The view that people (and things) don't have the power to do differently than they actually do has been called "actualism". It is the view that there aren't any unactualized powers, that anything that is possible is actual (and, correlatively, that anything non-actual is impossible). It has been argued to be a consequence of scientific determinism. On that view, if I didn't refrain from committing some bad deed, then I didn't have the power to so refrain. And if I didn't have this power at all, then it indeed wouldn't be reasonable to hold me responsible.

But we ordinarily do make a distinction between things that we didn't do because it wasn't in our power to do them, and things that we didn't do because we chose not to do them (even though we hold that it was in our power to do them). How do you account for this distinction, which we must necessarily be sensitive to when we deliberate about what to do while considering the range of our real options? Is it an illusory difference, or just a consequence of a lack of knowledge about our real powers, on your view? Hume, who was an actualist, thought that it was a fallacious distinction.

Holding oneself (through pride and remorse) and others (through praise and blame) accountable for our deeds just is to recognize the practical significance of the aforementioned distinction between a lack of power to do (or refrain to do) something and the merely unactualized power to do (or refrain to do) it. Punishment need not be assimilated to vengeance. It can be justified as a form of blame that is foisted on someone in circumstances where ordinary verbal admonestation wouldn't stick (or where deterrence is sought). It need not be viewed as the fulfillment of a desire to make someone justifiably suffer as much as a means to help awaken her to her own responsibilities, and to the power (as of yet unactualized) that she has to do better. Of course, punishment can be abused and the need for it may be invoked as a cover for a desire for vengeance. But the fact that punishment can be abused, and perverted into cruelty, doesn't abolish the metaphysical distinctions that justify its ordinary use.

We can set up a regression where the actions of this moment were determined by the conditions of the immediate prior moment, and so on. How far into the past? Practically, we can't determine pre-existing conditions very far back, so let's just stick with everything since one's individual conception.

Many states (state = nation, state = province) acknowledge that pre-existing conditions may render some destructive behaviors beyond one's own control. They provide for the "rehabilitation clinic" (often a life sentence in a mental hospital), imprisonment, parole, and so on. It's not very humane, but at least we aren't collecting a mob and stoning the person to death or burning them at the stake. Some states incarcerate people at extraordinary rates. Louisiana imprisons people at a higher rate than any other jurisdiction on earth. (See Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment).

An example of an unwilled criminal act would be pedophilia. Having, or attempting to have sex with children is decided illegal, these days, and people have been prosecuted for owning drawings or animations depicting pedophilic sex. (I'm not arguing in favor of pedophilia here, please note.) Pedophilia is a "paraphilia", and presumably are formed very early in life--long before one is legally responsible. Pedophilia doesn't seem to be curable, and it is difficult to suppress desire.

Another example is the extreme psychopath--something that happens to one; people don't choose to be psychopaths. No one chooses to be a psychopath, and it involves suffering and unhappiness (usually -- I gather. Don't know that I know any psychopaths.) While a psychopathic killer should certainly be secluded from society, we should also seek to find effective therapy to help psychopaths. We do that for other people with serious brain defects -- why not psychopaths?

Between these extremes, are people whose history may very well include causal factors, and/or deliberate decisions which predispose future criminal actions.

As for people who are talented and good at what they do, nobody gets to Carnegie Hall without practice, practice, practice. Becoming a recognized master at the violin, piano, or piccolo requires talent and a lot of work. The star performer didn't choose to be talented.

So, yes, we are sometimes shaped by pre-existing conditions. But the star performer had to choose again and again to practice and study their instrument. Maybe they spent 15 years before they were really world class. One might be predisposed to want sex with children or youth, but there are some choices that can be made: like not seeking out sex with children, seeking therapy -- some drugs blunt or suppress the sex drive. One might carefully avoid situations where temptation exists -- not becoming an elementary school teacher, boy scout leader, Sunday school teachers, and so on. This isn't going to lead to happiness, but it could keep one out of prison.

For most of us, most of the time, our behavior is a combination of external determination and internal decision, mixed together somewhat so it isn't crystal clear at any given moment why we are doing what we are doing.

We can set up a regression where the actions of this moment were determined by the conditions of the immediate prior moment, and so on. How far into the past? Practically, we can't determine pre-existing conditions very far back, so let's just stick with everything since one's individual conception. [...]

For most of us, most of the time, our behavior is a combination of external determination and internal decision, mixed together somewhat so it isn't crystal clear at any given moment why we are doing what we are doing. — Bitter Crank

If the argument sketched in your first paragraph is sound, then the claim in your last paragraph (with which I agree) is false. It would rather follow from it that everyone, all of the time, has their behavior entirely determined by conditions outside of their control (since they were conditions that already held prior to the time of their conception).

