We can know that it worked and so it’s opposite didn’t work.

Inductively, we thus have no good reason to think that the story would reverse itself in the future.

It still might. But we would have no good reason to think it would.

Inductively, we thus have no good reason to think that the story would reverse itself in the future. — apokrisis

What is the role of the 'Inductively' at the beginning of this sentence? If it means, 'using the principle of induction' then it is assuming the conclusion - i.e. the validity of that principle. If not, I can't see the word contributing anything to the sentence.

I agree we have no good reason to think the process would reverse, just like we have no good reason to think it won't reverse - assuming that 'good' means 'grounded and logical' (and if not that then what does it mean?). We don't have any logical reason to have any expectations about the future, which is the whole problem.

I’m confused. You say generality and particularity are points of view. I agree.

Then you make some further suggestion about individual worldly processes that produce entities en masse.

Apart from coke bottles and model T fords, did you have some natural process in mind here.

What kind of process produces beaches for instance? There are loads of those everywhere.

Do grains of sands run about and gang together at dead of night to build the beach you visit? Or were you thinking of something general like erosion and currents as the processes responsible?

just like we have no good reason to think it won't reverse — andrewk

But we do. We have inductive evidence that inductive principles have prevailed to date. This view has the weight of historic evidence. It’s abductive guess remains unfalsified. And the opposite guess has an equivalent lengthy history of not being true,

Then you make some further suggestion about individual worldly processes that produce entities en masse.

Apart from coke bottles and model T fords, did you have some natural process in mind here.

What kind of process produces beaches for instance? There are loads of those everywhere. — apokrisis

I'm not a physicist, but I would assume a constant in the action of water currents upon small particules in relation to geographical features? The entirety of philogeny would be the explanation of the process leading to a current living being.

It's because those processes leads to mass production of similar entities that we are warranted in speaking of category and kinds, not because the world is structured categorically. In the same way, predication is only seen as so central to our worldview because it is the most natural format of value-attribution for us to handle. All statements can be reduced to non-predicative forms without loss of meaning, and all basic attributive statements can be reduced to existential judgements à la Brentano. Again, imho.

I would assume a constant in the action of water currents upon small particules in relation to geographical features? — Akanthinos

But you mentioned a causal process that generally produces entities. Being particulate doesn’t seem a cause of a beach as such. The generality of currents as a process do.

t's because those processes leads to mass production of similar entities that we are warranted in speaking of category and kinds, not because the world is structured categorically — Akanthinos

So if a general process produces particular entities, then how does this structural fact about nature not justify a categorical representation of the situation in logic? Why would that picture fail?

Would a good analogy for the relationship be "logic is 'pure logic' and science is 'applied logic', in comparison to pure and applied mathematics"? — MonfortS26

Yes, this is how I see the relationship between logic and (empirical) science too. Logic defines all possibilities while empirical observation, that is, interaction with our environment, helps us find out in which logical possibilities we happen to live.

It is better to follow Wittgenstein's example and argue that logic reduces to the practical use of ordinary language with additional constraints to describe a more precise (but not infinitely precise) collection of states of affairs and associated behaviours.

If for any sentence written in logic we cannot think of a use for it, then we can signify this by baptising its negation with the name "logically-necessary".

I have a number of issues here so bear with me please.

Logic should be used in circumstances of uncertainty. In order to have a formal deductive logic, axioms must be set. These axioms should be ideally be grounded in the scientific method. It is fair to claim that the scientific method is itself, grounded in its own axioms, but the reproducibility and outside application of its results is reason enough to believe in its merit.

Um, no. Science uses mathematics, which is constructed via axioms which seem plausible and useful in mathematics. Mathematicians reason according to particular formal systems which they choose to use. The dominant such system of the day is Zermelo-Frankel set theory + Classical Logic (despite the name, Classical Logic was invented in the late 1800s, not the classical period, lol). And I assure you, science did not play a role in why this system rose to prominence (although there are a number of competing systems worth study). ZFC & CL gained prominence due to issues in *mathematics*, not science. Such as (with ZFC) the attempt to regiment mathematics axiomatically (ended up failing but the system is useful), such as understanding infinity and number theory etc. Classical Logic was the result of trying to find what rules for reasoning would be needed to overcome the inability of Aristotlean Logic to account for how mathematicians actually reasoned.

Science had nothing to do with it and it's difficult to see how it could itself determine the rules for reasoning when you have to use reasoning (and math) in science. The situation is more complicated than I've made out so far, but I'll get to that soon.

