Yes, it seems we must be more subtle.

I wonder if you have seen Kripke's idea:

Saul Kripke contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:

Begin with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the expression "is true" (or "is false"). So The barn is big is included in the subset, but not " The barn is big is true", nor problematic sentences such as "This sentence is false".
Define truth just for the sentences in that subset.
Then extend the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one of the original subset of sentences. So "The barn is big is true" is now included, but not either "This sentence is false" nor "'The barn is big is true' is true".
Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for The barn is big; then for "The barn is big is true"; then for "'The barn is big is true' is true", and so on.
Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like This sentence is false, since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the Principle of bivalence: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.[63]

Thanks.
But, how would you know if you are not assigning a false sentence the property of truth?
The barn is big is one sentence, the barn is small is another.
How would one know whether to club them together or not?

Plus we are assigning the property of truth here, not defining it.

He uses satisfaction.

Can you explain that term more clearly? How so?

We appear to be at sixes and sevens. I don't really know what you're asking. If you'd care to restart, please just re-ask.

If you're asking what truth is, or what makes true propositions true in some all-inclusive sense. I don't think there is any settled single answer. Try here for a start:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/







.

If that which makes a proposition true differs from true proposition to true proposition, then in what way does it differ?

Perhaps it be better to ask... what, on your view, makes a proposition true?

I'm simply trying to understand what you're saying with regard to truth.

With regard to defining true and false...

Defining true is calling something "true". Being true is not equivalent to being called "true". Exploring this difference(between being true and being called "true") can be interesting.

Perhaps it be better to ask... what, on your view, makes a proposition true? — creativesoul

Being true is not equivalent to being called "true". Exploring this difference(between being true and being called "true") can be interesting. — creativesoul

Alrighty! The Stanford site makes pretty clear that true as a general term does not have a single definition, but rather a constellation of differing and irreconcilable definitions. The details are extremely tedious - you're welcome to travel that path if you want to. More interesting to me is speculating on why.

(For present purpose I'm defining true and truth as meaning the same thing, expressed as an adjective or a noun.)

First, I don't think truth is an intrinsic property: nothing is true by itself in itself. It takes a person to assign it. Second, what makes a proposition true appears to be a bespoke and internal aspect of the proposition itself: each truth is unique.

Past this madness lies. Truth appears to be one of those ideas we all encounter throughout life that we just get used to, supposing in the use that we actually understand it, when in fact that understanding, when not illusory, is at best partial.

For example: "This thing here is a table." Never mind what theories of truth this proposition might fall under; let's just try to lay out and lay bare what it means. Can you already sense were this is going? First,it is not a table; it's not even a thing. Whatever can be said about it, must be said by someone. The act of saying creates a template - a filter - through which understanding is got. It's not even easy to say just what the ground of the understanding is. Deconstruction like this becomes a war on understanding that unconfined ends only in total ruin.

If we do "ruin" our understanding, then what becomes of truth. There can be no truth, because there is nothing to ground it upon.

It appears that truth becomes an arbitrary artifact of structure applied by a consciousness, which structure cannot have anything to do with what the truth refers to - because it is external to the thing referred to, a creature of the consciousness - even if that truth is a commonplace and generally accepted.

I recopy Heidegger's remark from above (p. 3). It begins to make sense, seem right, be true.

"Truth... comes to its ultimate essence which is called certainty. The name expresses that truth concerns consciousness as a knowledge, a representation which is grounded in consciousness in such a way that only that knowledge is valid as knowledge which at the same time knows itself and what it knows as such, and is certain of itself in this knowledge. Certainty here is not to be taken only as an addition to knowledge in the sense that it accomplishes the appropriation and the possession of knowledge. Rather, certainty is the authoritative mode of knowledge, that is, "truth," as the consciousness, conscious of itself, of what is known. The mere having of something in consciousness is, in contrast, either no longer knowledge or not yet knowledge." (The End of Philosophy, 1973, tr. Stambaugh, p. 20.)

Can we get any more from this?

Truth is not an object that you can define in the universe. Truth is a constant value which must exist before the universe or any other existence and one could speculate that it is the only thing that must always be. For example the statement "before the universe existed" demonstrates the ability to give a value to the non-existence of the universe at that point and the truth value of the statement, be the answer true or false, demonstrates the truth value that existed before the universe became.
This look at truth should answer the question "can the universe be defined" to have an answer as it has truth value or it does not. However, as the observer here has literally mapped everything themself, the answer was always Yes, and the observer has quantified and defined the universe by observing it.
Even while the scope may be beyond our comprehension, what ' is' or that which 'exists' must indeed have an end as that is the simple nature of our universe.

The Stanford site makes pretty clear that true as a general term does not have a single definition, but rather a constellation of differing and irreconcilable definitions. The details are extremely tedious - you're welcome to travel that path if you want to. More interesting to me is speculating on why. — tim wood

My speculation is that truth is a comparison, a measure of equivalence or differentiation. This apple is red is a comparison of the apple's color to a predefined wavelength of light.

