Let me define Jeff as the “Greatest God-Killer”. Therefore Jeff must exist. Therefore God is dead. I’ve always wanted to try that but I have yet to meet someone who thinks the OA makes sense.

OA makes sense — khaled

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents.

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents. — TheMadFool

The first premise is a veiled ontological assertion. Among all beings, there is some being which is the greatest being. That being is God. It doesn't prove god's existence so much as define it.

The first premise is a veiled ontological assertion. Among all beings, there is some being which is the greatest being. That being is God. It doesn't prove god's existence so much as define it. — Pantagruel

Point!

I'll get back to the issues you raised here but this just in on my news channel :smile:

How would an anti-theist make sense of the ontological argument? To an anti-theist, who equates god with a tyrannical despot, a non-existet god would be greater than one that exists and "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" would be, herein lies the rub, a non-existent god.

To counter the anti-theist, the proponents of the ontological argument would have to weave an "an offer we can't refuse" into God's greatness - god would have to be so great, so so great that even anti-theists would accept God with open arms and willing hearts.

This leads us to a point where we have to discuss the God-tyrannical despot notion. Is it possible, at some level, to make "an offer that they can't refuse" to anti-theists, make them change their minds so that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is a god that exists?

Why is god a tyrannical despot, ergo undesirable, in the eyes of anti-theists? Well, I suppose it has to do with God's omniptence. Omnibenevolence and, to some extent, omniscience, would function as the checks and balances on omnipotence but God wouldn't be God unless God has free will. If so, God's omnipotence becomes a liability for he can resist and run counter to his omnibenevolence and omniscience i.e. God can do "bad things" - it's not an if question but a when one.

Add to this the definition-defying proposition that omnipotence be removed as an attribute of god. This just won't do; after all what good is omnipotence if unaccompanied by power necessary to translate it into reality. Omnipotence is a necessary attribute of God, not to mention the fact that omnipotence follows naturally from omniscience.

This makes it impossible to make "an offer they can't refuse" to anti-theists. In other words, God's tyrannical despot image is here to stay. To doctor this image is to do violence to the very essence of God. If this be true then, the ontological argument can't convince anti-theists for to them "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is, well, a non-existent God. :chin:

Why is god a tyrannical despot, ergo undesirable, in the eyes of anti-theists? Well, I suppose it has to do with God's omniptence. Omnibenevolence and, to some extent, omniscience, would function as the checks and balances on omnipotence but God wouldn't be God unless God has free will. If so, God's omnipotence becomes a liability for he can resist and run counter to his omnibenevolence and omniscience i.e. God can do "bad things" - it's not an if question but a when one. — TheMadFool

And counter-rational things. I think this idea of god undermines the notion that the universe is rational also.

And counter-rational things. I think this idea of god undermines the notion that the universe is rational also — Pantagruel

How?

Well, if god is not bound by morality then equally he is not bound by rationality. So if rationality is no longer the arbiter of meaning (because god is) then the universe is reduced to absurdity.

Well, if god is not bound by morality then equally he is not bound by rationality. So if rationality is no longer the arbiter of meaning (because god is) then the universe is reduced to absurdity. — Pantagruel

Not necessarily but definitely a possibility. This leads me to another topic on God, God as a necessary being which I tend to think of as saying that god must exist and this seems to contradict God's omnipotence in that God's being forced to exist. As far as I can see, God has to be not only contingent but the most contingent of all beings, this being nothing more than a sign of God's omnipotence. :chin:

The following explains why I think the Ontological Argument is false.

CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

That the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact that the necessity of His existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him.

Rene Descartes

The (ontological) argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.

Bertrand Russell

It is this author’s contention that Renee Descartes should have rejected the validity of all ontological arguments for the existence of God and that his philosophy would have provided him with a unique and sound rationale for explaining why such arguments had to be false. Descartes should have realized that his version of the ontological argument, as well as the version formulated before him by Anselm, was simply incompatible with the new philosophical methodology and criteria he established for determining indubitably certain existence.

It was not sufficient for Descartes and Anselm before him merely to present the individual with the idea, or definition, of a necessary being and then, by performing a detailed analysis of the idea, or definition, try to claim to have demonstrated successfully the necessary existence of such a being.

I submit that Descartes’ own well-defined methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence should have prompted him, instead, to explain (a) the difference between contingent thinking activity and necessary thinking activity, and (b) the corresponding difference between contingent personal existence and necessary personal existence.

The specific definition of the terms contingent and necessary, as used in this paper, will be made clear during the following discussion.

In Meditation II, Descartes presented the reader with a detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum along with the method the reader could use to realize it. He claimed that a person attempting to doubt his own existence, even under the most extreme (hyperbolic) of scenarios (the dreaming doubt and the malicious demon doubt), would ultimately and inevitably realize or intuit, during his doubting activity, that his existence was an indubitably certain existence. A simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that not existing while doubting or thinking was impossible for the thinker. Or, phrasing it positively, a simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that existing while doubting or thinking was indubitably certain for the thinker. As Descartes put it: “I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think.”

