Anyway, was interested in whether other people have studied feminist philosophies and such. What's your take on feelings such as care or love be the guiding force to moral decisions? Is it overly simplistic or elegantly simplistic? — Posty McPostface

I think feminist, virtue and care ethics have a valid point that ethics has largely had a gap in recognition of love, care and sympathy, and that the terrain of human moral reasoning cannot be captured in monistic, commanding doctrines. But it's certainly overly simplistic to claim that this new form of ethical reasoning should be the only guiding force in moral philosophy, because there is a component of moral reasoning that is command-like (even if it's not monistic).

If there's one issue I have with "these sorts" of ethical theories (feminist, care, virtue, etc), it's that they tend to be too timid. They don't offer the opportunity to be radically moral. That, and by themselves they fail to provide a complete analysis of morality. Sometimes proponents will suggest we dispense completely with the notion of "duty", which is entirely unreasonable and unpersuasive, if not only because we are sometimes in situations in which we must make a decision that seems to be unaffected by things like virtue, love or care, and we have moral beliefs about what is right and what is wrong that are founded on principles; that is to say, a "virtuous" person believes murder to be wrong because it is wrong (and not that murder is wrong because a virtuous person believes it to be wrong).

In regards to virtue, I think people are generally stuck to their psychological types and it's only through an immense amount of effort that a person can "change" - yet even this possibility is dependent on the person being of a certain psychological type. If this is true, then not everyone can be "virtuous" - yet certainly there are things people should and should not do even if they are incapable of being "virtuous". In that sense, right action is to be sharply distinguished from good natured-ness (i.e. it cannot be a moral requirement to act from a certain intention or motivation).

In regards to love, I think it is entirely unreasonable to demand people love each other, because love is not something that can be voluntarily made. Love is not a foundation of ethics, at least, not in the romantic or deep friend-like way. Love is sometimes said to be the desire to see the good develop in someone else - yet this is a motivation, and I don't think motivations can ever be morally required (since we have no control over them).

So basically, virtue, care, feminist, (etc) ethics offer a different perspective on things and broaden the moral horizon but I hardly think they offer a complete alternative.

The issue with command type ethics is that you're left with a person who doesn't realize what they're doing is good, or why it should be counted as something good over some other action. This greatly stupifies the whole moral framework. There's no point in telling that some action is good unless they can't rationalize it themselves, and if you follow the news, then most of ethics can't be rationalized at all, it's rather a trait that can only be observed but not modeled.

Virtue-care-ethics is elegantly simplistic because it puts the emphasis on the individual to extend their sphere of interest to include others than one's self. I'd rather live in a democratic collectivist ethical society than have a benevolent dictator tell me what is good. Ethics of care is inherently democratic and education is focused on not habituating a person to be good but rather giving them the tools to want to be ethical and moral. What's more, a person who is motivated by care or love or other noble traits will always be a better moral actor than one guided by command type prescriptivist ethical theories. And, that get's neglected in philosophy nowadays. The pursuit of moral absolutes or as you say, monistic tendencies are largely a failure in terms of ethics.

What's more, a philosophy of care appeals to the Rawlsian notion of a veil of ignorance. If you empathize with an individual it requires some degree of putting on a veil of ignorance and trying to view the world in terms of the other and not the self.

In regards to virtue, I think people are generally stuck to their psychological types and it's only through an immense amount of effort that a person can "change" - yet even this possibility is dependent on the person being of a certain psychological type. If this is true, then not everyone can be "virtuous" - yet certainly there are things people should and should not do even if they are incapable of being "virtuous". In that sense, right action is to be sharply distinguished from good natured-ness (i.e. it cannot be a moral requirement to act from a certain intention or motivation). — darthbarracuda

Yes, but if doing what is ethical isn't motivated by a sense of care or compassion, then what are we left with? The alternative is worse than having a personal care and go through the process of deliberation about what's best for someone other than one's self to decide what is moral. Like, I said, having a person motivated to be ethical through encouraging kindness, care, and love will in almost all regards be better than even the best Kantian. To put this another way, emotivism and intuitionalism are superior to other ethical theories because they don't really rely on a yet undiscovered rationale as to what actions are the best, they are just intuitively obvious. I seriously doubt a calculus of utility could also be imagined to discern what actions are best or worst in some or any predicament or situation.

