My take on the matter is deflationary. There is some implicit metaphysics being pushed by stating 'the fact the grass is green' from 'the grass is green'.

In other words, the fact that the grass is green alludes to a certain set of conditions that are universal in nature to determine that the grass is green, where the green grass is just a statement based on individual experience that is much like the beetle in Wittgenstein's box.

Someone here quoted Wittgenstein as saying that there are no facts, only things.

But surely facts are things, and so, by "things", he must have meant "things other than facts or other abstract objects". Or maybe "objectively, physically existent things".

(I realize that he wrote in German, and I don't know if our "thing" means exactly the same as the German world that is translated as "thing".)

Anyway, with that proviso, I think that quoted statement is true. I don't think there are any genuinely objectively-existent things. Just abstract logical facts, and inter-referring systems of them, including complex systems of them, such as our universe.

(And if there are objectively existent physical things, they’re superfluous, and the proposition of their existence is unfalsifiable and unverifiable, merely (as a brute-fact) duplicating the things that are part of our complex system of inter-referring logical facts that is our universe.)

In a previous thread, I received a question posed by @Michael. It states the following:

"So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing?" — Posty McPostface

No. The grass and a fact about it aren’t the same thing.

“If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things.”

Surely we’d all agree that facts are things, but the green grass, and the fact that it’s green are two different things.

“Are they different?”

Yes.

“If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.” — Michael

The 2nd question is easier. Of course a fact about a thing is different from the thing.

The 1st question, about observer-independence is trickier. I think it’s natural, valid and right for us to define our world in terms of our experience, and so I speak of a person’s life-experience possibility-story as being more fundamental and primary, in a meaningful way, than the possibility-world that is that story’s setting.

You could say that we’re what makes our possibility-world meaningful and relevant. (…where “meaningful and relevant” means “meaningful and relevant to us"). That sounds a bit chauvinistic on our part, doesn’t it.

The abstract logical facts that make up our life-experience possibility-stories aren’t really different from all the other abstract logical facts.

So I don’t really believe in absolute observer-dependence, Anti-Realism.

I often tell the story of the Giraffe who said, “Alright then, let’s just say the one with the longest neck gets all the jellybeans.” The chauvinism of claiming absolute observer-dependence reminds me of that story. ...the notion that we make our world relevant because relevant is defined as "relevant to us".

So I don’t really believe in absolute Anti-Realism, though it’s true that the meanings of “real”, “exist” and “is” are flexible enough for us to validly call ourselves and our experience fundamental and primary. Our world is subjective, and that’s what there is, for us. and that subjective system of facts (our individual life-experience possibility-story) has its own independent reality and validity, regardless of there being other equally-valid logical facts and systems of them.

I decided to post this question as it stood as the topic title.

Is the difference between the fact of grass being green and green grass embedded in our use of language?

Even if you agree that this world isn’t other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts about hypotheticals, the facts are still different from, and not made by, the words about them. The word are about the facts, but they aren’t responsible for the facts that they describe.

My take on the matter is deflationary. There is some implicit metaphysics being pushed by stating 'the fact the grass is green' from 'the grass is green'.

It just sounds to me like two completely different things, the grass and the fact. (…even if, as I suggest, our physical universe consists of a system of inter-referring abstract logical facts.)

Michael Ossipoff

Surely we’d all agree that facts are things, but the green grass, and the fact that it’s green are two different things. — Michael Ossipoff

When I used the term "things" I meant "material things" or "objects". Are facts the observer-independent objects¹ that true statements describe, or are they something else?

As @Sapientia said in the original discussion, we can water green grass but we can't water the fact that grass is green, and so it would seem that the fact is not the object that the true statement describes. But if it's not the object (and if it's not the true statement) then what is it?

Regardless, it would seem that we have the statement, the object, and the fact.

¹ Assuming, for the sake of argument, that objects are observer-independent.

If you meant "thing" as a material thing or material object, then of course a fact isn't that kind of a thing.

For the relation between "statement" and "fact", wouldn't you say that a statement is an utterance that tells about a fact?

But "thing" seems to mean anything that can be denoted by a noun. The words "anything" and "everything" seem to say that. Maybe a thing is anything other than action or a modifier (distinct from the words for them, and except when they too are being referred to as things). So, the meanings of "run" and "green" aren't things, but words are things, including those words.

But "object" can't just mean a material thing, because we speak of abstract objects.

