Ok. I'm still in agreement with Wosret and darthbarracuda on that one, though. After birth, a person will be affected by things. That much we can agree on. Do we also agree that although it's true that preventing birth doesn't affect the non-existent, it isn't true that preventing birth doesn't affect anyone? Because it obviously does, especially those who plan to have children. With that in mind, can you understand my initial reaction?

I would like to say that I still do not find your definition of what makes an antinatalist convincing. If I am understanding correctly, those who don't have sex or don't have babies are to be considered antinatalistic. But the problem I see with this is that they are not intentionally being antinatalistic, they are only accidentally acting in such a way in that their actions would be compatible with antinatalism.

An ascetic who starves themselves, and then accidentally dies out of hunger, is not suicidal, and yet they happen to act in such a way that their actions are compatible with a suicidal person's.

Exactly. I don't want to be tarred with the same brush.

I don't understand.

There comes a point in life when someone can judge for themselves whether or not life is worth living — Sapientia

Yes, their life.

That's when they get a say in the matter, and your position, in practice, entails the removal of this potential. — Sapientia

They get a say in the matter of their own life.

For example, by saying that if someone existed, then their life would not be worth living. — Sapientia

I have never said this. If you're still going to lump me in with anti-natalists, fine, you clearly have a pathological obsession with doing so at this point, but if there's one thing you ought to have realized from this thread by now, it's that not all anti-natalists share the same assumptions. I don't speak for TGW, nor does he for me.

But the problem I see with this is that they are not intentionally being antinatalistic, they are only accidentally acting in such a way in that their actions would be compatible with antinatalism. — darthbarracuda

Yes, and this is all I meant to say. You seem to have answered your own objection here.

The funny thing about bizarre works of fiction, especially dystopian science fiction (which I took some time to read a bit of earlier this year -- neat stuff), is that there's nothing really fictional about it. What is described in those scenarios has close analogues in everyday life and the institution of birth. It really is a kind of bizarre, nightmarish institution. People get weirded out by babies growing in tubes, but they already get grown in tubes -- tubes inside of women! AHHH!

Do we also agree that although it's true that preventing birth doesn't affect the non-existent, it isn't true that preventing birth doesn't affect anyone? Because it obviously does, especially those who plan to have children. With that in mind, can you understand my initial reaction? — Sapientia

Creating a state of affairs where a new (another) life is created and thus is enabled/caused to be affected by any and all types of possible negative events, when this state of affairs did not need to happen, for the sake of one's own personal preference, does not seem justified. This decision does not just affect the individual who made the decision, this decision does not just affect ANOTHER individual in probable negative ways, it CREATES/ENABLES/CAUSES the VERY STATE OF AFFAIRS for ANY and ALL negative events to take place for a NEW individual person, which did not need to take place.

The flip side, that this also CREATES/ENABLES/CAUSES positive experiences is irrelevant in that, by not creating a new individual, one is not causing a state of affairs whereby harm is a result. Even the harm of being deprived is not occurring by "preventing" birth and thus preventing a state of affairs whereby any and all positive experiences may result for a new individual.

Are antinatalists here also antinatalists with regards to plant and animal life?

Also, let me add in the point that not only are negative events created, but, as I explained earlier, experiences are often a private affair, ever-so-slightly varied based on brain chemistry and the uniqueness of experiences for each individual are hard to even grasp what kind of micro-harms are being done that are simply not shared or hard to even convey. Some personalities, some, brain chemistries, some individual experiences will be more negative than others. The amount, and the kind of experiences someone will experience are simply is an unknown.

The confidence, good feelings, and optimism of a parent at the time of the decision to have a child (if it is not an simply an afterthought after an accident) does not translate to the child by simple hope. When the child is born, perhaps it will have some of the "traits" the parent was hoping for in order to cope/thrive in life. Some people might genuinely be better equipped to be generally "happier" or to handle situations differently, or who have a brain chemistry that allows for less negative experiences, moods, feelings. They might have an easier time coping with necessities and contingencies of life. Some people may not be equipped in such a matter or have to work much harder at maintaining this. Of course, just because some people cope better, does not mean they were not harmed. It does not cancel out the harm, though it means they can bounce back from it a bit better.