In regards to love, I think it is entirely unreasonable to demand people love each other, because love is not something that can be voluntarily made. Love is not a foundation of ethics, at least, not in the romantic or deep friend-like way. Love is sometimes said to be the desire to see the good develop in someone else - yet this is a motivation, and I don't think motivations can ever be morally required (since we have no control over them). — darthbarracuda

No, you're conflating Kantian/prescriptivist ethics with what is talked about, rather a normative ethical theory based on natural and emulatable (emphatic?) emotions. To demand that a person act or behave a certain way is unrealistic and goes against the Hume'ian emotive sense of ethics. People, are not programmable like computers and demanding anything from them to behave ethically completely nullifies the effort to be ethical. In other words, it's just not possible to teach a person to behave morally or ethically. Rather in some Buddhist sense, it's a facet of human nature that ought to be cultivated rather than demanded or required from a person. And, to cultivate this trait from a person, then a person ought to be encouraged to behave with a sense of care or love or something beyond one's sphere of interest other than the self.

Am I to understand that women's philosophy is about care, education, families, communities, virtue, being a good person and matters of personality and men's philosophy is about duty, right and wrong, law, politics and matters of principle? I don't think anyone has said such a thing in this thread and yet it seems to be a thought that's hanging around on the edge of the party waiting to be invited in. Or alternatively uninvited explicitly.

Am I to understand that women's philosophy is about care, education, families, communities, virtue, being a good person and matters of personality and men's philosophy is about duty, right and wrong, law, politics and matters of principle? I don't think anyone has said such a thing in this thread and yet it seems to be a thought that's hanging around on the edge of the party waiting to be invited in. Or alternatively uninvited explicitly. — Cuthbert

That would seem to be the case at least. Implicit or explicit, it's true on face value. As a population representative of what ethical conduct means or stands for, women sure do take the cake.

It may also be used to imply that they need not bother themselves too much with politics, law, duty and matters of principle. Let them concentrate on looking after the children and the old folk. True on face value or not I think some reflection is needed on the implications of the view I expressed.

Generalisations are often invidious. I could say 'But look at this wonderfully ethical man, and look at this despicable woman!' Then someone else chooses contrary examples. Eventually it becomes clear that we are not talking about men and women at all but about virtue, care, law, politics etc as those things are relevant to us all. But by that time we have wasted our energy on an ill-advised battle of the sexes.

It may also be used to imply that they need not bother themselves too much with politics, law, duty and matters of principle. Let them concentrate on looking after the children and the old folk. True on face value or not I think some reflection is needed on the implications of the view I expressed.

Generalisations are often invidious. I could say 'But look at this wonderfully ethical man, and look at this despicable woman!' Then someone else chooses contrary examples. Eventually it becomes clear that we are not talking about men and women at all but about virtue, care, law, politics etc as those things are relevant to us all. But by that time we have wasted our energy on an ill-advised battle of the sexes. — Cuthbert

Well, then you've answered your own question despite evidence showing that prison populations are predominantly male vs female.

The issue still is that why isn' there more talk about virtue-care-ethics and instead we still get Plato brought up and Aristotle, and the Stoics or Epicureans? Is there still some hefty amount of sexism in the field of philosophy despite ethics as care being a strong argument being proposed by feminist philosophers?

True. But we can't infer that men are more criminally minded or less ethical than women. Black people are also disproportionately imprisoned but I don't think that reflects on them either generally or individually. Japanese school children are better at maths than the English but that fact won't help us select a mathematician if we ever need one. It's a problem not about men and women but about the logic of generalisations.

As to sexism in philosophy, yes, I'm sure you're right. There's sexism pretty much everywhere and I would not imagine that philosophy is any exception. But I wonder whether splitting philosophy down the lines of virtue-ethics=feminine and duty-ethics=masculine effectively challenges the issue.

Yeah; but, I didn't suggest that the above was the case. You did. And, although it is an important point, I was solely asking about what members of this forum know about or think about ethics as caring.

