The Equal Omniscience and Omnipotence Argument — Truth Seeker

If I may, I'd like to look at this through the lens of a materialistic, and pantheistic, point-of-view. Consider that all that exists contains all the knowledge and all the power needed to keep the universe going.

I do notice that you mention "beings" and "sentient beings" in your OP - but must omniscience and omnipotence be restricted to them?

I think it might be rightly concluded that all that exists is omniscient and omnipotent.

Now to the question of benevolence - I think this is a man-made concept, rather anthropomorphic, and not an accurate reflection of reality. Reality doesn't operate according to better or worse, but just what is. Same holds true for nature, for example with the theory of evolution - which has no end goals, but is a progression of complex chemistry to produce the best suited to live in a particular environment.

And so, in a pantheistic worldview - "God" (i.e. all of creation) would be omniscient and omnipotent, but the notions of good and evil do not enter into the equation. All is merely what it is.

Classical free will requires:

the ability to choose otherwise — Truth Seeker

Are we currently operating with that definition, or is free will now determined by one's nature or cognitive architecture?

The classical problem of evil remains intact. — Truth Seeker

That's probably true, but these discussions do show that the classical problem isn't necessarily the only way to frame our understanding of God and evil. What I'm going to take away from the discussion is the thought that, when it comes to human suffering, subjective experience and judgment may carry a lot more ethical weight than it would first appear, from a strictly rationalist perspective. See: justice vs. mercy.

Appreciate your work on this.

What if omniscient and omnipotent beings also happen to be necessary? In that case, they could not be created, they would already exist. And also, if an omniscient-omnipotent being is necessary, could there really be, say, 12 of them? Or 20? Wouldn't there be 1 or an infinite amount?

Your view effectively resolves the problem of evil by denying that benevolence is a property of reality at all. But that is not a defense of omnibenevolent theism - it is a rejection of it.

Redefining omniscience and omnipotence as impersonal properties of “all that exists” strips them of agency, intentionality, and moral relevance. What remains is causal completeness, not a morally accountable God.

Once benevolence is dismissed as anthropomorphic, suffering no longer requires justification - but neither does reality deserve moral trust, worship, or praise. At that point, “God” becomes a poetic synonym for nature, not a being to whom moral predicates meaningfully apply.

In other words, the argument is not answered; it is bypassed by abandoning the very kind of God it addresses.

I’m explicitly using the classical libertarian definition - the ability to choose otherwise under identical conditions - because that is the version required to ground ultimate moral responsibility in traditional theistic frameworks.

If “free will” is instead defined as acting in accordance with one’s nature or cognitive architecture, then choices are fully explained by prior causes, and alternative possibilities do not exist. That may preserve a colloquial sense of freedom, but it cannot absolve a creator from responsibility for the outcomes of the system they designed.

So yes, if free will is determined by nature, then classical free will does not exist - and with it goes the standard moral defense against the problem of evil.

Thank you, J. I appreciate that framing, and I agree that subjective suffering carries immense ethical weight. Where I’d want to keep a distinction clear is between responding to suffering with mercy, and explaining suffering within a metaphysical framework.

The problem of evil operates at the level of coherence between claimed divine attributes and observed reality. Compassion and mercy guide how we treat those who suffer, but they don’t, by themselves, resolve that explanatory tension. If anything, the moral pull toward mercy highlights how inadequate many justificatory theodicies feel when confronted with lived experience.

Thanks for the thoughtful engagement - I appreciate the discussion as well.

If an omniscient–omnipotent being is necessary, then its existence and actions are not contingent or chosen, but metaphysically fixed. In that case, whatever world exists - including its suffering - exists necessarily as well.

That move does not resolve the problem of evil; it dissolves moral agency altogether. A necessary being cannot meaningfully be praised for goodness or blamed for harm, since no alternative was possible.

Whether there is one such being, many, or infinitely many is irrelevant to the ethical issue. The presence of involuntary suffering remains unchanged. What results is not classical theism, but a form of necessitarian or pantheistic metaphysics in which moral predicates no longer apply in the usual sense.

