Are our minds touching when I read your words on this screen? How is that different than being in each other's presence? I can experience you as words on a screen, or as a body, or as a voice on the phone, but never as a mind. — Harry Hindu

Actually, sometimes it is possible to experience people as a mind if you develop the sensitivity for it. In this way, you can catch what they're thinking before they even say it. But it takes a bit to build such a connection.

Actually, sometimes it is possible to experience people as a mind if you develop the sensitivity for it. In this way, you can catch what they're thinking before they even say it. But it takes a bit to build such a connection. — Agustino

We never experience other minds, only other bodies. You learn to predict other people's behavior that you know well.

So then what is the difference between materialism and idealism? Why choose one over the other? — Harry Hindu

One says that things are physical, the other that things are mental. It's a disagreement on the nature of the fundamental substance. It's not a disagreement on whether or not there are parts of the world that are not me. That would be solipsism vs non-solipsism.

All I'm saying is that idealism doesn't entail solipsism. There can be mental phenomena that isn't me. The Cartesian dualist says as much. There's no reason to believe that the existence of physical bodies is required to maintain this separation of minds.

It seems to me that you are saying that we aren't disagreeing on which meat we are chewing on, rather we are chewing on the same meat and we are merely disagreeing on the name of the meat we are chewing on.

Pretty much. As Hempel's dilemma shows, there's hardly even a coherent understanding of what it even means be a physical thing. And I think the same dilemma can be used to question the notion of the mental, too (and any other monism).

Substance is a vacuous concept.

We never experience other minds, only other bodies. You learn to predict other people's behavior that you know well. — Harry Hindu

Nope, that's not what I said. And you just repeated what you previously said, so you're clearly talking past what I'm saying.

I voted idealism because I think it's the best solution to the mind-body problem. Also it's a super sexy position. The metaphysical weak are those who depend on an unchanging reality to cope with the flux of existence.

And the idealist can say the same. — Michael

An idealist can say it, but I've not seen it backed up. What is it that connects the ideas in my mind of your behavior to your actual behavior, which I suppose are ideas in your mind?

BIV A has experiences of having a body, BIV B has experiences of interacting with other bodies.

But how does B justify interacting with A?

An idealist can say it, but I've not seen it backed up. What is that connects the ideas in my mind of your behavior to your actual behavior, which I suppose are ideas in your mind?

BIV A has experiences of having a body, BIV B has experiences of interacting with other bodies.

But how does B justify interacting with A? — Marchesk

Those questions can be asked of the materialist as well.

I don't understand why you think bodies being of substance A can avoid solipsism but bodies being of substance B can't.

I don't understand why you think bodies being of substance A can avoid solipsism but bodies being of substance B can't. — Michael

Because the substance of idealistic bodies is ideas in the mind of a perceiver, not a shared world of material objects.

Idealists don't have a body. They're in a similar position as the BIVs, minus the envattment. What they have is ideas in their minds of having a body and interacting with other bodies.

You need the idealist version of a Matrix to get around that.

Those questions can be asked of the materialist as well. — Michael

It's like claiming that we're all dreaming. Take the movie Inception. On one interpretation, the main character is inside a dream the entire movie. If so, then he has no reason to believe anyone else he interacts with is real.

Contrast this with being awake. We have reasons to believe other people are real, and not just ideas in the mind. That's the difference.

As regard idealism and solipsism:

I’d say the allegory to Inception is more for kids who wonder about what-ifs without understanding the (hopefully not too outdated) mindset of philosophical skepticism—ala Plato, Hume, and others. The allegory to The Matrix (“the womb”, no?), imperfect though it might be, is more in tune which an objective idealism (I’m specifically thinking of the latter movies in the series).

As to why not solipsism in either scenario: conscious agents will by definition be endowed with agency: top-down causal ability. At a very abstract metaphysical level, what is not my intention/agency will then pertain to some other agency’s (or agencies’) will / top-down causal ability. Hence, there are mandatorily entailed multiple agents (all of which must be aware/conscious of goals in order to will) via the first-person point of view’s reality; this because not everything is a consequence of its current or past will/agency/intentions within this world. Indeed, as per both Inception and The Matrix, conflicts of will are common … of course, between multiple agents/agencies.

To then affirm that in the movie Inception the other agencies were not “real” is then, I argue, a fallacy of reasoning (given the very metaphysical premises of the movie). Either you envision a body that is asleep/unconscious/etc. from which is produced multiple interacting agencies, or, else no such body and there being nothing but a communally shared dream between a multitude of agencies (as to the movie’s depiction of recurring personas, this in a way is no different than Shakespeare’s comments that all we are are actors/agencies/roles on a stage … playing out our roles on the sage of life (or at least something to the like)).