However, Descartes did not say that his existence was necessary-in-itself. He said only if, and when, he doubted, only if, and when, he thought, only then, during the time of their occurrence, did he simultaneously intuit his existence to be indubitably certain. If he ceased to think for an instant of time, then Descartes claimed that he would have no ground for believing that he could have existed during that instant. As Descartes cautioned: “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”

So, then, according to Descartes, a person’s thinking activity is contingent in the specific sense that it is experienced by the person as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In other words, the Cogito portion of the Cogito Sum is experienced by the person, in the first person, present tense mode, to be contingent thinking activity (a contingent Cogito), since it is experienced as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence.

Search as one will, there is no separate or concomitant intuition available which would also assure the person, beyond all reasonable and hyperbolic doubt, that his doubting or thinking is an activity impervious to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. And the force of this realization would apply equally to all the many different modes of the person’s thinking activity such as perceiving, inferring, deducing, imagining, remembering, conceiving, speculating, calculating, hypothesizing, etc.

Descartes showed how the performance of a human Cogito Sum did, in fact, yield the intuition of an indubitably certain, yet contingent, personal existence (the contingent human Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the human person’s simultaneous experience of the occurrence of its contingent thinking activity (the contingent human Cogito). Or, stating it more succinctly, a person’s contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), during the time that it is experienced by the person, always provides the person with a simultaneous intuition of the indubitable certainty of that person’s contingent personal existence (the human Sum).

Surprisingly, in none of his subsequent meditations did Descartes attempt to present the reader with a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum which would have paralleled nicely the detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum he offered in Meditation II.

Preoccupied as he was with the urgent need to provide a divine guarantee for his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth, in Meditation III Descartes decided to present the reader with a series of more, or less, traditional a posteriori arguments for the existence of God and, in Meditation V, he decided to present the reader with his a priori ontological argument for the existence of God based, curiously enough, upon his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth.

Nevertheless, had he intended to do so we suspect Descartes could have provided a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum along the following lines.

If one assumes the divinity thinks, then its thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would be necessary in the specific sense that it would be experienced by the divinity as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence and, as such, it would always provide the divinity with an intuition of its indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

In other words, he could have explained how the performance of a divine Cogito Sum would have provided an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the divine person’s experience of the occurrence of its necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). The divine person’s necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would provide the divine person with an intuition of the indubitable certainty of the divine person’s necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

He could have gone on to explain that IF the human person were also able to experience the occurrence of such necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito), then the human person, too, would be able to experience it as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. But that since the human person is, in fact, simply not able to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) in the same way as the human person is able to experience the occurrence of contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), the human person is, therefore, prohibited from ever having direct access to an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

This Cartesian-based distinction between the impossibility of having a personal experience of necessary thinking activity and the possibility of having a personal experience of contingent thinking activity should not be confused with the traditional distinction between an essence that contains within itself the reason for its existence (necessary being) and an essence that does not contain within itself the reason for its existence (contingent being). The Cartesian-based distinction is grounded in, and can be verified through, a person’s experience, whereas the traditional distinction is grounded in a person’s abstract thinking but cannot be verified through a person’s experience.

From a Cartesian-based perspective, the central issue is the possibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can cease to occur and can go out of existence versus the impossibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence.

Human thinking activity is contingent being because the human person experiences his thinking activity can cease to occur and can go out of existence – nothing more, nothing less. The human person’s, alone, is the I think contingently, I exist contingently (Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter).
By contrast, divine thinking activity is necessary being because the divine person experiences that its thinking activity can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence - nothing more, nothing less. God’s, alone, is the I think necessarily, I exist necessarily (Cogito necessario, Sum necessario).

It is simply impossible for a human being to have a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence (the divine Cogito).

However, from a Cartesian perspective, it is precisely this impossible experience which is the indispensable prerequisite that would enable a human being to have a performative intuition of the indubitable certainty of necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), i.e., the existence of God. But, unfortunately, all ontological arguments lack this indispensable experiential prerequisite. And, in response to Russell, this is precisely where the fallacy of the ontological argument lies!

For whatever reasons, the preceding line of thought is what Descartes chose neither to pursue, nor to explain.

Nevertheless, from a Cartesian point of view based upon a well-defined Cartesian methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence, I would submit (a) that the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) is precisely what a person would have to be able to experience in order to make a legitimate claim to having an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), and (b) that this Cartesian-based explanation of what would be required for a human person to successfully execute an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) is far superior to Descartes’ ontological argument and that of his predecessor, Anselm.

This Cartesian-based critique specifies precisely what is fallacious about Descartes’ ontological argument, Anselm’s ontological argument, and all other ontological arguments for the existence of God in a manner uniquely different than the critiques proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Gottlob Frege.

Ontological arguments, being conceptually abstract through and through and remaining completely detached and isolated from the empirical realm, lack the requisite foundation of a personal human experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). Only the possibility of having such a personal experience would also permit a human person to have an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

It is of interest to note, too, that all the critiques cited above are essentially as conceptually abstract as the ontological arguments they seek to contest. The total inability of a person to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity is never made the central issue of contention. For all these critics, the perennially unresolved central issue is simply the logical validity, or invalidity, of the abstract reasoning involved in the ontological arguments. Without exception, this is their exclusive, limited focus.

