That one ought not X is that X is against the rules — Michael

Nope, unless you alter the usual useage of the word "rule". At the moment premise 2 is ENTAILED by premise 1, even though you don't make this necessary connection clear - and thus it isn't separate from it. "Rule" presupposes a rule giver in the usual sense in which we use the word, ie something is a rule if and only if it has been given by a person. But a rule against action X does not necessarily mean that one ought not to do action X. For example, if I'm a Jewish slave in a Nazi concentration camp, and a Nazi guard instructs me not to eat anymore, then it does not follow that I ought not to eat (a statement of ethics). All that follows is that he doesn't want me to eat - it says nothing about what I ought to do.

That X is against the rules is that some authority has commanded that one not X
Therefore that one ought not X is that some authority has commanded that one not X — Michael

This is inherent in our usage of rule.

That so-and-so is an authority and has commanded that one not X is a product of and dependent on human decision
Therefore that one ought not X is a product of and dependent on human decision — Michael

This is begging the question. The conclusion is derived from a single premise, and thus inheres in it. Your argument begs the question here.

That X is immoral is that one ought not X — Michael

I agree.

Therefore that X is immoral is a product of and dependent on human decision — Michael

The way you have stated this argument, this does not even follow without error because you beg the question half-way in regards to your second, intermediary conclusion. If we were to state the argument in a different manner it would follow, granted the premises, but premise 1 would still be false under the meaning of rule used in premise 2. The only way to make premise 1 true while keeping premise 2 would be to equivocate on "rule" or change the meaning of authority and command. For example, it can be established as a rule (= something that follows with regularity) that if I develop friendships I will be happier than if I was entirely isolated. Given my nature, it would follow that I ought to develop friendships, and I ought not to be isolated. In a certain sense an authority has commanded me to do this - but it is the authority of my own nature - it is immanent and not transcendent, contrary to your unspoken of assumption that authority necessarily is external and contrary to your assumption that authority is always personal. That's why writers like Philippa Foot can develop entirely objective, although secular ethics.

That one ought not X is that X is against the rules — Michael

No.

This is begging the question. The conclusion is derived from a single premise, and thus inheres in it. Your argument begs the question here. — Agustino

Your quote missed the other premise. It's:

[Therefore] that one ought not X is that some authority has commanded that one not X
That so-and-so is an authority and has commanded that one not X is a product of and dependent on human decision
Therefore that one ought not X is a product of and dependent on human decision

Nope, unless you alter the usual useage of the word "rule". At the moment premise 2 is ENTAILED by premise 1, even though you don't make this necessary connection clear - and thus it isn't separate from it. "Rule" presupposes a rule giver in the usual sense in which we use the word, ie something is a rule if and only if it has been given by a person. But a rule against action X does not necessarily mean that one ought not to do action X. For example, if I'm a Jewish slave in a Nazi concentration camp, and a Nazi guard instructs me not to eat anymore, then it does not follow that I ought not to eat (a statement of ethics). All that follows is that he doesn't want me to eat - it says nothing about what I ought to do.

We can either say "you ought not move a pawn backwards" or "it is against the rules to move a pawn backwards". The two claims are interchangeable. Therefore that one ought not X is that X is against the rules.

Can you provide an alternative account of what "one ought not X" means? The above is the only meaningful account that I can find.

It seems accurate to me.

You ought not start a sentence with a lower case letter. It is against the rules to start a sentence with a lower case letter.

The two sentences above seem interchangeable. What am I missing? Perhaps you could provide what you consider the correct account of what "one ought not X" means?

I don't need a correct account to see yours is wrong.

It's possible you ought not to do something, even if there's no rule against it. It's also possible you ought to do something even though there is a rule against it. So your account can't be right.

I don't need a correct account to see yours is wrong. — The Great Whatever

I didn't claim otherwise. I only asked if you could provide one. Are you saying that you don't have one?

It's possible you ought not to do something, even if there's no rule against it.

Could you give an example? I can't see how this would work. "One ought not X and there is no rule against X" appears to be a contradiction and so doesn't make any sense to me.

It's also possible you ought to do something even though there is a rule against it.

In this case I would say that there are two conflicting rules; one which commands me to do it and another which commands me not to do it.

