This assumes a familiarity with Mary's Room:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument

One of the objections to Mary's Room is that Mary does not gain any new knowledge when she sees red for the first time. She has an acquaintance with red; she gains a new ability to imagine red.

Suppose that people suddenly develop the ability to teleport themselves, except for Mary. She still has no idea what it's like to teleport. She knows that everyone agrees it feels a certain way, but she doesn't know the specifics. So Mary questions two people she knows have teleported. Mary's also been warned that one of these people will lie to her. She asks Joe what it feels like to teleport, and he says it's like falling asleep. Bob disagrees and compares it to the feeling of free-fall. Mary then acquires the ability to teleport and discovers it's like falling asleep.

Doesn't Mary have new knowledge at this point? After experiencing teleportation, doesn't she know that Bob is lying? (we can stipulate that Bob is indeed the liar). Isn't "Bob is lying" a new propositional fact she's acquired from the experience alone? And isn't Mary justified in believing that Bob is lying? But Mary has no new information. Nothing's changed, except that she's experienced teleporting.