I was kind of thinking around the same way as you regarding punishment. It's not possible to abandon punishment; not only do we, the victims, need closure and a feeling of security but the perpetrator needs to understand that these actions are not acceptable. Just because these actions are pre-determined does not mean that the person himself can just sit back and let his body do all the work.

There is an illusory experience of having control over one's actions and this must be taken into account. Because of this I think a good indicator for a crime that requires punishment, although difficult to measure, is whether or not the criminal feels any guilt. If they already feel guilt, then part of the rehabilitation process is already complete. We just need to make sure that they don't over-ride their guilt and perpetrate the crime again.

Ultimately, like most things in the justice system, the changes that do occur will be gradual and likely slight. We likely will not see the end of the ostracizing of criminals, nor of the aggressive vengeful punishments that follow (the death penalty must go though).

If you cannot hold the guilty morally responsible for their actions, please forgive me when I do. I was predetermined to act that way. If you can't forgive me, I'll understand. You were predetermined not to. Of course, if I don't understand, I couldn't have. I wonder why you seek to convince me of anything since I'm going to do as I must, but I guess you had to try to seek to convince me because you had to.

I was kind of thinking around the same way as you regarding punishment. It's not possible to abandon punishment; not only do we, the victims, need closure and a feeling of security but the perpetrator needs to understand that these actions are not acceptable. Just because these actions are pre-determined does not mean that the person himself can just sit back and let his body do all the work. — darthbarracuda

That's right. The person being punished needs to understand that her action was unacceptable. The point of the punishment may be to coax her into building up such an understanding (leaving the rationale of deterrence on one side for now). But this hoped for nascent understanding only will be of any use if the person has the capacity to act well as a result of it -- that is, as an outcome of correct deliberation -- in the sort of circumstances where she previously failed to act well. That she has this general capacity entails that when she in fact failed to act well, that was a failure to exercise this capacity, and not due to her lacking the capacity altogether. If she were lacking the capacity, then the punishment would be pointless.

A hard determinist may argue that although she had the general capacity to act well, her failure to exercise this capacity (and deliberate properly) in the particular case was causally determined by her lack of understanding (or, equivalently, by her vicious character) and she was thus powerless, at that time, to display a character that was any better. But this reasoning relies on conceptually lumping together the external circumstances that may impede the actions, or practical reasoning, of an agent with the "internal" circumstances, including features of her own character and cognitive apparatus, that make her up as an agent.

The point of this distinction between two kinds of "circumstances" may be highlighted by a simple example. Consider the case where the agent was caught shoplifting and was sentenced to perform 50 hours of community service. First, let us suppose that the punishment coaxes her into thinking twice the next time she will have an opportunity to shoplift. That is, the main effect of the punishment is an ongoing deterrence effect. In that case, we may say that her heightened awareness that she might get caught, and punished again, refers to an external circumstance that she takes into account while deliberating. It inclines her to act well (that is, refrain from shoplifting) but it also restricts her "freedom" to acquire free stuff.

There is another possible outcome, though. During the time when she serves her sentence, she may reflect about the wrongness of what she did, talk to other people about it, feel remorse, etc. The outcome might be that, when another opportunity to shoplift occurs, her temptation to do so is diminished on grounds that mirror those of a person who simply is aware that doing so isn't a worthwhile way of living because, e.g., it wrongs others. In that case, on what possible ground might we say that her freedom is restricted? She is now acting well (or, at any rate, more likely to do so) out of her own cognizance of her opportunities. In a sense, she is less "free" to acquire free stuff, but that isn't because of a constraint that is merely external to her, as it was in the first scenario. Acquiring free stuff at the expanse of others isn't something that she wants to do anymore.

We can set up a regression where the actions of this moment were determined by the conditions of the immediate prior moment, and so on. How far into the past? Practically, we can't determine pre-existing conditions very far back, so let's just stick with everything since one's individual conception. [...]

For most of us, most of the time, our behavior is a combination of external determination and internal decision, mixed together somewhat so it isn't crystal clear at any given moment why we are doing what we are doing.
— Bitter Crank

If the argument sketched in your first paragraph is sound, then the claim in your last paragraph (with which I agree) is false. It would rather follow from it that everyone, all of the time, has their behavior entirely determined by conditions outside of their control (since they were conditions that already held prior to the time of their conception). — Pierre-Normand

My first paragraph was misleading; my fault. We can set up this regression, but it is impossible to prove -- there is no way of knowing all the events and thoughts that are in the regression from conception forward to say, age 35 and a murder trial, or a triumphant tour by a musician. Determinists suppose that one can (at least theoretically) account for what causes any given behavior. I don't think we can do that.

C. elegans is a 900 cell nematode. This little creature has been so thoroughly studied, biologist know how each cell develops from conception forward. It's 250 neurons have been mapped. It's genome has been read. We know just about everything there is to know about this creature. A regression could actually be set up for little C. elegans because there every aspect of it's life can be controlled.

