I've felt this discussion is lacking a Thomist to defend, or at least elaborate on, the argument. Perhaps you are such a Thomist? If so, you will be providing a useful service, as Thomists that have contributed to discussions in the past are absent here.

My question for the Thomist - be it you or somebody else - about the above sentence, is

"what does the sentence mean, beyond the everyday notion that 'I would not be surprised if this acorn became a tree', and if it does mean something more, can that thing be explained in a non-circular manner, ie without using synonyms for 'potential' like 'can', 'possible', 'may', 'might'. — andrewk

Sorry, I am not a Thomist, really. But I'm not really sure you would have to be in order to believe in concepts like potency and act which I find to originate in Aristotle, and again to be revitalized in the organicism of the Romantic philosophers.

I'll also add that it doesn't seem to be clearly the same thing as possibility, as I've said earlier but, more of a "constrained possibility" contained immanently within organisms. There are also two types of potencies within Aristotle I think that are good at making sense of the world. The first at rest, and the rest in action.

Just a classic stock example by Sachs: Take a blind man. It would be the case that a blind man does not have the potency to see anymore, while a man with his eyes closed does have the capacity to see, and in fact a capacity that is furthermore at rest. When the non-blind man opens his eyes, his potential to see is not removed, but is in an active process (Aristotle's word for entelecheia or being-at-work-staying-itself ). In this sense, what we are not talking about something that surprises us or not but something intrinsic to the blind man.

Entelecheia seems to be a phenomenological observation that is indicative of all organisms in the world. Each organism strives towards certain ends, from certain means. To use Schelling's terms again, a unity of both product and productivity which are both needed in the world.

Just a classic stock example by Sachs: Take a blind man. It would be the case that a blind man does not have the potency to see anymore, while a man with his eyes closed does have the capacity to see, and in fact a capacity that is furthermore at rest. When the non-blind man opens his eyes, his potential to see is not removed, but is in an active process (Aristotle's word for entelecheia or being-at-work-staying-itself ). In this sense, what we are not talking about something that surprises us or not but something intrinsic to the blind man. — Marty

The argument here, from Aristotle, is to demonstrate that the powers of the soul, the potencies, (the powers of self-subsistence, self-movement, sensation, intellection) exist as a form of potential. Since these powers are not active all the time, but continue to exist as potencies, we must assume that their essence is to be found in potential. When any such potential is active, this does not negate the potential, so we cannot properly describe the activity relating to such potencies as the actualizing of a potential.

Potential is passive, as that which is partaken of. And as Socrates describes in Plato's Parmenides, there is a way that the passive thing is partaken of without loosing anything of itself. This is like time, as Socrates says, "the day". No matter how many different places take part in the day, this changes nothing of the day. So this is the way that a passive potential can be taken part of, without changing or loosing anything of itself.

Basically it's not clear to me how anything else could come into existence if there weren't potential for them to exist in the first actualizer. — Andrew M

So I wonder if we're mixing up a couple of different concepts here: conservation and creation. My understanding is that Feser's argument concerns conservation. That is, we assume that the natural universe already exists and show that it depends on God's conservative act in order to remain in existence. It is in the act of conservation that God must play the role of the unactualized actualizer, whereby the changes occurring in the natural world find their causative ground in Him.

Creation is (perhaps) a different thing altogether in that it is ex nihilo. We have to remember that in the Aristotelian tradition potency has no reality apart from act. To create is not to draw actuality out of potentiality, but to cause something new to exist, along with its potentialities, where nothing existed previously. You might inquire as to how creation ex nihilo is possible, but I don't think that is the point of Feser's argument.

I just purchased Feser's book and have started reading the chapter in question. Interested to see where this goes.

Agreed. So I reject the idea that the first actualizer has potential for its own existence which is why I've said that it necessarily exists. However it doesn't follow that it doesn't have potentials for the existence of other substances. — Andrew M

But in this case the potentials belong to the other substances, not to the unactualized actualizer. If the unactualized actualizer, even if it were to exist necessarily, had potencies of its own then it wouldn't truly be an unactualized actualizer because its potencies would require actualization from something more fundamental. See also the above comments regarding conservation and creation.

