## Contingency argument Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

• 9
By law of bivalence there exist only 3 states of existence, Rationally possible/Rationally must/Rationally Impossible.
For a rationally possible case of existence, it's called contingent. (Something which if existed, did not exist prior, can cease to exist or come up in another possible way).
For a rational impossibility it's simply that (Square circles in 2D, a too light and too heavy object..etc).
For a rational necessity it just needs justification for now so one can't define it yet.
Now for the set of all contingencies to exist it needs an explanation.
This explanation can be either a contingent event or a necessary event.
To say that all the set of contingencies came only from contingent explanations, this would yield infinite regression, as these contingent explanations would need an explanation by themselves, and this is perfectly fine if you don't use it for an ultimate explanation of the universe.
This would lead to a fallacy if you wanted to justify "Why there is something rather than nothing?"
Because, even if the universe and existence is infinite and eternal, you showed no explanation anyways.

--Then, this dilemma cannot be explained, except if a first explanation (First cause is necessary in existence; IE It exists uncaused extrinsically).
If the first cause is something contingent then it would need an explanation by its own. If it's a contingent but is caused by its own (breaking contingency definition) this in itself is paradoxical, as this contingent event would need to exist first to make itself come up. So at some point we have the event simultaneously existing and not existing in the same time. For example if a finite universe should cause itself, it would be problematic as at one point it would exist and not exist simultaneously.

--This necessary cause must be the explanation of the set of all other contingent events, so it can't be for the first cause to be inside space or time, as this cause existed prior to space or time.

--This necessary cause needs to be eternal, as FROM (2) this cause is not bound by space and time, and a beginning is absurd when it comes to a-temporal setting. Also it will yield the same paradox if it had a beginning.

--This necessary cause needs to be maximally powerful to be able to be the explanation of the set of all rational possibilities; Because if the necessary cause is not maximally powerful then it was limited, and the first cause would need a prior specifier to limit its nature of existence, and since its the first cause then it cannot be limited as nothing prior to it exists.

--This necessary cause has a freewill; as freewill is the choice between different rational possibilities with no prior cause, and the necessary cause is the first cause so there is no prior causation for it's creation. And given that we only can see one rational possibility of ones self, then the first cause was free and willful to choose this particular possibility to exist rather than any other rational possibility.

--Multiple first causes cannot co exist; As every first cause will not be limited by a prior specifier, so they will all have freewill that may clash together negating each others freewill..
• 4.2k
Your argument fails because you didnt prove that the "necessary" is... necessary! You have combined two very different definitions of contingent. One is the scientific definition: that physical things can be done to objects. This has nothing at all to do with a philosophical theory of contingency where material things are inherently in need of something or somebody necessary. The world could be (in the philosophical sense) contingent, necessary (Spinoza), or even neither. I've seen it over and over again on this forum: people try to argue for God or Gods by mushing two discrete ideas into one. It's simply fallacious
• 185
By law of bivalence there exist only 3 states of existence, Rationally possible/Rationally must/Rationally Impossible.

I'd preface here that you'll need to specify whether you are talking about conceptual or metaphysical/nomological possibilities. There is a stark difference between what could have been or could be and what you imagine could have been or could be. How can we know what really is the case in reality? We experience reality but cannot dictate fully nor understand fully what will or could be the case irrespective of our abstractions that we entertain.
• 9

I am using a law of bi-valence here, speaking metaphysically/rationally. Things could have been in another way. For example a matter that needs to be explained is something that could have been possibly in a state of affair A, but instead it was in another state of affair B.
• 185
Things could have been in another way.

Really? How do you know this? Reality is. . . how it's and to specify that it could have been any-other way (speaking in terms of nomological/metaphysical possibilities) is to assert a tall order to be given to any one conceptual possible world or even the possibility there are other possibilities.

For example a matter that needs to be explained is something that could have been possibly in a state of affair A, but instead it was in another state of affair B.

If there were the equal possibility of these states of affairs A and B. You fail to realize or consider in this case that we do not know that reality was forced to be one (necessarily) but also that no other possibilities could exist to be actuated.
• 4.2k

Randomness abides
• 3.2k
Like a lot of proofs for God's existence, this has a lot of padding that quickly becomes irrelevant then reduces to familiar arguments, a consequence of choosing postulates consistent with one's conclusion rather than deriving one's conclusion from sensible postulates.

The TL;DR version is the prime mover argument contaminated with the God-of-the-gaps.

1. Multiple possibilities are reduced to single eventualities all if the time. There is nothing special about the first event in that case. This is simply describing physics and saying it is sentient.
2. The God of the gaps is a stupid, trapped God. One can set up a metastable system at will, freely. God is then obliged to decide which state that system will decay to. He is obliged; we are free. Is this really the God you sought to prove?
3. We've known for the best part of a century that there's no infinite regress in the Universe. Time has beginning, and there's no time before it in which someone could decide to kick things off.
4. Free will having no prior cause is eminently unreal. The problem with the incompatiblist idea of free will is that it must be random to demonstrate itself. I can go left or right at a fork in the road. A compatiblist will figure out which way is best. An incompatiblist will choose at random, which is to say: whatever experiences, knowledge, emotions she has cannot bear on the matter. Uncaused will is no kind of will at all, as it is indistinguishable from randomness. Again, is this the kind of mindless God you seek to prove?

So really what your argument boils down to is that the universe was randomly created, and constrained to obey laws. In that universe, no guiding intelligence is needed or can demonstrate itself.
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