But I don't think it is the case. It's not a view that I support in the least. It's a view I introduced for discussion. It seemed to be hovering on the edge by implication - because of the link made between feminist philosophy and virtue-ethics; and the comparison between the ethical goodness of men vs women.

It seemed to be hovering on the edge by implication - because of the link made between feminist philosophy and virtue-ethics; and the comparison between the ethical goodness of men vs women. — Cuthbert

I don't think there was a value judgment made about the ability to care for women more-so than men. If you want me to make a value judgment for the sake of discussion, then I can say that women profess an attitude of care more than men do on average. Does that make them more ethical beings? Not really, it's just that they are more caring than men are in regards to the welfare of others.

However, that doesn't mean that men ought to take care of what they're 'best at' and leave women to do what they're 'best at'.

I don't think there was a value judgment made about the ability to care for women more-so than men. If you want me to make a value judgment for the sake of discussion, then I can say that women profess an attitude of care more than men do on average. Does that make them more ethical beings? Not really, it's just that they are more caring than men are in regards to the welfare of others. — Posty McPostface

Yes, they do profess. It is part of the character role. In actual practice .... I have observed no differences between men and women when it comes to caring. Some people do and others don't.

Caring is not an ethic, it is a feeling. Where does this feeling come from, is tough to say? Some people certainly seem to care more than others. In part, caring can be somewhat learned by trial and error in a lifetime, but then again it may take, many, many, many lifetimes.

Justice is blind, impartial, cold, like a serpent, Draco (though not Draconian) uninvolved. Doctors aren't supposed to work on people they love, police are not supposed to be involved in investigations with respect to people that they are involved with in anyway, judges obviously can't be involved in trials with friends or enemies.

What "love and care" is, is deep deep bias. We definitely should have love and care for those close to us, but this means favoritism. This means bias. That's been well known for a long, long time. The idea that these should be a wide spread ethical system, is to propose tribalism.

Virtue-care-ethics is elegantly simplistic because it puts the emphasis on the individual to extend their sphere of interest to include others than one's self. I'd rather live in a democratic collectivist ethical society than have a benevolent dictator tell me what is good. — Posty McPostface

To deflate this a bit, all you're really saying is that helping others in need is moral. What if no one ever needs help. Does morality need to exist? If we know that there will never be a case that needing to help others will go away, why do we keep the whole society thing going where people are in constant need to be helped? Why is this a good thing to persist and continue into the future for more people? This becomes circular reasoning, and rather absurd.

There is far too much conflict for compassion to be all that great as a general ethical model. It is of course good to be compassionate, but compassion is also the source of guilt, and retribution, is my only point. If someone that you are uninterested in falls in love with you, or the truth might hurt someone, then compassion is going to make you feel shitty about rejecting them, or telling them the truth. You can be forced into lots of situations if you're too compassionate, and be tempted to lie all the time. You have to reduce compassion in order to be able to set boundaries, and not just let people walk all over you, or to tell people things they don't want to hear.

Also, when you reduce someone's problems to victimization and oppression, that compassion is going to make you feel invested, and personally hurt as well, and the blame, or responsibility, rather than being placed with the self causing guilt in the first case, will be placed with the third party causing anger, frustration, and desires for retribution in this case.

You can see that compassion is partial, or indeed individual, taking of sides, and feeling equal compassion for everyone leads to a stalemate, where a super-ordinate value must be the ruling principle in all cases, meaning that "compassion" itself is a nonstarter. Sounds nice and fluffy, and is a feel good word, that signals all kinds of virtue, but it isn't a great ruling principle.

To deflate this a bit, all you're really saying is that helping others in need is moral. — schopenhauer1

Care is a feeling that may manifest as action or inaction. It all depends.

The issue with command type ethics is that you're left with a person who doesn't realize what they're doing is good, or why it should be counted as something good over some other action. This greatly stupifies the whole moral framework. There's no point in telling that some action is good unless they can't rationalize it themselves, and if you follow the news, then most of ethics can't be rationalized at all, it's rather a trait that can only be observed but not modeled. — Posty McPostface

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. I understand how this happens in divine command theories (but why?? BECAUSE I SAID SO!!!), but theories like Kantianism, utilitarianism, or similar find grounding in reason, or intuition, or something.