Your view effectively resolves the problem of evil by denying that benevolence is a property of reality at all. But that is not a defense of omnibenevolent theism - it is a rejection of it. — Truth Seeker

I suppose it is, but I did say I was approaching the question from a materialist, pantheistic point-of-view.

I do not believe in the existence of "evil" as its own entity. There is no force that we can say is the source of evil. "Evil" is a man-made construct. Now, we might say that we can use "evil" as an adjective rather than a noun - that human behavior might be termed "evil" if it harms others. But this is a result of a very strong instinct to survive combined with a brain that developed with the capacity to do evil acts.

As to the question of benevolence - again - of course humans may do benevolent things. But it is not because of some external force that has entered into them, something detached from who they are, but rather humans evolved to guard and maintain the group. We are first and foremost social creatures. This necessitates the evolution of things like empathy.

agency, intentionality, and moral relevance — Truth Seeker

The only thing in existence that we know of that has these qualities is the human species. They are all products of our evolution.

not a morally accountable God. — Truth Seeker

Taking this from the pantheistic point-of-view - no, Nature is not morally accountable to us.

Once benevolence is dismissed as anthropomorphic, suffering no longer requires justification - but neither does reality deserve moral trust, worship, or praise. — Truth Seeker

I disagree. I think an inherent sense of awe and wonder at all of creation leads us to not only treat it morally, but to also respect and revere it, while at the same time valuing reason and science.

At that point, “God” becomes a poetic synonym for nature, not a being to whom moral predicates meaningfully apply. — Truth Seeker

Our morality is a product of our evolution.

the argument is not answered — Truth Seeker

Yes, I see, rather a new one was made.

Strict omnipotence is not a logically coherent notion. Multiple contradictions follow. One standard one, "can God create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?" Either he can, and his power is limited in lifting it, or he cannot, and his power is limited in creating it.

You explicitly include a contradictory ability: the ability to create omnipotent beings. You can't have two omnipotent beings. One can always try to strip omnipotence from the other. Either that attempt fails, limiting the power of the first, or it succeeds, limiting the power of the second.

Further, you cannot have two omnipotent and omniscient beings. One can always predict the actions of the other. Either the prediction fails, limiting the omniscience of the first, or it succeeds, limiting the power of the second to act outside of the first's predictions.

So, the rest of your proof is redundant. Your premises are already contradictory.

Moreover, you are arguing with Christian secondary literature, not primary. The idea of God being philosophically perfect, possessing all the "omnis", only arose with the fusion of Christianity and Greek philosophy, really beginning with Augustine.

A necessary omniscient-omnipotent (O-O) being would invalidate premise 2: "If a being is omnipotent, it has the power to bring about any logically possible outcome, including the existence of beings who are equally omniscient and omnipotent."

i think there may be some confusion regarding God's omnipotence. As a Christian, I believe it is correct that God is in control of His providential plan and that this is so despite the evils that humans have chosen in opposition to that plan. However, I think it is incorrect that God forces or controls the choices of people in a way that would predestine their choices. Instead, God permits actions, even those contrary to His will. Meanwhile, the will is free to choose, and does so, but not against God's foreknowledge of what will happen.

I think foreknowledge does not imply responsibility. For example, a meteorologist may know that it will rain tomorrow, and yet be in no way responsible for the rain.

So I think if you take the definition of free will at face and read it in a way that supporters of God's omni-attributes do, you will find that an omni-attribute God is not incoherent.

Fascinating thread guys.

Aren't religious concepts of 'omnipotence' or 'omni-benevolence' just as impossible to comprehend as scientific concepts of 'eternity' and 'infinity'?

(Apologies if I make obvious mistakes here, I continue to call myself a 'lay' philosopher due to my lack of experience)

You can’t simultaneously:

affirm omnibenevolence
deny that it prefers maximal flourishing

I am myself am a staunch atheist. But why does omnibenevolence require an end to suffering, or encouraging human happiness? I recently read Thich Nhat Hanh on grief and bereavement, and he states that love itself is impossible without suffering.

