Also, note how we can both talk about a hypothetical someone without talking nonsense. Remarkable, eh? — Sapientia

A most salient admission. I'll take it as proof that my objection to you was correct after all.

The anti-natalist position is about birth. — The Great Whatever

Oh really? Thanks for pointing that out yet again. You should keep on repeating these comments ad nauseam, rather than actually address my points.

You cannot decide that you know better than a non-existent person. — The Great Whatever

Oh really? Neither can you.

I am not talking about a hypothetical person. — The Great Whatever

Oh really? Who were you talking about then? This should be good. You couldn't have been talking about anyone living, since, according to you, they're already "going through that", so it wouldn't make sense to say that you wouldn't want to put anyone else through that. You also couldn't have been talking about a hypothetical someone who could exist in the future, but doesn't actually exist in the here-and-now, because you've just denied it and have repeatedly claimed that that's nonsense. Conclusion: you're the one talking nonsense.

I reckon that it was the latter: you meant that you wouldn't want to put anyone else through that, and if someone was born, then they'd go through that. But you don't want to admit to it because then you'd have to concede.

And it's still nonsense -- but at least you're admitting what you're doing now? — The Great Whatever

A most salient admission. I'll take it as proof that my objection to you was correct after all. — Thorongil

Are you two high? Or is it just that you can't grasp the logic of what I said? Because noting that we can both talk about a hypothetical someone without talking nonsense doesn't logically imply that I've done the exact opposite. At least TGW didn't seem as cocksure.

Idk Sapientia, it seems to me like you're just not very good at following a conversation.

Yes, but the way things seem to you clearly cannot be relied upon if an accurate reflection is sought after.

If I want some feedback, I'll seek it elsewhere, from a source that isn't hopelessly biased.

You said: "Being non-existent, strictly speaking, they don't get a say in the matter, nor are they entitled to one, nor are they missing out or being done an injustice." They're not missing out, eh? So why are you in favor of bringing them into the world so that they don't in fact miss out on art and whatever else? This is manifestly contradictory and shows you're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You either stick to the quoted statement and find a better argument or admit that the argument you presented several pages ago is faulty.

Each day is a little life: every waking and rising a little birth, every fresh morning a little youth, every going to rest and sleep a little death. - Schopenhauer

Let's talk sleep/unconsciousness/resuscitation via CPR or other means: if you are of the opinion that coming into existence is always a harm, is waking up from sleep or being resuscitated while unconscious undesirable?

This will obviously include the discussion of personal identity, but I assume that most if not all of us are willing to accept that personal identity is at least partly (if not entirely) composed of conscious awareness (a feeling of selfhood).

Going further, then, when one goes to sleep or goes into an unconscious state and then awakes, is the individual who wakes again the "same" individual?

If not, then the strict antinatalist seems to be in a tricky situation as it would seem as though they would be obligated to make sure they do not wake up again. For if they do wake up again, they will have created a conscious entity without its explicit consent; that is, they will have brought into existence an individual that would have otherwise stayed in non-existence.

What about CPR/other means of resuscitation? Can the strict antinatalist be okay with resuscitating unconscious individuals? What if they didn't want to be resuscitated?

If one answers that the probability of them desiring to be resuscitated is high, this contradicts the antinatalist's (presumed) position regarding consent in birth, for someone else could easily just say that the probability of the child enjoying their life and appreciating being born is high.

Perhaps the bullet ought to be bitten. Perhaps we ought to have little cards that tell passerbys whether or not they should attempt to resuscitate us.

is waking up from sleep or being resuscitated while unconscious undesirable? — darthbarracuda

Yes. For me anyway, waking up is horrible. I really can't stand it, because then it hits me that I'm still alive and have another day to suffer through. It's not strictly speaking being alive that's unbreable, but being conscious, and waking up makes you conscious.

That said, I don't think it would be productive to kill anyone, including sleeping people, or force them not to wake up. That will just cause more misery among the living.