Of course, this doesn’t of itself resolve “why are there ‘independent’ phenomenal objects perceived in like ways by multiple agents … such as the moon?” but, imo, it would logically refute the possibility of solipsism (aka, a singular aware/conscious agency in the entirety of existence). Then it’s back to the same old same old: does that dog over there hold conscious agency or is it an automaton as people such as Descartes assumed?

The imaginary vs real distinction doesn't relate to the question of Idealism vs Materialism. Both Idealists and Materialists make the imaginary vs real distinction. — andrewk

I don't think this is right; I think the distinction is closely related to the question of idealism vs realism. The imaginary is understood by realists to be something mental (ideal) whereas the real is considered to be something material (which is to say extra-mental).

The imaginary is understood as something perceivable only by the mind imagining it, whereas the real is something perceivable by multiple minds or even something not perceivable by any mind. The real is thus understood to be materially so.

How would you say idealists make sense of the distinction between real and imaginary?

In a sense, there's a lot more to the story of imaginary and real. E.g. are you’re perceptions, emotions, etc. imaginary or real? They certainly pertain to you as a total mind, though (and not the physically objective world).

Still, in the simplified sense you’ve addressed, the answer is (at least for those I have in mind, such as Kant) the same as the answer you’ve given:

The imaginary is understood as something perceivable only by the mind imagining it, whereas the real is something perceivable by multiple minds or even something not perceivable by any mind. — Janus

I am under the impression that realists interpret imagined counterfactual possibilities of perception as being evidence for the existence of mind independent objects.

Conversely, I understand idealists as interpreting imagined counterfactual possibilities of perception as being the definition of "mind-independent" objects.

I don't think I understand your distinction. The distinction between the real and the imaginary is not the same as the distinction between materialism and idealism. You are conflating meanings.

To then affirm that in the movie Inception the other agencies were not “real” is then, I argue, a fallacy of reasoning (given the very metaphysical premises of the movie). Either you envision a body that is asleep/unconscious/etc. from which is produced multiple interacting agencies, or, else no such body and there being nothing but a communally shared dream between a multitude of agencies (as to the movie’s depiction of recurring personas, this in a way is no different than Shakespeare’s comments that all we are are actors/agencies/roles on a stage … playing out our roles on the sage of life (or at least something to the like)). — javra

But Inception does explicitly state that the people you encounter when entering someone else's dream are projections of the dreamer's unconscious mind. The only exceptions being the other minds who have entered the dream with you from outside via the machine that allows people to have a shared dream experience.

However, the main character Dom, played by DiCaprio, does have ongoing doubts as to whether he's ever actually awake, and one of the characters in the movie is actually a projection (his deceased wife).

This leads to the possibility that Dom is stuck inside a dream the entire movie, and all the other characters are his projections. Or he's being incepted from outside. But there's no way for him to be sure. In actuality, the director is incepting the audience, creating doubt in the viewer as to what's real, leaving it open to interpretation, similar to a philosophy discussion.

But there's no way for him to be sure. — Marchesk

In a very somber way, I have to admit my amusement at this idea. There are an infinite what-ifs (I presume; I haven't enough fingers to count them all :) ). What does it matter!? This running about for absolute certainty is a running after the horizon in belief that one can eventually hold it in one's hands.

Here, a what-if: what if its all a dream & I am the only conscious agent & all other beings I presume to be independent conscious agents are actually just portions of my unconscious as indivuated conscious agents (notice the mine, mine, mine attitude at work here): this would mean that I as a conscious agent am not all that pivotally important, that I'm an agent along with a bunch of other fellow agents within a singular mind ...

And?

Get over the emotive tingle of it all and it amounts to the same old same old. I'm still me; you're still you; (physical) reality is still as it is. What's the difference? We still conflict, we still find moments of accord, will still have to deal with realities that bite/limit/constrain.

(as to the movie Inception, again, it wasn't one I gravitated toward)

How would you say idealists make sense of the distinction between real and imaginary? — Janus

I would say that, for an idealist, an event is imaginary if it was invented and narrated by somebody that had no good reason to suppose that it ever happened.

A materialist can use the same definition.

What does it matter!? This running about for absolute certainty is a running after the horizon in belief that one can eventually hold it in one's hands. — javra

We can't be certain, but we can strive for reasonable beliefs. I'm arguing that idealism is less reasonable than materialism when it comes to other minds, because materialists have a plausible account of interaction via bodies that idealists lack.

We can't be certain, but we can strive for reasonable beliefs. I'm arguing that idealism is less reasonable than materialism when it comes to other minds, because materialists have a plausible account of interaction via bodies that idealists lack. — Marchesk

Are you even arguing for materialism here or dualism? Because if you're arguing for materialism then the mind is a physical thing, and so there shouldn't be a problem with saying that minds can interact with each other without any intermediary. But then if you're arguing for dualism then you have to account for how your mind can interact with your body. Although even if there were an account of that, if minds can interact with bodies and bodies can interact with minds then why can't minds just interact with minds?

Either way, you're just shifting the goalposts.

