Definitely food for thought.. thanks!

I agree. I think that people are incapable of thinking of nations or individuals as 'forces of nature' and they inevitably hold attitudes of blame for, and anger and desire for revenge on account of, actions that they think have injured them or their loved ones, their interests or even the interests of their society. — John

Why is that? Does it have something to do with the generation and maintenance of the ego?

When N talks about aristocrats, he means military. — Mongrel

Not quite. The aristocratic in Nietzsche refers to all those who value ranking, or the stratification of society into differing ranks. It is a concept which is opposed to democratic and egalitarian. Hence why Nietzsche will often speak of a aristocratic society, spirit, values or even morality tout court. Consider his quite explicit definition: "Every enhancement of the type "man" has so far been the work of an aristocratic society - and it will be so again and again - a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other." (BGE §257).

In the Genealogy, he will in fact equate the aristocratic with the noble, to the extent that it simply stands for precisely the morality which is 'beyond good and evil': "what was the real etymological significance of the designations for “good” coined in the various languages? I found they all led back to the same conceptual transformation— that everywhere "noble,” “aristocratic” in the social sense, is the basic concept from which good" in the sense of “with, aristocratic soul,” “noble,” “with a soul of a high order,” “with a privileged soul” necessarily devel­oped: a development which always runs parallel with that other in which "common,” “plebeian," “low” are finely transformed into the concept "bad.” (GoMI, §3).

Very rarely will Nietzsche simply employ the term 'aristocrat' to refer to the military (look though the GoM for every reference to the term if you're reading it now - it will almost always be used in a wider sense, and almost always as a synonym for 'noble'). The aristocratic for Nietzsche is a kind of 'way of life' or approach to morality, and those who come close to that approach are aristocratic.

N is saying that a lot of the words we use to describe good and evil come from ancient societies. The Roman military was owned and operated by Roman aristocrats. The ancestors of European aristocrats were warlords (at least in the public imagination).

So I disagree that "noble" comes to mean "good" because it refers to anyone who accepts stratification. A slave can accept stratification, but he's never going to be noble.

Look at the clothes of a 16th Century European aristocrat. It's items that evolved from the padding soldiers wore under armor. I'm not trying to talk past you.. I understand what you're saying. An ancient person wouldn't necessarily have to be a military commander to qualify as the origin of speech about good and evil. I'll insist that you can't leave it out, though. He's saying that the most ancient meaning for good is powerful. The ancient meaning of bad is enslaved. We're talking about physical power here.

I didn't say that noble means good, although I did quote Nietzsche himself tracing the etymological significance of 'good' to nobility. So yes, Nietzsche acknowledges and respects the providence of the terms, but his usage of them is philosophical and not historical or anthropological. Hence why salve morality is not tied to the existence of actual slaves, nor are aristocratic values tied to the existence of actual aristocrats. Or rather it is the values which define the 'beings', and not the other way around.

What is at stake is a genealogy of morality, not societies. Hence also why slave morality - and not 'slaves' - is exactly the kind of morality that does not accept social stratification, irrespective of what individual, 'historical slaves' might or might not have accepted. The employment of these terms are conceptual, not historical. Again, Nietzsche will almost always speak of aristocratic values (or an "aristocratic mode of evaluation" - GoMI, §10) as the subject of his discourse, and it would be a reductive misreading to think that every time he does so, he is simply speaking of 'military values' or a 'military mode of evaluation' - especially given Nietzsche's explicit distaste for the military:

"Perhaps a memorable day will come when a nation renowned in wars and victories, distinguished by the highest development of military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice to these objects, will voluntarily exclaim, "We will break our swords” and will destroy its whole military system, lock, stock, and barrel. Making ourselves defenceless (after having been the most strongly defended) from a loftiness of sentiment — that is the means towards genuine peace, which must always rest upon a pacific disposition" (The Wanderer and His Shadow, §284).

So yes, Nietzsche acknowledges and respects the providence of the terms, but his usage of them is philosophical and not historical — StreetlightX

Nietzsche is translating history. Why would you disagree with that?

'Translating history'? I'm not even sure what that means.

OK. Thanks!

That's a good question and I'll need to give it some thought. I'm not too confident I'll be able to come up with a satisfactory answer, though.

