Free will however is ability to choose an option regardless of any constraint. — bahman

This is a rather contentious definition of free will. It certainly doesn't fit the conceptions of compatibilists. I don't think even most libertarian incompatibilists would be happy with such a definition. Most philosophers agree to distinguish between broadly external and internal constraints on agency and practical deliberation. External constraints limit the options that are open to you in any particular deliberative context while internal 'constraints', including the constraints of rationality and character, enable you to take ownership of the deliberative process.

Compatibilists, unlike libertarians, believe even the internal constraints are deterministic. It is true that some libertarians believe that whatever someone actually does freely, he or she ought to have been able to refrain from doing it (or to do something else) in the exact same circumstances regardless of the antecedent causal constraints on the action being internal or external to the process of deliberation and decision. This is the strongest possible version of the so called 'principle of alternative possibilities' (PAP). But that is a rather minority positions among defenders of the possibility of free will.

This is a rather contentious definition of free will. It certainly doesn't fit the conceptions of compatibilists. I don't think even most libertarian incompatibilists would be happy with such a definition. Most philosophers agree to distinguish between broadly external and internal constraints on agency and practical deliberation. External constraints limit the options that are open to you in any particular deliberative context while internal 'constraints', including the constraints of rationality and character, enable you to take ownership of the deliberative process. — Pierre-Normand

To me constraint just limit options whether they are external or internal. You cannot do that because of shame then one option is gone. You cannot do that because of shortage of money then one option is gone.

Compatibilists, unlike libertarians, believe even the internal constraints are deterministic. It is true that some libertarians believe that whatever someone actually does freely, he or she ought to have been able to refrain from doing it (or to do something else) in the exact same circumstances regardless of the antecedent constraints on the action being internal or external to the process of deliberation and decision. This is the strongest possible version of the so called 'principle of alternative possibilities' (PAP). But that is a rather minority positions against defenders of the possibility of free will. — Pierre-Normand

I see. But lets back to our discussion. Do you believe that we could live the best if we always choose rationally, pick up the best, rather than choosing freely, pick up the worst?

To me constraint just limit options whether they are external or internal. You cannot do that because of shame then one option is gone. You cannot do that because of shortage of money then one option is gone. — bahman

Yes, I think a confusion over the concept of a constraint, such that it is viewed as a mere restriction or impediment on the exercise of free agency (and hence constitutes a mitigating factor for personal responsibility) lays at the root of some incompatibilist intuitions. Not everything that is a causal antecedent of an action is a constraint in this fashion. Some causal antecedents of someone's action are 'internal' not just in the sense that they can be traced to process or states that are located inside of the skull but also in the sense that they are part of the enablement of the agent's abilities to rationally deliberate about what to do. To be able to deliberate rationally, on that view, entails that one's deliberative process is suitably integrated with one's core values and commitments, for instance (and also enable one to rationally appraise the salient features of one's practical situation). It is somewhat incoherent to view such enabling causal antecedents of one's rational deliberative processes to constitute negative 'constraints' on one's freedom, since removing those so-called constraints just amounts to destroying what makes one into a free rational agent in the first place.

By rational I mean we act or decide based on reason in a situation. — bahman

I have no idea what it means to act rationally. People act in many ways motivated by experiences and possibilities.

A rational decision is defined as a decision which the agent always choose the best option. — bahman

I can someone know the best option? There are just possible actions with unknown effects (hence the well known Daoist story of the father and his son).

Free will however is ability to choose an option regardless of any constraint. — bahman

Actions are subject to constraints but we choose to try to move in a certain direction. Humans have Choice in the direction we wish to try to take action. This is Will or Intention.

Humans have the ability to make Choices in Direction. We are Navigators in Life where nothing is certain or determined.

Choice permits novelty, creation, and evolution.

We can without doubt agree that we are rational agents. — bahman

That claim can be doubted...with evidence to turn doubt into actual negation. Psychological evidence, neurological evidence, evidence from behavioural economics...

By rational I mean we act or decide based on reason in a situation. — bahman

Reason is not the way we have been shown to make decisions, either in practice or in experiment. Decisions are emotional in their origins, which are typically considered to not be a source of the "rational". Reason is the vehicle to express emotion.

Rationality is important when it comes to decision in a situation which is defined as a set of prioritized options. — bahman

What exactly "prioritizes" the options? Reason can provide options...but emotion is what prioritzes them.