Also, the contingencies of events create memories and pathways in the brain that make every human have ever-so-unique spins on events (negative or otherwise). This individualized nature of experience for each individual makes it hard to say how specific instances of harm affects people generally. Self-reports of positive evaluations of life can "say" one thing but the phenomenal/internal/introspective understanding of specific events in a life (as they are experienced) can be quite different and varied for each person. Even if the sufferer articulated it to people in detail, it might not be conveyed accurately to the listener as to what the experience is like. These harms can be quite personal and unrelatable. Some people might not be as happy as they report, because of the difficulty of conveying personal, internalized experiences. Most people probably distort the real events in one major evaluative statement (like "life is good") by filtering out the vivid realness of actual internalized experiences.

I was agreeing with you. I just meant that I wouldn't want to be lumped into a group of which I don't belong, and of which I actually disagree.

Yes, their life.

They get a say in the matter of their own life. — Thorongil

Yes...

I have never said this. If you're still going to lump me in with anti-natalists, fine, you clearly have a pathological obsession with doing so at this point, but if there's one thing you ought to have realized from this thread by now, it's that not all anti-natalists share the same assumptions. I don't speak for TGW, nor does he for me. — Thorongil

It was just an example of a certain sort of statement. Talk about overreaction. Just use your imagination to replace it with a statement representative of your position. You do think along those lines, whether you're willing to admit it or not. You're just being picky. Why rabbit on about suffering so much if that isn't effectively what you're getting at? If it was simply true that life is worth living, then there'd be no problem with creating new life.

Yes... — Sapientia

No, don't say "yes," because you clearly still don't get it on the basis of the following:

If it was simply true that life is worth living, then there'd be no problem with creating new life. — Sapientia

This is a non-sequitur.

No, I will say "yes" because I understand and agree with those statements that you pointlessly stated. What are you accusing me of not getting? And no, it isn't a non sequitur. There's a hidden premise which makes it valid. I didn't think it necessary to state the whole argument. You can argue that one or more of the premises or the conclusion is false if you so choose, but it is not invalid.

So cough up this premise.

I imagine it would differ for different people, but for me, I'd say the obvious important criterion is sentience, in the sense of being able to suffer. Plants can't do that, so their existence or nonexistence is intrinsically indifferent, although it might have extrinsic worth to some sentient being. For animals, it's harder -- clearly they can suffer, though they can't suffer in quite the range of ways that humans can. On the other hand, they don't have the capacity to self-consciously recognize that they are suffering and voluntarily seek an end to it. Is it right to 'force' beings who do not want help to be 'helped' in such a decisive and violent way, given that left to their own devices they would continue reproducing? I don't know -- it may be that these questions don't matter much, and are just the result of anthropomorphizing animals.

That is, the notion of doing something 'wrong' or 'unjust' to an animal, as a being who on it own merits does not recognize or desire anything like rightness, justice, etc. may just be a category error, while causing them to suffer is still terrible because their suffering, even on its own / their own merits, is still genuinely awful. There's a way in which I think as humans, animals aren't our problem, but if the whole planet were destroyed so all life became unsustainable, I wouldn't be like 'oh boo hoo!' about it, I have no abstract commitment to animals surviving. What's important to note here is that neither would animals be sad about the prospect of being annihilated.

Depends. If I had it my way, all sentient life would cease to procreate. Perhaps non-sentient life would also need to be stopped in case they evolve into sentience.

One of the biggest reasons why I continue to be opposed to birth is that I see absolutely no good reason to take the risk and have a child. It seems to me that the only arguments that the "natalist" has for having a child is that they 1.) want a child, 2.) believe deeply that their child will come out fine.

The first argument is one of selfishness and desire, one that makes a child out to be an aesthetic object rather than a human being. The second argument is one of utter ignorance, as there is no way a parent can know if their child will come out fine. There are certainly ways of telling if they will come out poorly (by looking at a person's genetics), but that is not a fail-safe, nor does it protect the child from dangers that will happen to them "extra-genetically"; i.e. without the influence of genetics.