N mentions original sin, but doesn't explain that it was originally a Greek idea, not Jewish. The concept, as portrayed in Agamemnon, is inherited resentment. Abuse is like a pebble in a pond sending out waves of resentment over time and space.

Jesus is an image of a guy who isn't ensnared in it. I'm suggesting that every little bit of letting-go disintegrates ego.

I haven't read Agamemnon, but quick consultation with Uncle Google discloses that Agamemnon inherited the sin of his father Atreus, on account of a curse the latter was subjected to from his brother Thyestes. It's a secular version of inherited sin, historically generated in time, though, in contrast to the more esoteric Christian idea of original sin; which seems to be conceived in the primordial context of the Original Man turning away from God in Eternity.

If Nietzsche resists ressentiment it is because he wills himself to see it as beneath him. This move, ironically, relies on the formation of a very potent Ego. I think this passage StreetlightX quoted is pertinent:

"The I is not the attitude of one being to several (drives, thoughts, etc) but the ego is a plurality of personlike forces, of which now this one now that one stands in the foreground as ego and regards the others as a subject regards an influential and determining external world ... Within ourselves we can also be egoistic or altruistic, hard-hearted, magnanimous, just, lenient, insincere, can cause pain or give pleasure: as the drives are in conflict, the feeling of the I is always strongest where the preponderance is". — StreetlightX

This passage portrays the unconscious, uncreative self, but through self-awareness we may create ourselves, through a process of the aesthetization of the ethical life we can come to identify ourselves with the most noble sentiments and abjure those which are paltry and ignoble, those which lead to the slave morality.

You seem to be suggesting the more Eastern, Schopenhaurian idea of "letting go" of the Will, and the accompanying secular conception of Jesus, as another example of the eastern sage-type. I think both the Schopenhauerian strategy, which relies on denial of the Will, and the Nietzschean, which relies on cultivation of the Will, are understandable as very human attempts at solutions; they both move decisively away from any reliance on the Grace that the Christian sees as operating within the relationship between God and Man.

I should have quoted this in the OP. It's the passage I was pondering. The more I read of GoM, the more clear it becomes that N is saying that morality is tied up with language about interiority and immateriality. In the moral realm, negation is not the simple flip it is in logic. It's a potent emotional rejection of what is (and so of the world.) It's this rejection of the world that manufactures the soul.

And just exactly as the people separate the lightning from its flash, and interpret the latter as a thing done, as the working of a subject which is called lightning, so also does the popular morality separate strength from the expression of strength, as though behind the strong man there existed some indifferent neutral substratum, which enjoyed a caprice and option as to whether or not it should express strength. But there is no such substratum, there is no "being" behind doing, working, becoming; "the doer" is a mere appendage to the action. — Nietzsche, Geneology of Morals

To extend what you (and Nietzsche) seem to be arguing, would seem to be to say that people are inherently animists and that they (consciously or unconsciously) impute agency in the form of gods, spirits or souls to all natural phenomena, as something which 'stands behind' the phenomena; something of which the phenomena are merely 'outer' manifestations.

For me, the interesting question, given that does seem to be a fairly accurate picture of human thinking and behavior, is why this is so. Do we attribute agency or soul to natural events on account of the social attribution of agency which seems to be so necessary to social cohesion? Does this come about due to a human tendency to reify abstract concepts, or do the forms of the abstract concepts themselves reflect deeper, pre-linguistic intuitions?

But there is no such substratum, there is no "being" behind doing, working, becoming; "the doer" is a mere appendage to the action. — Nietzsche, Geneology of Morals

So, I'm wondering whether Nietzsche gives a justification for his phenomenalism, or whether he merely asserts it is so.

When he says the lightning is a subject which causes the flash, I don't think he exactly means animism.

Like if I say a baseball broke the window, the baseball is depicted as an actor. But there's definitely a link between the way we talk about any unconscious actor and the Big Kahuna: the conscious actor. Schopenhauer reasoned that there is only one will. Every actor is a manifestation of it.

He's saying that the most ancient meaning for good is powerful. The ancient meaning of bad is enslaved. We're talking about physical power here. — Mongrel

I know this was an earlier remark but I've been away, pardon me. This (quote) is of course the view Thrasymachus expresses in Book 1 of the Republic, but which Socrates argues against. To me the 'noble', whether Platonic or Aristotelian, version of the good is not overtly that might is right. It may have an underlying assumption that the stratification of society is unquestioned, and the top layer are the most virtuous or 'good', but that would be different.