Perhaps this omni-benevolent God is suffering right along with us, as did his son in some conceptions, as we as a species struggle through life with a goal of nirvana for all of humanity? This would be a tremendous act of moral agency.

He/she/they may not be concerned about individual flourishing, but overall human flourishing? If his/her/their concept of 'maximal suffering' necessitates free will, does it not also necessitate suffering?

I am not trying to deny the problem of evil. I tend to view philosophical and religious wisdom as comparable, even compatible. I can't conclude that there is a God, nor can I conclude that there is not. To me, this does not entail relativism. I believe in the possibility of an 'objective' truth, I simply assume we will never fully grasp it. This should not stop us from striving for it, by acting both whole-heartedly and half-sure.

Personally, I prefer to believe in free will over divine omnipotence. A determined world with no suffering feels more like hell than heaven to me.

When I run the thought experiment on myself, try as I may, I can't make myself believe that forgotten (and consequence-less) suffering matters. To whom? But then I'm stopping at the subjective, as you clearly are not. I think different people will have different intuitions about this. — J

Modern analysis of trauma often assert that 'trauma is written on the body', or similar propositions. In this conception, 'forgetting' is not even possible?

Modern analysis of trauma often assert that 'trauma is written on the body', or similar propositions. In this conception, 'forgetting' is not even possible? — Jeremy Murray

Probably true. The "amnesia theodicy" would require that God eliminate even such unconscious bodily traumas.

I will just give classical theism's two cents...

If a being is omnipotent, it has the power to bring about any logically possible outcome, including the existence of beings who are equally omniscient and omnipotent. — Truth Seeker

God is maximally powerful, as innate power itself, which is constrained by metaphysical possibility. God cannot do whatever he wants: this is a straw man that new atheists tend to use to appeal to a magical kind of power that is the crux of their arguments against the coherence of God's supposed nature. As an obvious example, God cannot annihilate Himself out of existence and then, from nothing, create Himself back into existence: this is not something His nature allows Him to do despite Him really being all-powerful.

In terms of omnipotence, in classical theism 'omnipotence' does not refer to absolute power that is akin to a magical get-out-of-jail-free card that allows God to do whatever we can conceive of; instead, it is to have innate power. God is purely actual---pure act itself---which makes Him have power intrinsically (since 'power' classically is 'the ability to actualize potential').

God cannot create a being that is likewise omnipotent; and we can prove this two ways. First, omnipotence requires pure act; so a being of pure act, of pure actuality, is the only kind of being that can be omnipotent. Two purely actual beings have no potential to be actualized; and each has the ability to actualize any potential. Therefore, two or more purely actual beings could not exist since they would limit each other.

The second way is to note that a purely actual being must be purely simple because anything that has parts has the potential to be affected (by those parts); and two purely simple being cannot coexist because they would be ontologically indistinguishable from each other (thusly collapsing into each other).

Trying to grasp this . . . Are you saying that "omnipotent" and "maximally powerful" don't mean the same thing, in what you're calling classical theism?

Hey J! Long time no see, my friend.

Classical theism is a view going back to Aristotle which views God in a specific way. In this view, God is subsistent being itself; which is the same as pure act of thought; and that the same as pure act of will; and that pure goodness; and that pure actuality. In short, omnipotence, "all-powerfulness", and "maximally powerful" refer to the same thing in this view; that is, that a being has intrinsic power unrestrained by anything else. This is what it means for God to be purely actual: pure act lacks all potential (going back to Aristotle) and so it cannot be actualized in any manner by anything else. This pure act is pure power; since power classically is the ability to actualize potentials and pure act is purely able to actualize a potential (untainted by anything else).

My point in bringing it up was that a lot of sloppier arguments against God's existence hinge on thinking of omnipotence (as well as other attributes) as if it is some sort of absolute power that entails the ability to do anything we can conceive of. This is patently false and a straw man of theism; as is evident from the fact that I can conceive of God killing Himself and re-creating Himself as nothing itself to then re-become Himself as God, and yet this is clearly not metaphysically possible for God to do. God, as pure act, is properly eternal and changeless---which does entail that He cannot kill Himself.

