I like oranges, but the colour is odd. — AmadeusD

Well, I guess the word "but" has other uses, but in your case it went like this:

I don't defend Trump, but here are the reasons I defend him

No, that was literally you inventing something I didn't say (or intimate). If that's your interpretation, you're entitled. But wrong. And that's okay.

This is tricky to give a yes or no to. The answer properly is 'yes'. But what i've said there is about how I behave, Not what I try to have others do around me, if you can grok the difference. — AmadeusD

Well this whole thread revolves around forms of behavior that also influence others' behavior, so I don't think it makes much sense to try to make it merely about one's own behavior. For example, I am talking about the way that "try to get people to either act or not act," and those acts are not merely about how you behave. The matter is about how you intentionally influence the behavior of others. If it were just you, standing alone, behaving as you like without any influence or effect on others, then none of my points would have any weight.

I think you're being a little callous in your capturing of the situation, — AmadeusD

Well you literally said that you "try to get people to either act or not act," and you also acknowledged the importance of intention. This seems to indicate that when you are merely trying to get people to act or not act (regardless of any intention), you have your own goals primarily in mind rather than their own. If we want to help someone then we have to focus on something more than a material act or omission. So I think my phrasing follows from your own words.

...but in a significant sense, yes, that's right. When I speak about how i interact with other people, i try my best to help people toward their goals. The decision to do so is moral. The activity of, lets say, educating someone as how best to achieve their goal in my view, is entirely practical as I see it. I could just as easily leave off and nothing would be different morally. — AmadeusD

But are you saying that your decision to help people towards their goals is moral, or not? Because in your third sentence that's what you said, but then in your fourth sentence you said it was "entirely practical" (which presumably means non-moral). Isn't that a contradiction?

If my behaviour violates other people's rights, that's counter to an overarching moral intention to maintain social and cultural cohesion. This is a legal argument rather than a strictly moral one, but to be sure, I am making a moral call to resile from a behaviour once I note it may be violating another's rights of some kind. — AmadeusD

Okay good, and we agree on this. Your behavior in cases such as these is moral in nature, or in your words, it requires "making a moral call."

There's no inconsistency. If I am trying to get someone to act, its on practical grounds due to a moral decision to help them. You must clearly delineate the two modes. A moral decision is made in my mind - I then behave without moral reasoning in persuading the other to act toward their own goal (not mine. That's incorrect). My (moral) desire is to help the person. Not their goal, per se. The how-to is somewhat arbitrary. — AmadeusD

Okay. Let's take just one part of this. You seem to be saying that you make a moral decision to help someone do something, and then you go on to "behave without moral reasoning in persuading the other to act toward their own goal." Is the idea that helping others is moral, but the thing that the other person is being helped to do need not be moral? It seems to me then that in the interaction you would be acting morally throughout (insofar as you are helping), and the person would be achieving some practical end with your aid. Thus from the perspective of the person being helped, you are acting morally insofar as you are helping them, but you are only acting practically insofar as the means-end intelligibility is being discovered. Is that right?

(If this is right, then when you earlier said that you are only helping them act, what you must have meant is that you are helping them act and think and understand, but the behavior that you call forth in them is not something that you deem moral.)

Roughly moral reasoning is that which gets us to do something because of its rightness or wrongness. Practical reason is trying to do things which will achieve an arbitrary goal. — AmadeusD

Okay good, and I will probably come back to this definition.

So, in my example, if my moral position was that it's good to help anyone whatever then you might find me teaching a racist how best to gut Chinese children. But my moral reasoning tells me not to help that person toward their goal. The reasoning-to-act issue never arises. Had it, the moral problem would be in my decision to help them, not my reasoning on how best they could achieve their barbaric (i presume moral) outcomes. — AmadeusD

But why is your unspecified decision to help someone moral, as you earlier said it was? Were you relying on a syllogism like this: <It is right to help people; I decide to help because it is right; therefore my decision to help is moral>?

My general point here is that it is hard to believe that you are a thoroughgoing moral subjectivist (or emotivist). — Leontiskos

I think most people have this trouble; particularly the theologically inclined. For instance I don't need answers to 'why are we here' or 'what does it mean to be human' or whatever to get on with my life all hunky dory. I don't care. We are here. We are human. What the 'means' is made up stuff we do for fun, basically. I get that its tough to understand, but there's a massive difference between being a subjectivist when it comes to morality, and being either a-moral, or dismissing morality entirely. Alex O'Connor does a good job of discussion emotivist in these terms imo. — AmadeusD

A simple case is your point about how you respect others' rights, and that this respect is moral in nature. If you were a subjectivist or an emotivist I'm not sure how that would work. It's helpful that you reference O'Connor, but I also find him muddled (even though he seems to improve with time). (Note that a lot of these themes overlap with a new thread on the topic).