I've been wondering whether the analytic distinction between power-over and power-to is at all useful in this debate. Slave morality seeks to overturn the power-over order of things. Master-morality seeks a space in which to exercise power-to.

I know this was an earlier remark but I've been away, pardon me. This (quote) is of course the view Thrasymachus expresses in Book 1 of the Republic, but which Socrates argues against. To me the 'noble', whether Platonic or Aristotelian, version of the good is not overtly that might is right. It may have an underlying assumption that the stratification of society is unquestioned, and the top layer are the most virtuous or 'good', but that would be different. — mcdoodle

N mentions Rome repeatedly as the image of master-morality. I think of Marcus Aurelius' view: what's good is a healthy, joyful expression of one's potential. Weakness in general (to the extent it's counter to nature) is a state of disease. So was Marcus Aurelius saying that slavery is inherently a sign of failure? I don't remember if he said that or not.

I think there are other ways to describe the dual/opposing moral frameworks N wants to point out. I'm not sure the Rome/Jew scenario holds too much water. If it's just a way to insinuate the situation, then yes, ok.

I've been wondering whether the analytic distinction between power-over and power-to is at all useful in this debate. Slave morality seeks to overturn the power-over order of things. Master-morality seeks a space in which to exercise power-to. — mcdoodle

But slave morality ends up being a perpetual angst. There's never any acceptance and never any attempt to actually change things. The slave just sits everyday bitterly complaining. I think the possessor of slave morality is happy that way. He or she doesn't really want things to change and certainly doesn't want the world to be perfect (because then what?) The master-moralist would be happy in a perfect world.

That wasn't exactly using your suggestion.. I'm still thinking about it.

Yes, I also wonder what Nietzsche means in saying "people separate the lightning from its flash, and interpret the latter as a thing done, as the working of a subject which is called lightning". What is Nietzsche intimating that people think the "subject which is called lightning" is? And does Nietzsche want to say it is nothing at all apart from the flash? Would that not amount to some form of phenomenalism? I haven't read Nietzsche for years, but I seem to recall statements to the effect that 'reality is the appearances'.

If this is what N wants to say then it relates to what he wants to say about the ressentiment of slave morality, insofar as it is Christianity which emphasizes the free and responsible soul which stand behind deeds. It would seem to be precisely this free and responsible soul (subject) which N wants to deny, just as he wants to deny the "subject which is called lightning". He seems to want to allow human acts just the same status as the acts of animals and other natural forces.

I've been assuming he's using "subject" the way Schopenhauer did (since he was a big Schopenhauer fan). For S, subject and object are interdependent (in a Hegelian sort of way). A subject is any actor (whether conscious or not). An object is acted upon. Cause and effect.. closely related situation.

Was N phenomenalist? Again, I've assumed that since he was a Schopenhauer fan, he was basically Kantian (particularly the TA).

A subject is any actor (whether conscious or not). An object is acted upon. Cause and effect.. closely related situation. — Mongrel

It seems to me that Nietzsche wants to equate the subject with actions. Like it is not the subject which acts but rather the subject which is the actions. The lightning which is the flash, and so on. A question that always came up for me when reading Nietzsche was 'Is he consistent?'

Not equate. Cause and effect are two sides of the same coin. They can't be independent of one another. The existence of an effect means there must be a cause. If a thing is a cause, there must be an effect. Cause and effect are bound together. That they appear separate is the result of an act of analysis.

Is he consistent? He's not an analytical philosopher that's for sure. I find his philosophy kind of dream-like.

Causes are not observed as such, though. Don't we understand causes to involve energy exchanges which can never be directly observed but can only be inferred?

On one hand I found Nietzsche's philosophy kind of mystical or romantic; which I guess could also be read as 'dreamlike'. I think he got a lot right with his emphasis on radical creativity. But I think he also reads as an utter determinist, and this seems to be an irresolvable inconsistency in this thought. But it is a long time since I read him!

Analytical philosophers are consistently consistent???

Causes are not observed as such, though. Don't we understand causes to involve energy exchanges which can never be directly observed but can only be inferred? — John

After it's all said and done, Schopenhauer has only mapped out the contours of thought. He has pointed out certain statements that are indubitable. But what does the way we're bound to think (as indicated by indubitability) have to do with the way the world is? What would your answer be?