No finite dictionary can non-circularly define all of its words. Maybe the meanings of "fact" and "thing" have to just be taken as understood.

Edit: Maybe, instead of saying "anything other than an action or modifier", I should say, "Whatever isn't an action or a modifier", in in order to avoid circularly using "thing" in "anything".

Michael Ossipoff

where the green grass is just a statement based on individual experience that is much like the beetle in Wittgenstein's box. — Posty McPostface

It can't just be individual experience per Wittgenstein's no private language argument. Statements of facts must be sociological. Other people agree that the grass is green such that we can construct propositions about it.

If you meant "thing" as a material thing or material object, then of course a fact isn't that kind of a thing. — Michael Ossipoff

So you agree that there is the statement ("the grass is green"), the object (the green grass), and the fact (that grass is green)? Three distinct, albeit related, things?

For the relation between "statement" and "fact", wouldn't you say that a statement is an utterance that tells about a fact?

I don't know. Do true statements refer to facts or objects?

I don't know. Do true statements refer to facts or objects? Does the statement "the ball is falling" refer to the fact that the ball is falling or to the falling ball? — Michael

True statements regarding empirical conditions have to refer to objective states of affairs other people can verify, however we wish to metaphysically classify those things. The ball is falling is true when it corresponds to an empirical situation with a falling ball.

True statements regarding empirical conditions have to refer to objective states of affairs other people can verify, however we wish to metaphysically classify those things. The ball is falling is true when it corresponds to an empirical situation with a falling ball. — Marchesk

And what are states of affairs? Facts or objects?

Doesn't a statement tell about and refer to both a fact and a thing?

Maybe a fact could be defined as a state of affairs that an utterance tells about, when an utterance tells about a state of affairs.

And what are states of affairs? Facts or objects? — Michael

I'

I'd say a state of affairs is a fact.

But even a fact is a thing when it's spoken of as one.

In "abstract object", doesn't "object" mean the same as "thing"?

Michael Ossipoff

And what are states of affairs? Facts or objects? — Michael

Objects or events. The facts are gleaned from the states of affairs.

Objects or events. The facts are gleaned from the states of affairs. — Marchesk

So what's a fact, if not the object/state-of-affairs? Is it the true statement?

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. So where does the fact fit in here? Is it the statement "grass is green"? Is it the green grass? Or is it some third thing, neither the statement nor the object? If neither, can we be more specific about what a fact is?

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. So where does the fact fit in here? Is it the statement "grass is green"? Is it the green grass? Or is it some third thing, neither the statement nor the object? — Michael

The fact is the state of affairs that the statement tells about.

It's neither the statement nor the object.

Michael Ossipoff

A statement is an utterance that tells about a fact. An utterance could be other than a statement. It could be "Oh shit!", or "Hey!".

Michael Ossipoff

o what's a fact, if not the object/state-of-affairs? Is it the true statement? — Michael

It's information about the states of affairs, which can be as simple as noting the color property of grass, or the direction the object is moving.

The fact is the state of affairs that the statement tells about.

It's neither the statement nor the object. — Michael Ossipoff

Then you're just changing the question to "what is the difference between a state of affairs and an object?"

It's information about the states of affairs, which can be as simple as noting the color property of grass, or the direction the object is moving. — Marchesk

Information? So facts are cognitive things? I guess that the answer to the original question, then, is that facts are observer-dependent (even if the object/event/state-of-affairs isn't)?

Then you're just changing the question to "what is the difference between a state of affairs and an object?" — Michael

Yes, but not just.

A thing is whatever isn't a modifier or an action (distinct from the word for a modifier or an action, and except when the modifier or action is spoken of as a thing).

I think "object" is often used to mean "thing". Don't they have the same meaning, in such usages as "abstract object"?

A fact is a state of affairs.

I guess that's true even if no statement is made, to tell about it.

Even a fact is a thing.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, but not just.

A thing is whatever isn't a modifier or an action (distinct from the word for a modifier or an action, and except when the modifier or action is spoken of as a thing).

I think "object" is often used to mean "thing". Don't they have the same meaning, in such usages as "abstract object"?

A fact is a state of affairs.

I guess that's true even if no statement is made, to tell about it.

Even a fact is a thing. — Michael Ossipoff

None of this addresses the issue. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. But then we also have the fact as something else. So what sort of thing is a fact, if neither an utterance nor a material object? And if we put the original question in context, are facts observer-independent? We can accept that material objects are observer-independent, but given that facts aren't material objects, it doesn't then follow that facts are observer-independent.

