Cool. I wonder, then, if the mass of the tree belongs to the perceived-tree or the collective tree?

I would say that, as measured, it belongs to the collective tree. The weightiness of objects can obviously be directly felt, though.

So the tree does not have a mass; mass is something we attribute to trees?

Edit: How is it that we can reach agreement?

The tree appears weighty, and the weight of trees can be accurately measured. A trees weightiness, as I said, but not its precise mass, is directly experienceable. So I conclude that its mass is measurable and inter-subjectively checkable, and belongs, not to its individual appearances, but to its collectively established attributes.

If trees are indeed publicly available, as they certainly seem to be, then, sure they are " publicly available prior to our being able to talk like that". Unless I am mistaken, I haven't anywhere claimed otherwise. If I have seemed to claim otherwise then it must have been due to poor expression. — Janus

I'm not saying that you have claimed otherwise. Rather, I'm assessing what you have wrote. Earlier you wrote...

What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. — Janus

What I'm pointing out is that that idea is based upon something. To take it a bit farther...

Whatever that idea is based upon, so too is everything you've said. Whatever the idea is based upon underwrites everything you've said here. If the term "underwrites" strikes you wrong, then take it to mean underpins, or serving as a basis, or words to that effect/affect.

My central concern has only been to point out that the public availability of objects is not directly given to me in experience. It is on that basis that I draw the distinction between the tree as experienced in living perception and the tree conceived as an independently existent. publicly available entity. — Janus

I agree, but ask you to take it a bit farther...

The public availability of objects is a necessary requirement for experience.

But there are two senses of the word 'tree' in play here. One denotes the living appearance which we all may experience. The other presents the logical conception of the one tree that we are all seeing. The first is "inner" to each individual's lived experience, and the second is an externalized formal principle of commonality. What other sense of 'tree' do you think there is? — Janus

How is the former not a logical conception while the latter is? What are you doing with the notion of 'logical'? I mean, you've called things 'logical' conceptions and 'logical' distinctions...

That's what I see as problematic. How do we explain the collectively established attributes? Why do they turn out to be the same for all ten observers?

The public availability of objects is a necessary requirement for experience. — creativesoul

Why do you say that? Do not solitary animals experience?

The second question misses the mark.

It's not a matter of why. It's a matter of how. I've been arguing for that.

Ah, that is the big metaphysical question! We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible. I have said this before many times both here and on the old PF in debates like this, and my position has not changed; I consider myself to be a logical realist. So, I say that logically speaking there must be a world of trees and so on that explains our intersubjectively shared world of experience, and makes coherent our talk about it.

This is not a metaphysical claim, though, as it would be just as true regardless of whether the objects of our shared world of experience are merely physical existents or are ideas in the mind of God, or a collective mind, a 'Matrix' or whatever. other metaphysical model you can think of.

The public availability of objects is a necessary requirement for experience.
— creativesoul

Why do you say that? Do not solitary animals experience? — Janus

We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible. — Janus

I would say the tree as lived experience is (or at least may be) a pure intuition. Now, Kant posited that intuitions without concepts are "blind" and concepts without intuitions are "empty". But then animals seem to be able to recognize things, so either animals have pre-linguistic conceptual abilities, or intuitions are not blind without concepts.

The tree as publicly available is obviously conceptual, not experiential; as I keep pointing out we do not directly experience the public availability of the tree, as we do its availability to us. Of course it is also a concept of something real that actually exists (we think) independently of our experience and concepts; but we can never experience that independent existence for obvious reasons.

The public availability of objects is a necessary requirement for experience.
— creativesoul

Why do you say that? Do not solitary animals experience? — Janus


We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible. — creativesoul

Yes, I already said that and I quote it below (to allow for what seems to be the extremely unlikely case that you hadn't noticed and it was pure chance that you repeated word for word what I had already written).

We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible. — Janus

Note, though that I emphasized the 'something', so I may well not be in total agreement with you here.

I would say the tree as lived experience is (or at least may be) a pure intuition. Now, Kant posited that intuitions without concepts are "blind" and concepts without intuitions are "empty". But then animals seem to be able to recognize things, so either animals have pre-linguistic conceptual abilities, or intuitions are not blind without concepts. — Janus

Kant also held the only pure intuition(s) as time and space, if I recall correctly. Kant was wrong in other ways, on my view...

