Absence of color is the absence of light. Light is responsible for the ability for us to perceive color. Without light, there can be no color (at least color perceived by us) Biological in nature. Rod and Cone

Are we doing memory now? — Banno

Just pointing out that recognizing red apples implies a certain prior knowledge of red and of apples.

Olivier5 I speculate that human recall is based on such non-specific shivers, connected into a narrative; not on a recording, however distorted or fragmented. — bongo fury

Assuming that you trust your speculation shivers and your logic shivers, note that, in order to offer any structure shiver to your memory shivers, a narrative shiver ought to be recorded, even if shiveringly so.

Just pointing out that recognizing red apples implies a certain prior knowledge of red and of apples. — Olivier5

Anamnesis?

Anamnesis? — Banno

I don't remember.

One is left with the impression that you don't actually have anything to say.

One is left with the impression that you don't actually have anything to say. — Banno

Don't you worry about me.

But isn't our brain in our heads? — Harry Hindu

It should be.

Your brain shivers are meaningless. — Harry Hindu

If you mean they aren't representations, then yes, that's my point.

Where are the scribbles you are reading now - in your head, in your brain, on the screen? — Harry Hindu

On the screen.

Where is the scribbles' meaning - in your head, in your brain or on the screen? — Harry Hindu

In the game in which we agree to pretend that the scribbles point at or represent things.

Assuming that you trust your speculation shivers and your logic shivers, note that, in order to offer any structure shiver to your memory shivers, a narrative shiver ought to be recorded, even if shiveringly so. — Olivier5

The organism's ability to repeat and modify behaviours is a kind of a trace of the past. But explaining that doesn't seem to require us to infer the storing of traces or representations. — bongo fury

Not literally, anyway. It might, of course, be convenient and useful to make the inference in a figurative manner of speaking.

Links to fascinating studies answering this too:

Start with an ape? In what situation might it have the brain shivers that you would describe as having a mental image and I would describe as readying to select among pictures? — bongo fury


Still, the mental images (whatever we call them or construe them as) aren't traces, or recordings. — bongo fury

I'm not sure what you might mean by the difference. It's obviously a really complex subject, but a 'mental image' from memory consists of almost exactly the same neural activity as the image in front of you right now. They are fired in a different order and from different sources, but it's the same neurons. so, you might see a table and that would result from neurons for edges, colour, texture etc all coming together with contextual areas such as the room you're in the activity you're doing, (and hundreds of others, it can't be overstressed how complex this really is) to fire the neuron for 'table' (or more likely specifically for 'my kitchen table'). This then goes on to fire areas which respond to this (those that search for the word 'table', those that prepare you to put your cup on it...). All of which is linked together by neurons in the hippocampus so that they can fire simultaneously the next time one element is fired. What's happening in memory recall is that those neurons are being fired in the reverse order. One element fires (the cause of recollection, maybe the word 'table') and the neuron in the hippocampus then fires all the others so that your brain is put in the same state as if it had seen the table.

I think what throws a lot of people about this 'same state' idea is the way memories seem more vague and malleable. This is caused by two things - the number of links the hippocampus drew together in forming the memory (it may have missed elements which were there), but much much more importantly than that is the constant re-appraisal that 'live' images undergo in perception. It's not the inaccuracy of the 'snapshot' that's being misunderstood here, it's the inaccuracy of the exact same moment of actual live perception. Any given instant of immediate perception is no less vague and malleable than that same instant of recollected perception. It's just that with immediate perception, the very millisecond in which the doubt arises about a section of an image, it can be resolved with a saccade focussing on reducing uncertainty there. We do the same with mental images (the eyes actually move around the mental image), but we have less data with which to resolve uncertainty. One of the theories about REM sleep is that the eyes are constantly trying to resolve the uncertainty in the flurry of mental images produced in the dream state.

(The above is all extremely speculative - the science is still uncertain in many areas)

All of which is to say that recall is basically the same as the initial perception, just limited by an inability to reduce uncertainty with focussed data hunting. Whether you want to call perception a 'mental image' or not, is moot, but if you do, then recall is probably one too.

As to apes...I don't really keep a stock of animal cognition papers, only one or two that cross over with stuff I'm interested in, but I know that work was done on macaques showing the same image recognition from memory using the same processes that human subject showed.

As for the 'physical trace', I'm happy to leave that to science. There's a growing body of evidence on the topic...@Isaac? — Banno

Indeed (see above). Growing, but still inconclusive as yet. It think the jury's out on the single-neuron vs neural-system theories, but, as Stephen Kosslyn put it

At this juncture, it is clear that the bulk of the evidence supports the claim that visual mental imagery not only draws on many of the same mechanisms used in visual perception, but also that topographically organised early visual areas play a functional role in some types of imagery.

At this juncture, it is clear that the bulk of the evidence supports the claim that visual mental imagery not only draws on many of the same mechanisms used in visual perception, but also that topographically organised early visual areas play a functional role in some types of imagery.

Sounds similar to the hallucination argument in favor of indirect realism.