We can either say "you ought not move a pawn backwards" or "it is against the rules to move a pawn backwards". The two claims are interchangeable. Therefore that one ought not X is that X is against the rules. — Michael

Nope. The way you use ought here equivocates on the earlier usage. This is not an ETHICAL question regarding the pawn, unless you want to say that I am immoral if I move the pawn backwards ;) - which is just crass nonsense.

You ought not start a sentence with a lower case letter. It is against the rules to start a sentence with a lower case letter. — Michael

Right, so I am immoral if I start a sentence with a lower case letter? What kind of crass nonsense is this? I think Wittgenstein would be horrified if he saw this misuse of his philosophy...

I don't need a correct account to see yours is wrong. — The Great Whatever

Epic!

Could you give an example? I can't see how this would work. "One ought not X and there is no rule against X" appears to be a contradiction and so doesn't make any sense to me. — Michael

You ought not to kill animals for fun in the African jungle. There is no rule against killing animals in some places in Africa. There's your example.

Can you provide an alternative account of what "one ought not X" means? The above is the only meaningful account that I can find. — Michael

Ought not to refers to actions which are contrary to the flourishing of human nature or the nature of other living beings (I could have just said the first part, it would be the same thing, but just to avoid misunderstanding)

Nope. The way you use ought here equivocates on the earlier usage. This is not an ETHICAL question regarding the pawn, unless you want to say that I am immoral if I move the pawn backwards ;) - which is just crass nonsense. — Agustino

I'm not saying that it's an ethical question. I'm saying that the claim "one ought not X" is the same as the claim "X is against the rules". At the moment we're discussing the first bullet of my argument. I didn't bring up morality until the sixth.

Right, so I am immoral if I start a sentence with a lower case letter? What kind of crass nonsense is this? I think Wittgenstein would be horrified if he saw this misuse of his philosophy...

I didn't use the term "immoral". I said that the claim "one ought not X" is interchangeable with the claim "X is against the rules". Not all obligations (or rules) are moral. But it is still nonetheless the case that where there are obligations there are rules.

You ought not to kill animals for fun in the African jungle. There is no rule against killing animals in some places in Africa. There's your example.

If there is no rule against killing animals for fun in the African jungle then there is no obligation not to kill animals for fun in the African jungle. The only thing that can make the claim "one ought not X" true is a rule which commands one to not X. There is no other coherent truth-maker.

Ought not to refers to actions which are contrary to the flourishing of human nature.

So "one ought not X" means "X is contrary to the flourishing of human nature"?

I'm not saying that it's an ethical question. I'm saying that the claim "one ought not X" is the same as the claim "X is against the rules". — Michael

That X is immoral is that one ought not X — Michael

That one ought not X is that X is against the rules — Michael

:-*

But it is still nonetheless the case that where there are obligations there are rules. — Michael

I agree, but morality is a choice not an obligation in the sense you use it here. That's why morality depends on freedom.

If there is no rule against killing animals for fun in the African jungle then there is no obligation not to kill animals for fun in the African jungle. — Michael

Agreed. What does this have to do with the morality of it though?

The only thing that can justify the claim "one ought not X" is if there is some rule which commands one to not X. — Michael

No. Because you still ought not to kill the animals for fun even if there is no rule against it, even if you are not obliged/forced not to kill them.

So "one ought not X" means "X is contrary to the flourishing of human nature"? — Michael

Yes - but keep in mind that human nature is transhuman as well as merely human.

:-* — Agustino

As I said, I didn't bring up morality until point 6. But you questioned point 1. Consider the first three points as a standalone argument.

I agree, but morality is a choice not an obligation in the sense you use it here. That's why morality depends on freedom.

Every obligation is a choice. Legal obligations, family obligations, work obligations...

Agreed. What does this have to do with the morality of it though?

So you agree that if there is no rule then there is no obligation. And as you've accepted that "X is immoral" means "one ought not X" you agree that if there is no rule then "X is immoral" is false.

No. Because you still ought not to kill the animals for fun even if there is no rule against it.

No. If there is no rule against it then nothing can make the claim "you ought not kill animals for fun" true.

Yes - but keep in mind that human nature is transhuman as well as merely human.

So "one ought not kill animals for fun" means "killing animals for fun is contrary to the flourishing of human nature"?

As I said, I didn't bring up morality until point 6. But you questioned point 1. Consider the first three points as a standalone argument. — Michael

That is impossible because they form one single argument. So it's a reductio ad absurdum if I can show that your argument entails nonsensical conclusions such that starting sentences with lower case letters is immoral.