People generally don't disagree about "fundamental" moral principles, like non-maleficence or fidelity. They disagree about empirical, sometimes metaphysical, views on the world. For instance, the debate surrounding abortion is not whether or not it's moral to kill a human being, because obviously most everyone agrees that it's not. The debate is whether or not a human fetus is a being that can be killed, i.e. whether or not it has moral status.

How does a virtue/care ethic approach this sort of topic? (I left feminist ethics out in this example because it's pretty obvious there's going to be strong views on abortion from the feminist crowd).

Virtue-care-ethics is elegantly simplistic because it puts the emphasis on the individual to extend their sphere of interest to include others than one's self. I'd rather live in a democratic collectivist ethical society than have a benevolent dictator tell me what is good. Ethics of care is inherently democratic and education is focused on not habituating a person to be good but rather giving them the tools to want to be ethical and moral. What's more, a person who is motivated by care or love or other noble traits will always be a better moral actor than one guided by command type prescriptivist ethical theories. And, that get's neglected in philosophy nowadays. The pursuit of moral absolutes or as you say, monistic tendencies are largely a failure in terms of ethics. — Posty McPostface

I don't think an ethical theory would count as an ethical theory if it didn't put emphasis on other people instead of yourself. I'm totally on board with investigating the ethics-before-duty, the phenomenology of the encounter with the Other (Levinas), etc. But I think it's a straw man to say only virtue-care-feminist ethics are ethics concerning other people, because that is certainly false.

Additionally, I think it was Aristotle who said virtue comes with habit. True, you must want to be virtuous, but it's something that needs to be taught as well. I'm not sure if the claim that virtuous people will always be a better moral actor than a prescriptivist person is true - and what are we defining "better moral actor" as apart from a person who does what is right, i.e. what ought to be done, i.e. prescriptions.

Yes, but if doing what is ethical isn't motivated by a sense of care or compassion, then what are we left with? The alternative is worse than having a personal care and go through the process of deliberation about what's best for someone other than one's self to decide what is moral. — Posty McPostface

I mean, sure, it's better to be a good person who does the right thing than a bad person who does the right thing for bad reasons. But I strongly believe what ought to be done stands independent of motives. Because it's certainly the case that a bad person doing the right thing out of bad motivations is still better than a bad person doing the wrong thing.

What ought to be the case stands independently of motives. Motives enhance the act, make it into something truly remarkable and praiseworthy, but it's not a requirement. It should be enough to say "don't rape" without the additional "don't rape because you don't want to rape," because if someone does want to rape, they wouldn't satisfy this condition. You mentioned previously how someone who doesn't "get" an ethical command will never see the rationale behind it. Yet I believe this is merely a case of someone not seeing the whole picture, or of having an impaired set of reasoning skills.

Like, I said, having a person motivated to be ethical through encouraging kindness, care, and love will in almost all regards be better than even the best Kantian. — Posty McPostface

But the Kantian is supposed to be motivated by duty to a categorical imperative. They are noble, serious and dedicated. The utilitarian is motivated chiefly by a recognition of the importance of pain and pleasure in the human experience, and while their compassion may not be situational-dependent, it's abstracted from everyday encounters and put into a hypothetical counterfactual that expunges context in favor of universality and consistency. Some might even go on and say consequentialist theories are an "enlightened morality", one that can work in situations that previous closer social bonds morality can't. (But can it replace this everyday morality? I think not).

To put this another way, emotivism and intuitionalism are superior to other ethical theories because they don't really rely on a yet undiscovered rationale as to what actions are the best, they are just intuitively obvious. — Posty McPostface

Emotivism and intuitionism are meta-ethical theories, not normative theories. At least, that is how I have learned it and I see it distinguished this way practically everywhere I go.

I seriously doubt a calculus of utility could also be imagined to discern what actions are best or worst in some or any predicament or situation. — Posty McPostface

Well, we have to keep in mind that consequentialists (like utilitarians) don't see their principle of utility as a very good decision theory. Utilitarianism is a theory of what we ought to do, not a theory of how we ought to go about doing what we ought to do. For the most part, utilitarianism (and most consequentialists) argue we ought to not use the principle of maximizing utility in our decisions because that's just not how we think. We aren't very good consequentialists, and consequentialists recognize this.