How does a moral subjectivist claim that the law is often wrong when it comes to moral regulation? — Leontiskos

As an example, with wills and estates there is generally a 'moral duty' to provide for one's children after death (if one has anything to pass on, anyway). I think this is wrong, overreach and inapt for a legal framework that doesn't interfere with people's personal affairs. So, that's my personal moral view. I don't think that's going to be true for the next guy. So i don't care to do anything about the policy. I have to enforce it regularly, actually (well, I have a part in doing so regularly).

This is why I think the Law does a pretty good job. For the most part, its been 'democratically' hammered out over time, through common law, into something resembling a "close-to-consensus" and I'm happy to live with that. — AmadeusD

But how does the subjectivist claim that the law is right or wrong? You give an example where you think the law is wrong, but then go on to say, "I don't think this is going to be true for the next guy. So i don't care to do anything about the policy." This is utterly strange to me. It's like saying, "This law is wrong but there is no reason to change it," or, "This law is right but there is no reason to keep it."

If you really think a law is wrong, then by definition it would seem that you want it to be changed. If you have no desire that it be changed, then I'm not sure you can say that it is wrong. And if you are a subjectivist then I think that would be consistent. Yet you say it is wrong.

Hey man, great set of questions/objections etc.. I have to prime you that I'm blunt in a few of these responses. Its not personal, or meant to indicate a shortness with you.

Well this whole threa — Leontiskos

So you don't grok the difference? Or what? It's somewhat hard to get more than "you're a little offtopic" here. Which seems totally true, tbf lol.

This seems to indicate that when you are merely trying to get people to act or not act (regardless of any intention), you have your own goals primarily in mind rather than their own. — Leontiskos

I have explicitly, and in detail addressed this. You are wrong. I probably shouldn't be required to go over it again at this stage. Suffice to say my goal is to do what I think is right. Their goal is whatever it is. They are not interdependent. The moral reasoning is inside my head and has no part in the discussion with old mate.

ut are you saying that your decision to help people towards their goals is moral, or not? — Leontiskos

You could just read the quote you quoted. There are two activities. One is moral. One is not. This isn't rocket science my guy - its really, really hard to see how you're not getting this.
My decision: Moral.
What I say to old mate: practical.

Nothing unusual or inconsistent here.

Isn't that a contradiction? — Leontiskos

Clearly not. It seems you're about to address this (which is odd as these prior responses act as if you're not going to.. just as an explainer for why it might seem weird that I either repeat myself within this reply, or ignore some things within it).

Your behavior in cases such as these is moral in nature, or in your words, it requires "making a moral call." — Leontiskos

Yes. It is specifically morality that would prevent me from, for instance, instructing someone on how best to harm a child.

Is the idea that helping others is moral, but the thing that the other person is being helped to do need not be moral? — Leontiskos

Roughly, yes. I think difference cases would be phrased slightly differently, but that's the delineation I am illustrating. It's 'good' in my view to help my younger son build legos. Building legos has absolutely no moral valence at all (to me. Maybe someone finds morality in building legos, I don't know. That's kind of the point).

It seems to me then that in the interaction you would be acting morally throughout (insofar as you are helping), and the person would be achieving some practical end with your aid. — Leontiskos

Now this is totally reasonable, but I think it's simply a requirement you need to maintain your position and no one whcih can be illustrated. Explaining how to put together a packing box for groceries isn't moral. That I am helping someone is moral. You may disagree, but you've asked for why my position is what it is - and this is it. They are different things. When i was sociopathic I often "helped" other people. Largely out of boredom. There was no moral decision. At all. The difference is my internal intention (I think we've been here and you disagree - i'm just trying to answer the objections).

Thus from the perspective of the person being helped, you are acting morally insofar as you are helping them, but you are only acting practically insofar as the means-end intelligibility is being discovered. Is that right? — Leontiskos

If I getting this right, from you, then yeah pretty much. I guess it would be cleaner to say that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case. Contrasted with perhaps dragging a struggling kid from a pool - I'm not going to check if the kid wants to drown or not. My morality tells to do a moral act, in that case and the moral act is the entire act in that case. In our example here (helping someone put a box together lets say) only the decision to act, or more closely, that I act is the moral element. The actual instruction could've just been handing a sheet of paper over and walking away in disgust at how inept old mate is.

helping them act and think and understand — Leontiskos

Well, maybe, but you've got this the wrong way around: that is a result, not an act on my part. I don't actually care whether the person listens to me to be honest. My decision was simply to help. If that's rejected or misunderstood, I don't care a lick. It would certain be better for their goal if they listened, though. But it doesn't move me because (i presume) its their morality or intention creating that fact rather than mine.