Every obligation is a choice. Legal obligations, family obligations, work obligations... — Michael

This is an equivocation on previous usage. Obligation is something you are OBLIGED (ie FORCED in some way, or pressured to do) to do.

So you agree that if there is no rule then there is no obligation. — Michael

In the sense of obligation I have illustrated above yes.

And as you've accepted that "X is immoral" means "one ought not X" you agree that if there is no rule then "one ought not X" is false. — Michael

Nope. I don't agree because "one ought not X" =/ "X is against the rules"

No. If there is no rule against it then nothing can make the claim "you ought not kill animals for fun" true. — Michael

Yes there is. Your own nature.

So "one ought not kill animals for fun" means "killing animals for fun is contrary to the flourishing of human nature"? — Michael

Yes. It has to do with the transhuman part of man - since man is not a self-sustaining substance, he depends for his existence on the rest of the world, and even on the animals. Thus cruelty towards the world and towards the animals is against his own nature - it is like sitting on a branch and cutting that same branch - simply because the world is the cause of the man, who is merely the effect.

That is impossible because they form one single argument. — Agustino

No, it's a single argument on its own:

That one ought not X is that X is against the rules
That X is against the rules is that some authority has commanded that one not X
Therefore that one ought not X is that some authority has commanded that one not X

This is an equivocation on previous usage. Obligation is something you are OBLIGED (ie FORCED in some way, or pressured to do) to do.

ob·li·ga·tion
ˌäbləˈɡāSH(ə)n/
noun
noun: obligation; plural noun: obligations
an act or course of action to which a person is morally or legally bound; a duty or commitment.

Yes. It has to do with the transhuman part of man - since man is not a self-sustaining substance, he depends for his existence on the rest of the world, and even on the animals. Thus cruelty towards the world and towards the animals is against his own nature - it is like sitting on a branch and cutting that same branch - simply because the world is the cause of the man, who is merely the effect.

So when you claim "one ought not murder" you're just claiming "murder is contrary to the flourishing of human nature". OK. So what? I accept that murder is contrary to the flourishing of human nature. What's the consequence/implication of this? That I ought not murder?

No, it's a single argument on its own:

That one ought not X is that X is against the rules
That X is against the rules is that some authority has commanded that one not X
Therefore that one ought not X is that some authority has commanded that one not X — Michael

Yes, fine. But your big argument has still been reduced to absurdity, regardless of the veracity of this bit of it alone.

ob·li·ga·tion
ˌäbləˈɡāSH(ə)n/
noun
noun: obligation; plural noun: obligations
an act or course of action to which a person is morally or legally bound; a duty or commitment. — Michael

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obligation

I can use a dictionary too! :) (although I thought pace Wittgenstein that meaning is use, not dictionary definitions :p ) If you refer to the first definition provided, which is the most frequent one unless you are a Kantian (a minority position in ethics today).

So when you claim "murder is immoral" you're just claiming "murder is contrary to the flourishing of human nature". OK. So what? I accept that murder is contrary to the flourishing of human nature. What's the consequence/implication of this? That I ought not murder? — Michael

Yes, that is the consequence of it.

1. Murder is contrary to the flourishing of human nature.
2. You share in human nature
3. Murder is contrary to your nature in-so-far as you share in human nature, which is exactly what "you ought not to murder" means.

Yes, fine. But your big argument has still been reduced to absurdity, regardless of the veracity of this bit of it alone. — Agustino

Then let's add a fourth premise to the above argument (which you now seem to accept as sound):

1. That one ought not X is that X is against the rules
2. That X is against the rules is that some authority has commanded that one not X
3. Therefore that one ought not X is that some authority has commanded that one not X
4. That X is immoral is that one ought not X

You accepted this fourth premise in your first post. Now derive from 3 and 4:

5. Therefore that X is immoral is that some authority has commanded that one not X

Yes and this argument has absurd conclusions, namely that starting a sentence with lower case letters is immoral. Therefore it is false.

Yes and this argument has absurd conclusions, namely that starting a sentence with lower case letters is immoral. Therefore it is false. — Agustino

If it's sound then the conclusion can't be false.