Some parts of our beings are established in a deterministic way -- to some extent, the biological platform on which our lives are lived is determined by genetics. Genetics affects the brain structure too, but mental activity once born affects it even more. And fairly soon there is a self at work in the young child.

At some point we start becoming increasingly responsible for who we are, what we are, and what we do. While fetal development may determine that someone is born psychopathic, even the psychopath can exercise restraint and self-control. "control" isn't the critical absence in psychopathy, it's guilt. Pedophiles feel guilt just fine, but they can not 'not desire' what they desire. They can choose, however, to pursue, or not pursue, their desired object. And so can the rest of us.

If people aren't morally blamable for their actions, because everything is predetermined, then people also cannot be blamed for morally blaming them -- though I suppose that you cannot be blamed for blaming the blamers, but then I can't be blamed for blaming you for blaming the blamers either...

I won't blame you if you blame me for blaming you... unless I can't help to.

At some point we start becoming increasingly responsible for who we are, what we are, and what we do. While fetal development may determine that someone is born psychopathic, even the psychopath can exercise restraint and self-control. "control" isn't the critical absence in psychopathy, it's guilt. Pedophiles feel guilt just fine, but they can not 'not desire' what they desire. They can choose, however, to pursue, or not pursue, their desired object. And so can the rest of us. — Bitter Crank

You are telling a story about complexity and unpredictability, and then suddenly transition ("...At some point...") to talking about control. I certainly agree that control is required for freedom. But I believe it to be a good point compatibilists make against (some) libertarians: that freedom actually requires some form of determination by past "circumstances" ("circumstances" that are, however, "internal" to the agent) and thereby also allow some degree of predictability. Her own actions must at least be predictable by the agent herself; though the way in which she "predicts" them normally proceeds through her deciding what she ought to do rather than through her making inferences on the basis of her own habitual behavior.

The actions of the agent must thus be the intelligible outcomes of (some of) her desires, commitments or intentions, and, optionally, of some episodes of explicit deliberation, for them to count as her own actions as opposed to things that merely happen to her. For sure, a fair amount of organizational complexity must be required in order that a living animal be capable of being acculturated, and capable of reasoning practically. But if an agent is thereby unpredictable from the standpoint of the laws that govern the complex physical evolution of her material parts (e.g. the firing of her neurons, etc.) it need not follow that her actions only are free inasmuch as they are unpredictable by anyone or by her. Quite the contrary, some capricious or arbitrary choices that a person makes may be quite unpredictable albeit quite unfree, owing to them not being intelligible even to the agent herself, while some other actions may be highly predictable by people who know the agent, owing to those actions being perfectly intelligible for her to perform in the circumstances. A parent saving his/her child from an obvious danger, or a thief grabbing an unattended wallet, may be highly predictable actions that are nevertheless free and intelligible, such that the agent is thereby fully accountable for them.

If you cannot hold the guilty morally responsible for their actions, please forgive me when I do. I was predetermined to act that way. If you can't forgive me, I'll understand. You were predetermined not to. Of course, if I don't understand, I couldn't have. I wonder why you seek to convince me of anything since I'm going to do as I must, but I guess you had to try to seek to convince me because you had to. — Hanover

(Y)

Damn... I didn't see you beat me to it...

A tornado hits your house and destroys it. For a brief amount of time, you probably feel rage at the tornado, until you realize that the tornado had no animosity towards you and that your house was simply in the path of destruction. There is no use blaming a phenomenon for which there is no agent responsible.

A man hits your car out of road rage. For a longer amount of time, you probably feel rage at the man and wish ill tidings to come into his life because of how inconsiderate they are. But perhaps the reason they felt road rage was because they had just lost their job. Or perhaps their dog just died. Or perhaps there is a chemical imbalance in the brain that led to his actions.

Because of your (pre-determined) inability to forgive someone for their (pre-determined) recklessness, you now have to go to court and pay a ton of money for lawyers and charges.

Just because things are pre-determined doesn't mean the trash is going to take itself out. You still have to put in effort to take the trash out. And so when we see how people are not intentionally bad and cannot be fully responsible for their actions, it is worth it to try to change how we respond to their actions, even if this change in response is ultimately pre-determined.

And if I were to succeed with such efforts, that's all the more reason to think that they're just assholes that don't care or try enough -- or that I'm superhuman, and fundamentally different from the rest of the soulless populous.

That is why it would require a society-wide change.

In my opinion, the need for justice (i.e. vengeance) is, in most cases, an outdated mode of operations. — darthbarracuda

Angry individuals or groups may seek vengeance. An orderly society requires justice. The two ideas, justice and vengeance, are entirely different and should not be confused. Even those who disagree with one another strongly on issues from determinism to abortion need to find a consensus on the principles of justice, or we shall all go to the dogs.