I think we’re now largely aligned on the metaphysics. You’re explicitly rejecting omnibenevolent theism in favor of a naturalistic, pantheistic view in which morality, agency, and empathy are evolutionary products, and nature itself is not morally accountable. On that picture, the classical problem of evil no longer applies because there is no moral agent to whom it could apply.

Where I’d draw a careful distinction is between human attitudes toward reality and properties of reality itself. Awe, reverence, and moral concern are powerful and meaningful human responses but they do not entail that the universe is benevolent, morally trustworthy, or oriented toward flourishing. Evolution explains why we value empathy and cooperation; it does not imply that the structure of reality shares or supports those values.

So I agree that a new framework has emerged here. My point has simply been that this framework resolves the problem of evil by relinquishing omnibenevolent theism, not by reconciling it with suffering. And that, in itself, is a philosophically respectable conclusion.

That objection only works if omnipotence is already constrained by the being’s necessary nature. But in that case, omnipotence no longer means the power to bring about all logically possible states of affairs - only those compatible with a specific essence.

The existence of multiple omniscient and omnipotent beings is not logically contradictory in itself; it becomes “impossible” only once additional theological assumptions (such as uniqueness or simplicity) are imposed. Those assumptions are not part of logic, but of a particular model of God.

So premise 2 is not invalidated by necessity alone. Rather, necessity is being used to redefine omnipotence in a restricted way - which concedes the broader point that classical omnipotence cannot be sustained without qualification.

I agree that foreknowledge by itself does not imply responsibility. A meteorologist who predicts rain is not responsible for it. But that analogy breaks down once foreknowledge is combined with authorship of the system in which the outcome occurs.

An omniscient creator who intentionally actualizes a specific world - knowing in advance every choice that will occur within it, and having the power to actualize a different one - stands in a fundamentally different relation to outcomes than a passive observer. Coercion is not required for responsibility; origination is.

Likewise, appealing to “permission” does not remove moral responsibility when prevention was possible without contradiction. Permitting foreseeable, preventable harm while setting the conditions under which it occurs remains morally significant.

Finally, coherence depends on which notion of free will is in play. Compatibilist freedom may preserve divine foreknowledge and control, but it weakens ultimate moral responsibility. Libertarian freedom preserves responsibility, but conflicts with exhaustive foreknowledge and providential world-selection. My claim has been that the omni-attributes cannot all be retained simultaneously without qualification.

Thanks for laying out the classical theist position clearly. I agree that, on Thomistic metaphysics, omnipotence is not defined as a magical ability to actualize anything we can conceive, but as innate actuality - pure act - constrained by metaphysical possibility. I’m not attributing the straw-man view to classical theism.

However, once omnipotence is defined this way, premise 2 is not so much refuted as replaced. The claim that God cannot create another omnipotent being follows from additional commitments - act-potency metaphysics, divine simplicity, and the identification of omnipotence with pure actuality - not from logic alone. Within that framework, uniqueness is guaranteed by definition.

The cost of this move, however, is that God no longer has alternative possibilities or deliberative choice in the ordinary sense. A purely actual, necessary being cannot do otherwise than it does. As a result, moral predicates such as responsibility, permission, or justification apply only analogically, not literally.

In that sense, classical theism preserves internal coherence by stepping outside the moral framework that gives rise to the problem of evil, rather than resolving it within that framework. That may be a defensible metaphysical position - but it is importantly different from a personal, morally accountable deity.

Thanks for such a thoughtful response - I agree with much of your spirit, especially the call for humility and the refusal of simplistic answers.

Where I’d want to draw a careful line is this: I don’t think omnibenevolence requires the elimination of all suffering, but I do think it cannot be indifferent to involuntary, non-consensual suffering that serves no necessary role in flourishing. Human love may require suffering because we are finite and constrained; an omnipotent being is not bound by that trade-off in the same way.

I also don’t deny that shared suffering or divine empathy would be morally meaningful - only that it removes responsibility if the suffering was knowingly and avoidably actualised. Compassion mitigates cruelty; it does not cancel authorship.

