A single atom cannot accomplish what the whole brain does. Atoms do not process information, integrate signals, have memory, or exhibit awareness. Neither does a single neuron, either. It is in the interaction of the system components – large scale neuronal networks - from which consciousness emerges. — Questioner

The logic runs directly against this. You have not given anything that could remotely support the emergence of consciousness from elements which are themselves non-conscious. We have zero examples of this elsewhere and no evidence it is the how consciousness is generated. That is your extreme obstacle. You don't even seem adequately across your own beliefs to explain them clearly.

You are, though, because you are being obtuse, defensive, refuse to stay on topic, cannot answer simple questions and refuse to accept that your position is an emotional one (which simply means its a conviction you can't support - but want to continue).

These are all on you. I have tried to tease out some answers from you to no avail - so have others. This is not my problem at all.

we say a level of organization is strongly emergent, that means it’s rules and principles cannot be determined, constructed, in advance from the rules and principles of a lower level, even in theory. You cannot determine the principles of biology in advance from the principles of chemistry and physics. — T Clark

I will read More Is Different. Thank you. but what you were saying seems impossible. I can understand that it's possible that, if there were non-biological beings who had intelligence equal to or greater than human intelligence, they may well never postulate the principles of biology. I would imagine there are so many ways the principles of chemistry and physics can combine and interact that it's possible no one would ever stumble upon the ideas that we know as the principles of biology. But that's not the same as it being impossible in theory to come up with those principles. The principles of biology emerge from the principles of chemistry and physics, and are specifically what they are because the principles of chemistry and physics are specifically what they are. If the principles of chemistry and physics changed today, the principles of biology would, also, if there was even anything left that might be considered principles of biology.

All that being the case, what is it that makes it impossible to determine the principles of biology ahead of time, even in theory?

no matter how peculiar consciousness may be, and no matter how unlike other physical properties, this is no obstacle in itself to it being a state of a physical thing — Clarendon

I haven’t read the whole discussion (and this topic has been addressed at length elsewhere), but I thought I’d respond to your reservations. We just went through a reading of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book lecture. The first six pages (available here) claim that philosophy mistakenly uses the framework of objects for thinking, understanding, meaning as “states” (I would take consciousness as part of this group). My notes on that section are here and below that.

Because of that framework, we imagine physical mechanisms, but the reality of errors, mistakes, etc. (leading to skepticism) causes us to take the mechanism as what he calls “queer”, or what you call “peculiar”. But we just want the situation to be “problematic” for that to require (logically) an “answer” because we want inherent individuality, certainty, it being subject to knowledge, etc.

conscious states are states of something quite different to any physical thing — Clarendon

I take Wittgenstein’s conclusion to be that instead of being modeled on a physical object (“mechanisms”), these are logical distinctions; driven by our interests and reflected in our common judgments. This of course does fly in the face of the initial presumption.

what you were saying seems impossible. I can understand that it's possible that, if there were non-biological beings who had intelligence equal to or greater than human intelligence, they may well never postulate the principles of biology. I would imagine there are so many ways the principles of chemistry and physics can combine and interact that it's possible no one would ever stumble upon the ideas that we know as the principles of biology. But that's not the same as it being impossible in theory to come up with those principles. — Patterner

Here's what Anderson says:

...the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a “constructionist” one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe...

...The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. The behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the properties of a few particles. Instead, at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature as any other... — P.W. Anderson - More is Different

Hi,

I'm not sure of the motivation for that view. Conscious states are states and states are of things. I'm taking that for granted.

I see no problem with that way of characterizing things, such that I see no motivation for thinking we are confused when we do so.

I think there is a problem in supposing conscious states to be states of physical things. Lots and lots of problems. The particular one I am drawing attention to is that unless one attributes conscious states to the basic units of matter, to attribute it to physical wholes violates a basic law of reason - one so fundamental it underpins basic logic. To suppose a whole could have a new kind of property not in anyway present already in its parts is really no different from supposing a valid argument can have a conclusion that was in no way present in any of the premises. That is, it is no different from thinking that sometimes arguments of this form - 1. if p then q, 2. p. 3. therefore R are valid.

But this doesn't imply a problem in the idea of concious states being states. It just implies that the objects of which conscious states are states are not physical ones (not complex physical ones anyway)

"The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe..."

Of course it implies that. The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. It may not be a certainty. There may be many ways things could have gone, and any one of them might happen if we started over. But it happening the same way has got to be possible. What could rule out the possibility?

The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. — Patterner

Everything that happens, happens consistent with the laws of lower levels of organization, i.e. physics. That doesn’t necessarily mean you can predict in advance how a complex system will evolve based on those laws, even in theory.

Keeping in mind this is a controversial idea.

The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. — Patterner

How do you know? Maybe laws are local, or maybe they change randomly.