The tree as publicly available is obviously conceptual, not experiential; as I keep pointing out we do not directly experience the public availability of the tree, as we do its availability to us. — Janus

The tree is publicly available prior to our experience. The tree is a part of our experience because it is publicly available.

Of course it is also a concept of something real that actually exists (we think) independently of our experience and concepts; but we can never experience that independent existence for obvious reasons.

In order to know what we're talking about when we say that X is not equal to Y, we must know what both consist in/of. Let X be Noumena and Y be phenomena. You see the problem?

I find it much more productive to acknowledge the fact that there are things that we do not know.

Yes, I already said that and I quote it below (to allow for what seems to be the extremely unlikely case that you hadn't noticed and it was pure chance that you repeated word for word what I had already written). — Janus

Duly noted and since corrected for accuracy.

In order to know what we're talking about when we say that X is not equal to Y, we must know what both consist in/of. Let X be Noumena and Y be phenomena. You see the problem? — creativesoul

Well, sure, but we can honestly acknowledge that we can't see how they are equal, or could be equal, as in the case with noumena and phenomena. I mean, we can conceive of the thing as it is experienced; and we can conceive of it as in itself (although we can't conceive how it is in itself). We can conceive that there may be things outside of current experience or even beyond experience altogether; we do that all the time. What we can't imagine is how something outside of experience could be the same as something within it, in anything more than the purely logical sense to do with identity that I have already mentioned.

The perception of the world of objects and events is a collaboration between the world and ourselves, our senses and minds, it is a living process. How could the world of objects without us be the same as the world of our perception of objects? We would be missing so it could not be the same. We cannot imagine what it would be like without us. It even seems incoherent to think that it could be like anything without any percipients at all involved.

Naive realism imagines a world of objects without us, but it imagines unreflectively that the thing in itself is just "like" the thing as experienced. We have no warrant for that. If we want to say that things can exist totally independently of us, then we should as you say " acknowledge the fact that there are things we do not know" and even that there may be things we cannot know.

Anyway it's not an easy thing to talk about without getting tied up in knots of apparent incoherence, inconsistency and even outright paradoxical contradiction. I've enjoyed the conversation nonetheless. :)

In order to know what we're talking about when we say that X is not equal to Y, we must know what both consist in/of. Let X be Noumena and Y be phenomena. You see the problem?
— creativesoul

Well, sure, but we can honestly acknowledge that we can't see how they are equal, or could be equal, as in the case with noumena and phenomena. I mean, we can conceive of the thing as it is experienced; and we can conceive of it as in itself (although we can't conceive how it is in itself). We can conceive that there may be things outside of current experience or even beyond experience altogether; we do that all the time. — Janus

You say "sure" but then go on to say something that doesn't indicate shared understanding.

We cannot perform a comparative analysis upon two things unless we know what those two things consist in/of. The Noumena limits all other thought/belief about it. We, according to Kant, do not have access to Noumena. Thus, we cannot know anything at all about it other than it is unknown, and/or unknowable. The distinction itself is untenable, a name empty of all content, according to Kant's own conception.

What we can't imagine is how something outside of experience could be the same as something within it, in anything more than the purely logical sense to do with identity that I have already mentioned. — Janus

I don't see why not. If our experience of something has no effect/affect on what it consists in/of, then there is less justificatory ground for us to say that it's different when beyond our experience than for us to say that it remains unchanged. There is no good reason at all to say that the tree's composition changes when it becomes a part of our experience. How would that change when it is not? On what ground would we justify saying that the tree's composition changes when it is not a part of our experience?

The perception of the world of objects and events is a collaboration between the world and ourselves, our senses and minds, it is a living process... How could the world of objects without us be the same as the world of our perception of objects? We cannot imagine what it would be like without us. It even seems incoherent to think that it could be like anything without any percipients at all involved. — Janus

I think that the framework itself leads one to questions that do not square with the facts.

There are things we discover that are not existentially contingent upon our awareness of their existence. We can know that much. If they existed prior to discovery, then they existed prior to being a part of our experience. If being a part of our experience does not effect/affect their composition, then we have less justificatory ground for saying that they are not the same when beyond experience than we do for saying that they remain unchanged.