On forgotten suffering, my intuition is that suffering matters because it is experienced by a sentient being at the time it occurs, not because it is later remembered or redeemed. Modern trauma research, if anything, suggests that harm can persist even without conscious recall.

I share your sense that we may never fully grasp objective truth - but I think that very humility obliges us to take our deepest moral intuitions about harm seriously, rather than setting them aside when they become inconvenient.

That objection only works if omnipotence is already constrained by the being’s necessary nature. But in that case, omnipotence no longer means the power to bring about all logically possible states of affairs - only those compatible with a specific essence.

The existence of multiple omniscient and omnipotent beings is not logically contradictory in itself; it becomes “impossible” only once additional theological assumptions (such as uniqueness or simplicity) are imposed. Those assumptions are not part of logic, but of a particular model of God.

So premise 2 is not invalidated by necessity alone. Rather, necessity is being used to redefine omnipotence in a restricted way - which concedes the broader point that classical omnipotence cannot be sustained without qualification. — Truth Seeker

I'm not following this. If an O-O being is a necessary being, then it is impossible for an O-O being to bring about "the existence of beings who are equally omniscient and omnipotent." (Premise 2).

Also, suppose God has a compelling reason (unknown to us, of course) for bringing about the existence of beings like us, who need salvation, instead of O-O beings.

omnipotence, "all-powerfulness", and "maximally powerful" refer to the same thing in this view; that is, that a being has intrinsic power unrestrained by anything else. — Bob Ross

God is maximally powerful, as innate power itself, which is constrained by metaphysical possibility. — Bob Ross

'omnipotence' . . . it is to have innate power. — Bob Ross

OK. I thought you were drawing a distinction between the two terms, in terms of metaphysical possibility, but no matter. I now see you mean them both to refer to the characteristic of having innate or intrinsic power.

But how would a classical theist -- who I guess you're defining as pre-Christian? -- apply this concept of omnipotence to the usual set-up requiring a theodicy? When the questioner asks why God did not create a world without (or merely with less) suffering, this request doesn't seem to have anything to do with what is metaphysically possible, or what would be beyond "innate" power.

Hey J! Long time no see, my friend. — Bob Ross

I'm glad to be considered your friend :smile: but . . . have you mistaken me for another TPFer? I don't think we've conversed before. If I've forgotten, my apologies.

There was once a young man who lived in a village. One day, he decided to go to the city; it was very important to him to go. But, if he goes, he will be killed and he knows this; nevertheless, the young man decides to go because there are people in the city that he is trying to save; he knows only he can save them. The father knows these people and wants them to be saved too. However, the father loves his son and does not want him to die. The father knows that the son will die if he goes, and he knows he can forbid his son from going and that his son will obey his commands. And yet, the father knows how important this mission is to his son. The father lets his son go to the city. The son goes and saves many people but is killed. Who is responsible for the death of the son: the father, the son, or the people of the city?

You’re conflating two different claims, and that’s exactly where the confusion comes from.

My point is not that a necessary O–O being could create equals. My point is that the impossibility of doing so does not follow from omnipotence alone - it follows only after you import additional constraints about the being’s nature (necessity, uniqueness, simplicity, etc.).

That distinction matters.

1. Omnipotence by itself does not block multiple O–O beings

If omnipotence is defined classically as the power to actualize all logically possible states of affairs, then:

* “There exists more than one omniscient, omnipotent being” is not a logical contradiction.
* Nothing about raw omnipotence or omniscience forbids plurality.

So, Premise 2 fails only if you add extra metaphysical assumptions. Logic alone doesn’t do the work.

2. Necessity is doing the real work - not omnipotence

When you say:

“If an O–O being is necessary, then it is impossible for it to bring about equals”

you’ve already restricted omnipotence by appealing to:

* necessary existence
* essential uniqueness
* fixed divine essence

Once you do that, omnipotence quietly becomes:

“the power to do whatever is logically possible given this very specific nature”

That is not classical omnipotence anymore. It’s qualified omnipotence.

And that was exactly my broader point: classical, unrestricted omnibenevolence, omniscience and omnipotence cannot be sustained without qualification.

You’re proving that point, not refuting it.