Conscious states are states and states are of things. — Clarendon

Wittgenstein’s point is that there is a misconception of “states” as if they are objects (not of objects), like conceptualized in the same framework that we have for objects. For example, picturing understanding as a thing (a physical mechanism, or something we “have”), rather than a judgment we make/determine. Of course I think it would be better to go to that source if that is unclear.

I thought this was in the same vein as

objects of which conscious states are states are not physical ones — Clarendon

but asking us to consider imagining a state as not only not physical but also not like an “object”, but a logical matter.

I thought this misunderstanding spoke to your misgivings when you say “I think there is a problem in supposing conscious states to be states of physical things” just turned around rather than attributing it to things.

We'd certainly have to be a lot smarter than we are to predict such a complex thing as the biology we are familiar with. If we were as smart as we'd need to be to be able to predict that, I suspect we'd be able to develop entirely new types of biology that, while possible, just haven't happened. At least not that we're aware of. I don't know why that's not possible.

How do you know? Maybe laws are local, or maybe they change randomly. — frank

One never knows. Is there reason to think they are anything but universal and consistent?

Is there reason to think they are anything but universal and consistent? — Patterner

There's reason to suspect they change over time. Do you know of anything that rules out strong emergence?

It may not be a certainty. There may be many ways things could have gone, and any one of them might happen if we started over. — Patterner

But that's exactly what the claim is, not that the very world we live in is impossible, but that it was not necessitated simply by the laws of physics.

And surely that's obvious if you just consider evolution by natural selection.

Some of us think there's reason to believe consciousness is an emergent property of certain organisms. You don't, and I get that, but did you really intend to be arguing against emergence as such?

I have been assuming throughout that consciousness is a state, not an object. Minds 'have' consciousness, but they are not made of it. It's a state of them.

The problem I am highlighting is not, then, one that is a product of picturing things incorrectly. The problem is that some people think that in the case of consciousness, we can get out what we did not put in. That is, though they accept in all other contexts that such a notion is incoherent, they suddenly accept it when it comes to consciousness.

("We're interested specifically in intentionality. Have you found that yet?") — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not convinced that’s how it goes. It seems closer to this: if you are a naturalist or physicalist, how do you account for intentionality? Does your model have sufficient explanatory power? There’s nothing to “find” but there may be an explanatory gap (Just how significant will depend on what metaphysics we subscribe to.) But that's been thrashed on that other thread.

As the celebrity physicist Sean Carroll observes, science does not require explicit metaphysical explanations in order to function, even though it inevitably rests upon metaphysical assumptions. Similarly, a talented musician doesn't need to read or formally understand music theory to perform brilliantly. Technical or pragmatic success does not depend on awareness of the underlying structures that make something possible. Effectiveness in practice can be largely independent of perhaps even indifferent to the deeper intellectual commitments and theoretical presuppositions that silently sustain it.

But that's exactly what the claim is, not that the very world we live in is impossible, but that it was not necessitated simply by the laws of physics.

And surely that's obvious if you just consider evolution by natural selection. — Srap Tasmaner

The claim is not that what we have was not necessitated. The claim is that the possibility of it could not have been seen beforehand. I don't see reason to think far greater intelligence than ours could have a much better understanding of the possibilities than we do, and possibly have foreseen this. Maybe they wouldn't, but no reason to think they couldn't.

Do you know of anything that rules out strong emergence? — frank

but did you really intend to be arguing against emergence as such? — Srap Tasmaner

says, "An example of strong emergence is the development of biological life out of chemical interactions." Chemical interactions are physical events. A biological entity is made up of a huge number of interacting physical events. It's all explainable by the lower-level principles of physics and chemistry. One example is what I said recently about redox reactions and the electron transport chain. Another is positively charged ferrous ions in hemoglobin attracting negatively charged oxygen molecules. Another is the shape of the active site on the RNA polymerase enzyme reading the bases of the DNA template strand by shape.

If that is considered strong emergence, then strong emergence obviously exists. I would have thought it's considered a bunch of examples of weak emergence working together, and that their interconnectedness that is a biological entirety is another layer of emergence above, but still explained by what's below.

I thought strong emergence was for things that cannot be explained by physical levels below, ultimately chemistry and physics. Which does not make sense, and is why I've been saying you can't build something non-physical out of physical materials. I believe that is what physicalism is trying to say is the case with consciousness. I think consciousness is proof that there is something non-physical at work, and why I am in the panpsychism camp.

Chemical interactions are physical events. A biological entity is made up of a huge number of interacting physical events. It's all explainable by the lower-level principles of physics and chemistry. — Patterner

Do you think, or do you think it’s possible, to explain and predict the principles of biology from the principles of physics. Here’s a list of some of those principles— evolutionary theory, physiology, genetics, thermodynamics, and ecology. Once you’ve done that, you need to explain and predict how those principles will interact and integrate to produce biological organisms and how they historically evolve and develop as energy-processing, self-regulating systems.

I had no idea how traumatized some members here are about physicalism. I searched for threads created in the past, and they were just as harsh as they are now.

