I do not think I have been inconsistent, maybe incoherent sometimes.
I'd love to find out at the very least where I am inconsistent.

Here's a test you can do for yourself... Define "truth". Then copy and paste all paragraphs you wrote that include the term. Replace the term with the definition. Re-read. Does the entirety of your work make sense?

Yes, because there is a double meaning. A place where I have been incoherent.
The initial term truth remains undefined.

I introduce another two terms true and false later on based on the undefined term truth earlier.

Welcome to the forum...

(Y)

I argue later that this is the best way to deal with defining truth, and avoiding a completely circular definition like "Truth is that which is true", or avoiding an infinite tower which was used by Tarski, because it entails assuming infinity.

Not sure if you are being sarcastic. Probably are.

Oh, and inconsistent is incoherent in the sense I'm using... two ways to talk about the same thing...

Tarski is good. Lots of folk paved the way.

The thing is I am not talking about the same thing.
There are two truths in the statements I am making. I apologize for not pointing it out earlier.
I have made the edit now.

The truth which is defined eventually is not the same as the original truth.

The thing is I am not talking about the same thing. — guptanishank

Then you ought not use the same name.

Yeah, I think though there is no better name for it. I am trying to justify using the same name currently, give me some time.

Fine, I will change the names. Hopefully it comes out more poetic :P

Made the edit, hopefully it is more clear now.

Heidegger on truth:

"Truth... comes to its ultimate essence which is called certainty. The name expresses that truth concerns consciousness as a knowledge, a representation which is grounded in consciousness in such a way that only that knowledge is valid as knowledge which at the same time knows itself and what it knows as such, and is certain of itself in this knowledge. Certainty here is not to be taken only as an addition to knowledge in the sense that it accomplishes the appropriation and the possession of knowledge. Rather, certainty is the authoritative mode of knowledge, that is, "truth," as the consciousness, conscious of itself, of what is known. The mere having of something in consciousness is, in contrast, either no longer knowledge or not yet knowledge." (The End of Philosophy, 1973, tr. Stambaugh, p. 20)

Let’s give this property the name “existence”. — guptanishank

Existence isn't generally considered a property - at least not a first-order one, which is what your scheme relies on.

You seem to be close to defining truth in terms of satisfaction. Not too bad an approximation.

Truth and falsity are the fundamental units of epistemology.
True statements are accurate in relation to some universe, and completely logical.
False statements are statements that are inaccurate and/or illogical.
There are also statements (most) which are true in relation to some possible universes, but false in relation to others - ambiguously true or false statements.

There's a problem on your definition!
Universe is undefined. Cannot be defined.

False as you say is in relation to true.

The problem with that universe thing again.

No, it's on logical validity that I seek to define Truth on. Forget existence, give it the word A. It would not change a bit.

Existence just came close to what I wanted. Here, sets can exist, statements can exist, Questions can exist, No can exist, and maybe a few other elements, or uncertainty can also exist. But,k you will never know exactly what all can exist, so it's not possible to define this set.
It's the Universe, it will always be undefined.

Edit: The Universe is the set of all sets in existence.

But then existence is always undefined.

But the true set which I defined has a one to one correspondence with this undefined set, at least in one dimension, by definition, or construction through logic.

it's on logical validity that I seek to define Truth on — guptanishank

Trouble is, validity is defined in terms of truth. Circularity ensues.

Trouble is, validity is defined in terms of truth. Circularity ensues. — Banno

Um, no it isn't. What am I missing?

Tell me more.

All m is P
All S is m
----
All S is P

Valid but no truth.

All bicycles are two-wheeled vehicles.
All Dutchmen have two-wheeled vehicles.
----
All Dutchmen have bicycles.

True (on the assumption that all Dutchmen have bicycles), but certainly not valid.

I'm guessing you're arguing that you cannot create an argument that is both valid and false. The problem with that is you have to know the truth of the matter independent of the argument. The best you can do with that is argue that truth can be defined in terms of validity (the premises are true; the form is valid; the conclusion must be true). Not validity in terms of truth. (E.g., The conclusion is true; the argument must be valid.) The only point I have here is that I'm thinking of validity as a matter of form, and truth as being true.

Heidegger on truth:

"Truth... comes to its ultimate essence which is called certainty. — tim wood

I would certainly agree that truth has the property of certainty. Although it's relation to consciousness as mentioned in your post is slightly long worded, and complicated to understand in one try. I will read again.

"Trouble is, validity is defined in terms of truth. Circularity ensues."

I think I agree with you on this. If you were to define logical validity:
All m is P, is True
All S is m, is True
----
All S is P , is True.
How, do we know All S is P is valid? Because it is true, and other sentences which can be formed may not be.

I think that is a circularity we cannot do without, any definition of truth has to be based on some logical validity.

I just like the good old "it's valid if it is true under all interpretations" thing.

You guys are far to clever for me.

I think that is a circularity we cannot do without, any definition of truth has to be based on some logical validity. — guptanishank

There are no end of threads on truth in PF. The net of them, as I read them, is that "truth" is an abstract general term that means merely and only that which makes individual true propositions true, which can differ from true proposition to true proposition. You can if you like invoke validity, but it seems at a level which renders it trivial. The true is true because it is true. Can you improve on that?

A statement can be true without being the result of valid inference, although tim wood's candidate isn't. Logical validity isn't necessary.

One can also hold unshakable conviction in a statement, and the statement can still be false. Certainty is not truth, although it is a result of presupposing it.

Strange thing about false statements, is that they can also be ascribed the property of truth, for example. — guptanishank

Sure. That's what happens when one holds false belief. Being called "true" doesn't make it so.

The net of them, as I read them, is that "truth" is an abstract general term that means merely and only that which makes individual true propositions true, which can differ from true proposition to true proposition... — tim wood

"That which makes individual true propositions true"...

Is the first "true" above necessary?

If that which makes a proposition true differs from true proposition to true proposition, then in what way does it differ?

All m is P
All S is m
----
All S is P

Valid but no truth. — tim wood

I'm not following this. Why no truth?

@creativesoul I don't think there is anything in this thread.

I'm not following this. Why no truth? — creativesoul

The only way it can be true is to import content beyond what's there, to have a prior understanding that all ms are ps and that all ss are ms. Lacking that, I don't see how any m is a p, or any s an m. It's a form without content. Implied content, sure, if you want, but that;s not the point, is it.