Just a classic stock example by Sachs: Take a blind man. It would be the case that a blind man does not have the potency to see anymore, while a man with his eyes closed does have the capacity to see, and in fact a capacity that is furthermore at rest. When the non-blind man opens his eyes, his potential to see is not removed, but is in an active process (Aristotle's word for entelecheia or being-at-work-staying-itself ). In this sense, what we are not talking about something that surprises us or not but something intrinsic to the blind man. — Marty

Would I be correct in guessing that Sachs ia an Aristotelian.

The trouble with so many Aristotelian expositions is that they often use an example rather than a proper definition to explain a term. That might be fine if they were reasoning about the everyday, but it fails completely when they are trying to reason about non-everyday things like the source of the universe, because the example is everyday but what they try to apply it to is not.

When we take the blind man example away from the everyday context it becomes inapplicable, because (as only one example) we can easily imagine the creation of electronic eyes connected to the optic nerve of a previously blind person.

It seems to me that to be an Aristotelian one has to make an act of faith that various undefined terms, like potential, essence, entelechia and eudaimonia (even though I quite like that last one), mean something objective and tangible and can be used in the course of logical reasoning.

The consequence of that is that an Aristotelian argument (and hence also most Thomist arguments) are never going to be accepted by non-Aristotelians because they are not prepared to make that act of faith.

Feser's writing pullulates with such undefined terms, which is OK for him because he has faith, but it is meaningless to an infidel like me.

(Y)

Well, this would be my guess: there's some problems there. When Aristotle speaks about organisms he'll basically appeal to them as acting as totums, as opposed to composites or artifacts. The totum, as opposed to a composite is basically an organism that is self-organizing, self-determining, and functions according to its whole which determine its parts. When we insert such an eye it isn't a part of that process, and it seems completely fair to me for the sciences to attempt to find what is intrinsic to a blind man. What is the immanent causation that occurs within such an organism.

When that function is lost the body generally has said to lose the potency as a whole. However, if we replace it with electronic eyes, there begins to be a sense where the capability of its function is said to be externally gotten instead of it being immanent to the organism itself. The organism would never produce an electronic eye.

When Aristotle speaks about organisms he'll basically appeal to them as acting as totums, as opposed to composites or artifacts. The totum, as opposed to a composite is basically an organism that is self-organizing, self-determining, and functions according to its whole which determine its parts. When we insert such an eye it isn't a part of that process, — Marty

The trouble is that this requires yet another Aristotelian leap of faith, to believe that the word totum means something exact and objective that can be used for reasoning. I wonder whether Aristotle would call a coral, which is a symbiosis between two different organisms, a totum. Or a hive of bees.

If something inserted into the totum is not part of the totum then nearly all of a person is not part of their totum, since, other than the initial two cells that came together to form a zygote, a person is made up entirely of things inserted from outside - food, water, oxygen etc. I wonder how Feser would seek to include food but exclude artificial eyes. Having considered those, one could then consider things like transplanted organs and skin grafts.

I must re-emphasise that I'm not trying to persuade Aristotelians, Thomists or Feserians out of their beliefs. We all make leaps of faith in something or other, so making it towards Aristotle is as good as to anywhere else. I'm just pointing out that the arguments they see as so powerful mean nothing to somebody that is not prepared to take the Aristotelian Leap of Faith. So it would be unreasonable for them to expect the arguments to mean anything to a non-Aristotelian.

It seems to me that to be an Aristotelian one has to make an act of faith that various undefined terms, like potential, essence, entelechia and eudaimonia (even though I quite like that last one), mean something objective and tangible and can be used in the course of logical reasoning. — andrewk

Aristotelian terms like "matter", "form", "potential", and "actual", are developed through volumes of consistent usage. The key point here is consistency. So as one reads the usage in different books of Aristotle, in different fields of study, the meaning of the terms starts to come through, from these various applications of the same terminology.

