Morality is our necessary "crowd control" system. It's our built in (we have to learn it) self-control mechanism. "Built in" but not pre-programmed. It has to be taught and learned. But "taught and learned" doesn't preclude a built in, biologically based capacity for crowd-control and self-regulation. — Bitter Crank

I agree. It is through the operation of empathy that ethical knowledge is acquired, and through the operation of conscience that moral conduct is maintained (empathy and conscience being psychological functions which develop in neurotypical human beings).

Morality among peoples seems to have a fair amount of commonality. — Bitter Crank

According to Donald Brown, morality is a human universal.
Brown, Donald E. (1991). Human Universals. New York City: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-87722-841-8.

Thanks for the suggestion. I have never read Rorty, but I definitely will do. He was interviewed in a Heidegger documentary I watched recently. I really liked his demeanor. BTW I'm quite busy with a another project at the moment. I probably won't be ready to discuss The Concept of Time for another two weeks if that's cool? I plan to read bits and pieces of different texts to try to understand it... — bloodninja

I think you'll like Rorty. He assimilates Harold Bloom's "anxiety of influence" and this gives some real content to authenticity, which is otherwise vague if undeniably stirring and resonant. He's a strong writer of English prose, so he's a pleasure to read. I look forward to hearing what you think. Also, two weeks sounds great. It's something to look forward to.

Morality is our necessary "crowd control" system. It's our built in (we have to learn it) self-control mechanism. "Built in" but not pre-programmed. It has to be taught and learned. But "taught and learned" doesn't preclude a built in, biologically based capacity for crowd-control and self-regulation. — Bitter Crank

This sounds A LOT like Aristotle in Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics:

"Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit."

In other words, the moral virtues are grounded in our nature, according to Aristotle.

In other words, the moral virtues are grounded in our nature, according to Aristotle. — bloodninja

Based on your quote, I thought he was saying the exact opposite.

Really? How do you interpret "we are adapted by nature to receive them [the virtues]"?

Really? How do you interpret "we are adapted by nature to receive them [the virtues]"? — bloodninja

I reread the passage and I agree with your interpretation.

BUT If there is no human nature, then in what are our moral theories grounded? This is my first question. — bloodninja

If we go the Levinasian route, it's that ethics is fundamentally originative from a peculiar relationship to the Other. The Other is precisely that which cannot be assimilated into a "Self" worldview, defined and calculated and mixed and organized into a framework. The Other eludes such violence.

So, I think Levinas might have said that trying to pin ethics down to something like a "human nature" is a form of violence to the Other. By doing so, we'd be trying to ground ethics in the familiar and intelligible when the Other is not this way.

If we go the Levinasian route, it's that ethics is fundamentally originative from a peculiar relationship to the Other. The Other is precisely that which cannot be assimilated into a "Self" worldview, defined and calculated and mixed and organized into a framework. The Other eludes such violence. — darthbarracuda

Where does the "peculiar relationship" come from?

I would add that it should be hardwired. There from the beginning before any social influence. — T Clark

Why would it need to be "hardwired...there from the beginning" in order to qualify as human nature?

Why would it need to be "hardwired...there from the beginning" in order to qualify as human nature? — Janus

Back to the definition I copied from the web.

the general psychological characteristics, feelings, and behavioral traits of humankind, regarded as shared by all humans — T Clark

If it is not inborn and it develops based on environmental conditions, then it won't be shared by all.

I can't see why characteristics that develop in the process of socialization in all societies would not qualify as natural human characteristics.

I can't see why characteristics that develop in the process of socialization in all societies would not qualify as natural human characteristics. — Janus

There is evidence that the capacity for some human social characteristics - language, morality, sociality - are built in - hardwired. We are not blank slates. There are structures in our brains that provide the potential for many human behaviors.

What do you mean by the process of socialization? How could it be universal if it's dependent on the specific environment that a person is brought up in?

If any human characteristic is only developed through socialization, and is more or less universally (i.e. normally) developed when socialization occurs, then such a characteristic would not be dependent on "the specific environment" but on socialization in general.

What would be an example of what you're getting at?

Any characteristic or behavior that would not occur in the absense of socialization.

I think You are both on to something. T Clark, I don't think you expressed your idea clearly enough when you said "I would add that it should be hardwired. There from the beginning before any social influence." Because, prior to this the definition you quoted mentioned "psychological characteristics, feelings, and behavioral traits", which I think Janus, and Aristotle, are rightly pointing out can only occur through socialization. However, I think what you T Clark are getting at is correct as well, that it (human nature) cannot be merely contingent. I think we need a broader and more ontological definition of what would count as human nature. For example:

something innate while simultaneously pointing to or articulating what is fundamentally distinctive about us — bloodninja

I think You are both on to something. T Clark, I don't think you expressed your idea clearly enough when you said "I would add that it should be hardwired. There from the beginning before any social influence." Because, prior to this the definition you quoted mentioned "psychological characteristics, feelings, and behavioral traits", which I think Janus, and Aristotle, are rightly pointing out can only occur through socialization. — bloodninja

As you convinced me when you quoted Ari S. Totle, he and I agree that the capacity for a particular behavior or ability is built in. Ari, Janus, you, and I agree that learning is required for it to manifest. I would consider the capacity as part of human nature and not the ultimate manifestation. That's probably a quibble.