The same argument can be applied to the concept of logic as well. In situations where an axiom is not grounded in scientific reasoning, for my personal use, the best option is to create arguments and attempt to decide what is more probable based on said arguments. This is a process that can only be done with intuition. The merit of those arguments, if not eventually supported by scientific progress, can be measured through the durability of those claims due to public scrutiny. Logic is only useful in determining future behavior. When trying to determine what the best course of action is, the first step is to make observations, based on those observations, you ask yourself questions. Once you have your questions, you create a set of axioms that are logically consistent with each other and use deductive reasoning in order to determine the best outcome. Finally, if things do not go as planned, you come back and question those initial axioms and go back and change them as necessary. Then repeat the cycle.

How on earth are you doing probability without reasoning? What is the axiom in question that you are questioning? Arguments need to be constructed in particular ways (the correct rules for reasoning) to be valid. Now one *can* disagree about which rules are correct for reasoning (Classical Logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Paraconsistent Logic, etc.), but to settle logical disagreements one has to appeal to a model of theory choice and decide based which theory of logic is the best theory of reasoning (determined by the usual criterion of theory choice).


Intuition is a terrible idea here since people's intuitions aren't all the same, nor is there any inherent reason why intuition allows one to reach a true conclusion better than anything else. And isn't this kind of odd? You say science must do X Y & Z and yet you say we have to resort to intuition?

And besides, what observations are going to bear on logic? Look, logic isn't about the world, the world isn't logical. A logic is a formal system that maps out a particular consequence relation. The world is... whatever the heck it is, I don't know (ask a metaphysician). Outside a formalism, one simply reasons. If there is a relationship between logic and reality, it's not obvious what that relationship is.

Also, you made an assumption here. Axioms don't have to be "logically consistent with each other", as then you're simply assuming a particular axiom already (the Law of Non-Contradiction). There are formal systems where that law is not a tautology. Namely, dialetheic logics, a type of Paraconsistent Logic.

The problem with this though is where I state that the axioms should be grounded in the scientific method. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I basically just re-transcribed the scientific method. It seems like the scientific method is just the application of logic, reduced to 'scientific' axioms. My question is this, is there any knowledge worth knowing, that cannot be learned through this cycle? Is there any reason not to just follow the scientific method and adjust based on the pragmatic maxim when in times of doubt?

1) There's no such thing a "the" scientific method.
2) Science is basically useless (because it's inapplicable) in formal disciplines like mathematics and logic. And surely we've gained knowledge from mathematics and logic.

This thread makes no sense to me. Logic is not science and science is not rebranded logic. "Pragamtism" is not logic either.

We have inductive evidence that inductive principles have prevailed to date. — apokrisis

We have observations that inductive principles have served us well in the past. On that I expect we agree.

I can see no way to turn that set of observations into a reason to expect that inductive principles will serve us well in the future, without using the principle of induction itself. And neither could Hume. And neither, to my knowledge, has anybody found a satisfactory answer to that in the intervening centuries.

Again, the converse is true. We can see from a history that believing the contrary of the principle of induction would have been as misleading as possible. So to adopt the contrary in regards to the future would be as unreasonable as possible. Hence it is only reasonable to continue to assume the principle.

We are talking about a meta-argument, remember. This is not about some particular belief. This is about the general method of belief. We are no longer talking about just events in the world. We are talking about a habit of mind.

So to adopt the contrary in regards to the future would be as unreasonable as possible. — apokrisis

This supposes we already have a standard for judging what is reasonable and what is not. What is that standard, and where did we get it from?

Experience. A history of what works. Reason seems reasonable as unreason has likewise proved itself as such.

A history of what works. — apokrisis

We have a history of what worked, not of what works. The difference of tenses is critical.

It seems rather impractical--perhaps even impossible--to operate reasonably under the assumption that the future will work differently from the past. What would (or could) warrant any particular expectation or corresponding course of action?

In any case, induction is justified because its method is such that experience would, sooner or later, correct any erroneous beliefs adopted by following it.

What would (or could) warrant any particular expectation or corresponding course of action? — aletheist

Nothing. The mistake is to expect, or even demand, a warrant. The answer is to act without warrant.

We act according to our nature, which is to assume the principle of induction, without wasting time futilely seeking a warrant for the assumption.

Sigh. The history of what worked up to a nanosecond ago then?

Crucial difference my arse. Pointless pedantry more like.

Crucial difference my arse. Pointless pedantry more like — apokrisis

Really? If you have to resort to sneering your beliefs must be poorly thought-out indeed.

Well prove me wrong by actually making an argument and not merely an assertion.

If the difference in tense is crucial, demonstrate what practical difference it could make.

If the difference in tense is crucial, demonstrate what practical difference it could make. — apokrisis

Because we know what consequences past actions have had, but we do not know what the consequences will be of future actions, or of actions we are currently undertaking but for which the consequences are not yet observable.