The incarceration rate itself seems to me an indicator of something about a society. Russia and the United States, for instance, have appallingly high rates of imprisonment. To face a long term of imprisonment for trivial acts of theft seems to be profoundly unjust. Practically speaking that is a bigger issue at the moment than the problems of determinism.

Practically speaking that is a bigger issue at the moment than the problems of determinism. — mcdoodle

I agree.

Are we justified...? — darthbarracuda

As has been indicated above, the justification for justice is just that it is just.

If that is not enough for you, you might have recourse to theories of the evolution of grudger strategies as the most effective in prisoners' dilemma type repetitions in social animals. But that is an explanation rather than a justification.

For a brief amount of time, you probably feel rage at the tornado, until you realize that the tornado had no animosity towards you and that your house was simply in the path of destruction. — darthbarracuda

I probably wouldn't get mad at the tornado, but I'll play along. Damn tornado!

But perhaps the reason they felt road rage was because they had just lost their job. Or perhaps their dog just died. Or perhaps there is a chemical imbalance in the brain that led to his actions. — darthbarracuda

Maybe, and then they chose to hit my car, which they shouldn't have done.

Because of your (pre-determined) inability to forgive someone for their (pre-determined) recklessness, you now have to go to court and pay a ton of money for lawyers and charges. — darthbarracuda

I'm not going to court because I'm mad. I'm going to court to get the money necessary to fix my car and maybe to pay my medical bills. I'm not just there for revenge. Even if I were, it's not like the jury is going to enter a decree declaring that vengeance is mine. Civil courts give money. If you're not there for money, don't go.

And so when we see how people are not intentionally bad and cannot be fully responsible for their actions, it is worth it to try to change how we respond to their actions, even if this change in response is ultimately pre-determined. — darthbarracuda

You miss the entire point of my post. You can no more tell me how I ought to act than I can tell the road rager how he ought to act if we're all determined to do whatever we're going to do. If the road rager isn't bad for having done what he did, I'm not bad for punishing him for what he did. We both were forced to do whatever we did.

Maybe, and then they chose to hit my car, which they shouldn't have done. — Hanover

Isn't that begging the question, given that whether or not he chose to hit your car, or could have chosen otherwise, is what's at issue? If it was a crime of passion, then that suggests that he was rendered incapable of self-control for the duration of the act. It wouldn't have been a choice, but an abrupt, impulsive reaction. He'd still probably get charged with a crime, even if that line of defence was successful. It would only serve to reduce the sentence. That seems like the way it should be. I don't find the idea of letting such people go unpunished appealing.

Isn't that begging the question, given that whether or not he chose to hit your car, or could have chosen otherwise, is what's at issue? If it was a crime of passion, then that suggests that he was rendered incapable of self-control for the duration of the act. It wouldn't have been a choice, but an abrupt, impulsive reaction. He'd still probably get charged with a crime, even if that line of defence was successful. It would only serve to reduce the sentence. That seems like the way it should be. I don't find the idea of letting such people go unpunished appealing. — Sapientia

This is the traditional thinking on the subject. There are varying degrees of freedom, some of the more dispassionate I suppose have more freedom and those more driven by impulse less. That would seem to link freedom with deliberation and thoughtfulness, which is why a "cold blooded" murderer is considered the worst sort. If you commit murder when you're heated and angry (have "hot" blood, as in "my blood is just boiling"), you're not considered as evil as when you're cool, calm and collected as you would with cold blood.

Of course, if you're a lizard, you do everything with cold blood.

The argument being made in the OP was beyond that and inconsistent on its face. It is argued that we shouldn't hold anyone responsible because everyone is motivated purely by external circumstance and unable to pull themselves from their circumstances and decide freely. That being the case, there is no real distinction between the freedom in one acting coldly and one acting hotly. The inconsistency is in the OP's then attempt to argue how we should behave toward the guilty, as if we are somehow exempt from the same forces as the guilty and that we have the ability to alter our behavior towards them and do otherwise.

You may pity a criminal but it does not make the action is correct. If say they were pushed into the crime becuase everyone who had a chance to intervine did not. While also letting them get pushed into a corner, watchers are guilty. The first case is a matter of choice, the second is a matter of negligence. Negligence is the fualt of the person in charge or over seeing, choice is the fault of the person doing the act itself. So no not everyone is free of all crime.

An example would be John decides to rob a toy store. His family is poor and can not afford toys so he steals them and stabs a cashier who tried to stop him. Another situation, we have two children at school together. They get in a fist fight with each other. You can blame the children but legally those kids got hurt at school, and under supervision of the school. You can argue neglect as the school did not do enough to protect children in thier care and allowed a fight to happen. So this is a case where you can sue the school for neglect.