incompetent, flickering way (flickering like a candle in the wind) what people who train for years in meditation do in a highly focussed way. It's incompetent because your mind isn't trained enough to not unconsciously flicker back and forth between a sense of "what is" that helps itself to ordinary language terms, and a sense of "what is" that really does just take bare shcmerception as bare schmerception without any presuppositions.

A "punt" is a colloquial term for a bet, a wager.

Take the dream tree, does it exist? Well, if it doesn't exist then what is it that you are aware of when dreaming? Nothing? But it sure seems like you are aware of something doesn't it? Some qualities are there before your consciousness are they not? If I were to ask you about the dream tree, couldn't you tell me about it? You could tell me "it had a trunk 500 metres high and purple leaves", for example. If you told me that, you would be describing what you were aware of when you dreamt, and you couldn't do that if there were nothing you were aware of when you dreamt, could you? This is what leads me to insist that the dream tree does exist and that the only difference between it and a real tree is that a real tree can be perceived by others and exists unperceived also. In fact, I would go as far as to say that what I mean by "real tree" is " a tree that can be perceived by others and which exists even when no one is perceiving it". — PossibleAaran

Yes a dream seems like we are aware of something. I can tell you about my dream. I think that neither of these things make something real, though. This sort of reminds me of On What There Is, although we are talking more about awareness and seemings here than statements. The only thing I'd contend is that even though I am aware of dreams and I would even say I am justified in believing they are real because they seem real to me, that they are not real.

The difference between the dream-tree and the tree isn't that others can perceive it. I'd say that this mistakes the how for the what -- how we come to be justified in believing something exists differs from what that something is. Or, in this case, that it is at all. We come to believe something is real based upon what others say and do, and come to doubt something is real if others do not perceive what we perceive. These are the methods. But the methods don't define what it means to be real, only what it means for us to determine if something is real or no -- how we come to reasonably believe it to be so, not whether it is so.

Our perceptions aren't infallible. I can make mistakes in perception, as when I think that a tree is 'real' but it isn't. But what this mistake amounts to is that I thought the tree was such that it could be seen by others and existed even unperceived, and I was wrong on both counts. But, even when I was hallucinating, I couldn't be mistaken that I was seeing a tree - even if it turned out to be a mere hallucination tree. This is essentially Descartes' view that he cannot be mistaken that he seems to see a fire, even though an evil demon might trick him into thinking that there 'really is' a fire. I have just tried to explicate what I mean by 'real' and used this concept instead of Descartes' terminology, because I think his terminology encourages the veil of perception doctrine (I do not think that he actually espoused that doctrine, but his phrasing in an English translation makes it very tempting). Whether you mean the same thing by 'real' I am not sure. It would be interesting to find out what you do mean by 'real' if not my explication, and equally interesting to determine whether dream trees or ordinary trees are 'real' in your sense, and what bearing this would have on our present subject matter.

Hrmm... I think you're coming close to contradicting yourself here. Either our perceptions are infallible, in which case I cannot be mistaken when I see a fire, or they are fallible, and I can be mistaken when I see a fire.

I wouldn't define "real" in terms of perception, whether it be mine or others. I'd say that perception handily fits into our notions of rational justification, rather than what it takes for something to be real. So in the case of a dream or a hallucination I am not seeing what is real, but I believe that I am seeing what is real. That being the case it is equally reasonable to believe that, though I may be mistaken, the car I parked in the garage is still there. That's more or less the angle I'm going at -- that it is just as reasonable to believe that things continue to exist unperceived, because there is nothing special about perception when it comes to whether something is real or not, and if we have perceived something, at least, then we are just as justified in believing in its reality as if we are perceiving something.

I tend to think of the real as given. It is beyond belief. It contradicts desire and perception. In some ways it seems like it can't be countenanced -- that there isn't such a thing as a theory of the real which would tell us what it means to be. I like Quine's answer as well, but it seems a little too bound up in the language of propositions to me. It doesn't seem to me that reality is bound to propositions as much as it outstrips them (even though they remain true).

But beyond this notional metaphor of reality I could not honestly give you a hard philosophical answer to your question. I could only say what it is not, and why that fails, and hope that there is some common ground in there.