You said: "Being non-existent, strictly speaking, they don't get a say in the matter, nor are they entitled to one, nor are they missing out or being done an injustice." They're not missing out, eh? So why are you in favor of bringing them into the world so that they don't in fact miss out on art and whatever else? This is manifestly contradictory and shows you're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You either stick to the quoted statement and find a better argument or admit that the argument you presented several pages ago is faulty. — Thorongil

My god, it's so silly that I have to explain the difference between present tense and future tense. You really should know the difference already. To state that they DO not miss out doesn't contradict the claim that they WOULD miss out IF such-and-such bla-de-bla. Get it? If not, please go back to school and stop bothering me.

Nope. If no one were born, nobody would miss out, either.

What is it about life that you find to be absolutely dreadful?

It's consistently painful and tedious.

Nope. If no one were born, nobody would miss out, either. — The Great Whatever

Yes, but that's obviously not the condition - or not the only condition - I had in mind, so your reply is either an ignoratio elenchi or a straw man.

I refer you back to my previous post where I provided an explanation in terms of future possibilities, and brought up a thought experiment involving parallel universes and hypothetical scenarios. You know, one of the many posts of mine that you ignored or failed to understand or twisted or replied with an irrelevant, short, single sentence truism that I've never disputed.

Yes, but that's obviously not the condition I had in mind — Sapientia

Then why did you say it?

To state that they DO not miss out doesn't contradict the claim that they WOULD miss out IF such-and-such bla-de-bla. — Sapientia

This is irrelevant, isn't it? They neither DO nor WOULD miss out.

In a hypothetical scenario in which a child was born, that child WOULD suffer. In a hypothetical scenario in which no child was born, no child WOULD suffer. Do you understand the asymmetry? It is possible to subject an actual person to misery by birthing them, but not to deny anyone anything, hypothetical or otherwise, by abstaining from birth.

It's consistently painful and tedious. — The Great Whatever

I can sympathise. That's how I feel when arguing against you.

Yeah, no argument there. That's why you have to find something that makes up for the bullshit. Something to live for.

I don't think there is anything that makes up for it, or even comes close to doing so.

Then why did you say it? — The Great Whatever

I didn't. I said "IF such-and-such and bla-de-bla" because I'm tired of repeating myself. You've predictably filled that part in however you like, rather than spend the time and effort involved in grasping what I was getting at or simply asking me to clarify.

This is irrelevant, isn't it? They neither DO nor WOULD miss out. — The Great Whatever

No, there is a sense in which it makes sense to say that they would miss out, but you'd have to interpret what I've said charitably, and take what I've previously stated into consideration, but it seems as though you have no interest in doing so, so why should I bother to explain myself again? You haven't actually argued against it. You've just denied it or claimed that it's nonsense without justifying that claim.

Learned Helplessness

It's quite simple, really. In a hypothetical future scenario, someone is born and experiences valuable things out of life. This scenario can become an actuality, unless we go extinct. In a figurative sense, therefore, we can say that this someone would be missing out if they were never born and didn't subsequently experience those valuable things in life. Would they actually be missing out? No, because they were never born. Did I ever state or imply that they would actually be missing out? No. That's a straw man.

This way of talking is demonstrably not nonsensical if interpreted correctly, as in the example I gave earlier of the phrase "turning in one's grave".

Why you and Thorongil deny or fail to even grasp this is beyond me, unless it's a case of wilful ignorance.

It's quite simple, really. In a hypothetical future scenario, someone is born and experiences valuable things out of life. This scenario can become an actuality, unless we go extinct. In a figurative sense, therefore, we can say that this someone would be missing out if they were never born and didn't subsequently experience those valuable things in life. Would they actually be missing out? No, because they were never born. Did I ever state or imply that they would actually be missing out? No. That's a straw man. — Sapientia

This is the use of counterfactuals to describe a potential, possible world, which is plausibly at least a component of our ability to conduct debates about modality.

Anyhoo, it's pretty easy to see, at least to myself (and others here as well) that the valuable things "missed" are not as important as the terrible things "avoided". There is nothing wrong with keeping people in non-existence.