But why is your unspecified decision to help someone moral, as you earlier said it was? — Leontiskos

Because in making the decision, i am weighing explicitly where it sits ion my internal spectrum of right ad wrong. Once i've made the decision, the moral lens is put down (unless something further comes up that requires a moral decision - like finding out they have an ulterior motive or whatever that I do have a moral issue with).

A simple case is your point about how you respect others' rights, and that this respect is moral in nature. If you were a subjectivist or an emotivist I'm not sure how that would work. — Leontiskos

I don't see an issue, other than from the perspective of someone who requires an outside arbiter of their morality. Violating others rights (although, that then begs the question of what rights I consider moral and not... that notwithstanding...) makes me feel shit. So I do my best not to. It doesn't actually matter too much what effect it has on the other person unless I've done it unintentionally. Then, their reaction is what makes me feel shit because it was unintended. If i intended to do something I knew would violate a right that i feel is immoral, why would I care about them being hurt? Thanks for the link - i've been following some of it.

But how does the subjectivist claim that the law is right or wrong? — Leontiskos

I don't. I wont speak for others. I'll say it works for the most part. I then have personal views on particular aspects that tend not to come into a legal discussion for me. The only times I make moral claims about legal issues is such as above. But if i were to take the view that what I personally considerally morally this or that should be reflected in law, I would be a nation of one fightining against my brothers (metaphorically) to enforce a set of feelings I think are essentially unhelpful in the wider world (i.e outside of regulating my own behaviour and choices).

This is utterly strange to me. — Leontiskos

Yah. I've picked up on that :P This seems to be the boilerplate for the disagreement, as I see it. And that's all good - it seems to support my view (tongue-in-cheek).

If you really think a law is wrong, then by definition it would seem that you want it to be changed. — Leontiskos

No. The law is not a moral institution. It may appear that way, because collective moralities over time have shaped it - but in a pluralistic society it is a practical guide to disputes of morality in most cases. This is why there are courts that allow what we in the West would call murder - because those cultures have hammered out law with a different moral lens to the majority of the West. This is something like a smoking gun against the Alvaro-type moral thinkers. There is no universal sense of morality (running against 180s claim in the thread you linked, for instance).

If you have no desire that it be changed, then I'm not sure you can say that it is wrong. And if you are a subjectivist then I think that would be consistent. Yet you say it is wrong. — Leontiskos

This seems to be cause you conflate law and morality. The law lives outside my head. It cannot be part of my morality. I can react to it morally, and that's all.

A committment to free speech would have us accepting plenty of 'immoral' things said by others, while not ever trying to have the law prevent them from saying it (or more recently, the reverse of this lol. Trying to instantiate tolerance for views I find immoral in pursuit of free speech).

Perhaps there's a theological bent to you thinking, as noted: laws are moral laws in religion (almost always). They aren't so in the secular land. Or at least, this is my view on the Law vs morality in the west. Law emerges from morality, as such, but is not itself a moral arbiter. It's just as best we can get to a "middle way" to decide issues for which people have strong moral beliefs. Probably good to understand that when I saw "that law is wrong" i mean "i would rather not". Not that there's some benchmark I can take you to to understand why it's wrong. You're just going to get my opinion if you ask.

I do note here that I hve given an example which is specifically a 'moral duty' but this is a specific beast within Law which is not representative of how Law works - its a bespoke family law issue. I think Family law should operate like all law, but it doesn't and that seems to work.

Hey man, great set of questions/objections etc.. I have to prime you that I'm blunt in a few of these responses. Its not personal, or meant to indicate a shortness with you. — AmadeusD

Okay, but I think you need to actually revise your rhetoric if you really want to avoid coming off as "short." It's a bit like the person who says, "No offense, but [now I'm going to say something that is offensive]." If someone really wants to avoid offense, then they have to actually stop saying offensive things. It doesn't make sense to say offensive things and then slap on the disclaimer, "No offense intended." What I'll do is limit myself to those parts of your post that are substantive rather than "short."

Roughly, yes. I think difference cases would be phrased slightly differently, but that's the delineation I am illustrating. It's 'good' in my view to help my younger son build legos. Building legos has absolutely no moral valence at all — AmadeusD

Okay good, I understand what you are saying.

When i was sociopathic I often "helped" other people. Largely out of boredom. There was no moral decision. At all. The difference is my internal intention — AmadeusD

So are you saying that when you were sociopathic you helped people without thinking that helping people was right, and now you help people because you think helping people is right? It's the "because it is right" that changed, and made the non-moral act a moral act. Is that right?

If I getting this right, from you, then yeah pretty much. I guess it would be cleaner to say that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case. — AmadeusD

See, I really don't know what that means, and I don't think you understand how unclear these sorts of claims are. There is nothing clean about the statement, "that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case." Even if I try to clean up the grammar it still isn't clear to me: "that I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." If you really think what you are saying is obvious, then it should be easy to express clearly and lucidly.