Free will however is ability to choose an option regardless of any constraint. — bahman

I once thought I understood what "free will" was, but have long since given up thinking it has an actual definition from anyone, professional or layperson. In my view, the idea of free will can't even be wrong since it is a conceptual reification created in Iron Age philosophy to describe phenomena which were unknown and inscrutable at the time. The term should be consigned to the dustbin of philosophical history as, in my opinion, it is a conceptual dud that derails and suppresses progess in philosophical thought.

it is a conceptual dud that derails and suppresses progess in philosophical thought. — Uneducated Pleb

I can't believe that Free Will is still taught as relevant. Some ideas die hard. We have choices with unpredictable consequences.

I see. But lets back to our discussion. Do you believe that we could live the best if we always choose rationally, pick up the best, rather than choosing freely, pick up the worst? — bahman

This rather amounts to asking if our being less rationally or morally fallible would make us more or less free. I don't think there is a categorical answer to this question. There is an interesting conundrum that arises from comparing Aristotle's to Kant's idea of moral praiseworthiness. According to Aristotle's conception of a virtuous agent, someone who refrains effortlessly from acting selfishly, say, is more praiseworthy than someone who must make an effort since the first one is manifesting a more virtuous character. Kant, on the other hand, holds that the person who must overcome the most strongly felt temptation in order to refrain from acting selfishly is more praiseworthy since she displays a superior ability to have her reason control her passions. So, your question is rather similar to the question whether someone is freer accordingly whether she displays moral praiseworthiness in accordance to Aristotle's or to Kant's account of moral praiseworthiness.

I think there is a way to reconcile Aristotle's and Kant's intuitions, and this consists in construing moral praiseworthiness not as a metaphysical (intrinsic) attribute of an agent but rather as the normative dimension of a social reactive attitude the function of which is to scaffold moral growth. We praise the person who act virtuously (and/or rationally) effortlessly because she is an exemplar model of virtue (or wisdom or intelligence). And we also praise someone who effortfully emulates acts of virtue because such efforts promote moral (or intellectual) growth. In both case, the aim is the same -- virtuous action and dispositions -- and the achievement of this aim also is what constitutes the ability to act freely and responsibly.

I think I should expand on rational decision. We don't need freedom for rational decision. Free decision and rational decision are in fact different. What is the exactly rational decision: You look at options and prioritize them, I like this one more or that one is more important for me, etc. Prioritizing is done using weighting. We pick up the best option when available options are prioritized.

By rational I mean we act or decide based on reason in a situation.
— bahman

I have no idea what it means to act rationally. People act in many ways motivated by experiences and possibilities. — Rich

Rational decision is picking up the best options after prioritizing them. The process of prioritizing is done using weighting. I like this one me, this one is more important, etc.

A rational decision is defined as a decision which the agent always choose the best option.
— bahman

I can someone know the best option? There are just possible actions with unknown effects (hence the well known Daoist story of the father and his son). — Rich

Yes, there are situation that the best option is not available, for example when you like two things similarly.

Free will however is ability to choose an option regardless of any constraint.
— bahman

Actions are subject to constraints but we choose to try to move in a certain direction. Humans have Choice in the direction we wish to try to take action. This is Will or Intention.

Humans have the ability to make Choices in Direction. We are Navigators in Life where nothing is certain or determined.

Choice permits novelty, creation, and evolution. — Rich

I agree.

We can without doubt agree that we are rational agents.
— bahman
That claim can be doubted...with evidence to turn doubt into actual negation. Psychological evidence, neurological evidence, evidence from behavioural economics...

By rational I mean we act or decide based on reason in a situation.
— bahman
Reason is not the way we have been shown to make decisions, either in practice or in experiment. Decisions are emotional in their origins, which are typically considered to not be a source of the "rational". Reason is the vehicle to express emotion. — Uneducated Pleb

No, there are only two sorts of decision making: rational and free decision. We always follow our emotions in any situation. Without emotions we depressed and are not willing to do an. In case of rational decision we choose an options after prioritizing them. We also have free decision. I am arguing that free decision comes to play when we want to choose worst so what is use of it.

Rationality is important when it comes to decision in a situation which is defined as a set of prioritized options.
— bahman
What exactly "prioritizes" the options? Reason can provide options...but emotion is what prioritzes them. — Uneducated Pleb

Emotion and reason are used to give weight to options. I like this one more, this one is more important for me because of future consideration, other example.

