If one weighs whether one wants to act in a certain way in specific circumstances, and, if the reasons add up so that they mostly want to act that way, then that act would best satisfy their preferences with respect to how they want to act in those specific circumstances. Is this correct? — Aleph Numbers

I'm not quite sure if I catch your drift but since reason is part of your thesis you should know that there are irrational desires/wants/preferences. If one thinks carefully about some of our desires/preferences it turns out they're irrational - in other words your preferences/desires/wants are proven to be unreasonable. For instance you may fall in love with a gorgeous actress and may want to be in a relationship with her but, of course, most of the time this will be impossible. If one persists in this irrational desire it could land you in trouble e.g. a restraining order may have your name on it.

Good point. I'm mostly referring to instances in which the act is weighed via evaluation of reasons. That being said, I'll try to better explain what I mean: someone might want to drink soda because it is sweet and they like sweet things, but they also want to avoid gaining weight. If they weigh these two preferences and decide that they think their desire to drink soda outweighs their desire to manage their weight, then their desire to drink soda has won out (or so it would seem). I'm asking if in such a situation it can be said that the person can be said to be satisfying their preferences with respect to how they want to act in those specific circumstances if they drink the soda. Or is it only a partial satisfying of preferences because they are not also managing their weight, another still existing preference?

Good point. I'm mostly referring to instances in which the act is weighed via evaluation of reasons. That being said, I'll try to better explain what I mean: someone might want to drink soda because it is sweet and they like sweet things, but they also want to avoid gaining weight. If they weigh these two preferences and decide that they think their desire to drink soda outweighs their desire to manage their weight, then their desire to drink soda has won out (or so it would seem). I'm asking if in such a situation it can be said that the person can be said to be satisfying their preferences with respect to how they want to act in those specific circumstances if they drink the soda. Or is it only a partial satisfying of preferences because they are not also managing their weight, another still existing preference? — Aleph Numbers

This raises an interesting issue. I'm reading Richard Dawkins' book The Devil's Chaplain and he makes an intriguing remark - that our phenotype (our bodies and minds), since it's shaped by environmental conditions as per evolution, is a record of what the environment was like millions of years ago. If we consider your dilemma (go for the sweets or watch your weight) against this backdrop we come to realization that our "weakness" for sweets reflects how precious for survival carbohydrate-rich food was to our ancestors whose lives were dominated by concern for, among other things, where the next meal would come from. Fast forward to the modern age and now our fondness for sweet food has become a liability as it's now abundant and has become one of the leading causes of metabolic disorders like obesity and diabetes.

What this means is that there's no conflict at all between these two desires. Wanting to drink the sweet soda is just as much about survival as the desire to watch your weight. What's happened is our minds have evolved faster than our bodies have - Richard Dawkins makes a mention of this too.

You seem to be saying that many of our preferences are based in a nomological view of human nature, and that they exist side by side with other preferences that are rooted in the evolution of our minds. Well, drinking the soda is no longer about survival in real terms because you can get by just fine without drinking soda now. Same goes for eating meat; just because it might have been necessary at one point doesn't mean it is necessary now. But I see what you are saying - at one time both preferences would not have been in conflict.

However, what if they are in conflict? What then? Would the more pressing preference "best" serve to satisfy our preferences with respect to how we want to act?

However, what if they are in conflict? What then? Would the more pressing preference "best" serve to satisfy our preferences with respect to how we want to act? — Aleph Numbers

It all boils down to living as long as possible - what's best for that will usually win out but not always as rampant obesity indicates.

I'm asking if in such a situation it can be said that the person can be said to be satisfying their preferences with respect to how they want to act in those specific circumstances if they drink the soda. — Aleph Numbers

This makes me think about addiction, which makes me think about the question of free will. An addict may want to stop using whatever substance he’s addicted to, but is simply unable to resist his urge to do so. I also think it’s good to consider the difference between rational (intellectual) and irrational (emotional), as these two forces are often at battle within any decision we make. So the question becomes if the addict uses X substance again even though he doesn’t want to, is that an act against his will, and therefore irrational? Or, is it an act of free will, and therefore rational? Did he willingly choose to give in to his addictive desire, or was his desire simply overpowering?

:up: This in turn makes me consider if bodily pleasures should win out over some sort of "higher order" happiness. The addict might not be acting freely, and thus not be making a moral decision. However, the addict using a substance might still result in the greatest amount of bodily pleasure, if not "higher order" happiness. Thus, if bodily pleasure wins out, then one need only initiate addictions and allow them to unfold to do a good thing. No negative externalities, no rules or exceptions to rules. However, most people, I think, would argue that some sort of lasting happiness would be preferable to an addiction.

This in turn makes me consider if bodily pleasures should win out over some sort of "higher order" happiness. — Aleph Numbers

Depends on what the goal is. If bodily pleasures leads to that goal, then it should win out; but if not, then not.

However, the addict using a substance might still result in the greatest amount of bodily pleasure — Aleph Numbers

In the short term. The long term consequences of “fiending” and/or withdrawal is where the downside lays.

However, most people, I think, would argue that some sort of lasting happiness would be preferable to an addiction. — Aleph Numbers

I do too. Also, if the act of using a substance you’re addicted to does violate your free will, then I would argue that any violation of free will is harmful, or at least feels harmful.