Contrasted with perhaps dragging a struggling kid from a pool - I'm not going to check if the kid wants to drown or not. My morality tells to do a moral act, in that case and the moral act is the entire act in that case. In our example here (helping someone put a box together lets say) only the decision to act, or more closely, that I act is the moral element. The actual instruction could've just been handing a sheet of paper over and walking away in disgust at how inept old mate is. — AmadeusD

I still don't understand what you are saying. So in your example of helping someone put a box together, you say that your decision to help them is the moral element. Or else "that I act" is the moral element. But those are two different things. Is it the decision or is it the "that I act," and what does "that I act" mean? Everything we do can be construed as an act. A decision is an act. Box-building is an act. Helping is a form of acting. So "that I act" is very vague given how broad the term 'act' is.

I should add that what you are attempting is quite difficult, philosophically speaking (i.e. the specification of moral acts or else human acts). It is not something which has easy or obvious answers. Tackling the problem requires a thoroughgoing application of one's mind. It requires careful thinking, and in turn, carefully constructed sentences.

Well, maybe, but you've got this the wrong way around: that is a result, not an act on my part. I don't actually care whether the person listens to me to be honest. My decision was simply to help. If that's rejected or misunderstood, I don't care a lick. — AmadeusD

Eh, I don't believe you. If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. No one speaks to someone without caring whether they listen. If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak.

Because in making the decision, i am weighing explicitly where it sits ion my internal spectrum of right ad wrong. — AmadeusD

Okay, and I am glad to see that you're acknowledging that you have an internal spectrum of right and wrong, that you engage in moral activities and decisions, etc. That is different from conversations we have had in the past.

Violating others rights (although, that then begs the question of what rights I consider moral and not... that notwithstanding...) makes me feel shit. So I do my best not to. It doesn't actually matter too much what effect it has on the other person unless I've done it unintentionally. Then, their reaction is what makes me feel shit because it was unintended. If i intended to do something I knew would violate a right that i feel is immoral, why would I care about them being hurt? — AmadeusD

But I think you do care what effect it has on the other person. The whole concept of "violating another's rights" has this built-in. Someone who cares about violating another's rights eo ipso cares about the effects of their actions on other people. It is not possible to recognize another's rights without caring about the effects of one's actions on others.

No. The law is not a moral institution. It may appear that way, because collective moralities over time have shaped it - but in a pluralistic society it is a practical guide to disputes of morality in most cases. — AmadeusD

I certainly disagree, and yet it's not even clear that what you say here is coherent. "The law is not a moral institution; it is a practical guide to adjudicating disputes of morality." Does that make any sense? I think it makes more sense to say that an institution that adjudicates disputes of morality is necessarily a moral institution. I'm not sure how one would adjudicate moral disputes while remaining non-moral.

Law emerges from morality, as such, but is not itself a moral arbiter. It's just as best we can get to a "middle way" to decide issues for which people have strong moral beliefs. — AmadeusD

The same would apply here.

...But we don't need to get too deep into the nature of law, as it might make the conversation too long and unwieldy.

Okay, but I think you need to actually revise your rhetoric — Leontiskos

Well, I get you but disagree. I told you what you needed to know upfront. I am not obliged to come across particularly personable. I would say, particularly here. But I hear you, generally. It's better to get on. Personally, I'd have just read that and moved on with it in mind. Takes all kind

So are you saying that when you were sociopathic you helped people without thinking that helping people was right, and now you help people because you think helping people is right? It's the "because it is right" that changed, and made the non-moral act a moral act. Is that right? — Leontiskos

I would say yes (phrased this way because I can't view myself from the outside with my own set of beliefs etc..). I can recall a couple of occasions on which I went to help someone, mucked it because I didn't know what I was doing and walked away laughing because it entertained me as best I could be entertained. One of these occasions was to leave a child without a parent at an event at which they were bound to get lost and likely hurt. I am not proud of this period of my life in any way, to be clear.

If you really think what you are saying is obvious, then it should be easy to express clearly and lucidly. — Leontiskos

As far as I'm concerned, I have. Thanks for cleaning up the grammar (i type quickly at work because of short windows for thinking about other things. I should probably use Drafts, but I'd probably never end up posting them). If you feel otherwise, that's cool and I respect you on that. The sentence you laid out seems clear as day to me in what it means (curse of knowledge perhaps).