The consequence of that is that an Aristotelian argument (and hence also most Thomist arguments) are never going to be accepted by non-Aristotelians because they are not prepared to make that act of faith. — andrewk

What is required, rather than an act of faith, is an act of intense study. You might argue that to embark on such an extended task, such as to understand Aristotle's writing, would require faith that this would be a worthwhile venture. But I don't think it's a matter of faith, rather it's a matter of interest. Some are interested, some are not

I'm just pointing out that the arguments they see as so powerful mean nothing to somebody that is not prepared to take the Aristotelian Leap of Faith. — andrewk

So I think that you are quite wrong here to call this a "Leap of Faith". It is a matter of having an interest in something and having the commitment and perseverance to follow through and develop an understanding of that thing which interests you.

The trouble is that this requires yet another Aristotelian leap of faith, to believe that the word totum means something exact and objective that can be used for reasoning. I wonder whether Aristotle would call a coral, which is a symbiosis between two different organisms, a totum. Or a hive of bees.

It is odd that you have no problem differentiating the hive of bees as being consist of many organisms, each with their own particular totum, and a coral, each with different totums working in a symbiosis. It's true, however, that you can go and see larger wholes. That's why I'm a fan of top-down causation.

I don't know how Feser would, but the way in an artifact differs from a totum is that the artifact's whole is determined by the concept - it's logocentric. We will create an electronic eye when we conceive of such a product, and put it into action according to the principles we wish.

However, organisms aren't imparting just a concept when they are producing something. Either to their offspring or immanently when the organism is going through a process of division, expansion, or some sort of immanent function. (This is a work of physis) The offspring receives the prior organism in such a way that it will act in accordance to its parents genes - though no completely. Unlike the concept which is external to it.

Aristotelian terms like "matter", "form", "potential", and "actual", are developed through volumes of consistent usage. The key point here is consistency. So as one reads the usage in different books of Aristotle, in different fields of study, the meaning of the terms starts to come through, from these various applications of the same terminology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, but this is crap. The key point isn't consistency, but the fact that these terms originated through an effort to understand different aspects of reality. If you go back to the process, you will understand the genesis of the terms, and so you will understand that they make sense and refer to real aspects of the world.

The point is, that if you want to understand what Aristotle meant by "potential", or "matter", or some other word, you must read how he used that word. It is only by using that word in many different instances, in a consistent way, that he gave the word an intelligible meaning.

Attempting to understand "the genesis of the terms" is pointless if what one is interested in is the meaning which Aristotle gave the terms. Why would you look at all the different usage in the time around Aristotle, if what you are interested in what Aristotle meant by those words? Why would someone look at how you and various other people use a word if what they are interested in is what I mean when I use that word. So really, what you said is what is crap.

Attempting to understand "the genesis of the terms" is pointless if what one is interested in is the meaning which Aristotle gave the terms. Why would you look at all the different usage in the time around Aristotle, if what you are interested in what Aristotle meant by those words? Why would someone look at how you and various other people use a word if what they are interested in is what I mean when I use that word. So really, what you said is what is crap. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a strawman. To understand the genesis of the term means exactly to understand the process through which Aristotle went to come up with the term.

It is a matter of having an interest in something and having the commitment and perseverance to follow through and develop an understanding of that thing which interests you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can agree with that. I have not read Aristotle's physics or metaphysics for the same reason that I have not read any astrology texts - because the evidence that has been presented to me about them indicates that the ideas therein are outdated and have no application other than to the understanding of what sorts of things people used to believe a long time ago.

For somebody with an interest in those, it is an excellent idea for them to spend the hours and days necessary to read it and get a sense of what Aristotle was thinking. But I have no interest in it. If I'm going to read translations of Ancient Greek texts for reasons other than historical interest, I'll read Aristotle's logic or ethics, as they have not become outdated.

But it makes no sense to describe an argument that Aristotle or one of his followers makes as a 'proof', when it does not conform to the accepted rules of logic, one of which is that all terms used must be well-defined. 'Getting a sense of what Aristotle was getting at' from reading hundreds of pages can never substitute for a definition, because all those pages can contain is a finite number of examples of how he used a word, and examples - be they ever so many - are not a definition.