Care is a feeling that may manifest as action or inaction. It all depends — Rich

Yes, but what of the problem I mentioned? What is it that we need to perpetuate the help-cycle to begin with? In other words, why do we keep the whole society thing going where people are in constant need to be helped? Why is this a good thing to persist and continue into the future for more people? This becomes circular reasoning, and rather absurd.

Yes, but what of the problem I mentioned? What is it that we need to perpetuate the help-cycle to begin with? In other words, why do we keep the whole society thing going where people are in constant need to be helped? Why is this a good thing to persist and continue into the future for more people? This becomes circular reasoning, and rather absurd. — schopenhauer1

The "help cycle" is complicated. At a community level one can choose to participate depending upon circumstances. At the government level it is automatic with unpredictable results. I chose whether or not to participate based upon my experiences, which are constantly changing. There is no straightforward answer, there are only choices we make in our lives when there are choices to be made.

The "help cycle" is complicated. At a community level one can choose to participate depending upon circumstances. At the government level it is automatic with unpredictable results. I chose whether or not to participate based upon my experiences, which are constantly changing. There is no straightforward answer, there are only choices we make in our lives when there are choices to be made. — Rich

My question is what are we doing by continuing this whole community thing in the first place? If I am duty-bound to help others (something I nominally agree with), then why are we keeping community going in the first place? Helping others is always instrumental. We help others to..help others to..help others.. to help others. Thus ethics is a means to an ends. But what ends?

My question is what are we doing by continuing this whole community thing in the first place? — schopenhauer1

Everyone is doing things in order to learn the effects of different actions.

If I am duty-bound to help others (something I nominally agree with), then why are we keeping community going in the first place? — schopenhauer1

One can care, and not help, which often leads to healthier outcomes. It is all a process of learning and becoming a better navigator in life. Navigation (making choices) is a skill that takes time to learn. Ethical "rules" are if no assistance, as one learns in life. We do things and then judge effects. This is why ones own understanding of the nature of life has a substantial impact on the way over lives a life. So much meaning is lost if we see ourselves as just following rules, or worse yet, programmed robots.

Thus ethics is a means to an ends. But what ends? — schopenhauer1

Ethics is a discussion point. It one treats it as hard and fast rules, then it becomes more difficult to learn.

That would seem to be the case at least. Implicit or explicit, it's true on face value. As a population representative of what ethical conduct means or stands for, women sure do take the cake. — Posty McPostface

I find it hard to believe this is intended to be a serious statement. Or am I misunderstanding. Are you saying women are more ethical than men? I don't know which it is more insulting to.

it's just that [women] are more caring than men are in regards to the welfare of others. — Posty McPostface

Aaargh.

What "love and care" is, is deep deep bias. We definitely should have love and care for those close to us, but this means favoritism. This means bias. That's been well known for a long, long time. The idea that these should be a wide spread ethical system, is to propose tribalism. — Wosret

Love and care as a basis for ethics are not nepotism. It's compassion - valuing the interests of others - specific others or humanity in general.

There is far too much conflict for compassion to be all that great as a general ethical model. It is of course good to be compassionate, but compassion is also the source of guilt, and retribution, is my only point. If someone that you are uninterested in falls in love with you, or the truth might hurt someone, then compassion is going to make you feel shitty about rejecting them, or telling them the truth. You can be forced into lots of situations if you're too compassionate, and be tempted to lie all the time. You have to reduce compassion in order to be able to set boundaries, and not just let people walk all over you, or to tell people things they don't want to hear. — Wosret

You clearly don't know the meaning of the word "compassion." Compassion doesn't mean guilt or retribution, it means kindness. Being kind doesn't mean giving people what they want, it means caring how what you do affects people. Do you really not understand what it means, feels like, to be kind?