I still don't understand what you are saying. So in your example of helping someone put a box together, you say that your decision to help them is the moral element. Or else "that I act" is the moral element. But those are two different things. Is it the decision or is it the "that I act," and what does "that I act" mean? Everything we do can be construed as an act. A decision is an act. Box-building is an act. Helping is a form of acting. So "that I act" is very vague given how broad the term 'act' is. — Leontiskos

Okay, I'll try to clarify. This response tells me it's probably semantics and not concepts, which is encouraging. Up top, I would say that I hear you on "all agential events are acts". Seems reasonable and like you say, it's hard to distinguish these things. But it seems clear to me that a thought, or a decision to cross the road is not an act in, at the very least, the same sense as crossing the road. Could that be agreed? Our language may be different, but we're talking about materially and morally different things imo.
They (tend to)follow one another and are of different kinds "That I have decided to act" is probably better put for this discussion, but I see a clear and meaningful distinction between "acting or not acting" on the one hand, and what the act is on the other. An example might be the trolley problem. Doing nothing gives us one impression - and either of the choices gives us a separate, slightly askance impression. Dovetailing, to be sure and so I was wrong to be quite so stark about and thank you for that. Is "killing a child" immoral? Well, imo yes. Is "deciding to kill a child" immoral? Well, also probably yes but if then you are prevented from doing so, we're talking about different things as the 'act' (in my use) hasn't actually occurred.

If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. — Leontiskos

You are confusing whether i care to help, or whether i care to succeed. Remember, my form of morality is essentially narcissistic. I care that I tried. I don't care much about the success. I understand and don't fault you for not believing this. But I can tell you it's true as many times as you like.

If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak. — Leontiskos

As with above, no, I care that I spoke. It's pretty self-interested. That's, as I see it, the discomfort with emotivist. It is by definition self-interested and not concerned much with outcomes other than insofar as they make one feel a type of way. I understand why people don't like it.

Okay, and I am glad to see that you're acknowledging that you have an internal spectrum of right and wrong, that you engage in moral activities and decisions, etc. That is different from conversations we have had in the past. — Leontiskos

Is it? I don't quite think so. If that's what you've gotten, I have far more work to do about the semantic issue To me, I obviously carry out moral evaluations and act on the result of that evaluation. If that hasn't come across, I apologise as you might be running along tracks I can't quite get on for a discussion. That'll be my bad. (I guess the novel aspect of my position is that once I've begun to act, the morality isn't involved until something changes in the context (noted with the ulterior motive comment in previous post)).

But I think you do care what effect it has on the other person. The whole concept of "violating another's rights" has this built-in. Someone who cares about violating another's rights eo ipso cares about the effects of their actions on other people. It is not possible to recognize another's rights without caring about the effects of one's actions on others. — Leontiskos

Ah. It seems you've again confused law with morality. Some rights I couldn't give a flying F about. I would violate them all day long, because I don't care about the effect that has on someone else. I, personally, have deemed that right lacking/wanting/wrong or whatever on my internal moral compass and therefore do not act as if its a moral obligation. And, despite working in law, I often violate it for what I deem worthy outcomes. This rests on my rejection of rights as anything but legal positions. I do not think rights arise from anything but legal authority (or something analogous like religious authority).

So I can recognise that someone has right x, understand they enjoy that right at Law, and still not give a shit. Thought, I may enforce it for the moral reason of social cohesion, as earlier noted, because that overarching consideration may trump the fact that in case A I couldn't care less.

I certainly disagree, and yet it's not even clear that what you say here is coherent. "The law is not a moral institution; it is a practical guide to adjudicating disputes of morality." Does that make any sense? I think it makes more sense to say that an institution that adjudicates disputes of morality is necessarily a moral institution. I'm not sure how one would adjudicate moral disputes while remaining non-moral. — Leontiskos

That's totally fair, and this is an issue I would far, far, far prefer to say out loud rather than sit rewriting sentences about until I find exactly what hits hte nail. I shall have a go..

Moral systems have, over the centuries, existed and exerted certain power over people. Those systems are essentially incompatible (Catholic, Islamic, Secular, NAP, what have you..). So a system must be put in place to adjudicate between them. I do not think it a moral exercise to essentially mathematically work out (although, this is a little bit misleading, I do think it amounts to a calculation-over-centuries) what the most people would assent to and agree with. Given huge numbers of people disagree with laws and in fact, often violate them for specifically moral reasons, tells me that laws are not moral creatures (again, exceptions exist but they appear to operate different from lets say tax law and it feels like a bad move to me overall). Essentially, what I think is that a law of the land operates as a neutral arbiter between competing social interests. We do not cut off the hands of thieves in the west, but a small number of people in the west would love that to be the case. So law just goes "Well, mathematically, that's a small group so we wont take that into account - we've observed that most people prefer x outcome" not "cutting of hands of thieves is wrong, so we wont take that into account". And, you'll also note that as societies values change, the law catches up eventually on sort of critical mass basis, not on a response to moral argument basis.

Now, I may be overselling this - I can see good arguments for your point of view - they don't move me much as laws are not there for the purpose of making people feel good. They're there to maintain a mathematically(non-moral) deduced middle ground that most people will be ok with (moral). It is a very, very fine line and it's possible I am incapable of wording things correctly 'on paper'. I cop to that. The people are moral, the law is not. As I see it.