It sounds from this post like you have some particular examples in mind. Can you post them and we'll discuss. My expectation is that the predictions will either be in terms of other words that are equally nebulous, or they will be 'definition by example'. But I am happy to be shown to be wrong.

You might inquire as to how creation ex nihilo is possible, but I don't think that is the point of Feser's argument. — Aaron R

Creation ex materia is the natural assumption if we observe how things come into existence in ordinary experience. For example, a builder constructs a house using existing material such as wood and bricks.

If creation ex materia of other substances is not ruled out for the first actualizer then statement 9 of Feser's argument remains at issue. Creation ex nihilo is just as in need of demonstration as pure actuality, immateriality, etc., are.

I just purchased Feser's book and have started reading the chapter in question. Interested to see where this goes. — Aaron R

Agreed. It's good to see the argument clearly laid out such that it can be evaluated.

But in this case the potentials belong to the other substances, not to the unactualized actualizer. If the unactualized actualizer, even if it were to exist necessarily, had potencies of its own then it wouldn't truly be an unactualized actualizer because its potencies would require actualization from something more fundamental. See also the above comments regarding conservation and creation. — Aaron R

The potential that the first actualizer has to create other substances would be actualized by the first actualizer itself. To use the builder/house analogy, the builder has the potential to construct a house. The builder actualizes that potential when he constructs a house.

Note that the builder is a hylomorphic substance, so the material of the builder also contributes to the construction of the house as well as the wood and bricks. This is taken to its logical conclusion in the first actualizer since there is no external material.

Definitions lots of times only make sense to those who have familiarised themselves with the subject of study or when supplemented with examples and other auxiliary comments. — Πετροκότσυφας

Whether a definition makes sense is about whether one sees the reason for it, and how it might be used. That is different from the question of whether something is well-defined. In mathematics one frequently encounters definitions that one can see are well-defined, even though one has no idea (at first) of their motivation or use. It is the understanding of motivation and use that requires lots of reading and practice, not the determination of whether the definition is well-defined (non-nebulous).

Both quantum mechanics and general relativity could be fully defined and all the laws laid out in less than ten pages each, and a mathematically-literate reader could check that the definitions were well-defined, even if she had no idea what the purpose or applicability of any of it was. It's the purpose and applicability that accounts for the other few hundred pages of any relativity or QM text.

My assertion is that Aristotle's definitions are nebulous, not that they are hard to understand. That assertion is based on the observation that definitions that have been presented here (other than in his Logic and to some extent his Ethics) have always been nebulous. If there are any that are not nebulous, it should be able to be presented here in a short post, just as with the definition that a Hilbert Space is a vector space over the real or complex numbers, equipped with an inner product, that is also a complete metric space. For the Hilbert Space, a branching tree of definitions would ensue as necessary for readers that did not know the definition of vector space, real numbers, complex numbers, inner product, complete or metric space. But that tree would terminate in leaves within a few steps and at no stage would there be any concern that any of the terms was nebulous. Readers could see that the terms were all well-defined even though they may have no idea what the purpose of any of them were.

To understand the genesis of the term means exactly to understand the process through which Aristotle went to come up with the term. — Agustino

Then why did you say that what I said was crap? That was a senseless insult.

'Getting a sense of what Aristotle was getting at' from reading hundreds of pages can never substitute for a definition, because all those pages can contain is a finite number of examples of how he used a word, and examples - be they ever so many - are not a definition. — andrewk

It's a completely different form of argument from what you're used to. It's not deduction. It's not induction in the sense of scientific induction, but another form of induction concerning conclusions relative to the way that words are used. It's called dialectics. In dialectics we do not proceed by first defining words, we start with particular words and proceed toward determining the significance of those words. This requires putting those words into all sorts of familiar contexts. If consistency is maintained then a concept can be developed.

Both quantum mechanics and general relativity could be fully defined and all the laws laid out in less than ten pages each, and a mathematically-literate reader could check that the definitions were well-defined, even if she had no idea what the purpose or applicability of any of it was. It's the purpose and applicability that accounts for the other few hundred pages of any relativity or QM text. — andrewk

I disagree with this. I find that there is a whole lot of ambiguity within commonly accepted definitions in physics. Why do you think that QM is subject to so many different "interpretations"? If there wasn't ambiguity as to what the applied terms really meant, there could not be multiple interpretations.

