• apokrisis
    1.4k
    I know you call the relation irreducibly complex and triadic, but this means that existence is not basic, that there is "something more", "below" existence, that makes up the relation. A relation without parts makes no sense.darthbarracuda

    But that is just immediately denying the irreducible triadicity that you just cited.

    To start searching for the monism that is "beneath"', or to start trying to decompose a relation into parts, is simply to go at a holistic answer in usual pig headed reductionist fashion.

    Your complaint is that it is not coherent with your own ontic commitments. And we already know that.

    So when you say that existence itself is a modelling relation, this is using an ontic phenomenon to explain all ontic phenomenons. It's just ontic all the way down. That doesn't make sense.darthbarracuda

    It doesn't make reductionist sense you mean. So ... great!

    You have a lot more in common with speculative realism than you might think.darthbarracuda

    Well if Aristotle, Peirce, systems science, etc, hadn't already figured it out in far more complete fashion, then I guess I might be impressed by speculative realism.
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    These conclusion, again, makes quality metaphysically prior to quantityjavra

    Not really. It makes possibility prior to actuality. And if you then give pure possibility a name like Apeiron, you seem to be pointing to a quality - and saying I count just one of these.

    That's why Plotinus did call his version "the one". The quality was named after its quantity, as it seemed it's most essential characteristic to him - the undivided that logically must stand at the end of a trail of divisions.
  • javra
    81
    Not really. It makes possibility prior to actuality. And if you then give pure possibility a name like Apeiron, you seem to be pointing to a quality - and saying I count just one of these.

    That's why Plotinus did call his version "the one". The quality was named after its quantity, is seeming it's most essential characteristic to him - the undivided that logically must stand at the end of a trail of divisions.
    apokrisis

    But now we’re addressing different species of thought, regardless of how analogous they might be in their structures.

    The One is termed so due to being a perfect unity of being. You know, here we could revel in labels all we want. A rose is still a rose by any other name. The One, as clearly presented by Plotinus, was unlimited quality. Being unlimited, it was non-quantity. For instance, a different label for “The One” was “The Good”. This qualitative property, however, currently doesn’t seem to fit into you’re system’s modeling of the Apeiron.

    Trust me, I’d really like to discover that I’m wrong about this just affirmed belief of mine—such that the Apeiron can also be equated with “the good”.
  • darthbarracuda
    2k
    How am I supposed to understand a concept that is usually used in a reductive sense, like a relation, but is claimed to be non-reductive, irreducibly complex? How is it that "complexity" is not reducible to parts and yet maintains its identity as complexity? How is this still meaningful?
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    So YOU can only understand a relation as another part. Yet how many things must you have to have a relation? I count a minimum of three ... even for the reductionist.

    And if the job is to reduce complexity to something, surely it is simplicity. And the triadic modelling relation is the simplest possible story. Less than three things makes no sense in an ontology founded on dynamical relations.
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    I don't have to defend theistic versions of naturalistic metaphysics. But sure, the good would equate to notions of balance, equilbrium and optimality. Good is what works best to achieve the long run aim of a self-sustaining structure of flow.

    And while you say the one was talking about a oneness of quality, that quality was still being quantified in a way that justified it as special.

    If everything else is counted in terms of "many", then being counted as "one" is clearly an argument for how the one is to be measurably distinguished.

    Again, it is simply a requirement of intelligibility that we form ideas of qualities in terms of quantities we might measure. The two aspects of epistemology go together automatically. The question then becomes, is this also the way we find reality to be organised?
  • darthbarracuda
    2k
    So YOU can only understand a relation as another part. Yet how many things must you have to have a relation? I count a minimum of three ... even for the reductionist.apokrisis

    So as you say, a relation must have three parts. Are these parts themselves also triadic relations? If not, then what are they, exactly? How can we know what they are?
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    Physics gives us different intuitive ways of imagining parts. What do you think is different when you switch from a mental image of Newtonian billiard balls to quantum field excitations?
  • darthbarracuda
    2k
    I would imagine a whole lot, but this doesn't answer my question: calling the most basic "something" irreducibly triadic is like saying the United States government is irreducibly triadic and also the most simple and basic thing in the country. The government is surely triadic, but it can also be dismantled into the three branches of government. Similarly, the Peircean sign can be reduced to sign, object, and interpretent - yet surely these three things are "things" in themselves, no?
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    So then describe to me how a relation could involve less that three different component parts or aspects. And in particular, a hierarchical relation.

    Sure you can count three things. But none of these things are the same thing, nor can exist without the other two. So your reply is pretty flippant.
  • darthbarracuda
    2k
    Sure you can count three things. But none of these things are the same thing, nor can exist without the other two. So your reply is pretty flippant.apokrisis

    Yet clearly since they are not the same thing, this means they have a different nature. And their nature cannot be completely dependent upon the relations between the three, since this would lead to an empty regress of relations: A's nature is dependent on B and C's, but B's nature is dependent on A and C's and C's nature is dependent on A and B's, but A's nature is dependent on B and C's so A's nature really is dependent on the relations between itself and B and C, but we don't know what A, B, or C even are to even begin to sort out anything.

    I don't pretend to know what the big theory of everything is, so don't expect me to come up with a replacement theory. I just think your confidence is unwarranted as your theory isn't sufficient.
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    I just think your confidence is unwarranted as your theory isn't sufficient.darthbarracuda

    Again, just show how a relation can be reduced to less than three parts even under reductionism. So far you have failed to make your case.
  • darthbarracuda
    2k
    I don't see how that is relevant, as I've already demonstrated why relations are not primary.
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    So you accept the irreducible triadicity of relations ... and now want to change the subject. Sweet.
  • Punshhh
    535
    Again, just show how a relation can be reduced to less than three parts even under reductionism. So far you have failed to make your case.


    A modest metaphysics would have in mind the limitations of thought and logic. That they are both merely a product of an intellect, a computation of conceptual representations of the experience of that mind.

    Through the acknowledgement of this humility, a mature metaphysics would endeavour to address the real*, to embrace the logic of solipsisms, regressions and the necessity for relations and realise the need for some kind of creatively inspired bridge to span the void between the products of mind and the real. This would surely be a necessity, otherwise metaphysics would fall into solipsism, regression, or a dogma of the necessity of relations.

    *by real I mean that which is independent of this mind, while hosting its existence.
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    You lost me round about where we have to embrace the logic of solipsisms, regressions and the necessity of relations, but then beware of falling metaphysically into precisely the same triad.

    Shome mishtake shurely?
  • Punshhh
    535
    Elementary Mr Bond.

    It's not difficult, solipsim, regressions, the necessity of relations(indeed all the artefacts of thought) are products of intellectualisation.

    So how do we account for our existence, with more intellectualisation? Or do we look elsewhere?
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    You might have missed it, but the Metaphysical hypothesis of Peircean semiotics is that existence is explained as "the general growth of reasonableness".

    So epistemology is ontology. The triadic sign relation explains the development of the Cosmos as well as accounting for the human observer.
  • Punshhh
    535
    Noble that effort may be, it is more intellectualisation and as I claim, is subject (susceptible) to solipsism, regression and intellectual dogma. How does it bridge to the real?

    The triadic sign relation may only be an aspect of the kind of manifestation in which we as humans find ourselves, in terms of existence it might be insignificant. I realise you accept such limitations. But how do we progress beyond them?
  • apokrisis
    1.4k
    As usual with pragmatism, the proof is in the pudding. The right ideas measurably work.

    Did you have some other criteria in mind?
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