But isn't our brain in our heads?
— Harry Hindu

It should be. — bongo fury

But how do you know that? Is knowing that your brain is in your head the same as your brain being in your head? Is there a stat of affairs where both are true - that there is a knowing your brain is in your head and a state where a brain is inside a physical head? If so, are the two states of affairs causally related in any way?

Not literally, anyway. It might, of course, be convenient and useful to make the inference in a figurative manner of speaking. — bongo fury

Is there a clear difference between literal brain shivers and figurative ones, and if yes, what could it be?

a 'mental image' from memory consists of almost exactly the same neural activity as the image in front of you right now. — Isaac

Sure, if you mean, the neural activity we might figuratively call "mental imaging from memory" is of largely the same character as the neural activity we might figuratively call "mental imaging from visual attention".

One possible next question, for lovers of clarification, is how this literally involves images, if at all.

Is this about, how can we be sure of things? I'm not usually into all that, sorry. My bad, if you can explain it.

Is there a clear difference between literal brain shivers and figurative ones, and if yes, what could it be? — Olivier5

Not sure what you mean. If it helps, I think there's a clear difference between brain shivers (ok, neural activity) literally and only figuratively consisting of pictures or representations.

Not sure what you mean. — bongo fury

Maybe because you're not brain shivering hard enough.

Quining illusory brain shivers, and how hard brain shivers give us direct access to darkness.

As usual, I am using the reflexivity of thought against thought deniers. The denial of thoughts is itself a thought. It applies to Fury calling thoughts "brain shivers", derogatively. By reflexivity, that very idea of him then becomes a mere "brain shiver", nothing serious. And when he fails to understand something, he's just not shivering his brain hard enough... :-)

I believe the qualia-phobes think our brains are not shivering hard enough when it comes to consciousness, thus our belief in color woo. We can tell that Dennett's brain shivers particularly hard, because of his zombie views.

derogatively — Olivier5

In my defence, I settled on "shiver" in preference to "spasm". For the prosecution, I should have said "neural activity". To switch sides again, I wanted a sortal, and neural "events" or "episodes" sounded medical.

I can only apologise if my remarks etc.

No apology is needed when you shoot yourself in the foot.

What term do you suggest?

If you want to think about thoughts, and speak about them, you have to realize that anything you say about thoughts can apply reflexively, to itself, because what you say about thoughts is still thoughts. So if you're thinking about saying that thoughts are useless, for instance, or illusions, or mere physical spasms, then this very idea of yours becomes itself a useless illusion or spasm.

Reason cannot undermine reason. Thoughts cannot undermine thoughts. No amount of clever thinking will ever prove that there is no such thing as clever thinking.

So to answer your question, no need to torture the language in order to demean what you are trying to explain; that's like shooting yourself in the conceptual foot. Usually, common English offers a variety of decent starting points, and it's a Frenchman talking. "Neuronal activity" is perfectly fine and clear, if you are talking about objectively observable neuronal activity. "Thoughts" is a perfectly fine word too, about the subjective experience of thinking...

What term do you suggest? — bongo fury

A term that explains why from your vantage point it appears that my brain is shivering and from my vantage point it appears that the world is shivering colors and shapes and sounds, etc.

"Neuronal activity" is perfectly fine and clear, if you are talking about objectively observable neuronal activity — Olivier5

Including that crowning achievement of animal life, thinking in symbols: neuro-muscular activity which is preparing to select among symbols to identify the

shivering colors and shapes and sounds, etc — Harry Hindu

"Thoughts" is a perfectly fine word too, about the subjective experience of thinking... — Olivier5

Sure - pending literal clarification of the poetry. If you are going to then apply logic to it, anyway. Poetry has different (no less exacting) standards.

A term that explains why from your vantage point it appears that my brain is shivering and from my vantage point it appears that the world is shivering colors and shapes and sounds, etc. — Harry Hindu

I propose "shivering qualia". This is a harder problem, because one cannot just quine the shivering away. Actually, I kind of like the term "shivering" now.

Sure - pending literal clarification of the poetry. If you are going to then apply logic to it, anyway. Poetry has different (no less exacting) standards. — bongo fury

You do it again! Thoughts cannot undermine thoughts.

Thoughts are "poetry" you say? That is not even beautiful poetry... Logic makes for boringly predictable poetry as well. :vomit:

Thoughts are "poetry" you say? — Olivier5

No, "the subjective experience of thinking" is a poetical description of the thoughts, I say. You won't be able to clarify it in concrete terms, saying "here's some", and "here's some more", "that thing isn't some" etc.

No, "the subjective experience of thinking" is a poetical description of the thoughts, I say. You won't be able to clarify it in concrete terms, saying "here's some", and "here's some more", "that thing isn't some" etc. — bongo fury

"The subjective experience of thinking" is required for any of your thoughts to have any meaning for and to other subjective beings, such as other posters here or people in your life. If you'd tell them you are not actually a subject but a mere object, a machine composing your sentences mechanically, rather than based on human observation and reason, not many people would take said sentences seriously. (not saying they do now...)

(There's a thread out there on machine poetry, if you're interested in that...)