...But we don't need to get too deep into the nature of law, as it might make the conversation too long and unwieldy. — Leontiskos

Fuck. I should have read this first.. .LOL. Thanks man. Enjoying this one a lot.

I would say yes (phrased this way because I can't view myself from the outside with my own set of beliefs etc..). I can recall a couple of occasions on which I went to help someone, mucked it because I didn't know what I was doing and walked away laughing because it entertained me as best I could be entertained. One of these occasions was to leave a child without a parent at an event at which they were bound to get lost and likely hurt. I am not proud of this period of my life in any way, to be clear. — AmadeusD

Okay, that makes sense.

But it seems clear to me that a thought, or a decision to cross the road is not an act in, at the very least, the same sense as crossing the road. Could that be agreed? — AmadeusD

Sure.

They (tend to)follow one another and are of different kinds "That I have decided to act" is probably better put for this discussion, but I see a clear and meaningful distinction between "acting or not acting" on the one hand, and what the act is on the other. An example might be the trolley problem. Doing nothing gives us one impression - and either of the choices gives us a separate, slightly askance impression. Dovetailing, to be sure and so I was wrong to be quite so stark about and thank you for that. Is "killing a child" immoral? Well, imo yes. Is "deciding to kill a child" immoral? Well, also probably yes but if then you are prevented from doing so, we're talking about different things as the 'act' (in my use) hasn't actually occurred. — AmadeusD

Okay, this does help. Let's revisit that initial formulation that you maintain is clear, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." Taking the child case, you seem to say that the decision and the act are both immoral, albeit in somewhat different ways. If this is right, then your principle only holds in certain cases, namely the principle, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral." That's not inconsistent, as you did follow it with, "...in this case."

Still, the problem is that if someone gives a principle and then follows it with, "...in this case," or, "...sometimes," then they have effectively nullified the principle. It is one thing to say, "Decisions to act are moral but physical action is not." It is quite another to say, "Decisions to act are moral and physical action is not, sometimes." The "sometimes" immediately raises the question, "Well when does your principle hold and when does it not?" Without that explanation the principle can't actually function in an argument.

If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. — Leontiskos

You are confusing whether i care to help, or whether i care to succeed. Remember, my form of morality is essentially narcissistic. I care that I tried. I don't care much about the success. I understand and don't fault you for not believing this. But I can tell you it's true as many times as you like. — AmadeusD

You're telling me that you try to do things without trying to succeed at the things you do. I'm sure you understand why I don't believe you, given how strange your claim is?

If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak. — Leontiskos

As with above, no, I care that I spoke. It's pretty self-interested. That's, as I see it, the discomfort with emotivist. It is by definition self-interested and not concerned much with outcomes other than insofar as they make one feel a type of way. I understand why people don't like it. — AmadeusD

The problem is that speaking and being listened to are "two peas in a pod." No one speaks to someone without wanting that person to listen to them. A cooperative activity cannot be purely self-interested in the sense you require. It's like saying, "I get on the teeter-totter and I push off the ground. I care that I pushed, I don't care whether the other person provides a counterweight. It's pretty self-interested." The problem is that teeter-totters make no sense without a counterweight.

Is it? I don't quite think so. If that's what you've gotten, I have far more work to do about the semantic issue. — AmadeusD

Here is an example from a previous conversation, where you critique the use of the words 'right' and 'wrong' in relation to morality:

If "right" and "wrong" are to inform moral systems [...] then that supposed fact is contradicted by the obvious fact that 'right' and 'wrong' give us nothing which could inform the system as they are too ambiguous and essentially self-referential. — AmadeusD

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I guess the novel aspect of my position is that once I've begun to act, the morality isn't involved until something changes in the context — AmadeusD

Well, would you agree that all along you are running the "background process" of "helping," and that this "background process" is moral? The whole time you are helping him construct the cardboard box you are helping, and so if helping is a moral act then it seems to be operative throughout. If you stopped running that "background process" then you would also stop building the box.

Some rights I couldn't give a flying F about. — AmadeusD

And I am obviously not speaking to those.

So I can recognise that someone has right x, understand they enjoy that right at Law, and still not give a shit. — AmadeusD

Well you've literally claimed in this thread that there are certain rights of others that you would not transgress, so obviously there are some rights you give a shit about. Obviously my argument had to do with those rights rather than ones we haven't spoken about at all. Given that you are averse to transgressing some rights, you surely care what effect your actions have on other people (who possesses those rights).