Yet materialism, at least traditionally, upholds epiphenomenalism to be true. A strange paradoxical perspective: I as an agency, in order to coherently account for my physical and metaphysical context(s) as viewed in a manner X, conclude that I am in no way an agency.

I find a hybrid version more pleasing, though whether it would be termed objective idealism or some variant of neutral monism, it still would not be one of materialism (nor Cartesian Dualism).

Other than the issue of solipsism - were one to be accordant to empirical realities of brain-mind relations within this (objective) idealism - what else would made idealism a less reasonable belief of other minds?

because if you're arguing for materialism then the mind is a physical thing, and so there shouldn't be a problem with saying that minds can interact with each other without any intermediary. — Michael

Is that like how software can interact with other software without an intermediary (hardware)? For a materialist, the mind is part of a living body, not separate from it. It would be meaningless for mind to mind interactions independent of a body.

This is what an idealist needs to do. Show how mind A can know about mind B via ideas in mind A. What is the connection between one mind having ideas of a body belonging to someone else, and another mind? How is that different from dreaming or imagining someone else's body (and behavior)? I dream of having conversations with people, but I've never had reason to connect that to someone else that's not part of my dream.

This is what an idealist needs to do. Show how mind A can know about mind B via ideas in mind A. — Marchesk

And the materialist has to show how mind A can know about body B via ideas in mind A.

You might say that the ideas in mind A are caused by changes in body A which are caused by interacting with body B.

I fail to see how that's more parsimonious than saying that ideas in mind A are caused by interacting with mind B.

But this epistemological problem is still besides the point. Idealism doesn't entails solipsism. One can claim that only mental phenomena exists without claiming that only my mental phenomena exists. It's just Cartesian dualism minus any physical bodies.

All you're actually arguing for is scepticism. But sceptical problems are problems for the materialist as well.

And the materialist has to show how mind A can know about body B via ideas in mind A. — Michael

Au contraire. The materialist can just deny that perceptions are ideas in the mind. It's my understanding that the majority of professional philosophers who weigh in on perception are direct realists these days, and that sense-data has fallen out of favor.

I fail to see how that's more parsimonious than saying that ideas in mind A are caused by interacting with mind B. — Michael

You're right, but that's a problem for indirect realists and dualists to deal with.

This is what an idealist needs to do. Show how mind A can know about mind B via ideas in mind A. — Marchesk

Ideas, as in thoughts? Man, this is a bit too Cartesian sounding in mindset for my own personal tastes. We are far more than thoughts. Unless one expands thought to include emotions, intuitions, perceptions via senses, understandings, non-phenomenal sensations (such as pleasure or happiness), and, of course, intentionality/will … which then tends to make “thought” a rather amorphous concept.

Our thoughts are there to better to guide, but we at pith are not our thoughts/ideas.

For instance, I sense your mood via interaction, as you might sense the mood of others. I, personally, don’t have an idea of your mood. Not unless I abstract what I sense into a thought.

I grant it’s a very different outlook on what a mind consists of. But then, never been one to like Descartes’ philosophical mindset (not that he doesn’t have some good aspects).

Ideas, as in thoughts? — javra

Ideas as in perception, not concepts. That's the sense-data theory of perception that Locke, Hume, Berkeley and others have championed. And it does bring up the specter of skepticism regarding other minds.

But if we directly perceive minds/bodies when we interact with people, the problem of other minds need not be an issue.

Ideas as in perception, not concepts. That's the sense-data theory of perception that Locke, Hume, Berkeley and others have championed. And it does bring up the specter of skepticism regarding other minds. — Marchesk

Their concept(s) of "perception" were not limited to the materialist concept of perception being that which occurs via the living physiological senses. They weren't materialists. An example I find easy to express: I can perceive/apprehend happiness in me: it has no smell, tactile feel, visual appearance, etc. Nor is it in any way differentiated from me the perceiver/apprehendor when present.

That I can sense other people's moods (sometimes better than other times) is something we all naturally experience (something we can all perceive, as you say).

A trap, ?

There's no objection to there being a perceiver, just that the perceived is the perception.
Or, put differently, that the experienced is always the experience.
Or, that everything (literally) is mind stuff, where mind is the likes of experiences, qualia, thinking, love/feelings, headaches, self-awareness, consciousness.

Seems that, in an ontological sense, an experience is part of the experiencer when occurring.
The experienced, on the other hand, may or may not be.

Suppose cogito ergo sum is actually cogitamous ergo sum.

We never experience other minds, only other bodies. You learn to predict other people's behavior that you know well. — Harry Hindu

Nope, that's not what I said. And you just repeated what you previously said, so you're clearly talking past what I'm saying. — Agustino

Nope. I said that we never experience other minds, and you said we can. I then repeated myself and said that we can't. So no, we aren't talking past each other. The problem seems to be that you either spoke past what I originally said, or you didn't clearly explain what it is that you meant.