And we can further use counterfactuals by arguing that a potential person "has" the right to consent to exist. Since they cannot consent, do not give birth.

This is the use of counterfactuals to describe a potential, possible world, which is plausibly at least a component of our ability to conduct debates about modality.

Anyhoo, it's pretty easy to see, at least to myself (and others here as well) that the valuable things "missed" are not as important as the terrible things "avoided".

And we can further use counterfactuals by arguing that a potential person "has" the right to consent to exist. Since they cannot consent, do not give birth. — darthbarracuda

I don't agree with that second paragraph if you're suggesting that it's necessarily true and/or true of every case and would (or would likely) be true of every possible case in the future.

But the big problem here is that the other two can't even grasp, or won't accept, this counterfactual manner of talking as meaningful or true. We haven't really been able to move past it. They've consistently missed the point or twisted my words or outright dismissed it as false or nonsensical. I mean, just look at the next reply. But you seem more sensible.

Regarding your third paragraph, in the sense we're talking about, I agree with that first sentence, and the second sentence is also true, but only for a certain period of time. It's true that babies or hypothetical people can't consent to life, but capable adults can (or rather they can affirm or reject it, and they have a choice, and are at some liberty to take matters into their own hands and choose which path to travel down or to cut the journey short), so I don't see it as being as big of an issue as you do. As I said to you before, it's a cost that can pale in comparison to the benefits. (N.B. can, not necessarily will. There are various factors and things to consider, and our own subjective evaluation comes into play, although some might wish to maintain the pretence of complete objectivity).

In a figurative sense, therefore, we can say that this someone would be missing out if they were never born and didn't subsequently experience those valuable things in life. — Sapientia

"In a figurative sense?" No, in no sense.

Did I ever state or imply that they would actually be missing out? No. That's a straw man. — Sapientia

Then what are you actually saying? What does the word "actually" do here? Is anyone missing out? No. Would anyone be? No. So what's your point? What does it mean to figuratively miss out on something?

In the end I believe it comes down to a subjective introspective appropriation of the value of existence. Can a life be made to be valuable? Possibly. Can a life be miserable and worthless? Possibly. Is an actualized valuable life worth more than an avoided miserable life? That is really what I perceive to be the underlying sentiment here: that there is a disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfillment, and that no amount of pleasure will be able to compensate for the amount of pain, or the potential thereof, that a life will contain.

In the end I believe it comes down to a subjective introspective appropriation of the value of existence. — darthbarracuda

I'm glad that you acknowledge the subjectivity of it, but I suspect that you go further than I would with the appropriation part. I would say that some cases are more clearcut than others. If taken to extremes, we can more easily judge the value of a certain life - whether that be the life of an actual person or a hypothetical life. We can imagine a life of extreme misery, and in contrast, we can imagine a much better life. But there is a large grey area in between, and of course, although we can take certain factors into consideration, we don't have a crystal ball with which we can rightly appropriate the value of the lives of all of those within that grey area.

Can a life be made to be valuable? Possibly. Can a life be miserable and worthless? Possibly. Is an actualized valuable life worth more than an avoided miserable life? — darthbarracuda

Yes, that's at the heart of the issue. My answer is that it can be. So, we shouldn't rule it out.

That is really what I perceive to be the underlying sentiment here: that there is a disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfillment, and that no amount of pleasure will be able to compensate for the amount of pain, or the potential thereof, that a life will contain. — darthbarracuda

The part in bold is what I think really matters. The former part could be conceded. It may well be the case that there is, in a certain sense, a greater and disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfilment. But what matters is the effect that this has on the value of life. If the misery to fulfilment ratio was, say, 2:1, it doesn't follow that the detrimental effect that the former has on the value of life outweighs the beneficial effect of the latter. I don't think that you can successfully argue that that is true of every case, so I think that your position is untenable.