Moral systems have, over the centuries, existed and exerted certain power over people. Those systems are essentially incompatible (Catholic, Islamic, Secular, NAP, what have you..). So a system must be put in place to adjudicate between them. I do not think it a moral exercise to essentially mathematically work out (although, this is a little bit misleading, I do think it amounts to a calculation-over-centuries) what the most people would assent to and agree with. — AmadeusD

I do. In fact I think your "mathematical assessment" is itself a moral position, namely a quantitative form of democratic morality. If someone says, "This moral disagreement will be resolved by a majority vote," their method of adjudication is itself moral. There are other ways to resolve moral disagreements than a majority vote, or a mathematical assessment.

Given huge numbers of people disagree with laws and in fact, often violate them for specifically moral reasons, tells me that laws are not moral creatures — AmadeusD

That's an invalid argument. "This law can be broken, therefore it is not moral." The same is true with, "This law can be broken for moral reasons, therefore it is not moral." But the second claim rests on an equivocation on the word 'moral' (which I incidentally address in my OP, beginning with the third sentence of the introduction). Indeed, when someone breaks a law for moral reasons they are presupposing that the law itself is immoral, and an immoral thing is a "moral" thing in the broad sense (just as a murder is a moral act, albeit not a good act).

Essentially, what I think is that a law of the land operates as a neutral arbiter between competing social interests. — AmadeusD

How do you figure it's neutral? We literally argue over laws. How does the outcome of that vociferous argument become "neutral"?

So law just goes "Well, mathematically, that's a small group so we wont take that into account - we've observed that most people prefer x outcome" — AmadeusD

Again, you are appealing to a kind of majoritarianism, which is clearly a moral position. "We ought to do whatever most people want," is a moral claim.

Now, I may be overselling this - I can see good arguments for your point of view - they don't move me much as laws are not there for the purpose of making people feel good. They're there to maintain a mathematically(non-moral) deduced middle ground that most people will be ok with (moral). It is a very, very fine line and it's possible I am incapable of wording things correctly 'on paper'. I cop to that. The people are moral, the law is not. As I see it. — AmadeusD

Fair enough. In a technical sense you are elevating a classically liberal notion of law as if it were the only possible or reasonable notion of law, and given that you have grown up in a classically liberal society that is totally understandable. Most societies do not consider their "normal" to be moral/idiosyncratic. Classically liberal societies assume that all societies function via a "mathematical" notion of law.

Fuck. I should have read this first.. .LOL. Thanks man. Enjoying this one a lot. — AmadeusD

Haha

If this is right, then your principle only holds in certain cases, namely the principle, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral." That's not inconsistent, as you did follow it with, "...in this case — Leontiskos

I think its more than they can come together in some cases, but are not dependent on one another. I can concede this and, as i say, regret the starkness with which I had teased them apart. But they do come apart, it seems, which I guess was what I needed. I may just be a bit unique in how my brain processes those pieces of data.

Still, the problem is that if someone gives a principle and then follows it with, "...in this case," or, "...sometimes," then they have effectively nullified the principle. It is one thing to say, "Decisions to act are moral but physical action is not." — Leontiskos

Ah, fair enough. This illustrates to me a mistake in what I've said, not my concept. What I am getting at is that the act following a decision need not be in the same category of 'event'. Some acts are 100% moral acts. I think i conceded this earlier by saying that pulling the kid out the water was a moral act following a moral decision on part ,and this does happen semi-regularly (probably less than most people). As best I can tell, what I've said works for my argument, i've just been clumsy. My initial point was just that deciding to so something and the thing have different valences. I maintain that, but you're right that they coincide often. I am just saying thats not a dependence, i guess.

You're telling me that you try to do things without trying to succeed at the things you do. I'm sure you understand why I don't believe you, given how strange your claim is? — Leontiskos

You may want to re-read the quoted, highlighting to yourself narcisisstic. Its definitely strange, and as i said, I get the skepticism. But it's the case. I would say though "without trying to succeed" is a step to far, and something you've imported. I try to succeed - that's what attempting to help is. If it doesn't work, i don't care. I can't quite see why its required I care about the success through the entire act. I simply stop caring if it's not going well (and I can't see a clear path to success). Perhaps a psychological foible. I'm not bothered.

No one speaks to someone without wanting that person to listen to them. — Leontiskos

You may not. I often do. Again, perhaps a psychological foible.

The problem is that teeter-totters make no sense without a counterweight. — Leontiskos

I disagree. Your view of them and what they are intended to do is colouring something. If the intent is simply to have gotten on a teeter-totter(we call them see-saws) and done my part, that's all i care for. In my line of work this mental state is a vocational necessity because it is not in my interest or my responsibility to chase the other side of a deal for their undertakings etc. If they give htem, we proceed. If they don't, I move on to another piece of work. Rinse, repeat. But almost everyone is self-interested in this line of work, so will do their part. Generally, when they don't they get in trouble as they have harmed their client. But that has nothing to do with me and I couldn't care less. I do my part.