Free will however is ability to choose an option regardless of any constraint.
— bahman
I once thought I understood what "free will" was, but have long since given up thinking it has an actual definition from anyone, professional or layperson. In my view, the idea of free will can't even be wrong since it is a conceptual reification created in Iron Age philosophy to describe phenomena which were unknown and inscrutable at the time. The term should be consigned to the dustbin of philosophical history as, in my opinion, it is a conceptual dud that derails and suppresses progess in philosophical thought. — Uneducated Pleb

Interesting.

I see. But lets back to our discussion. Do you believe that we could live the best if we always choose rationally, pick up the best, rather than choosing freely, pick up the worst?
— bahman

This rather amounts to asking if our being less rationally or morally fallible would make us more or less free. I don't think there is a categorical answer to this question. There is an interesting conundrum that arises from comparing Aristotle's to Kant's idea of moral praiseworthiness. According to Aristotle's conception of a virtuous agent, someone who refrains effortlessly from acting selfishly, say, is more praiseworthy than someone who must make an effort since the first one is manifesting a more virtuous character. Kant, on the other hand, holds that the person who must overcome the most strongly felt temptation in order to refrain from acting selfishly is more praiseworthy since she displays a superior ability to have her reason control her passions. So, your question is rather similar to the question whether someone is freer accordingly whether she displays moral praiseworthiness in accordance to Aristotle's or to Kant's account of moral praiseworthiness.

I think there is a way to reconcile Aristotle's and Kant's intuitions, and this consists in construing moral praiseworthiness not as a metaphysical (intrinsic) attribute of an agent but rather as the normative dimension of a social reactive attitude the function of which is to scaffold moral growth. We praise the person who act virtuously (and/or rationally) effortlessly because she is an exemplar model of virtue (or wisdom or intelligence). And we also praise someone who effortfully emulates acts of virtue because such efforts promote moral (or intellectual) growth. In both case, the aim is the same -- virtuous action and dispositions -- and the achievement of this aim also is what constitutes the ability to act freely and responsibly. — Pierre-Normand

The issue that I am raising is that free will is the only ability that allows us to do the worst, so what is point of having it. I like this more than that. This is rational decision. I throw this away because I want. This is free decision.

The issue that I am raising is that free will is the only ability that allows us to do the worst, so what is point of having it. — bahman

There is not better or worse. There is only a choice to move in a particular direction. Consequences are always unpredictable and changing as things evolve.

What Choice allows is evolution of Mind. We create, experiment, learn, and evolve. It is fundamental to existence.

There is not better or worse. There is only a choice to move in a particular direction. Consequences are always unpredictable and changing as things evolve.

What Choice allows is evolution of Mind. We create, experiment, learn, and evolve. It is fundamental to existence. — Rich

There are of course better or worse options. I like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate one.

There are of course better or worse options. I like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate one. — bahman

In a subjective way, you have preferences in taste. However, in a practical manner, you might choose a vanilla in some ice cream store that has an absolutely horrible taste to you, which you don't know until you actually taste it. Possibly the chocolate might have tasted better. Consequences of any choice is always unpredictable, but we do choose and then learn. This is the process of human evolution.

n a subjective way, you have preferences in taste. However, in a practical manner, you might choose a vanilla in some ice cream store that has an absolutely horrible taste to you, which you don't know until you actually taste it. Possibly the chocolate might have tasted better. Consequences of any choice is always unpredictable, but we do choose and then learn. This is the process of human evolution. — Rich

What is your opinion about OP?

If I recall correctly, Aristotle was writing to and for a class of gentleman in Athens society, if so, then his position is not unexpected, and I think Kant's moral works were framed more towards the general public (poor people) of his time. I think their thoughts need to have modern interpretation.

If I recall correctly, Aristotle was writing to and for a class of gentleman in Athens society, if so, then his position is not unexpected, and I think Kant's moral works were framed more towards the general public (poor people) of his time. I think their thoughts need to have modern interpretation. — Cavacava

The issue that I brought up concerns a conundrum regarding the ascription of moral praiseworthiness to the action of an agent. This connects to the topic of free will because of the connection between freedom and responsibility, on the one hand, and the connection between personal responsibility and praiseworthiness on the other hand. I dont think pointing out that Aristotle and Kant had different target audiences goes to the core of the issue. Both of their arguments seem to me to have intuitive appeal even if we bracket out prejudice and agree that all human beings, aristocrats or not, can justifiably be praised for their efforts in vanquishing bad temptation, or for their being able to do well effortlessly. I was attempting to show that the apparent inconsistency between the Aristotelian and the Kantian criteria of praiseworthiness is the result of a misconception regarding the nature of moral (or rational) praiseworthiness and that both the Aristotelian and the Kantian conceptions of ethics show in different albeit complementary ways why our modern 'metaphysical' conception of praiseworthiness is misguided.