You understand what it is I am doing when I use words like "white". I am using them to label certain features of my field of awareness:

you're simply labelling portions of schmerception with tracking labels. ( — gurugeorge

What's wrong with doing this? Why can't I do it? Perhaps:

And then you get to Wittgenstein's point - you can't be sure you're using the same tracking label in the same way now as you did 5 minutes ago, in fact you can't even help yourself to any normal notion of time.) — gurugeorge

The reason I can't do it is because my memory might deceive me. I think I'm using "white" to track a particular feature, but, unbeknownst to me, I was using the label a different way just a moment ago.

Note, this doesn't stop me from using words as labels for parts of my conscious awareness. Rather, if I am a sceptic about memory then I am not entitled to the claim that my words at the moment mean what they did a moment ago, until I have a non-circular justification of memory. While this is an interesting point to make about radical scepticism, it has no bite here. It is possible to doubt whether things exist when I am not aware of them without doubting the reliability of memory. The considerations I put forward (that noone has ever... schmerceived... the property of unschmerceived existence) do not apply to memory. We can simply take memory forgranted and focus on the problem that arises for unschmerceived existence specifically. Here it is again. Say that a thing has the property of independent existence only if it is such that it exists even when noone is perceieving it.

(1) I can know that X has some property P only if I am/was aware of that property at some time (or I have testimony tracing to someone who was aware of if).

(2) I cannot be aware of the property of independent existence.

C. I cannot know that any X has the property of independent existence.

Notice that I can raise this argument without worrying at all about memory.

Hi again

Hrmm... I think you're coming close to contradicting yourself here. Either our perceptions are infallible, in which case I cannot be mistaken when I see a fire, or they are fallible, and I can be mistaken when I see a fire. — Moliere

There is no contradiction. Is Descartes contradicting himself in holding that although he might be mistaken about whether there is really a tree because he might be dreaming, but he cannot be mistaken about whether it seems that there is a tree? I hold the same view but put it differently. His 'seeming tree' is my 'tree'. I cannot be mistaken about whether there is a tree, since, even when I am dreaming, I am directly aware of a tree. I could be mistaken about whether the tree I am aware of is a dream tree or a real tree. I then have an explication of the difference between 'real' and 'dream'.

You say you can't give any definition of "real". That isn't necessarily a problem, but tell me this. Supoose in your dreams last night you saw a dream tree (or seemed to see a tree, if you prefer). It was 200ft tall and had large purple leaves with different animals on every branch. You wake up and go to see some friends. To your surprise, one of them starts telling you about this dream they had. They dreampt about a tree 200ft tall with large purple leaves! Another friend pipes up and begins to describe animals that were in the tree, exactly as you remember it. A last friend, getting very excited, explains that he dreampt the tree too, and he describes faithfully the buildings that surrounded the tree.

Over the next several days each of you dreams about the same tree again, each time sharing the same story with one another. If this happened, would you still insist that the tree which all of you keep dreaming about isn't a "real" tree? What would be the meaning of that?

Best,
PA

There is no contradiction. Is Descartes contradicting himself in holding that although he might be mistaken about whether there is really a tree because he might be dreaming, but he cannot be mistaken about whether it seems that there is a tree? I hold the same view but put it differently. His 'seeming tree' is my 'tree'. I cannot be mistaken about whether there is a tree, since, even when I am dreaming, I am directly aware of a tree. I could be mistaken about whether the tree I am aware of is a dream tree or a real tree. I then have an explication of the difference between 'real' and 'dream'. — PossibleAaran

If not a contradiction then at least some linguistic cleaning would be nice from my perspective.

Descartes cannot be mistaken whether it seems like he is seeing a tree. Precisely because "seems" modifies the statement: You cannot be mistaken about whether it seems there is a tree, but you can be mistaken about whether there is a tree -- even when you a dreaming.

I think that it's a little sloppy to split "tree" into types -- it's not like "dream tree" and "real tree" are species of the genus "tree". "Real" does not work exactly in that way. Even when it comes to a logical display of these terms it's not a matter of kinds and categories, but is an operator which ranges over a domain -- some set.

Just curious -- have you read Quine's On What there Is?

You say you can't give any definition of "real". That isn't necessarily a problem, but tell me this. Supoose in your dreams last night you saw a dream tree (or seemed to see a tree, if you prefer). It was 200ft tall and had large purple leaves with different animals on every branch. You wake up and go to see some friends. To your surprise, one of them starts telling you about this dream they had. They dreampt about a tree 200ft tall with large purple leaves! Another friend pipes up and begins to describe animals that were in the tree, exactly as you remember it. A last friend, getting very excited, explains that he dreampt the tree too, and he describes faithfully the buildings that surrounded the tree.