The binary bifurcation of true/false can be enhanced to true/not-true/false, where not-true and false are not identical sets. That increase in resolution also demonstrates that further increases could result in a gradient, perhaps what we call confidence.

The Stanford site makes pretty clear that true as a general term does not have a single definition, but rather a constellation of differing and irreconcilable definitions. — tim wood

Yes it does. That fact grounds my questions.

(For present purpose I'm defining true and truth as meaning the same thing, expressed as an adjective or a noun.)

I've heard enough. Thanks for the exchange. I'm not interested.

true... does not have a single definition, — tim wood

Yes it does. That fact grounds my questions. — creativesoul

Fact? Great! What is it?

Events. Ongoings. Happenings. States of affairs. The case at hand. The way things were and/or are. Reality.

By the way. What you've just quoted is a misrepresentation of the facts. It makes it seem as if I offered that answer to that quote. I didn't. I abhor insincerity.

By the way. What you've just quoted is a misrepresentation of the facts. It makes it seem as if I offered that answer to that quote. I didn't. I abhor insincerity. — creativesoul

Maybe you should read the post; it's just above.

From earlier in the thread:

Statements are what's true/false. Correspondence to fact/reality is what makes them true. The lack thereof is what makes them false. — creativesoul

Sure, that's the correspondence theory of truth. There are others - go back to the Stanford link; as noted, it's a place to start. In short, truth does not have a single definition.

Well, that's similar to the correspondence theory. In the details, I reject the conventional account for the same reason(and more) that I reject the notion that all thought and belief have propositional content, or that propositions are equivalent to thought and belief. Eventually, I'll coin my own namesake. For now, I use the terms "truth" and "correspondence" interchangeably. Hesperus and Phosphorus.

I'm familiar with that article. I'm also cognizant of equivocation. I'm also up for it if you would like to compare the different conceptions of "truth". Other than that, I would still like for you to answer the question I asked earlier. Twice.

By the way. What you've just quoted is a misrepresentation of the facts. It makes it seem as if I offered that answer to that quote. I didn't. I abhor insincerity.
— creativesoul

Maybe you should read the post; it's just above. — tim wood

When I wrote "Yes it does", 'it' referenced the article. Maybe you should read the post; it's just above. Then compare what I wrote with what you quoted. Removing the context removes much of the meaning(or at least what is required for one to correctly attribute and/or share it).

If it was inadvertent, then my mistake and apologies. However, given the lack of commitment in your language to make any strong assertions, I'm cautious of both rhetoric and dialetheism(para-consistent logic).

My speculation is that truth is a comparison, a measure of equivalence or differentiation. This apple is red is a comparison of the apple's color to a predefined wavelength of light — AngleWyrm

.
Ok, but this a speculation on what truth is. I was speculating on why truth has several irreconcilable definitions.

The binary bifurcation of true/false can be enhanced to true/not-true/false, where not-true and false are not identical sets. That increase in resolution also demonstrates that further increases could result in a gradient, perhaps what we call confidence.

A lot of slippery ground, here. In categorical reasoning - dialectic - "confidence" won't do. Not-T (or Not-F) won't do.

In Rhetoric, confidence (persuasiveness) is important. But Not-T/Not-F aren't categories, even in Rhetoric. Confusion: Not-T/Not-F could mean potentiality; i.e., that they would be true or false but information is lacking that could be provided. Or they're categorical; i.e., that they're intrinsically neither true nor false. The trouble with these is that other, better terminology exists. For potentiality, it's contingent. For categorical, it's not sufficiently meaningful.

does that mean then that some beliefs are inherent and are never questioned?

creativesoul does that mean then that some beliefs are inherent and are never questioned? — Myttenar

Not sure what you're referring to. In the above question, replace the term "that" with what you're asking me about. That would let me know what you're asking hopefully.

I wouldn't use the term inherent as qualification for belief, unless it was discourse about kinds of belief. For example, moral belief is always about that which is considered acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. So, belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and behaviour is inherent to moral discourse. Any and all times we're thinking about what we should or should not do, we are involved in moral thought and belief. Any and all times we're stating that we should do something or other, we're making a moral claim, by virtue of expressing moral thought and belief.

Regarding beliefs that are never questioned...

Questioning one's own thought and belief is a metacognitive endeavor. Not everyone can, nor does. A crucial aspect of questioning one's own thought and belief is that one cannot effectively do it alone. It requires an other.

It could also be said that when one holds unshakable conviction in some belief or other, that that belief is unquestioned or unquestionable. However, that is not to say that it has never been.

"it" was in reference to your post about correspondence theory..

Thought and belief without propositional content.. to me resembles instinct.
I had assumed that propositional content was exactly the methodology used to develop beliefs.
Maybe I am unclear on the idea?

In Rhetoric, confidence (persuasiveness) is important. — tim wood

Confidence in the mathematical sense used in probabilities and statistics. Roll a single six-sided die: Prior to the toss I am 5/6 confident (83%) that the result will not be a four.

↪creativesoul "it" was in reference to your post about correspondence theory..