So, with that said, I have decided not to engage with this topic anymore cause I feel it is insurmountable given the strong objection to this thesis.

Do you think, or do you think it’s possible, to explain and predict the principles of biology from the principles of physics. Here’s a list of some of those principles— evolutionary theory, physiology, genetics, thermodynamics, and ecology. Once you’ve done that, you need to explain and predict how those principles will interact and integrate to produce biological organisms and how they historically evolve and develop as energy-processing, self-regulating systems. — T Clark

No one needs to explain all this in detail. Are you saying that thermodynamics is not reductionist because you can't predict the weather exactly one year in advance?

Reductionism is actually correct in principle. Suppose a pile of 271,828 atoms reacts differently than expected. Then you simply define a new rule for 271,828 atoms, and everything is reductionist again.

I guess the argument that life is strong emergence would be about final cause. We could debate whether that's necessary for understanding life. Some, like Robert Rosen say it is.

No one needs to explain all this in detail. Are you saying that thermodynamics is not reductionist because you can't predict the weather exactly one year in advance?

Reductionism is actually correct in principle. Suppose a pile of 271,828 atoms reacts differently than expected. Then you simply define a new rule for 271,828 atoms, and everything is reductionist again. — SolarWind

The essence of emergence is that, while you can reduce all phenomena into pieces explainable by lower level laws, e.g. physics, in many cases you can not construct higher level phenomena based on those same laws even in theory. Tell me how you would determine the principles of biology I described in my previous post from the principles of physics?

Are you saying that thermodynamics is not reductionist — SolarWind

I left my response to this out of my previous post. Yes, you can construct the principles of thermodynamics from the laws of physics, but you can't for the other elements listed.

The essence of emergence is that, while you can reduce all phenomena into pieces explainable by lower level laws, e.g. physics, in many cases you can not construct higher level phenomena based on those same laws even in theory. — T Clark

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult. There has to be a misunderstanding. Anything that exists and is the product of the laws of physics was constructed on the laws of physics. But you're saying they cannot be constructed on the laws of physics.

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult. There has to be a misunderstanding. Anything that exists and is the product of the laws of physics was constructed on the laws of physics. But you're saying they cannot be constructed on the laws of physics. — Patterner

If X emerged from Y, then X cannot be before Y in time. If consciousness emerged from body, then consciousness cannot know anything before existence of the body in time. But consciousness can know time before the body it emerged from by imagination. We can imagine what happened before our birth. We can imagine how life was like in ancient and prehistoric times.

Therefore consciousness cannot have emerged from body.

If X emerged from Y, then X cannot be before Y in time. — Corvus

That is true, but it does not disprove the possibility that consciousness may have already existed in a preliminary form. It may have been “asleep” in dead matter and unaware of anything. That is panpsychism.

it does not disprove the possibility that consciousness may have already existed in a preliminary form. — SolarWind

Yes, maybe it may have. It could be further point of discussion for clarification?
Some nights in my dreams, I see places and houses I have never been in my life, and folks I have never met in my life. Maybe that is the reason why.

That is panpsychism. — SolarWind

Another reasoning on emergence. If X emerged from Y, then X must exist separate from Y. If X exists in Y after emergence, then X is equal to or part of Y.

Consciousness does not exist separate from body. Or does it exist in the body? Or it does not exist in the form of existence.

If X exists in the form of non-existence, then does X exist? If X emerged from Y, then it must exist. But it doesn't exist. Therefore X could not have emerged from Y.
(X= consciousness, Y= body) We need to clarify this point.

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult. There has to be a misunderstanding. Anything that exists and is the product of the laws of physics was constructed on the laws of physics. But you're saying they cannot be constructed on the laws of physics. — Patterner

I think most physicists probably agree with you. I've given convincing you my best shot, so we should probably leave it at that. It's been a good conversation for me.

If X emerged from Y, then X must exist separate from Y. — Corvus

Let's take an example. X = triangle, Y = lines.
If a triangle emerged from lines, then the triangle must exist separate from the lines.
That doesn't make sense to me.

I don't get how that answers my question to T Clark.

That is true, but it does not disprove the possibility that consciousness may have already existed in a preliminary form. It may have been “asleep” in dead matter and unaware of anything. That is panpsychism. — SolarWind

That's not my understanding of panpsychism in general, and not what I think about it. I don't think it's preliminary or asleep at any point, in any thing. And I don't think consciousness is awareness. I think every particle is experiencing it's own existence at all times. A particle's existence does not include mechanisms that store information, perceive anything within itself or the environment, make any decisions, or think in any way. Consciousness doesn't "wake up" when it's in beings like us. Rather, we experience much greater complexity than a particle does.

I think most physicists probably agree with you. I've given convincing you my best shot, so we should probably leave it at that. It's been a good conversation for me. — T Clark

I just think I'm not understanding you. It seems like you're saying we have tables made out of wood and nails, but we can't make tables out of wood and nails.