You can see that compassion is partial, or indeed individual, taking of sides, and feeling equal compassion for everyone leads to a stalemate, where a super-ordinate value must be the ruling principle in all cases, meaning that "compassion" itself is a nonstarter. Sounds nice and fluffy, and is a feel good word, that signals all kinds of virtue, but it isn't a great ruling principle. — Wosret

I'll say it again, you have completely misunderstood what compassion is. The way you describe it it sounds like an afterthought. Something you might do if you have the time. Not really that important.

You can't value the interests of "humanity in general" except in empty abstraction, in real life you only deal with a few at a time.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evolution-the-self/201403/the-downside-compassion

https://books.google.ca/books?id=eSyPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT51&lpg=PT51&dq=compassion+is+the+source+of+guilt&source=bl&ots=ds1C851Q3L&sig=qz4acZHd6_8wS9z2nt3bvAuAnzo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi3mr7h2fbWAhVE9GMKHYMvAeQQ6AEITDAI#v=onepage&q=compassion%20is%20the%20source%20of%20guilt&f=false

https://books.google.ca/books?id=vliHyq9cPKcC&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=compassion+makes+your+enemy+my+enemy&source=bl&ots=r-dOVA6X4K&sig=8CMuhuPKrZmOv-eXP4Uhps196W4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjf9O7c2vbWAhUK0mMKHfweA84Q6AEITzAH#v=onepage&q=compassion%20makes%20your%20enemy%20my%20enemy&f=false

https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-empathy-trap/article33412535/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&

There are some sources, your incredulity isn't very persuasive. Also, in insinuating that I'm some unfeeling monster, where was my compassion, friend? When seen as the enemy of things you do have compassion for, it is denied, that's where it went.

You can't value the interests of "humanity in general" except in empty abstraction, in real life you only deal with a few at a time. — Wosret

Not true.

Also, in insinuating that I'm some unfeeling monster, where was my compassion, friend? When seen as the enemy of things you do have compassion for, it is denied, that's where it went. — Wosret

I don't think you are an unfeeling monster, but I think you may be looking at compassion through the glass of your own cynicism and insecurity. Compassion is generous. I don't see any room for generosity in your understanding of it.

When do you ever actually interact with "humanity in general"? How can what I said not be true?

Why you callin' me names, man? I gave sources, I didn't pull this out of my ass, this is what I've read, put your pyschologizing away, and give real reasons why it is otherwise, explain why I have sources, and you have intuitions...

When do you ever actually interact with "humanity in general"? How can what I said not be true? — Wosret

Compassion isn't an interaction, it's a set of attitudes and feelings. I like people. The first thing I want when I meet a new person is to find out what they know and what's important to them. Good will is my default setting.

Why you callin' me names, man? I gave sources, I didn't pull this out of my ass, this is what I've read, put your pyschologizing away, and give real reasons why it is otherwise, explain why I have sources, and you have intuitions... — Wosret

I felt a little bad about the psychologizing. On the other hand, you wear your idiosyncrasies on your sleeve and use them for rhetorical effect. To a certain extent it's open season.

Sources? Psychology Today? The Globe and Mail? Please. The sources you linked to are pseudo-psychological clap trap. They use the same incorrect definition for compassion that you do. Compassion - Sympathy and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others. Where is there room for guilt in there?

I don't know what to say to that compassion isn't an interaction... so you can be compassionate completely regardless of how you interact with people?

I guess we disagree then, and since it seems to just be that you're right, and I'm flawed and devious, there isn't a whole lot I can say to that.

I don't know what to say to that compassion isn't an interaction... so you can be compassionate completely regardless of how you interact with people? — Wosret

By your logic, being hungry (the feeling) is the same thing as eating (the action).

I should also point out that at no time did I say that compassion is a bad thing, or anything like that, I was saying that it doesn't make a good ruling principle, there was no attacks on compassion as a virtue, or good thing, just as not all that is needed for an ethical philosophy, as there is no way to solve conflicts, and it is inherently biasing.

I don't believe that one can feel compassion, just as I don't believe that one can feel hunger, and then have no compulsory action or reaction whatsoever as a response, no. Emotions move us, that's what they do. They are not just abstract things un-attached to our actions. Compassion, unless for imaginary suffering, that you're conceiving of in virtual space happens when we encounter the real thing, in individuals, and not "humanity in general".