Over the next several days each of you dreams about the same tree again, each time sharing the same story with one another. If this happened, would you still insist that the tree which all of you keep dreaming about isn't a "real" tree? What would be the meaning of that?

Probably not. It wouldn't quite fit into my conception of dream anymore, though, either. I'd be uncertain exactly how to classify it, but if such phenomena were common -- or if I even experienced it just once -- I'd probably hesitate to use dreams as a contrast class to reality.

The reason I can't do it is because my memory might deceive me. — PossibleAaran

No, the problem is deeper than that, it's that you can't tell whether your memory is deceiving you or not, in fact you don't even know what memory is because, again, the concept of memory, like perception, like colour concepts and shape concepts, only makes sense in a public world where one person's memory can be checked by someone or something else, by something that's understood and accepted as existing outside the private individual's experience.

How did you come to learn that this thing popping into your private experience is a memory, as opposed to some fresh, sui generis experience? How did you learn the use of the concept of memory? Is there Russian doll array of homunculi inside you, each checking the memory of the previous?

And doesn't memory itself often involve the past existence of the presently unperceived? My earliest memory is of playing with a toy train at Christmas. Neither the train nor the room exist now; I'd have as much difficulty knowing about those things' non-existence outside my present experience as I supposedly have re. knowing about the existence of something outside my present experience.

IOW both the existence AND the non-existence of things outside my present experience are as problematic as each other - which is to say, not problematic at all.

I can know that X has some property P only if I am/was aware of that property at some time — PossibleAaran

False, you can know by inference. That's what happens with things like the camera test. You might have never seen the piece of paper in question, but be shown a photograph of it that demonstrates its existence.

I think that it's a little sloppy to split "tree" into types -- it's not like "dream tree" and "real tree" are species of the genus "tree". "Real" does not work exactly in that way. Even when it comes to a logical display of these terms it's not a matter of kinds and categories, but is an operator which ranges over a domain -- some set. — Moliere

But that's just a matter of words, isn't it? I am not particularly bothered whether it is not a "normal" use of the word tree to suppose that something I am aware of in a dream is a tree. I am defining "tree" as "thing which looks a certain way". Both things that I am aware of when asleep and things I am aware of when awake look that way, hence they are trees. I do not really care if the words are being used unusually. You can express the point in Descartes' way if you prefer, by saying that I cannot ever be mistaken that it seems to me that there is a tree, but I could be mistaken about whether there really is a tree or whether I am dreaming. I myself have no objection to his way of putting it either.

It still seems to me that we need to ask what the difference is supposed to be between "really seeing a tree" and "dreaming". My own explication is in terms of "reality" existing even when unperceived and capable of being perceived by other people, whilst dreams satisfy neither requirement. Again I'm not really bothered if that is an ordinary definition. It seems to me that if I could show that a tree exists even when unperceived by me and can be perceived by others, I will not be too bothered whether or not that tree is described as "a dream" or "real". If you think there is still some further question about whether I am dreaming which is important, I'd be interested to hear what it is.

I'd probably hesitate to use dreams as a contrast class to reality. — Moliere

This is my point exactly. Showing that something exists unperceived and such that others can perceive it settles the interesting issue. If a philosopher continues to ask "ah but am I dreaming it?", I don't really know what he wants.

Yes, I have read Quine. Why do you mention that?

I am not assuming that we mustinfer ourselves out of the present moment of experience, or what isnsometines called "solipsism of the present moment".

I make one assumption:

(A) To know whether something which you are presently aware of has a particular property, you must either be aware of that property or able to infer it from what you are aware of.

I add one premise. Say that the property "permenance" is the property something has if and only if it exists when noone is aware of it:

(B) I have never been aware of the property of permenance.

(A) and (B) entail that if I am to know that something has the property of permenance, I must infer it from what I am aware of.

I stress again that this problem doesn't arise for memory, since (A) is not an assumption about memory and the problem only begins given that assumption. I agree that you can raise all sorts of sceptical doubts about memory, but I'm not raising them here. I am only raising the local problem which begins with (A), and I can accept (A) and discuss problems that result from it without raising doubts about everything that I believe.