Now, there are excellent arguments against having a child, one of which is the risk that is involved in birth. This argument can be further developed by appealing to the utter lack of necessity of birth. There is no extra-emotional reason to have a child. The child is not fulfilling a prophecy, or contributing to the inevitable apotheosis of humanity. The child will become quite literally just another one of the billions of people on the planet, eating and shitting and sleeping their way to death. All of the positive aspects of life are not guaranteed, nor are they something that should be used as a reason for creating a child.

... they 1.) want a child, 2.) believe deeply that their child will come out fine. — darthbarracuda

First a reasonable statement, then you plunge off the rails into the snake pit of twisted logic.

The first argument is one of selfishness and desire, one that makes a child out to be an aesthetic object rather than a human being. — darthbarracuda

"Wanting a child" does not, in any way, shape, manner, or form, make a child into an aesthetic object. Most people want children because... they want children. They like children. They like the idea of raising up children to be good people. And, by and large, most children turn out to be "good people". They may be flawed; but they are basically "good".

The belief that "the child will come out fine" is justified by experience. True enough, some children are born with significant physical or mental deficits. The rate of normal births is, however, very high. The cause of childhood death is usually insufficient food and clean water or disease. Are disease and starvation good reasons not to have children? Quite possibly. If one is in the middle of a war, plague, or mass starvation, yes--probably a good time to hold off on having children.

"Wanting a child" does not, in any way, shape, manner, or form, make a child into an aesthetic object. Most people want children because... they want children. They like children. They like the idea of raising up children to be good people. And, by and large, most children turn out to be "good people". They may be flawed; but they are basically "good". — Bitter Crank

I disagree. Certainly some may have children because they like the idea of contributing a positive influence in the community, but to say that all parents do this is a ridiculous generalization. Children are born all the time out of a pure desire for a child, and then later the parents end up hating the kid because they realize how much work it is.

If having a child was a purely rational action, no children would be born. There just is no good reason to have a child that justifies the risk.

Are disease and starvation good reasons not to have children? Quite possibly. If one is in the middle of a war, plague, or mass starvation, yes--probably a good time to hold off on having children. — Bitter Crank

Not only this, but what about when a community's supply of nutrients goes sour, or when the stability of society crumbles? All of this is unpredictable.

I'm sure if I asked you if you would want to go through any uncomfortable experience again, whether that be middle school or an interview for your first job, or if you would want to go through any uncomfortable experience for that matter, you would say no. It just makes me wonder why you then go on to say that it is perfectly acceptable to force another person to go through these trials, unnecessarily.

I'd like to bring to the discussion a topic that I encountered the other day while reading a thread by Schop1 over at the old PF.

Forget about the inevitable aches and pains of life. What about the frustrated preferences, the frustrated idealism of every person? We live in a society in which every person has a different idea of how things should go. In the end, nobody gets what they want, nobody lives the life that they actually desired, because they were forced into strange and rigid social institutions and told that this is the way you live your life and that's that. You have to go to school, you have to go to an 8-5 job, you have to go to church, you have to pay taxes, you have to serve in the military (or at least you used to if you were a male of a certain physical strength), you have to put aside your dreams and your preferences and focus on all the various other things that keep this whole society thing falling apart.

From my perspective, existence is synonymous with limitations and deprivations. In the end, can we honestly say: was it worth it?

Here is the full argument:

P1. If life is worthwhile, then life is good enough to live.
P2. If life is good enough to live, then life cannot be so lacking in goodness, or so bad, that it is better not to live.
P3. Procreation produces life.
C1. Therefore, procreation produces something worthwhile.
P4. Producing something worthwhile is itself worthwhile.
C2. Therefore, procreation is worthwhile.
P5. If procreation is worthwhile, then procreation cannot be so lacking in goodness, or so bad, that it is better not to procreate.
P6. If procreation is not so lacking in goodness, or so bad, that it is better not to procreate, then there can be no problem about procreation great enough to make it better not to procreate.
P7. If there is no problem about procreation great enough to make it better not to procreate, then there is no real problem with procreation.
P8. Life is worthwhile.
C3. Therefore, there is no real problem with producing life through procreation.