Anyway it's not an easy thing to talk about without getting tied up in knots of apparent incoherence, inconsistency and even outright paradoxical contradiction. I've enjoyed the conversation nonetheless. :) — Janus

Likewise.

I reject Kant's framework for reasons given heretofore. However, Kant was brilliant through and through. Given the historical circumstances... pretty amazing stuff.

Now, Kant posited that intuitions without concepts are "blind" and concepts without intuitions are "empty" — Janus

That's a misquote, by the way...

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

So would you analyse Game of Thrones in terms of pixels? Yet it is a sequence of computer images. Words are complex, letters simple. And so on and so forth. — Banno

You don't have to describe Game of Thrones in terms of pixels unless it is necessary to do so. For most purposes, it is unnecessary to do so. You describe it in terms of characters and events. That's enough. Nonetheless, it is pixels that give rise to the sequence of computer images that is Game of Thrones which is what in turn gives rise to Game of Thrones characters and events. So if you wanted to describe Game of Thrones in detail, for some strange reason, you'd have no choice but to describe it in terms of pixels. Talking about Game of Thrones with your friends and even analyzing it in detail is not the same as doing philosophy. When we do philosophy what we need, in many cases, such as for example this one, is a highly detailed description of the aspect of reality that is under our examination. It is true, what we do determines how detailed our description has to be. But when what we do is philosophy, especially of this sort, our description has to be quite detailed. In this particular case, we want to know what is the difference between that which is mental and that which is not. Notice that your description of the difference between what is mental and what is not is not merely lacking in detail. Rather, it is lazy. It is pretending that it is an answer when it is merely an evasion.

That's a tree. How much more precise can it get? Which part misses the mark? — creativesoul

The more you say about the tree the more likely you are to say something about it that isn't true. — creativesoul

So when you say "that's a tree" that is just as precise as saying "that's a red tree" which is just as precise as saying "that's a trunk with a number of branches each one of which has a number of red leaves"?

I agree that the more you say something (whether it is about a tree or something else) the more likely you are to say something wrong. This is why many people prefer to say less and even be silent. But that's no argument against saying more. It's merely an argument against saying something that is not true.

How can it be a misquote if it isn't a quote? It was in my own words, and I understand "concepts without intuitions" to mean the same as "thoughts without content", so I don't think I have departed from Kant's intention, which, if true, means it would not be a misreading either.

We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible. — Janus

A tree, perhaps?

Folks tend to get hung up on notions of proof and evidence: don't believe it without some justification. The opposite can also be true; there are things that one ought not doubt without proof or evidence.

That the thing before you is a tree is perhaps one. The reasons for doubt are lame.

You say "sure" but then go on to say something that doesn't indicate shared understanding. — creativesoul

The degree to which we agree will necessarily be limited by the fact that our approaches are completely different. You seem to be concerned with what we are justified in saying based on inferences to the best or "most plausible" explanation. Your approach is more in the positivist, objectivist, analytic mode, which concerns itself with being correct or right, where that means what we say is both justified and true. You would call that knowledge, I think. It is firmly based on the notion of correspondence.

I, on the other hand, think correspondence is fine when it comes to empirical, inter-subjectively check-able knowledge, but that's as far as it goes. For me knowledge in the important sense is not something that needs to be checked and justified. It is more like the Biblical sense of knowing; the knowing of familiarity. What you would call knowledge I would call belief.

So in that sense I can say I know the tree, but I do not know the public availability of the tree, or the ultimate explanation for it. My approach is more in line with the critical, phenomenological mode of inquiry. I am not concerned with being right in some intersubjectively established or establish-able sense, but with gaining enriching insight into experience. Knowledge, in the sense of the positivistic, objectivistic conception is great for science, technology and everyday practical matters, but that externalized mode will never tell us about the truly important things such as what love, goodness, beauty or truth are.