I'm glad that you acknowledge the subjectivity of it, but I suspect that you go further than I would with the appropriation part. I would say that some cases are more clearcut than others. If taken to extremes, we can more easily judge the value of a certain life - whether that be the life of an actual person or a hypothetical life. We can imagine a life of extreme misery, and in contrast, we can imagine a much better life. But there is a large grey area in between, and of course, although we can take certain factors into consideration, we don't have a crystal ball with which we can rightly appropriate the value of the lives of all of those within that grey area. — Sapientia

The fact that we don't have a crystal ball means that we probably shouldn't be messing around with stuff that affects other people.

The part in bold is what I think really matters. The former part could be conceded. It may well be the case that there is, in a certain sense, a greater and disproportionate amount of misery compared to fulfilment. But what matters is the effect that this has on the value of life. If the misery to fulfilment ratio was, say, 2:1, it doesn't follow that the detrimental effect that the former has on the value of life outweighs the beneficial effect of the latter. I don't think that you can successfully argue that that is true of every case, so I think that your position is untenable. — Sapientia

Regardless of the misery/value distinction, there is a threshold that once stepped over, the value of life drops significantly. In fact I would be willing to bet (based off of psychological and anthropological findings) that the value people derive from their lives is post hoc at best, that is, a derivation of relief that allows them to comfort themselves.

Again, since there is no way to predict how a person will end up, we probably shouldn't be experimenting.

The fact that we don't have a crystal ball means that we probably shouldn't be messing around with stuff that affects other people. — darthbarracuda

You can use that same reasoning to argue that we should let other people have children, and let those children live their lives unaffected by the actions of present-day antinatalists. (Of course, you and I both understand that they wouldn't technically be affected if they never exist, but I think that you catch my drift, bearing in mind what could be and what could cease to be a possibility). I also get that you don't argue in favor of enforced antinatalism, but the point still stands when you once again consider what could be if we were all antinatalists. It's hard to overstate just how catastrophic the consequences would be if you're not correct: we're talking about the extinction of humankind here. And what would otherwise happen? We'd continue to live on, through the good and the bad. Most people would affirm that they'd rather it be that way than not at all, and we should give them some credit.

Regardless of the misery/value distinction, there is a threshold that once stepped over, the value of life drops significantly. — darthbarracuda

Yes, and those cases in which life is ruined as a result are just a subset of the totality of cases, and it seems to be a minority, too.

In fact I would be willing to bet (based off of psychological and anthropological findings) that the value people derive from their lives is post hoc at best, that is, a derivation of relief that allows them to comfort themselves. — darthbarracuda

I'm willing to bet against you, and to bet on your evidence being insufficient to support your conclusion. At best, it'll show that this is a phenomenon that occurs in some, but crucially not all situations.

Again, since there is no way to predict how a person will end up, we probably shouldn't be experimenting. — darthbarracuda

If we had not have overcome our worries about experimentation in the past, then we might still be suffering from small pox. Fortunately, however, inoculation took off.

If we don't overcome our worries about experimentation now, then no else will get to live a life worth living. Setting aside the sophist objection that future generations don't exist in the present, you'd effectively be depriving them of the opportunity to live a life worth living. It's important to think of it that way, otherwise one might overlook the severity. It seems that some people in this discussion would rather turn a blind eye, and will construct arguments to try to explain it away.

Instrumentality means nothing other than a means to an end. Anything other than that is what you're reading into it. — Sapientia

Yes, hence why I use it to describe existence. The ends never end though. It is always a means to another end, and another end, and another end. If you do not get the sentiment of it, it's like not getting what someone means when they say existential angst vs. test anxiety, or situational depression vs. severe depression, or any other such situational usage vs. global usage. Perhaps it is a schopenhauer1 neologism, but it is one I am sticking to. It conveys well, I think, the understanding that we are striving creatures that work as if there is an end, but there is no end. I find it hard to believe you would not get that concept. To parse the term to try to make it its common usage when it was meant in its global usage would be an obvious misuse of what I am trying to connote. To say, for example, "But look.. I just accomplished and END, therefore everything is not instrumental!" would be misleading, and if you knew the global understanding of the way I am using this, it would be purposely misleading, and therefore a strawman. I am not saying you were going to do that, but just anticipating the possible strawman.