N.B. I don't think that it's simply true that life is worthwhile. Rather:

I'm saying that it can be worthwhile to have children because there are things in life that are worthwhile, and I'm further saying that there are, and have been, and probably will be, some cases in which it is worthwhile. — Sapientia

I think that most people are competent enough to grasp the logical link between thinking that life is worthwhile and having no problem with procreation without anyone needing to produce a lengthy argument.

I'm saying that it can be worthwhile to have children because there are things in life that are worthwhile, and I'm further saying that there are, and have been, and probably will be, some cases in which it is worthwhile. — Sapientia

There is a difference between a life worth continuing and a life worth starting. Giving birth to a child that turns out to have a life worth living is still a risk, but results in a lucky draw.

P1. If life is worthwhile, then life is good enough to live.
P2. If life is good enough to live, then life cannot be so lacking in goodness, or so bad, that it is better not to live.
P3. Procreation produces life.
C1. Therefore, procreation produces something worthwhile.
P4. Producing something worthwhile is itself worthwhile.
C2. Therefore, procreation is worthwhile. — Sapientia

Nope, in these premises you're still equivocating on the word life. You fail to distinguish between individual lives that may or may not be worthwhile to continue living and the creation of as of yet potential lives, about which you cannot by definition decide the worth of.

To make it easier for you, what you have to do is the following: you must prove that life in general is an end-in-itself, i.e. something to be continued, created, and in a word, affirmed for its own sake. You have thus far conceived of life as a means to an end, where that end is to experience worthwhile things; things that are not life. In other words, despite saying that it's not true that life is worthwhile, this is precisely what you have to claim in order for your argument to work; specifically for P4 to do the work necessary to reach your conclusion. Moreover, if you want to enjoy and experience worthwhile things, then you can pursue this end without procreating. Even if you are a utilitarian who wants to maximize the number of people who experience worthwhile things, potential human beings are by definition excluded from consideration. Non-existent people don't and can't experience anything.

It just makes me wonder why you then go on to say that it is perfectly acceptable to force another person to go through these trials, unnecessarily. — darthbarracuda

I say that it is good to have children because, in my personal -- and valid for me -- experience, life is on balance a good thing. Is it all good? Obviously not. Is it all bad? Just as obviously not. On balance... it's quite a bit better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick--which is more than I can say for the antinatalist argument.

All the arguments I have read here about how having children is an inherently bad thing boil down to "Life sucks" and "having babies is forcing them to suffer". This line of reasoning doesn't strike me as mature, insightful, wise, or anything of the kind. It strike me more as juvenile, uncomprehending, stupid, and... stop me before I say something harsh.

What I find remarkable, darthbarracuda, is that someone (you) who has written as many intelligent posts as you have is spouting this stuff.

P4. Producing something worthwhile is itself worthwhile. — Sapientia

Why isn't P4 a tautology?

How does one prove

"that life in general is an end-in-itself" — Thorongil

? It seems like that life as an end in itself can be asserted, and then one has to stop. "End in itself" can't be proven, can it?

i'm content with the idea that life is an end in itself. What vouches for something that is an end in itself, other than that thing itself?

There is a difference between a life worth continuing and a life worth starting. Giving birth to a child that turns out to have a life worth living is still a risk, but results in a lucky draw. — darthbarracuda

Yes, there is a difference, but both boil down to whether life is worth living. And yes, as I've acknowledged, there is a risk, as well as a possible reward. But no, it's not a lucky draw. There is an element of luck, but that alone is insufficient to rightly say that it's a lucky draw: which suggests that it's entirely down to luck, and not something that we have any control over.