I submit that the Cartesian-based critique succeeds in altering this traditional focus since it offers a unique, experientially grounded explanation for why, ab initio, all ontological arguments for the existence of God must be false.

Certain assumptions shared by Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God, be the arguments a posteriori or a priori, are that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are ontologically prior to the ideas of the finite and the imperfect, and that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are innate to the human mind because they are implanted there by God. For example, for Descartes my idea that I think contingently (which is my idea of a finite and imperfect activity) presupposes an ontologically prior, innate idea of what it means to think necessarily (which is my innate idea of an infinite and perfect activity). Or, to understand that I think contingently (a finite and imperfect activity) requires that I must have some ontologically prior, innate understanding of what it means to think necessarily (an infinite and perfect activity).

However, as this line of reasoning relates to the central theme of this essay, I would submit, contrary to Descartes’ position, that my understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) is not innate to the human mind and is not implanted there by God.

Neither is the idea of my contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity) obtained, as Descartes would claim, by my limiting or bounding, in some way, the ontologically prior, innate idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity). Instead, my idea of necessary thinking activity is a direct result of my deliberate attempt to try to remove, albeit unsuccessfully, that characteristic from the idea of my contingent thinking activity which limits and constrains it; viz., its vulnerability to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. This, I submit, is the genuine way in which I arrive at an understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity).

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow, either from the former interpretation of Descartes or from the latter interpretation of this author, that I can have a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) in the same way as I do, in fact, have a direct personal experience of contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity).

As I see it, the central issue is not a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, an idea of perfect thinking activity or an idea of perfect being – be those ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious.

Instead, the central issue is a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, a direct personal experience of that perfect thinking activity or of that perfect being.

Or, approaching it from a slightly different direction, doubts and desires may come from an understanding that I lack something, and that I would not be aware of that lack unless I was aware of a more perfect being that has those things which I lack. However, my ability to have an idea of, or conception of, or understanding of, or awareness of a more perfect, or infinite, being that possesses all those things which I lack (inclusive of necessary thinking activity), does not mean that I am also able to have a direct personal experience of that being and its necessary thinking activity in precisely the same way as I am able to have a direct personal experience of my being and my contingent thinking activity.

Certainly, I can postulate the existence of a being that thinks necessarily and exists necessarily, but I cannot have a direct personal experience of the necessary thinking activity which would simultaneously yield an intuition of the indubitably certain existence of such a necessary being. Again, I can perform the “Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter,” but I cannot perform the “Cogito necessario, Sum necessario.”

Descartes’ a priori ontological argument for the existence of God is not an experientially grounded performative argument like the one he formulated that successfully and persuasively proved the existence of the human self. His ontological argument, lacking the crucial, indispensable experiential foundation of necessary thinking activity, is destined to fail from its very inception. It is a non-persuasive, quasi-intuitive argument espousing a so-called self-validating idea of God which is given in consciousness and which represents God as existing, but which, in fact, completely misses the mark.

In fact, one could assert even further that the ultimate test of the efficacy of any argument for the existence of God, be that argument a priori or a posteriori, does not consist in the ability of that argument to provide the meditator with a clear and distinct idea of God’s necessary personal existence. Instead, one could assert that the efficacy of any such argument is determined, first and foremost, by whether, or not, it can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). And even assuming such an argument can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity, then can it also engender in that meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum)?

However, in conclusion, this author knows of no traditional, professionally recognized, a priori or a posteriori argument for the existence of God that has succeeded in providing the meditator with the requisite foundation of a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) while also engendering in the meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

I never even get past the notion of greatest. No idea what that means. Who is the greatest soccer player? What is the greatest tuna fish sandwich? Etc.

Ya gotta be kidding. That's a rational argument? :roll:

Well done.

OA makes sense
— khaled

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents. — TheMadFool

Two months late but point of fact: Dawkins refutes the ontological argument in precisely this way in The God Delusion.

Now I am needed elsewhere. Heroism never stops for pedAnt-Man!

This is an awful formulation, a Plantingian Modal OA is much better and even those are hard to defend (albeit I accept it).

The God delusion is an awful book and is not at all representative of actual atheology. If your interested in real responses to proper formulations of the OA, look towards actual atheist philosophers like Graham Oppy for example.

The God delusion is an awful book and is not at all representative of actual atheology. If your interested in real responses to proper formulations of the OA, look towards actual atheist philosophers like Graham Oppy for example. — Elliot Fischer

It wasn't a recommendation, just noting that the argument has been employed before. I have mixed feelings on The God Delusion; aspects of it are compelling, a lot are not. Which makes it better than, say, the Bible. My feeling is that it is less a serious book of secularism and more a cheat sheet for atheists looking for a verbal scrap.

This is an awful formulation, a Plantingian Modal OA is much better and even those are hard to defend (albeit I accept it). — Elliot Fischer

Could you expand a little?

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents. — TheMadFool

Because it's never been about the OA argument itself.

It's always about the social hierachy, power games, one-upmanship. IOW, about the argument from power, which is the most powerful argument.