And that isn't a consequence. I'm not saying that every obligation is a moral obligation. I'm saying that every obligation reduces to a rule. Therefore every moral obligation reduces to a rule.

If you prefer, read it like this:

1. That one ought_y not X is that X is against the rules_y
2. That X is against the rules_y is that some authority_y has commanded that one not X
3. Therefore that one ought_y not X is that some authority_y has commanded that one not X
4. That X is immoral is that one ought_moral not X
5. Therefore that X is immoral is that some authority_moral has commanded that one not X

"One ought not X and there is no rule against X" appears to be a contradiction — Michael

No it doesn't.

So I don't understand what more you're looking for. I showed that your initial argument is false via a reductio ad absurdum, as well as that your first premise is wrong, because that simply is not what is meant by ought, which refers to ethical injunctions which in turn have nothing to do with rules. Furthermore, I also provided an additional separate account of what morality and ought is and means.

If it's sound then the conclusion can't be false. — Michael

Where have I said it is sound? I have said that regardless of the veracity of the first small argument, the big one is necessarily false because of the conclusions it entails. This does not indicate that I thought the small argument is sound. Not at all, because the first premise, as I have said multiple times, is false.

I'm not saying that every obligation is a moral obligation. — Michael

That one ought not X is that X is against the rules — Michael

That X is immoral is that one ought not X — Michael

Thus: "one ought not X" (A) = "X is against the rules" (B) = "X is immoral" (C). If every A is a B, and every C is an A, it necessarily means that every C is also a B.

I showed that your initial argument is false via a reductio ad absurdum

...

Thus: "one ought not X" (A) = "X is against the rules" (B) = "X is immoral" (C). If every A is a B, and every C is an A, it necessarily means that every C is also a B.

See the addition to my previous post.

1. That one oughty not X is that X is against the rulesy
2. That X is against the rulesy is that some authorityy has commanded that one not X
3. Therefore that one oughty not X is that some authorityy has commanded that one not X
4. That X is immoral is that one oughtmoral not X
5. Therefore that X is immoral is that some authoritymoral has commanded that one not X — Michael

Equivocation of ought, as I said before.

How is it equivocation?

You're using ought in two different senses - in a moral sense, and in a non-moral one, without establishing the connection and interchangeability of the two.

Furthermore, consider that your argument entails several additional difficulties. If not all obligations are moral obligations, by what are moral obligations distinguished from other obligations? And how would you draw the line between moral obligations and non-moral obligations? Because if you loosen your argument as you must, and claim that not everything that is against the rules is immoral, you will collapse your position into the investigation of what is morality - because we will no longer be able to identify immorality simply by it being against the rules.

You're using ought in two different senses - in a moral sense, and in a non-moral one, without establishing the connection and interchangeability of the two. — Agustino

The first premise is read as "that one is [placeholder] obligated to not X is that there is a [placeholder] rule against X".

So, where the obligation is a moral obligation, "that one is morally obligated to not X is that there is a moral rule against X".

This isn't equivocation.

Furthermore, consider that your argument entails several additional difficulties. If not all obligations are moral obligations, by what are moral obligations distinguished from other obligations? And how would you draw the line between moral obligations and non-moral obligations?

I've already pointed this out. There are also legal obligations, work obligations, and so on. Legal obligations are those established by legal rules issued by legal authorities; work obligations are those established by work rules issued by work authorities; and so on.

Moral obligations are thus those established by moral rules issued by moral authorities.

The question, then, is can there be an objective moral authority? And the answer to that is "no". As stated in the original post, authority is a product of and dependent on human decision. As such there is no objective moral authority, no objective moral rule, and so no objective moral obligation.

Because if you loosen your argument as you must, and claim that not everything that is against the rules is immoral, you will collapse your position into the investigation of what is morality - because we will no longer be able to identify morality simply by it being against the rules.

I don't need to loosen it. If a thing breaks a legal rule then it's illegal. If it a thing breaks a moral rule then it's immoral.

The first premise is read as "that one is [placeholder] obligated to not X is that there is a [placeholder] rule against X".

So, where the obligation is a moral obligation, "that one is morally obligated to not X is that there is a moral rule against X".