If there are any that are not nebulous, it should be able to be presented here in a short post, just as with the definition that a Hilbert Space is a vector space over the real or complex numbers, equipped with an inner product, that is also a complete metric space. — andrewk

The problem is not one of nebulous definitions, it is whether or not the definition corresponds with what the word really refers to.. So physicists can define "Hilbert Space" in a way that suits their purpose, but this does not necessarily mean that their definition represents anything real. In ontology and metaphysics, the intent is to describe reality so it is not a case of producing useful definitions, but a case of finding the correct words to apply to the appropriate aspects of reality. Describing something is a completely different endeavor from using mathematics to make predictions. Definitions are posterior to the former, but prior to the latter.

If there wasn't ambiguity as to what the applied terms really meant, there could not be multiple interpretations. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no ambiguity. You are misunderstanding what an interpretation of QM is. That's understandable, as the word is used differently there from how it is normally used.

An interpretation of QM is not about working out what is meant by the things QM says. Those things are beyond question, as all QM does is make predictions about observations. An interpretation of QM is about speculating about the things that QM does not talk about. It is essentially proposing a set of metaphysical hypotheses that is consistent with QM.

It's a completely different form of argument from what you're used to. — Metaphysician Undercover

say rather - 'from what one encounters in science or mathematics'. I am plenty used to encountering that form of argument around here.

I have nothing against dialectics, I think they're fine. It's only when people pretend a dialectic is something it isn't that I take issue. Calling a dialectic text a 'proof', as the OP does, and as some of Aristotle's disciples do, is pretending the dialectic is what it's not, and that is what I am criticising. For all I know, Aristotle may be rolling in his grave at the thought that there are people out there that are saying his dialectics are proofs.

Beginning means that part of a thing from which one would start first. Is that well-defined or is it nebulous? — Πετροκότσυφας

Nebulous. Who is this 'one' to which it refers? What does it mean to 'start from' the beginning? What is the beginning of a triangle? What is the beginning of a wheel? What if different people would start first at different places - then there is no unique beginning, as it depends on who we're asking.

But whether this matters depends on whether you agree with MU that Aristotle's metaphysics texts contain dialectics rather than proofs. If so then definitions do not matter, nor does nebulosity. It's only when someone claims that it's a proof that we need to hold it to that higher standard. So far as I can see, neither you nor MU are making such a claim, in which case there is no disagreement.

All of these have formal definitions, as you well know. Go to the wikipedia page on any of those terms, go to the section entitled 'Definition' and you will find it.

I have no idea what that last statement means. But if you are trying to argue that the definitions in Aristotle's metaphysics are as formal as those in mathematics then I'm afraid I have no interest in engaging with such a notion. Nobody that understands mathematics would agree with that assertion, and that's enough for me. MU has said that it is unreasonable to expect metaphysical dialectics to have the same characteristics of precision as mathematics has, and I agree with him.

That's extremely unfortunate. I really don't think any form of science can be done without telos, or what you called "acquainted" Aristotelianism. Considering there's a lot of philosophers today that think the same, and the reintroduction of powers in analytic philosophy. Not to mention people who try to tackle the issue of Goethean science that's very similar to the concepts use in Aristotle.

Seems like just dismissal to me with how huge Aristotle was for the development of Philosophy.

Seems like just dismissal to me with how huge Aristotle was for the development of Philosophy. — Marty

Not at all. Nobody is denying he had a huge influence, just as Galen did with Medicine. The fact that medical schools no longer teach Galen's beliefs does nothing to deny his historical importance.

I presume you would not expect physics departments to still teach Aristotle's physics. But the fact that they do not does not belie the fact that his physics was influential right up to the time of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton.

Further, as I've said above, Aristotle's Logic and Ethics are still as applicable as ever and still play roles in real life - his Logic in both philosophy and mathematics departments, and his Ethics in how many people choose to live their lives.