3. Appealing to “unknown reasons” doesn’t rescue the argument

Your final move:

“Suppose God has a compelling reason (unknown to us) for creating beings like us instead of O–O beings”

is a theological appeal, not a logical one.

It concedes that:

* The limitation is not logical impossibility.
* The limitation is grounded in divine preference, plan, or essence.

Which again confirms my claim: the restriction comes from theological commitments, not from logic itself.

* Logic alone does not rule out multiple O–O beings.
* The impossibility arises only after importing necessity, uniqueness, or essence.
* Once those are added, omnipotence is no longer “all logically possible states of affairs”.
* Therefore, classical omnipotence survives only by being redefined.

That’s the position. If we keep the terms clean, there’s no contradiction here - only a choice between unqualified omnipotence and theologically constrained omnipotence.

The answer depends on who had which powers and options. Once we’re precise about that, the analogy collapses.

1. Immediate vs ultimate responsibility

Immediate cause of death: the people of the city who killed the son. They bear direct moral responsibility for the killing.
Proximate decision: the son chose to go, knowing the risk. He bears responsibility for undertaking a lethal mission.
Enabling authority: the father knowingly allowed an avoidable death while having the power to prevent it.

So responsibility is distributed, not exclusive.

2. Why this analogy fails as a defense of God

This story only works because the father is limited:

* He cannot save the people himself.
* He cannot stop the people of the city from killing his son without overriding everyone involved.
* He must choose between tragic options.

But an omniscient, omnipotent being is not in that position.

A God with unlimited power would have additional options that the father in your story does not:

* Save the people without requiring the son’s death.
* Prevent the killing without coercing moral agents.
* Achieve the goal without lethal means.

If such alternatives exist (and omnipotence implies they do), then permitting the son’s death is no longer a tragic necessity - it becomes a chosen means.

3. Foreknowledge + power + permission matters

If the father:

* Knows with certainty the son will die,
* Has the power to prevent it without sacrificing the goal,
* And still allows it,

then the father bears moral responsibility for allowing a preventable death, even if he didn’t kill his son directly.

This doesn’t mean the father is the only responsible party - but it absolutely rules out moral innocence.

4. The hidden assumption doing the work

The parable quietly assumes:

“There was no other way.”

That’s the very claim under dispute.

Once that assumption is removed, the analogy stops supporting omnibenevolence, omniscience and omnipotence and starts raising the same question it was meant to answer.

The people of the city are guilty of murder. The son knowingly chose self-sacrifice. The father bears responsibility if he knowingly allowed a preventable death while possessing the power to avoid it.

For a limited human father, that may be tragic. For an omniscient and omnipotent being, it is a moral problem - not a solution.

If the goal can be achieved without the death of the son, choosing his death cannot be justified by love alone.

Does the father have a responsibility to be mindful of his son's wishes?

Premise 4:

A perfectly omnibenevolent being necessarily prefers the outcome that maximizes well-being and minimizes suffering. — Truth Seeker

Minimizing suffering does not necessarily maximize well-being. Without suffering (or potential suffering) there could be no adventure, no courage, no fortitude. Perhaps these virtues conduce well-being. Don't mountaineers choose suffering (because it is necessary to adventure and fortitude)? The Greeks believed that the Gods could not be heroic, because they were immortal. The reduction of their suffering necessarily led to the impossibility of certain virtues.

The theist could construct a theodicy to attack "Creating vulnerable, ignorant, and powerless sentient beings when one could instead create equally omniscient and omnipotent beings knowingly introduces avoidable suffering." For human suffering, the theist claims that it is necessary byproduct of free-will and unavoidable if God wants people to have free-will, which is supposed to be a good thing. So good, it outweighs the suffering that results from bad choices.

The theodicy I would use to attack "Creating vulnerable, ignorant, and powerless sentient beings when one could instead create equally omniscient and omnipotent beings knowingly introduces avoidable suffering." is the suffering is not avoidable. Th existence of beings like us is such a positive thing, it outweighs the suffering that necessarily results from our actions. God could create a realm of perfect beings where there would be no suffering, but that would not be a maximally good state of affairs.