This isn't equivocation. — Michael

I disagree with moral obligations in the sense of legal, or [placeholder] obligations. Obligation simply does not have the same sense in the case of morality as it does in the case of law, or work, etc. because morality necessitates freedom as a ground of its possibility, in a way that law, work, etc. don't (for example, you can't be moral if you are forced to behave morally, but you can be a law abiding citizen if you are forced to obey the law). Again, morality is not obligatory in the same sense that laws are - and for this reason there is equivocation, even though this is not apparent until the concrete terms of ought are analysed.

Moral obligations are thus those established by moral rules issued by moral authorities. — Michael

What counts as a moral rule, as opposed to a legal rule?

The question, then, is can there be an objective moral authority? — Michael

Yes - human nature, I've already clarified that.

As stated in the original post, authority is a product of and dependent on human decision. — Michael

Rather man has the free will to move towards the flourishing of his own nature, or towards its own destruction.

I don't need to loosen it. If a thing breaks a legal rule then it's illegal. If it a thing breaks a moral rule then it's immoral. — Michael

Morality does not necessarily have to function by transcendent rules coming from external authorities. At the highest level, the "rules" (if you can even call them that - they are not rules in-so-far as they are freely chosen), are immanent.

"One ought not X and there is no rule against X" appears to be a contradiction and so doesn't make any sense to me. — Michael

If someone asks you to show that this is a contradiction, you will offer a syllogism. How shall we decide on the soundness of the syllogism? A syllogism cannot tell us how to decide on the veracity of the premises. But what we can say, is that your conception of morality is limited to rule-following. That is fine - but all that I am saying is that morality has other facets, many of which do not involve rule-following. You seem to be unable to see this fact.

I will grant you though, that IF morality was mere rule (refering here only to the authority given ones)-following, in the absence of a personal God, there would be no objective morality. Thus far you seem to 1. presuppose the inexistence of a personal God, and 2. be unaware of the existence of different dimensions of morality. I would disagree on both assumptions, but discussing the second will evidently be more fruitful than discussing the former.

What counts as a moral rule, as opposed to a legal rule? — Agustino

It's issued by a moral authority rather than a legal authority.

I disagree with moral obligations in the sense of legal, or [placeholder] obligations. Obligation simply does not have the same sense in the case of morality as it does in the case of law, or work, etc. because morality necessitates freedom as a ground of its possibility, in a way that law, work, etc. don't. Again, morality is not obligatory in the same sense that laws are.

It's not clear to me what the distinction is. We're as free to break the law as we are to break moral rules. Breaking the law makes you a criminal and breaking moral rules makes you immoral.

Furthermore, this sense of (moral) "obligation" that you're using isn't consistent with your account of "one ought not X" meaning "X is contrary to human flourishing".

Yes - human nature, I've already clarified that.

How can human nature issue commands? This is a clear category error.

Morality does not necessarily have to function by transcendent rules coming from external authorities. At the highest level, the "rules" (if you can even call them that - they are not rules in-so-far as they are freely chosen), are immanent.

Again, a category error. Rules just are commands issued by someone who has the power to tell us what to do. Rules aren't the sort of things that come pre-packaged with the universe or which spontaneously pop into existence some time after.

That is fine - but all that I am saying is that morality has other facets, many of which do not involve rule-following. You seem to be unable to see this fact. — Agustino

If "X is immoral" just means "one ought not X" then there is no sense of morality that does not involve rule-following as obligation without rules is incoherent.

If, however, you want to define "X is immoral" as "X is contrary to human flourishing" then, yes, it would involve more than rule-following. However, the consequence of this is that prima facie this account would have nothing to do with obligation. "X is contrary to human flourishing and so one ought not X" is not an analytic claim. One would have to make an additional case to argue that one ought not do that which is contrary to human flourishing.

It's issued by a moral authority rather than a legal authority. — Michael

What counts as a moral authority? How do we identify moral authorities?

It's not clear to me that the distinction is. We're as free to break the law as we to break moral rules. Breaking the law makes you a criminal and breaking moral rules makes you immoral. — Michael

(for example, you can't be moral if you are forced to behave morally, but you can be a law abiding citizen if you are forced to obey the law). Again, morality is not obligatory in the same sense that laws are - and for this reason there is equivocation, even though this is not apparent until the concrete terms of ought are analysed. — Agustino

Furthermore, this sense of (moral) "obligation" that you're using isn't consistent with your account of "one ought not X" as "X is contrary to human flourishing". — Michael

I have offered no sense to it, I have merely illustrated that moral obligation simply cannot be similar to legal obligation.