We cannot perform a comparative analysis upon two things unless we know what those two things consist in/of. The Noumena limits all other thought/belief about it. We, according to Kant, do not have access to Noumena. Thus, we cannot know anything at all about it other than it is unknown, and/or unknowable. The distinction itself is untenable, a name empty of all content, according to Kant's own conception. — creativesoul

What you say here highlights the difference between our approaches beautifully. You say the concept of noumena is empty. I say it exemplifies the ultimate mystery of existence. Of course we cannot know anything about the noumena (since that is precisely how it is defined), other than the fact that the mind naturally comes to think this distinction between known/unknown and, more importantly, knowable/ unknowable.

"We must imagine that there is something that provides the conditions for collectively established attributes to be possible."

A tree, perhaps?

Folks tend to get hung up on notions of proof and evidence: don't believe it without some justification. The opposite can also be true; there are things that one ought not doubt without proof or evidence.

That the thing before you is a tree is perhaps one. The reasons for doubt are lame. — Banno

OK, I have no doubt the thing before me is a tree, but the quote from me you are responding to is not concerned with that question; you seem to be conflating two different concerns.

Of course in an immediate sense the tree does provide the attributes which may be collectively established on account of the fact that we all agree that we can identify them. But it does not, all by itself, provide the conditions for the possibility that there could be collectively established attributes in the first place. Perception itself, and the kind of percipients we are, obviously contribute to that, and the fact that we find our perceptions intelligible in terms of objects such as trees, and their parts and attributes.

This is a process we will never be able to get outside of in order to understand in that objectivistic way some folk so desire. We can create scientific theories of perception, but we can never penetrate in an objectivist way the ultimate mystery of experience and intelligibility. That mystery we need to live from the inside to gain a different order of insight which is more akin to the arts than it is to the sciences.

That's my take on the situation, anyway.

How can it be a misquote if it isn't a quote? It was in my own words, and I understand "concepts without intuitions" to mean the same as "thoughts without content", so I don't think I have departed from Kant's intention, which, if true, means it would not be a misreading either. — Janus

Hey Janus.

Listen.

Don't take that personally. I was letting you know, just in case. Although what you said does more closely match something else he wrote regarding concepts and percepts...

I have to say though...

If anyone draws an equivalence between thought and concepts then they're forced to say that either a.) thought requires language, or b.) concepts do not. Both of those are problematic, and the former is just plain false. I strongly suspect that Kant distinguished between the two, with concepts being subsumed within thought and/or understanding. I mean, given his categories...

Cheers!

No worries, I don't take anything on here personally.

I think you are failing to make a distinctiin between thoughts and thinking. The way I understand it a thought consists in concepts but thinking obviously does not necessarily.

So I would say that animals think but they do not entertain thoughts, which would require concepts and hence symbolic language.

As another example a painter thinks visually but that thinking does not consist in discrete thoughts which could be formulated.

More on certainty. It is a type of belief, not a type of truth.

There are two obvious approaches. In the first truth is taken to be approachable only asymptotically, and so certainty is seen as unachievable. In the second, truth is taken as more or less trivial, and certainty as attributable to whatever one chooses.

No worries, I don't take anything on here personally.

I think you are failing to make a distinctiin between thoughts and thinking. The way I understand it a thought consists in concepts but thinking obviously does not.

So I would say that animals think but they do not entertain thoughts, which would require concepts and hence symbolic language.

As another example a painter thinks visually but that thinking does not consist in discrete thoughts which could be formulated. — Janus

I want to address the comparison between our views you offered earlier... and will momentarily. But first...

The first claim above is curious, because given the position I've been working out for longer than I care to admit, that is a perfectly reasonable thing to say. Most often, I do not. That is quite true. However, the term "failing" indicates to me that you think that I am unaware of that fact; as if I'm not drawing the distinction between thoughts and thinking inadvertently. It's actually intentional.

I'm impressed with the fact you noted that. Kudos!

My position has - as it's very pillars - thought/belief. All the eggs are in one basket. ;) This isn't the appropriate place to discuss that however. I mean, these kinds of threads are all kinds of fun for all kinds of reasons, and have important subject matter that cannot be talked about too much, particularly given the current state of collective understanding... every little bit of clarity helps.

However...

I gladly welcome you to join my thread - which is about that - here. I suspect it may be fun. Certainly more funner than lately...

There are two obvious approaches. In the first truth is taken to be approachable only asymptotically, and so certainty is seen as achievable.

Why do you say that?

Does it mean that we can only approach the truth, what is.