I really don't think any form of science can be done without telos — Marty

The evidence does not support such a belief. Surveys have shown that large proportions of scientists are not theists, or part of any religion (eg here), and hence one would not expect them to believe teleological accounts. Yet they manage to continue to produce inspiring, useful science.

I actually would like physics departments to include Aristotlean concepts, at least minimally be familiar with them before rejection. I think all sciences have an a-priori metaphysical assumptions about them that guides how they are done -- particularly the idea that the world operates like a mechanism and has no direction. Its about the same as I feel about how important philosophy of science ought to be to a physicist.

Fairly important.

Then why did you say that what I said was crap? That was a senseless insult. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you talked about the central importance of consistency - ie checking out that Aristotle uses the term with the same definition/meaning throughout. That's irrelevant.

The evidence does not support such a belief. Surveys have shown that large proportions of scientists are not theists, or part of any religion (eg here), and hence one would not expect them to believe teleological accounts. Yet they manage to continue to produce inspiring, useful science.

I'm not sure what that's suppose to mean. Teleology is a metaphysical question, so I wouldn't expect scientists to know much about it, understand how it works, or even be aware that they use it all the time.

Not to mention, you don't have to be a theist in order to believe in teleology.

I think all sciences have an a-priori metaphysical assumptions about them that guides how they are done — Marty

Even a practising scientist is not in a position to make such a statement, unless they have worked in every scientific field. If you have not studied science at least to tertiary level, and preferably engaged in at least some research, this opinion is simply uninformed.

Science looks for patterns and makes models to describe them. One does not need to postulate a telos to do that, any more than one needs a telos when one looks for interesting shapes in clouds or star constellations. One may overlay a telos on it, if one's philosophical disposition encourages that - and some do. But such an overlay is strictly optional, and plenty don't.

Even amongst the ancients there was a split between those that believed in telos, like Aristotle, and those that did not, like Democritus and Epicurus. One either accepts telos as an axiom or one does not. Hence any proof that relies on teleology should make it clear that it relies on acceptance of an axiom of teleology rather than being presented as a proof that any reasonable person should accept.

Even a practising scientist is not in a position to make such a statement, unless they have worked in every scientific field.

(teleology) relies on acceptance of an axiom of teleology rather than being presented as a proof that any reasonable person should accept.

These two things seem to be in conflict.

Also: I mean, practicing scientists have made this claim. Many of them.

Being “endowed with a purpose or project is essential to the very definition of living beings.” — Jacques Monod

“It would make no sense to talk of the purpose of adaptation of stars, mountains, or the laws of physics,” but “adaptedness of living beings is too obvious to be overlooked.... Living beings have an internal, or natural, teleology.” — Theodosius Dobzhansky

E.S.Russell, Colin Pittendrigh, Ernst Mayr, Paul Weiss, Robert Arp, Hans Jonas, Francisco J. Ayala, J. B. S. Haldane, etc.

Yeah, anybody that thinks telos is necessary doesn't think it is optional. I know a lot of people think that it is optional, but I'm not sure what it means to say that things aren't directed, or dont have a means-end framework.

Not to mention the philosophers Hegel, Schelling,

An interpretation of QM is not about working out what is meant by the things QM says. Those things are beyond question, as all QM does is make predictions about observations. An interpretation of QM is about speculating about the things that QM does not talk about. It is essentially proposing a set of metaphysical hypotheses that is consistent with QM. — andrewk

This explanation of what QM says is nebulous. Making mathematical predictions about observations is doing nothing more than saying that if we put two groups of two things together, then we'll have four things. Unless we know something about those things which we are dealing with, then the mathematics with all of its axioms and definitions, is meaningless. And to know something about those things, we refer to descriptions rather than definitions.

Understanding the mathematics without understanding the thing which the mathematics is being applied to, does not constitute a complete understanding. I can predict that the sun will rise tomorrow, and even the time at which it will rise, without understanding anything about the solar system. The predictions are derived from definitions. To understand the thing which the prediction is concerned with, requires descriptive speculation, and this is a hit and miss operation, with much trial and error. The use of this trial and error activity, along with its descriptive terms, and the assessment of this process, is just as important toward understanding the object, as is the use of mathematical definitions.