How can human nature issue commands? This is a clear category error. — Michael

Exactly! It can't, so we can speak of obligations only metaphorically, not literarily. That is exactly the problem that I'm pointing to. "Obligations" (and "commands") is a poor language to use in discussing morality. In a certain sense morality is obligatory and a command - but that will not be the same sense in which the law is obligatory and a command.

Rules just are commands issued by someone who has the power to tell us what to do. — Michael

A narrow conception of rules. Rules is also used to refer to regularities, patterns, etc.

Rules aren't the sort of things that come pre-packaged with the universe or which spontaneously pop into existence some time after. — Michael

Laws of physics?

If "X is immoral" just means "one ought not X" then there is no sense of morality that does not involve rule-following as obligation without rules is incoherent. — Michael

Yes, fortunately it doesn't, that's been my whole point, this premise is wrong.

If, however, you want to define "X is immoral" as "X is contrary to human flourishing" then, yes, it would involve more than rule-following. However, the consequence of this is that prima facie this account would have nothing to do with obligation. — Michael

Why should morality have something to do with obligation, when we know that morality requires freedom for its possibility in a way that is incompatible with obligation in the hard sense of it (being forced to)? If someone is forced to, or even less, pressured to do something, then that action simply cannot be a moral achievement. Morality requires freely choosing the good - not under an obligation to choose it, which implies choosing it for a reason other than itself (ie because of the obligation), but rather for its own sake.

One would have to make an additional case to argue that one ought not do that which is contrary to human flourishing. — Michael

What if, as I have said before, "one ought not to" simply MEANS "it is contrary to human flourishing"? I have claimed that this is a framework which isn't only better than the one you have offered (where "one ought not to" simply MEANS "it is against the rules"), but also includes it, although it isn't limited to it. Your criticism under my framework would simply be a step on the ladder to ascend higher, a moment of aufheben.

What counts as a moral authority? How do we identify moral authorities? — Agustino

The nihilist might say that there isn't a moral authority, or that such a thing is incoherent. The subjectivist might say that each person is a moral authority with authority only over themselves. The relativist might say that society is a moral authority with authority only over its members. The theist might say that God is a moral authority with authority over everyone.

I don't know what the objectivist would say. There doesn't seem to be any sensible answer, which is why moral objectivism doesn't – and can't – work.

Exactly! It can't, so we can speak of obligations only metaphorically, not literarily. That is exactly the problem that I'm pointing to. "Obligations" (and "commands") is a poor language to use in discussing morality. In a certain sense morality is obligatory and a command - but that will not be the same sense in which the law is obligatory and a command.

In what sense is morality obligatory and a command if talk of obligation and commands in this context is a category error? Your position seems to be affirming its own incoherency.

A narrow conception of rules. Rules is also used to refer to regularities, patterns, etc.

Perhaps, but I'm talking about the sort of rules that relate to obligations.

Laws of physics?

You're really clutching at straws now. I'm talking about rules in the prescriptive sense, not in any descriptive sense.

Yes, fortunately it doesn't, that's been my whole point, this premise is wrong.

No, I'd say that the premise is right, and that your premise that there are obligations sans-rules that is wrong.

Why should morality have something to do with obligation, when we know that morality requires freedom for its possibility in a way that is incompatible with obligation in the hard sense of it (being forced to)? If someone is forced to, or even less, pressured to do something, then that action simply cannot be a moral achievement. Morality requires freely choosing the good - not under an obligation to choose it, which implies choosing it for a reason other than itself (ie because of the obligation), but rather for its own sake.

Because you've agreed that "X is immoral" means "one ought not X". The claim "one ought not X" has everything to do with obligation. It's the second word.

What if, as I have said before, "one ought not to" simply MEANS "it is contrary to human flourishing"? I have claimed that this is a framework which isn't only better than the one you have offered (where "one ought not to" simply MEANS "it is against the rules"), but also includes it, although it isn't limited to it. Your criticism under my framework would simply be a step on the ladder to ascend higher, a moment of aufheben.

The problem with this is that the claim "I ought not X" explicitly says something about me and what I should do, whereas the claim "X is contrary to human flourishing" doesn't. Moral philosophers might agree that X is contrary to human flourishing but not agree that one ought not X. They quite clearly don't mean the same thing.