My earliest memory is of playing with a toy train at Christmas. Neither the train nor the room exist now; I'd have as much difficulty knowing about those things' non-existence outside my present experience as I supposedly have re. knowing about the existence of something outside my present experience. — gurugeorge

You tell me. How do you know that those items don't exist? I didn't raise that problem. There is likely an answer to that question, but I'm not presently discussing it. I have tried to constrain the discussion to the problem which springs from (A). I don't want to drag in all of these other issues because they are separate issues.

both the existence AND the non-existence of things outside my present experience are as problematic as each other - which is to say, not problematic at all. — gurugeorge

That X and Y are both as bad as each other does not entail that neither of them are bad! That Tom and Jones are both less than five feet doesn't entail that neither of them are less than five feet! Isn't this obvious?

you can know by inference. That's what happens with things like the camera test. You might have never seen the piece of paper in question, but be shown a photograph of it that demonstrates its existence. — gurugeorge

I agree you can know by inference. What is the inference? Is it inductive, dedective, inference to the best explanation, what? I've been trying to get you to spell out this inference for me for some time, but you never say what kind of inference it is. It is hard to evaluate the strength of an inference when one doesn't know what the inference is.

Best
PA

I agree you can know by inference. What is the inference? Is it inductive, dedective, inference to the best explanation, what? I've been trying to get you to spell out this inference for me for some time, but you never say what kind of inference it is. It is hard to evaluate the strength of an inference when one doesn't know what the inference is. — PossibleAaran

I think I did in our previous long conversation. It's deductive inference. This goes back to my point that we posit (punt, bet, conjecture) identities (natures, essences, etc.) for things, then we deduce what ought to eventuate for experience if we have identified the thing correctly (i.e. if the thing has the identity, nature or essence that we think it has) and then we check experience to see if things pan out as we'd expect them to if the thing has the identity we're positing for it.

So for example, if it's a piece of paper, which like all material things, is defined as having the property of existing while we're not perceiving it, then (we deduce that) a camera ought to inform us of the fact that it exists while we don't perceive it.

As I said in previous conversations, it might not - the camera might reveal nothing, in which case we look for confounding factors (e.g. someone's playing a trick) or we adjust our posit (it's not a piece of paper but something else, perhaps a new kind of object that doesn't exist when we're not perceiving it).

You see, there's no mystery about the thing having the property of unperceived existence or permanence, because pieces of paper, material things, are such things as have that property. The question is only whether the thing is a piece of paper, a material thing, or not.

It's deductive inference. This goes back to my point that we posit (punt, bet, conjecture) identities (natures, essences, etc.) for things, then we deduce what ought to eventuate for experience if we have identified the thing correctly (i.e. if the thing has the identity, nature or essence that we think it has) and then we check experience to see if things pan out as we'd expect them to if the thing has the identity we're positing for it.

So for example, if it's a piece of paper, which like all material things, is defined as having the property of existing while we're not perceiving it, then (we deduce that) a camera ought to inform us of the fact that it exists while we don't perceive it. — gurugeorge

This reminds me of Falsificationism. Make a hypothesis, deduce certain predictions. See if the predictions obtain by appeal to experience. If they do, retain the hypothesis. If they don't, the hypothesis is refuted.

Apply this to the view that things exist unperceived (unschmerceived if you like), and unphotographed. The thought would be that we have never experienced anything which refutes that hypothesis, although there is nothing by way of positive reason to support it. Is that your idea?

This is my point exactly. Showing that something exists unperceived and such that others can perceive it settles the interesting issue. If a philosopher continues to ask "ah but am I dreaming it?", I don't really know what he wants. — PossibleAaran

Well what if I park the car in the garage, and then ask you to go check to see if it is there. I'll give you a walkee talkee. I don't perceive the car in the garage, but you tell me that it's there. Isn't that just as good in that case?

Yes, I have read Quine. Why do you mention that?

It just struck me that some of what you were saying sounded like what he called Plato's beard. But maybe I'm off here.

Apply this to the view that things exist unperceived (unschmerceived if you like), and unphotographed. The thought would be that we have never experienced anything which refutes that hypothesis, although there is nothing by way of positive reason to support it. Is that your idea? — PossibleAaran

Yes, more or less. The burden of proof is on "not existing unperceived" as a positive, competing hypothesis with "existing unperceived". The latter has (things like) camera evidence, what can you give me for the former? If you can't give me anything, then there's no reason not to work on the latter hypothesis, bearing in mind that both hypotheses are conjectural.

Will respond to your other post later.