So it is wrong to dismiss an activity which is an attempt to understand, as less important, or not as reliable, as an activity which uses clear definitions, simply because it takes into account the many different ways in which specific words are used rather than adhering to clear definitions. They are simply aimed at different aspects of understanding. Mathematics and predictions are used to understand the activities of things. Descriptive words are used to understand the things themselves.

Because you talked about the central importance of consistency - ie checking out that Aristotle uses the term with the same definition/meaning throughout. That's irrelevant. — Agustino

If there is no consistency in word usage then there is no conceptual structure, and the work is unintelligible. It's quite clear to me that consistency is extremely relevant. If you think that you could read any material, philosophy, science, fiction, or whatever, in which the author does not maintain some degree of consistency in word usage, and find that work to be intelligible, I think you're fooling yourself.

Even a practising scientist is not in a position to make such a statement, unless they have worked in every scientific field. If you have not studied science at least to tertiary level, and preferably engaged in at least some research, this opinion is simply uninformed.

Science looks for patterns and makes models to describe them. One does not need to postulate a telos to do that, any more than one needs a telos when one looks for interesting shapes in clouds or star constellations. One may overlay a telos on it, if one's philosophical disposition encourages that - and some do. But such an overlay is strictly optional, and plenty don't. — andrewk

To a certain extent I would argue that one of the things allowing "scientism" to run rampant in many scientific circles is the loosening of importance of philosophical reflection in scientific reasoning. As science is taught (at least from my experiences), philosophy is not taken seriously, sometimes to the point of hostility. Many scientists, it would seem, fail to understand the metaphysical assumptions underlying their research, which leads them to assume something is the case (because of their general intellectual environment, probably most often) without actually arguing for it.

It used to be the case that great scientists were also great philosophers, or at least respected the importance of philosophy. They understood that science has limitations and works within a pre-established metaphysical framework. These metaphysical views were not assumed to be true, but they were approached in a more open-ended way. Many 20th century scientists took the views of Hume, Kant or Husserl seriously. Aristotle and Peirce are good examples of scientist-philosophers. etc.

Anyway, most scientists, like most people, believe there exists a real external world, that causality is real, that universals are real (re: natural kinds), that humans stand in a Cartesian relationship to the world, and, yes, that some form of teleology is real (even if most do not realize that teleology extends beyond intelligent-design babble). When you go into a specific field you see much more diversity of opinion in many metaphysical issues; neuroscience, psychology and the cognitive sciences have the representationalist theory of mind, and reductive materialism as paradigm ideas (yet there is a lot of disagreement, and I for one think they are wrong). QM leads us into theories of reality, realism and idealism or panpsychism or whatever. And biology is rife with teleological descriptions that, in most cases, are "reduced away" to mere mechanical laws with varying degrees of success.

So the point here is that science absolutely cannot operate without the use of metaphysical assumptions, whether scientists like it or not. Back in the day this was not controversial, but nowadays anything that threatens the monopoly, or hegemony, of science in our intellectual inquiry is immediately cast into doubt. We can't do science without metaphysical assumptions, but we can do science without metaphysics. But it just ends up cheap and uninteresting.

Making mathematical predictions about observations is doing nothing more than saying that if we put two groups of two things together, then we'll have four things. Unless we know something about those things which we are dealing with, then the mathematics with all of its axioms and definitions, is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're entitled to that view. I think you are taking too wide an interpretation of 'meaningless'. Science is useful and it is also beautiful, to those that understand it. You may not be in a position to find it beautiful but there is no question that you find it useful. If you don't also find it meaningful, be content that it is useful.

So it is wrong to dismiss an activity which is an attempt to understand, as less important, or not as reliable, as an activity which uses clear definitions — Metaphysician Undercover

You are forgetting how that discussion arose. It has nothing to do with dismissing any activity. You claimed that the proliferation of interpretations of QM imply that QM's definitions are nebulous. My response was that interpretations talk about things that QM does not even seek to address, and that they are completely different activities, not that one is more important than the other. To complain that QM does not address the issues with which interpretations concern themself is like complaining because biology tells us nothing about how stars are formed.