You can use that same reasoning to argue that we should let other people have children, and let those children live their lives unaffected by the actions of present-day antinatalists. (Of course, you and I both understand that they wouldn't technically be affected if they never exist, but I think that you catch my drift, bearing in mind what could be and what could cease to be a possibility). I also get that you don't argue in favor of enforced antinatalism, but the point still stands when you once again consider what could be if we were all antinatalists. It's hard to overstate just how catastrophic the consequences would be if you're not correct: we're talking about the extinction of humankind here. And what would otherwise happen? We'd continue to live on, through the good and the bad. Most people would affirm that they'd rather it be that way than not at all, and we should give them some credit. — Sapientia

An appeal to the majority proves nothing in terms of the truth of an ethical doctrine. We do not have a crystal ball, and this means that we ought not to mess around with things that affect other people. This doesn't mean we get to just do whatever the hell we want. This is exactly why engineers follow safety protocol when building things, so the damage is minimized. In the case of birth, damage is minimized by not giving birth to anything, and while this may lead to the "loss" of pleasurable moments, the minimization of severe pain is more important, since there really is no loss at all and those who are suffering immensely don't give a shit about the supposed pleasures of life.

If there was a society filled with 99 happy people and 1 miserable person, we would be concerned about the 1 miserable person. The 99 happy people would be rather unimportant once we saw the misery the 1 person was going through. How much happiness will make up for the Holocaust, or for the day-to-day misery of the animals being eaten alive?

The whole point here is that since you cannot predict how a life will turn out, and that life itself is filled with unfortunate circumstances, accidents, and general suffering, and that there is indeed a chance that something severe will befall the born, that having a child is not a rational nor moral thing to do.

When it comes to a judgement of birth, I tend to be passive and view it as something that is just a product of human emotions and ignorance. But nevertheless I do not view birth as something to be cherished.

The ends never end though. It is always a means to another end, and another end, and another end. — schopenhauer1

If you mean simply that there are countless means and ends in life, and that once one ends, another inevitably arises, then yes, that is true. But I don't think that that's a problem in itself. You have to smuggle in a certain viewpoint, such as your own, for it to be problematic.

If you do not get the sentiment of it, it's like not getting what someone means when they say existential angst vs. test anxiety, or situational depression vs. severe depression, or any other such situational usage vs. global usage. — schopenhauer1

I do get it. I was the one emphasising the sentimentality involved in your view of instrumentality. I'm just pointing out that your conclusion only follows given certain premises besides instrumentality. It's a bit like looking at an inkblot on a piece of plain paper. The inkblot itself is meaningless. How we interpret it is what matters.

It conveys well, I think, the understanding that we are striving creatures that work as if there is an end, but there is no end. — schopenhauer1

There is a sense it which it is true that there is no end, and there is a sense in which it is false. It doesn't bother me in the slightest that there is no objective purpose. There is purpose nonetheless. We don't all have an overarching purpose to life, but many of us do, and besides, there are countless purposes that arise within life - some of which get accomplished. That is enough for some.

I find it hard to believe you would not get that concept. — schopenhauer1

I'm glad you've at least given me the benefit of the doubt.

To parse the term to try to make it its common usage when it was meant in its global usage would be an obvious misuse of what I am trying to connote. To say, for example, "But look.. I just accomplished and END, therefore everything is not instrumental!" would be misleading, and if you knew the global understanding of the way I am using this, it would be purposely misleading, and therefore a strawman. I am not saying you were going to do that, but just anticipating the possible strawman. — schopenhauer1

No, I'm not denying the instrumentality, nor that it occurs on a global scale. I'm denying what you think that implies. It's this misguided overestimation of one's own judgement that I have been objecting to: the one that fails to recognise the subjective limits, and attempts to transcend them. There is a typical and understandable reaction to pessimists, nihilists, and antinatalists - at least when they get carried away, as they often do: speak for yourself!