In concrete terms, I am prepared to bet, today, on who won the last papal election, but not on who will win the next one.

You said the difference in tense between past and present was crucial - between worked and works.

So what was that about?

You said the difference in tense between past and present was crucial - between worked and works.

So what was that about? — apokrisis

We have observations about what worked in the past, and that includes observations that the principle of induction worked in the past. I can see no way of logically deducing from those observations a prediction of what will work in the future- including whether the principle of induction will work in future - without using the principle of induction. Neither could Hume. Neither could anybody else since then.

So your claim is now about past vs future tense and not past vs present tense. Do you blame me for feeling confused. Especially when you just won’t correct what you said.

But again, if we are now in the future that acceptance of induction predicted, then that is inductive confirmation of a principle. We decided to use the principle and now we can see how well it has worked. So it would be matchingly unreasonable to now drop the principle. It’s converse lacks any empirical support and only has empirical falsification.

So sure, induction says we can’t know that the past predicts the future. But when we speak to the principle itself, it has got a track record that makes that a reasonable bet.

We act according to our nature, which is to assume the principle of induction, without wasting time futilely seeking a warrant for the assumption. — andrewk

It’s hardly futile if we have a history of evidence. Again, the issue is not whether things are certain but whether there are good reasons to continue to hold a principle. And the evidence weighs heavily here for the principle and not its contrary, or even a null hypothesis.

Gosh it's like someome here has never read Hume before.

I haven't changed my position, and I certainly don't blame you if you feel confused. I feel confused most of the time, and I hope nobody blames me for it.

So it would be matchingly unreasonable to now drop the principle. — apokrisis

Nobody has suggested that we drop the principle. Look at the post eight up from here (for some reason I can't link to it), where I in fact suggest the opposite.

That one cannot find a non-circular, logical reason for holding a principle is not a reason not to adopt it.

We act according to our nature, which is to assume the principle of induction, without wasting time futilely seeking a warrant for the assumption. — andrewk

Why are we not rationally warranted to base our expectations on what we have observed and continue to observe to work; namely inductive reasoning? Particularly as we have no viable substitute at all, that seems to be a pretty good reason to accept induction.

That one cannot find a non-circular, logical reason for holding a principle is not a reason not to adopt it. — andrewk

I think that is the mistake you are making, and that Hume also made; is imagining that there could possibly be a logical reason. That just makes no sense at all! The reason that warrants acceptance of induction is not, and cannot be, purely deductive, it is simply practical.

I think that is the mistake you are making, and that Hume also made; is imagining that there could possibly be a logical reason — Janus

Hume imagined no such thing. On the contrary he pointed out that there couldn't be a logical reason, or at least (being a fairly humble fellow) that he had no hope of ever finding such a reason.

as we have no viable substitute at all, that seems to be a pretty good reason to accept induction. — Janus

That is Reichenbach's response, and IMHO it's a good one. Note that it says nothing about how likely induction is to work, just that we have no alternatives that we expect to work any better. That, either alone, or together with my observation that we cannot help but use induction, is enough reason to use it when deciding on actions. But whether that's enough to call it a warrant depends on how strong your standard of warranty is.

Note also that the Reichenbach response relates to deciding on actions, whereas I think Hume was more focused on beliefs, and what warrant we have for them. He is quoted as saying 'I have no reason to believe my dinner will not poison me.' As far as that pure belief goes, Reichenbach's response doesn't help, because it's only about actions. But Reichenbach helps with what Hume is reputed to have said next, which is:

'But I shall eat it anyway'

If a man's beliefs are identified with his non-verbal behaviour, then it is no longer clear to me when he isn't making an induction. Which suggests that epistemological warrant for induction might not be needed simply because it is vacuous to even speak of consenting to 'ceremonies' of induction, for if all behaviour can be regarded as future-anticipating then induction is just another word for behaviour.

If a man's beliefs are identified with his non-verbal behaviour — sime

That is a very contentious proposition, and in any case, I don't see how it bears on warrant. No one denies that we do think - and behave - inductively (except maybe Popperians).

That is a very contentious proposition, and in any case, I don't see how it bears on warrant. No one denies that we do think - and behave - inductively (except maybe Popperians). — SophistiCat

Because if induction is a vacuous notion then to insist upon warrant is to insist upon nothing. I'm with popper, but feel he didn't quite go far enough to dissolve the issue of warrant into being a non-issue.

Suppose that someone described themselves to be a gambler, but that they always bet on the least frequent outcome without offering any justification and regularly lost. Is there any difference between describing them as a being bad gambler vs denying that they are in fact a gambler?

Is there a clear distinction between predicting badly vs not making a prediction?

Doesn't the difference entirely rest upon the normative and hence subjective context by which we judge behaviour to be future-anticipating?