So, I think Levinas might have said that trying to pin ethics down to something like a "human nature" is a form of violence to the Other. By doing so, we'd be trying to ground ethics in the familiar and intelligible when the Other is not this way. — darthbarracuda

Interesting... What does Levinas mean by ethics? I looked up his entry on Stanford encyclopedia which begins: "Levinas's philosophy has been called ethics. If ethics means rationalist self-legislation and freedom (deontology), the calculation of happiness (utilitarianism), or the cultivation of virtues (virtue ethics), then Levinas's philosophy is not an ethics."

Consequentialism, deontology, virtue theories, etc, these are all ethical theories. Levinas' phenomenology, to be brief, is a theory of Ethics with a capital E. He isn't all that interested in specific prescriptive claims but with the most fundamental and originative essence of ethics, that encounter with the Other. Levinas is hard to read but, as I understand it, ethics is seen by him as a sort of "welcoming" of the Other, where it's provided care, aid and attention without trying to dominate and assimilate it into the Same.

Where does the "peculiar relationship" come from? — T Clark

I'm not sure what you mean, exactly.

As OP's, I feel your arguments rely on very specific views that aren't universal.

BUT If there is no human nature, then in what are our moral theories grounded? This is my first question. — bloodninja

The question implies you have the premise of morals being grounded in human nature.

It's very interesting I will try reading him sometime. Thanks.
Yes exactly. How else could they be grounded? Moreover, my current view is that our being is groundless; that there is no human nature in other words. Thus if there is no nature to ground them, then our moral theories appear to be groundless cultural phenomenons. Moralities are entirely relative to one's culture in my current view. I didn't always think this way.

Which part specifically? Otherwise, the view that man is a rational animal with free will comes from Aristotelianism and Scholasticism. Source

How else could they be grounded? — bloodninja

To give some examples:

• God
• Well-being (of anything)
• Well-being of any sentient beings
• Culture
• Nothing

To give some examples:
God
Well-being (of anything)
Well-being of any sentient beings
Culture
Nothing — BlueBanana

1. God. Which god? Jesus? Allah? Shiva? Buddha? Brahma? Ganesha? Mahavira? etc. etc...
2. Well-being. Okay but how would one know what would count as well-being to begin with? Only by having an idea of the nature of the being in question? For example, The well-being of the human would depend on what it means for a human to live well, which in turn requires something like a description of human nature. It's only upon the basis of some conception of human nature that the idea of "well-being" or flourishing makes sense.
3. Well-being of any sentient beings. No comment.
4. Culture. Well this is EXACTLY my view. And it means that Morality with a capital M is groundless.
5. Nothing. Interesting... What do you mean? Do you mean: we just do what one does because it's what one does, and it's ultimately meaningless?

Which god? — bloodninja

I'm providing examples of people's views, not my own ones, so any of them, although I'm not sure exactly which religions base their morals on their deities.

Well-being. Okay but how would one know what would count as well-being to begin with? Only by having an idea of the nature of the being in question? For example, The well-being of the human would depend on what it means for a human to live well, which in turn requires something like a description of human nature. — bloodninja

Randomly picking humans from the group of anything imaginable seems biased as we are humans. I'd rather take a rock or something into consideration. This view goes along quite nicely with teleology.

Well-being of any sentient beings. No comment. — bloodninja

Why? Because animals shouldn't be treated well or because of reasons related to discussing the subject?

Nothing. Interesting... What do you mean? Do you mean: we just do what one does because it's what one does, and it's ultimately meaningless? — bloodninja

Yes. Among with every other way it can be interpreted. Your interpretation, as far as I can tell, is morals not existing, but one could also interpret it as morals existing independently of anything else, or human beings having morals but for no underlying reason, or human beings not existing at all (except me, because cogito, ergo sum).

Randomly picking humans from the group of anything imaginable seems biased as we are humans. I'd rather take a rock or something into consideration. — BlueBanana

Sorry I don't understand, can you please explain more what you meant here?

Why? Because animals shouldn't be treated well or because of reasons related to discussing the subject? — BlueBanana

No because the idea of sentience grounding morality can't be taken seriously. Morality is far too complex to be grounded in sentience.

Your interpretation, as far as I can tell... — BlueBanana

Here is my interpretation:

The difference between possessing an innate nature and not is that if the former is true then we can ground our moral claims and give them strong normative force. If the latter is true, and there is no innate human nature, then it appears that we have nothing to ground our moral claims in so they have weak normative force; we would be a social construction just like the socially constructed moral claims. Morality would be completely meaningless and arbitrary. To the question why be good? there would be no sufficient answer. — bloodninja

Sorry I don't understand, can you please explain more what you meant here? — bloodninja

Morals can be viewed as a thing much larger than us puny humans. Taking our viewpoint of course does warp our perceptions of the matter. Without considering broader points of view, how do we know the conclusions we draw are correct, and not as warped as the point of view?

No because the idea of sentience grounding morality can't be taken seriously. Morality is far too complex to be grounded in sentience. — bloodninja

Sentience isn't complex? The most conventional view is that morals only apply to sentient beings, and therefor it's quite logical to say that morals are a property of sentient beings or their sentience.

Here is my interpretation: — bloodninja

By that, I meant your interpretation of what I meant by "nothing", not your opinion of the subject.

Morals can be viewed as a thing much larger than us puny humans. — BlueBanana

How so? Morality is only human. God is dead.

Sentience isn't complex? The most conventional view is that morals only apply to sentient beings, and therefor it's quite logical to say that morals are a property of sentient beings or their sentience. — BlueBanana

Sentience is absolutely irrelevant as far as the grounding of morality is concerned. I think you are also misusing the concept "property". How can morals be a property? Do you understand what morality is? Morality is not a property.