Obviously free will is nonsense.
I thank god that all my decision making is determined by me; my motivation; my learning; my experience and my situation. Anything short of that is just throwing the dice.

This is a rather contentious definition of free will. It certainly doesn't fit the conceptions of compatibilists. — Pierre-Normand

It is exactly that offered by compatibilists, except that the emphasis is different.
To compatibilism free will is the ability to act determinedly in the absence of constraints.

What is your opinion about OP? — bahman

If you are asking what is the use of Free Will, then I would respond that we see humans are constrained in our choices, but the choices we make are the essence of Life. From these choices we learn and evolve. This is Life.

It is exactly that offered by compatibilists, except that the emphasis is different. To compatibilism free will is the ability to act determinedly in the absence of constraints. — charleton

For sure, but, as I had attempted to stress, the relevant compatibilist idea of a constraint on free will is much more restricted than the idea appealed to by bahman (or by some libertarians). Many compatibilists don't view 'internal' causal antecedents such as values or desires to constitute constraints on free will, whereas bahman seems to be defining free will as the absence of *any* sort of antecedent causal determination, including such things as values, desires or reasons (and not just external constraints such as threats, coercition or lack of resources and opportunities).

Bahman's caricature dovetails fully with to banal and impracticable libertarian idea.
But the way you constructed your post, was not incompatible with compatibilism.

But the way you constructed your post, was not incompatible with compatibilism. — charleton

I didn't mean to rule out compatibilism. Quite the contrary, I meant to point out that bahman's definition was too strict to accommodate many common conceptions free will, such as compatibilists ones, and also some libertarian ones (which don't all rely on the most restrictive and implausible understanding of the principle of alternative possibilities).

If you are asking what is the use of Free Will, then I would respond that we see humans are constrained in our choices, but the choices we make are the essence of Life. From these choices we learn and evolve. This is Life. — Rich

I am asking what is the using free will considering the fact that it always allows us to choose the worst.

I am asking what is the using free will considering the fact that it always allows us to choose the worst. — bahman

I responded that there is no such thing as better or worse choices since consequences (long-term and short-term) are totally unpredictable. What people do is make choices based upon their experiences and emotions (there is an enteric mind that makes gut decisions) and then learn something new from now their decisions. Choices is what defines all of life. It is the essential element of Mind Evolution.

So the question is what is the use of free will when we, rational agents, can always choose the best option? — bahman

On a social scale, free will allows us to blame others for their actions. When a person chooses "the worst option," the belief in free will allows us to say, "You messed up!"

I think the need to blame people for faults is a psychological need that all or most humans have. In fact, I believe there is a school of thought (the name is escaping me) that says even if free will doesn't exist, it is still a useful fiction. I tend to agree. I would hate to live in a world where, say, someone could cheat on their spouse and the only thing their spouse could say is, "Well, he had no choice."

I should point out that I haven't read all of the responses in this thread, so if my response has already been addressed, feel free to ignore this post or copy and paste the relevant response.

I should point out that I haven't read all of the responses in this thread, so if my response has already been addressed, feel free to ignore this post or copy and paste the relevant response. — czahar

Your response isn't redundant but it's broadly compatible with the conception that I am advocating, which portrays 'reactive attitudes' broadly construed (such as praise and blame, gratitude and resentment, shame and pride, etc.) not as implying the mere acknowledgement of an agent's (or one's own) intrinsic freedom but rather, in part, as constituting this freedom through functioning as social scaffolds of rational and moral growth and competence.

In other words, I view most popular philosophical discussions of free will, determinism and responsibility to go wrong when they seek to establish the antecedent and objective criteria of freedom of choice on account of which an agent can reasonably be held responsible for her actions. I rather view the range of sentiments and social attitudes associated with the normative appraisal of other people's (and one's own) choices and actions to make up the essential cement necessary to hold various bits of human behavior together and thereby to make it possible for people's to behave rationally and morally at all.

The premise of the OP is what ought to be in question, namely that there is a particular utility function U(a) that represents the value of the set of choices available to an agent, that can be identified independently of the choices the agent actually makes.

For if a utility function cannot be identified and justified independently of the choices the agent actually makes, then one's proposed function is at best describing the agents past history of decisions, which says nothing for or against the idea of the agent having determined vs free-willed choices.

And to merely ask the agent "which choice do you prefer?" before he appears to make a decision isn't to obtain independent information of his preferences.

Why do brains create comics? To amuse their particles?