I'm not so familiar with Schopenhauer's works. I am very much more familiar with Kant, and I gather he is basically a Kantian, other than that he denies things-in-themselves or noumena, and affirms the thing-in-itself or noumenon, which he characterizes as the Will. So Kant's 'empirical', the 'for us', is for Schopenhauer 'representation' and Kant's 'transcendental, the 'in-itself' is for Schopenhauer 'will'?

So, it sounds like his pointing out certain statements that are indubitable is much like Kant's project of identifying synthetic a priori principles which form the basis of all experience and judgement. Kant allowed that these principles must be operating if there is to be a coherent empirical world. But he did not endorse their provenance when it comes to the noumenal. I see the world as being a symbolic representation of spirit, but to say with Hegel, that the spirit is the rational, and the rational is the real would be to objectify spirit, I think. So, for me, characterizing it as the Will would also be to objectify it, and to understand it as being subject to deterministic forces and thus, would be, ultimately, to deny the possibility of any freedom which is not merely an illusion for us. I disagree with this objectification, and believe that the spirit may only be known intuitively, that is gnostically, and not via inductive, abductive or deductive reasoning; the proper ambit of these is the empirical.

Like Kant did for practical reasons, I take this as the working of faith, but I don't accept the 'imperative', his concept of duty. So, I would say that we can determine what the world is, in the empirical sense, but we cannot determine what spirit is. The world is an expression of spirit, but that expression tells us nothing about what spirit is, because the question really has no sense. Spirit is known directly through faith, intuition and creativity. I think that's the closest thing I can offer as an answer to your question.

So Kant's 'empirical', the 'for us', is for Schopenhauer 'representation' and Kant's 'transcendental, the 'in-itself' is for Schopenhauer 'will'? — John

He did want to say that the thing-in-itself is the Will, but he later backed off of that and agreed with Kant that it's unknowable.

So, I would say that we can determine what the world is, in the empirical sense, but we cannot determine what spirit is. — John

But in lesser ways we can follow the course from thesis/antithesis to synthesis, right?

Human
Male -- Female
Both
Human

But in each of these lesser cases, the starting point is itself a product of analysis. The scheme leads us to contemplate the Big Kahuna, and in that's how we end up with the concept of the Absolute, which lays somewhere beyond the mind's grasp. There is no vantage point on it.

If you say it expresses itself as the world, hasn't it been analyzed to speaker and expression?

But in lesser ways we can follow the course from thesis/antithesis to synthesis, right? — Mongrel

Yes, I agree

If you say it expresses itself as the world, hasn't it been analyzed to speaker and expression? — Mongrel

Perhaps 'creator' and 'creation' would be closer, but the nature of the expression is a mystery, not something analyzable. Just as it is a mystery as to exactly what a work of art reveals about its creator, and also as to how it is even possible that it is an expression of her spirit (although I think we know it is).

Perhaps 'creator' and 'creation' would be closer, but the nature of the expression is a mystery, not something analyzable. Just as it is a mystery as to exactly what a work of art reveals about its creator, and also as to how it is even possible that it is an expression of her spirit (although I think we know it is). — John

Well what's the relationship between a human psyche and spirit?

Not sure exactly how to parse this question. Individual psychology would be an expression of, but not the same thing as the spirit of a person, I guess, because the former is also influenced by social conditions and circumstances. The creative spirit can be inhibited or even occluded by negative psychological factors.

I know it's not a popular view these days, but I tend to believe that a person's nature is not exhaustively determined by genetics and environment; there is 'something else', and that 'something else' is what I refer to as 'spirit'.

It sounds like you're describing the source of inspiration, the part of a person that's undefined and so the realm of pure potential. Is that close?

That sounds right, but instead of saying it's "part of a person" I'd probably say that is the person, or the essence of the person, so it's not just 'the realm of pure potential' but pure actuality as well. So, that an occlusion of spirit is also an expression of spirit. It's not easy to speak about such things without falling into paradox. Should we be afraid of falling into paradox? I wonder if Nietzsche would be afraid of falling into paradox.

I can't produce any quotes to show that. Schopenhauer was pretty paradoxical, though. So if N did reject paradox, I'd like to know how he understood things.