Well, would you agree that all along you are running the "background process" of "helping," and that this "background process" is moral? — Leontiskos

Hmmm. That's a difficult one. I can lean a millimeter that was and assent, or a millimeter the other way and reject. There's an underlying basis of the act, which is my want to help - but that want is devoid of content in a significant way. Would have to think, but it certainly could be so.

If you stopped running that "background process" then you would also stop building the box. — Leontiskos

Hmm. Once the decision is made new info is needed to change my course of action. You see this as strange. That's fine. But it's not incoherent. It's like keeping a promise you don't really want to keep, I guess, but I don't feel obliged in these circumstances, to another person - but to my prior decision. So, I don't htikn that's quite so.

And I am obviously not speaking to those. — Leontiskos

But that's key to the premise. If there are rights I don't care about, the fact there is a right to be violated is not really the crucial motivator in my resiling. It is that I personally consider that right morally correct to defend or some such.

Well you've literally claimed in this thread that there are certain rights of others that you would not transgress, so obviously there are some rights you give a shit about — Leontiskos

Yep. Not sure what you're not getting. Some rights that's going to be true about, some it isn't. Rights-violating (or defense) is something with reference to law, but resting on my moral compass.

Given that you are averse to transgressing some rights, you surely care what effect your actions have on other people (who possesses those rights). — Leontiskos

No, no. It is narcissistic: I care to not feel like i violated my own moral principle. That's it. That's where it ends. Lucky harming my child hurts me, huh? I might care about the effect on others even, but it doesn't factor into a decision as such. Whether or not i will care after the act, that I did or didn't do itis what matters to me. Recall the child I left at the festival - I still function somewhat that way, but I have an internal compass that would've still told me to get the child to safety - not to help the child, necssarily, but to satisfy my moral itch. I understand exactly how uncomfortable and offputting this is to other people. But I don't care.

If someone says, "This moral disagreement will be resolved by a majority vote," their method of adjudication is itself moral. There are other ways to resolve moral disagreements than a majority vote, or a mathematical assessment. — Leontiskos

You think? I'm not quite seeing it. Its a mathematical event, not a moral one, to me. I think i know what you're saying though, which is that someone thought that method was "right" and so we're back in moral territory. I prefer to think it was considered 'best'. Which is not, to my mind, moral. Its practical. But I can see how your view goes through, so I won't argue hard.

That's an invalid argument. "This law can be broken, therefore it is not moral." — Leontiskos

That's not the argument.

Indeed, when someone breaks a law for moral reasons they are presupposing that the law itself is immoral — Leontiskos

I don't see why this is required, but I can see why its usually going to be true. I often violate laws for moral reasons that have nothing to do with the law itself. I don't think its immoral, for instance, to prevent harm to children. I think there is a mathematically sound consensus that slapping kids is bad for them. So much is true. The law itself reflects that attitude, but its a mathematical function of the consensus - not moral claim. I have slapped kids in circumstances where it was required to protect them from fire (the classic example) and in one case water (batting them away from an edge they were already past the precipice of). I violated a law for a moral reason, but do not think that law is immoral at all. Not sure where else to take that, sorry lol.

How do you figure it's neutral? We literally argue over laws. How does the outcome of that vociferous argument become "neutral"? — Leontiskos

Neutral roughly means 'in the middle'. I understand laws to be, at least attempts at getting to the middle point of competing interests in a pluralistic society (this meaning we can ignore anything 'from on high' as it were). I think the entire function of public law is to supercede the moral function of the human heart, let's say, and force people to socially agree to tenets which they may have moral reservations about, but are mathematically the overall, averaged preference. The preference is moral, to be sure (i,e politicians and the house are places for moral debate) but the resulting laws from this process are, again, mathematically representations of an average over centuries. I have a hard time seeing that as moral - but I wont outright say you're wrong here. It's a good point.

Again, you are appealing to a kind of majoritarianism, which is clearly a moral position. "We ought to do whatever most people want," is a moral claim. — Leontiskos

Not appealing to it. Observing it. And given it's not intentional, it's just happened to be the 'working' outcome of a deliberative process, Its hard to see them in the same light.
I don't know how many judgements you've read, but they are decidedly a-moral. Judges are extremely, extremely reticent to use any moral terms. They generally use a form called ILAC.
Issues
Law
Application
Conclusion.

There is no room for moral debate, in the vast majority of cases. The law is what it is, we hold the facts up the law and existing guidance tells us what to do. Judges often opine that they'd prefer to do something else, but morality isn't hte arbiter in law. Toughie.

Classically liberal societies assume that all societies function via a "mathematical" notion of law. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure this is hte case, but I'm also unsure I'm getting you fully. My notion of Law is one which looks like it works to me. That's about it. I'd change some things if I were a King, for instance.