We can certainly say that facts are dependent on material objects, but then they might also depend on something else (e.g. statements).

Information? So facts are cognitive things? I guess that the answer to the original question, then, is that facts are observer-dependent (even if the object/event/state-of-affairs isn't)? — Michael

Not sure, but I'm not comfortable with saying facts are out there in the world. There is a close relationship with facts and states of affairs, but they're not the same thing in my view. Consider that the facts can be wrong. States of affairs can't be wrong. But what we take to be the facts can be.

This suggests that facts are observer-dependent to an extent. And what sort of facts we're interested in will impact how we talk about a particular state of affairs. One could say that we generate facts (or information) from our interactions with states of affairs, based on what we're interested in.

A fact, an action, or a modifier is a thing too.

...which spoils my definition of a thing.

Maybe "thing" can't be defined, though we all know what it means. Whatever can be referred to?

Michael Ossipoff

Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say, or how it relates to the issue-at-hand.

None of this addresses the issue. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. But then we also have the fact as something else. — Michael

A fact is a state of affairs. A statement is an utterance that tells about a state of affairs.

A thing is whatever can be referred to.

"The grass is green" is a statement telling about a fact. it's also a fact.

Statements and facts are things too,

The fact and the statement aren't the same thing, though the statement is our only way of denoting the fact, and so "The grass is green" is both the statement and the fact.

So what sort of thing is a fact, if not an utterance and if not a material object?

A fact is a state of affairs.

And if we put the original question in context, are facts observer-independent?

Yes, The facts that make up our life-experience possibility-story aren't different from all the other abstract facts. But our life-experience possibility-stories, complex systems of inter-referring facts, have their own reality completely independent of the other abstract facts, In the context of our ilfe-experience possibility-stories, nothing is observer-independent.

But that's just in the context of our life-experience possibility-stories. In the global context, of course all the other facts are there too, independent of us and our life-story, just as our life-experience possibility-story is independent of them.

We can accept that material objects are observer-independent

Not in the context of our life-experience stories.

Anyway, I don't think material objects have objective existence anyway. They're just part of a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts.

, but given that facts aren't material objects, it doesn't then follow that fact are observer-independent.

But aren't they anyway?

Surely the inter-referring logical facts of which someone's life-experience possibility-story is composed aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. Those other facts are independent of a person's life-experience story, just as it is independent of them.

Michael Ossipoff

The question of observer-independence broadens the subject a lot, which is why my reply was so long, and got into another topic.

Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say, or how it relates to the issue-at-hand. — Michael

I was addressing the issues that had been raised. But it isn't always obvious what someone else means, in topics such as these.

I was saying what I meant, and of course I'm always willing to clarify or re-word things, when specific phrases are referred to as unclear.

But, as I said above, sometimes we just can't tell what the other person means, no matter how well they say what they mean. Communication isn't perfect or reliable, and that's just a fact. Sorry if what I said wasn't clear, and I'm always willing to clarify or reword any particular statement or sentence referred to as unclear. But I realize that that doesn't always succeed, because communication on these topics isn't reliably successful.

We're talking about meanings of words whose meanings are rarely examined, and of course it can be far from obvious what someone else means in such a discussion.

Though I'm willing to clarify upon request, I also realize that you aren't obligated to pursue someone else's meaning.

Michael Ossipoff

Let me answer this in a briefer way:

Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say — Michael

I've been posting definitions of the terms whose definitions were being discussed. (Things, Statements,and Facts). ...and commenting on the relations between things, facts and statements.

, or how it relates to the issue-at-hand.

See above.

But I'll repeat here that, though I'm always willing to clarify what I meant by any statement that someone specifically refers to as unclear, I also realize that you aren't obligated to care what I say.

Michael Ossipoff

I'll just add that of course, the only way that I could clarify the meaning of something that I said would be for someone to, first, specify a particular statement of mine whose meaning wasn't clear, and what wasn't clear about it.

You'd have to be specific.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass?

Nothing. They are truth functionally equivalent.

But surely facts are things, — Michael Ossipoff

A thing: a,b,c...

A predicate: F,G,H...

A fact: Fa, Ga, Hb

Facts are not things.

And there is the issue.

The error here is to think that fact has one meaning, one use, and our job is to fathom that. It ain't necessarily so.

So a fact can be what is the case, and also a statement of what is the case. p as opposed to "p", an ambiguous disquatation.

But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? — Michael

Trading on the ambiguity.