Nope, in these premises you're still equivocating on the word life. You fail to distinguish between individual lives that may or may not be worthwhile to continue living and the creation of as of yet potential lives, about which you cannot by definition decide the worth of. — Thorongil

Your charge of equivocation is incorrect, since I did not switch between senses in a misleading way. There is only one main sense in which I used the word "life", and one other sense, and the distinction between usage is obvious. The main sense is the quality of being alive, and the other sense is of a life or lives: those who possess such a quality. I don't need to make the distinction you speak of. My argument is about the worth of life, universally and absolutely. That is what I meant when I spoke of life being worth living as a simple truth.

And I've already explained why comments like the last part of the quote above are wrongheaded and irrelevant.

To make it easier for you, what you have to do is the following: you must prove that life in general is an end-in-itself, i.e. something to be continued, created, and in a word, affirmed for its own sake. You have thus far conceived of life as a means to an end, where that end is to experience worthwhile things; things that are not life. In other words, despite saying that it's not true that life is worthwhile, this is precisely what you have to claim in order for your argument to work; specifically for P4 to do the work necessary to reach your conclusion. Moreover, if you want to enjoy and experience worthwhile things, then you can pursue this end without procreating. Even if you are a utilitarian who wants to maximize the number of people who experience worthwhile things, potential human beings are by definition excluded from consideration. Non-existent people don't and can't experience anything. — Thorongil

You don't seem to understand the point of the argument. We're assuming that life is worthwhile for sake of argument. That's not something that I need to prove or even argue in favour of. Remember that this stems from my claim that if it is simply true that life is worthwhile, then there is no problem with creating new life. That's all I need to defend.

The experience of worthwhile things is part of life, in the sense that it is part of being alive; part of living life. The only exceptions that come to mind are those who are alive, but who have yet to experience such things, and those who were unfortunate enough to have died before really having lived - and I'm not saying that in the loose sense of "Man, I'm forty-five, and I've never been to Vegas". I mean anyone who is alive but has not lived long enough to experience any worthwhile things at all, or who died too early to do so, or who were born incapable of doing so due to severe disability. This experience, like all experience, is exclusive to the living. It relates to possible future generations as potential - and that is what you're robbing them of, so to speak. (And don't take that too literally, for Christ's sake. In case you can't tell, my patience is beginning to wear thin).

That those who so desire can pursue the goal of experiencing worthwhile things without procreating is utterly beside the point, as is the fact that non-existent people are not part of the set of people who experience worthwhile things, as is the fact that non-existent people don't and can't experience anything. How many times do I need to point out that these things don't need to be pointed out, and that it's a waste of both of our valuable time to do so, and especially to do so persistently?

I say that it is good to have children because, in my personal -- and valid for me -- experience, life is on balance a good thing. Is it all good? Obviously not. Is it all bad? Just as obviously not. On balance... it's quite a bit better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick--which is more than I can say for the antinatalist argument.

All the arguments I have read here about how having children is an inherently bad thing boil down to "Life sucks" and "having babies is forcing them to suffer". This line of reasoning doesn't strike me as mature, insightful, wise, or anything of the kind. It strike me more as juvenile, uncomprehending, stupid, and... stop me before I say something harsh.

What I find remarkable, darthbarracuda, is that someone (you) who has written as many intelligent posts as you have is spouting this stuff. — Bitter Crank

Oh such the bitter enemy of antinatalism. The same old cliches. Antinatalism has many well-reasoned positions. Provide me with a label to throw at your well-reasoned stances? I am sure you expect the likes of me to spout off this stuff. Pragmatism-style condescension is almost as tropey, don't you think?

Why isn't P4 a tautology? — Bitter Crank

Because "producing something worthwhile" and "being worthwhile" don't mean the same thing, and producing something worthwhile isn't necessarily worthwhile - even though that latter point seems to contradict P4. I admit that P4, in its present form, is not adequately constructed, but it's adequate enough to get the point across without making the argument even more complex than it already is. There are innumerable cases in which P4 is true, and the salient point relating to that part of the argument is that procreation is one of them.

It might also be worth noting, to all it may concern, that the point of my argument is more about validity than soundness. I was responding to the charge that my conclusion doesn't follow.