Any philosophical theory of mind needs to be consistent with what we know about biology, and in particular - with the function of sense organs and the brain. There are cognitive and neuro scientists who also work in the field of philosophy of mind — Relativist

Philosophy of mind is not neurology or biology. That was the point. There are clear divisions between the different subjects and methodology adopted.

….confirmed the passage regarding Apperception…. — Corvus

It’s much more than a passage. He re-wrote in B all of A95-130. That the guy that came up with all this had to re-do most of it, in the name of clarity no less, may not bode so well for the rest of us.

Probably better to not seek a definition for apperception, but instead concentrate on what it’s supposed to do, in the overall Grand Scheme of Things related to human empirical cognition.

Anything you perceive has degrees: that which is foremost to attention and becomes experience of something, but also that which escapes attention but is nonetheless present to the system itself and is all that minutia the unity of which constitutes the totality of that experience.

Cognition is the former and usually represents the thing, apperception is the latter and represents the synthesis of all those representations the word used to describe the cognized thing, doesn’t list. So, e.g., tree is the thing cognized, bark (texture/orientation/color), leaves (shape/location/color), branches (size/shape/complexity), roots, dirt, and all the rest are the so-called “synthetic unity of pure apperception” the word tree doesn’t express but given from sensible intuitions of their own belong to our understanding contained in the conception “tree”, without the immediate consciousness thereof.

Anyway….so goes the hard problem.

Clearly, science has not solved the hard problem, but it is difficult for me to accept explanations that are supported only by faith, not evidence. There's like this science-epistemophobia going on — Questioner

But you have faith science will eventually solve the hard problem?

But you have faith science will eventually solve the hard problem? — RogueAI

I put my faith in the scientific method, but I can't make predictions about what discoveries might be made in the future. But there is a significant body of knowledge about brain function that I do accept - notice I used the word "accept," not "believe in"

I put my faith in the scientific method, but I can't make predictions about what discoveries might be made in the future. But there is a significant body of knowledge about brain function that I do accept - notice I used the word "accept," not "believe in" — Questioner

If you hold that consciousness is ultimately explainable within the scientific framework, then you are assuming that the hard problem is tractable by third-person methods. It’s a metaphysical expectation about what science can, in principle, do.

It’s much more than a passage. He re-wrote in B all of A95-130. That the guy that came up with all this had to re-do most of it, in the name of clarity no less, may not bode so well for the rest of us. — Mww

From my recollection of the reading was, the concept of apperception was originally used by Leibniz and Locke to denote unconscious perceptions or perceptions with no perceived objects. Kant borrowed the concept, and further expanded for his own ideas in CPR.

My intention was not to go over Kant's write-up in full, but just find out the core meaning of his idea on the concept, and then come to own idea of consciousness reflected from the concept.

then you are assuming that the hard problem is tractable by third-person methods. — RogueAI

I don't need to think your thoughts to know you have them

Do machines have thoughts?

Do machines have thoughts? — RogueAI

Not like I do

Do machines have thoughts?
— RogueAI

Not like I do — Questioner

How would you go about proving that with the scientific method?

How would you go about proving that with the scientific method? — RogueAI

Two different structures with two different functions processing information in different ways

How would you go about proving that with the scientific method?
— RogueAI

Two different structures with two different functions processing information in different ways — Questioner

No, I'm asking you how would you prove a machine has thoughts at all using the scientific method. How could you determine whether any machine does or doesn't have mental states?

a machine has thoughts at all using the scientific method — RogueAI

I machine does not have thoughts the way I understand them.

a machine has thoughts at all using the scientific method
— RogueAI

I machine does not have thoughts the way I understand them. — Questioner

Can a machine have ANY mental states? Or is that something only brains are capable of?

Can a machine have ANY mental states? Or is that something only brains are capable of? — RogueAI

I'm not an expert on AI - I wish I could remember the details of an article I read some time ago - that describes how neural networks function quite differently than computers - that these vast networks in a brain cannot be replicated in a machine.

Long story short - a machine will never approximate what a human brain can do

Several dictionaries. Here's the Wiki You'll note that even the Wiki delineates between Kant's bespoke use and it's actual "meaning" per se.

The thinking "I" doesn't exist in every perception and sensation — Corvus

What? If there was no thinking "i" there would be no sensation. This is true of both forms of 'apperception'. THe entire basis for it is the thinking I.

Long story short - a machine will never approximate what a human brain can do — Questioner

That's a profoundly unscientific claim. Interesting. This seems quite common in you comments, while you commit to the scientific process, it seems. I suppose this explains a lot of the daylight.

What? If there was no thinking "i" there would be no sensation. This is true of both forms of 'apperception'. THe entire basis for it is the thinking I. — AmadeusD

Is this what Kant said? Or is it what you think?

Of course Kant says this. Is it the entire basis for the very concept of sensation. It is baked into the transcendental system as the single fundamental aspect of any experience. Both uses take advantage of this basis.

I cannot understand your question quite well enough to say something less incredulous, and that's probably on me.

Of course Kant says this. — AmadeusD

Provide the source supporting the claim preferably from the original text.

Is it the entire basis for the very concept of sensation. It is baked into the transcendental system as the single fundamental aspect of any experience. Both uses take advantage of this basis. — AmadeusD

Consider a case from dreams. You see yourself in your own dream, and it is a type of visual perception. But you have little idea who you are, and why you are in the place doing or meeting folks you don't know. Your perception has no "I" in it.

You return to your idea of self identity, only when you wake up from the dream wondering or trying to remember the content of the dream.

And there are times, you do things with no idea of your own self, if you are focused on the things you do such as driving, playing tennis or watching films listening to music etc. There are times, you forget about your own self identity immersed at the external objects or activities you do.

Provide the source supporting the claim preferably from the original text. — Corvus

All representations must be capable of accompanying by the ‘I think’; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all

- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B131

This is just him saying exactly what I've laid out, to be clear.

Your perception has no "I" in it. — Corvus

I think you're confusing the concept of identity what the concept of "i". the "thinking i" is simply whatever mode you find yourself thinking in. It is hte thinker. Not a thinker. It is simply the thinker of a given thought you're having. The context is not changing the concept.

It seems you're explicitly making this error:

You return to your idea of self identity, — Corvus

The thinking I doesn't rely on any stable identity - the only identity is between the thought and someone thinking it at a given time. Doesn't have to the same I as twenty minutes ago for the concept to hold.

It'll be clear I think the rest is not to be responded to here, at least.

- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B131

This is just him saying exactly what I've laid out, to be clear. — AmadeusD

Kant was talking about apperception in conjunction with intuition exclusively. He further divides apperception into pure apperception and empirical apperception in B132, and explicates the difference in the concept.

I think you're confusing the concept of identity what the concept of "i". the "thinking i" is simply whatever mode you find yourself thinking in. It is hte thinker. Not a thinker. It is simply the thinker of a given thought you're having. The context is not changing the concept. — AmadeusD

How can you have self identity with no concept or idea of "I"? The two are closely related, if not the same concept. Your point is not making sense at all.

The thinking I doesn't rely on any stable identity - the only identity is between the thought and someone thinking it at a given time. Doesn't have to the same I as twenty minutes ago for the concept to hold. — AmadeusD

Not sure what you mean here. You need to be more clear on your points.

t'll be clear I think the rest is not to be responded to here, at least. — AmadeusD

You are the one who kept on digging into this aspect, and I was trying to clarify your points to come to some conclusion or agreement. But you ideas are not clear enough in what you are trying to say.

You need to read further B132 and beyond to understand Kant's idea on apperception. It looks like you just read a line or two from B131, and misled what Kant was talking about.