Thought and belief without propositional content.. to me resembles instinct.
I had assumed that propositional content was exactly the methodology used to develop beliefs.
Maybe I am unclear on the idea? — Myttenar

Which wouldn't surprise me at all, given that my position is unconventional. They're catching up though. ;) Paradigm shift is a slow process. That post is underwritten by my own personal conception of thought and belief. One could say it's a theory of mind, however that would be misleading for I am not a mind/body dualist. I do not believe that disembodied cognition is even possible.

To be clear, the vast overwhelming majority of thought and belief could be said to have propositional content. It makes more sense, on my view at least, to say that most thought and belief are existentially contingent upon language, and as such the content therein can be - most times - adequately represented by virtue of statements thereof.

However, I do strongly argue for the notion that philosophy - on a whole - has gotten thought and belief wrong.

When I wrote "Yes it does", 'it' referenced the article. — creativesoul

Now I'm really confused. I thought you were disagreeing with the article, as in, yes, truth does have a single definition, and my disagreement grounds my questions. Or is it, yes indeed, the article did say that, and the fact that it said it grounds my questions. But maybe this is a path we can quit together.

I'm also up for it if you would like to compare the different conceptions of "truth". Other than that, I would still like for you to answer the question I asked earlier. Twice. — creativesoul

No, I wouldn't. Over years I've read maybe 1000-2000 pages - books, articles - on what truth is, because I care and wanted to know. I can report that nothing conclusive came from any of them. The DNA of most theories is mostly similar - but not the same. It leads me to conclude that what truth is, depends on why it's being sought, and more subtly, how. (How you look for it may determine what you find.)

As to the twice asked question, it's a kindness to ask it again. I looked back and found these:

Earlier you used the notion of what makes a true proposition true. I asked a question about that, but it has not been answered. — creativesoul

If that which makes a proposition true differs from true proposition to true proposition, then in what way does it differ? — creativesoul

That's quite a challenging question to try to answer.

Side note: Kurt Godel of undecidable proposition fame wrote a mathematical expression that translates to, "this sentence is not provable." In writing this expression he proved (and exhibited) that there were propositions that were true, but not provable (details omitted, it's not quite that simple). He wrote it that way because he could rigorously express something like "x proves y." He apparently determined that he could not rigorously define truth, because had he been able to, he could have written a mathematical expression that would translate into "this sentence is not true." Neither of these sentences are especially interesting in English, but because they're mathematical expressions, the one on provability is very interesting to mathematicians because it says that there are true propositions that are not provable, in fact an infinite number of them. Had he been able to write the sentence about truth, he then would have created a mathematical expression that was both true and not true, and that would have been very, very bad indeed! We can conclude, then, that truth, whatever else can be said of it, is not rigorously definable.

One challenge is that in order to note differences, we first have to know what we're comparing. This cries out for a definition, but if we do that we've essentially begged the question. That leaves us with looking at each true proposition, to see if what makes one true is exactly the same thing that makes another true. Can we agree without demonstration that they are not the same? 2+2=4 and "strawberries taste good": both propositions, both true. But what in their respective truths is the same? Or in the infinite number of true propositions, is there one way that they're all true? I suspect there are infinite ways that an infinite number of true propositions are true, each unique to its own proposition, though many may share similarities.

One thing can be the same: that a bunch of folks sitting around say, "Yup, that's true." I think that neither the consensus nor the cause of it is trivial (although they could all be wrong!). A sign of this kind of truth is an affective change: relaxation. In the presence of truth understood and acknowledged as such, there's a kind of relaxation, a suspension of critical faculty. How many ways are there to get a person to suspend their critical judgment in favour of acceptance?

Confidence in the mathematical sense used in probabilities and statistics. Roll a single six-sided die: Prior to the toss I am 5/6 confident (83%) that the result will not be a four. — AngleWyrm

Sure, confidence, but you also have a categorical proposition about your chances that is true, if you've done the math right, and false, if you haven't.

How many ways are there to get a person to suspend their critical judgment in favour of acceptance? — tim wood

In order to achieve the relaxation that accompanies belief that something or other is true...

How many ways are there to convince another to believe something?

Truth - here - doesn't factor into the goal, except with regard to getting the answer correct. Otherwise... Ends justify the means.

Regarding another portion of your last reply...

What would count as conclusive with regard to truth?

"both propositions, both true. But what in their respective truths is the same? "

Since "strawberries taste good" is subjective I'm going to say perspective.

Sure, confidence, but you also have a categorical proposition about your chances that is true, if you've done the math right, and false, if you haven't. — tim wood

Willingness to be wrong is part of the equation. I can state with 100% certainty what the sum of the roll of a pair of dice will be before the toss: It will be a number in the range [2..12].

The value of 100% certainty is that it shows the full range of what is possible, but without a sense of what is probable. There is a trade-off that can be made where I can choose to be less certain of what is possible in exchange for what is probable.

For example, I can choose to narrow the outcome of that toss of dice to be a prediction in the range [5..9], with a confidence of (24/36 = 6/9 = 67%). I'll be right 2 times out of 3 and wrong 1 time out of three. If there's a financial gain/loss involved then that may be enough base a decision.