• Bob Ross
    98
    Hello @Philosophim,

    You have brought up some very thought-provoking points and, thusly, it has taken me some time to really give it its due. I realized, with aid of your contentions, that the synthetic/analytical distinction is also not actually directly exposing what I want (just as, I would argue, the applicable/distinctive distinction isn't) and, therefore, I can no longer invoke it legitimately to convey my position. Consequently, I was forced to really dive into what I am actually trying to convey and, therein, really clearly define each fundamental building block. So, I now going to share with you what I believe to be a much more clear, distinct representation of what I am trying to convey (but of course it could not be as well (: ).

    As a general overview, I still do not think (as I alluding to above) either a/s or a/d properly convey the distinction I am addressing and, quite frankly, I don't think it quite explicates properly what you are trying to convey either. I think both distinctions are missing the mark: in hindsight, the a/s more than a/d. It is like at prima facea a/d makes sense, but at a deeper evaluation it diverges from the rightful distinction. Let's dive in.

    First I need to start my derivation not at the distinction I want to convey but at the groundings, fundamentals, of everything. That is, a deeper analysis of reason to determine, recursively, what is occurring across all instantiations (because reason is the focal point of all derivation, I think we would agree on that at least generically). If this endeavor is accomplished, then I submit to you that it will be relevant, at the very least, to your epistemology as it would be the protocol by which all else conforms.

    I think that, although I am open for suggestions, there are two groups of fundamentals worth mentioning right now: the most fundamental and some sub-distinctions therein. It is important to note, before I begin deriving and defining them, that I only giving ordering in terms of those groups and not in terms of the items therein: in the case of the most fundamental I am not particularly convinced one can make a meaningful order and in the case of the sub-distinctions therein I don't find it relevant at this point to parse it.

    Most Fundamental:
    In the case of the most fundamental, they are as follows:

    - The principle of non-contradiction (PoN): subject concept which is not in contradiction by its predicate.
    - Negatability: the ability to conceive of the direct opposite (contradiction) of a given concept.
    - Will: a motive.
    - Connectivity: the ability to construct connections via connectives.
    - Connective: a concept which relates two other concepts in some manner (relations).
    - Spatiotemporality: the spatiotemporal inevitable references of concepts.

    These are the fundamentals which are such because they are the utmost (or undermost) conceptions that one can derive. Any other concept is thereafter.

    It is important to note that by "spatiotemporal" I am not referring to "space and time" (as in two separate distinctions) but more as "space and time juxtaposed as one". Time and space cannot be separated in a literal sense.

    Sub-distinctions Therein
    There are two sub-groups worth mentioning at this time. First is the sub-group of connectivity:

    - Possibility: a predicate which does not contradict its subject concept.
    - Necessity: a predicate which is true of all possibilities of its subject concept.
    - Impossibility: a predicate which contradicts its subject concept.
    - Conditional (Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in some sort of dependency. This includes, but is not limited to, biconditionals (IFF) and uniconditionals (IF).
    - Unconditional (Not Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in a manner that has no dependency (e.g. the connection that A and B are not related is a relation determined by a connective which dictates their unconditioned nature).
    - Communal: two concepts share a concept.

    The second relevant sub-group is of spatiotemporality:

    - Quantity: A concept which is numerable. Such as "particular", "singular", "three", etc.
    - Quality: A concept which is innumerable. Such as degrees on a spectrum from 0 to 1.

    Immediate Productions of The Fundamentals and Sub-distinctions
    Now, from those fundamentals, along with the understanding of the relevant sub-distinctions therein, arises immediate processes of reason which are identifiable, which are:

    - Concepts
    - Properties
    - References
    - Contexts
    - Conflations
    - Conceptual Conflations
    - Contextual Conflations
    - NOTE: probably many more, but the aforementioned are the relevant ones.

    These immediate processes, derived ultimately from the fundamentals, are, in fact, arranged in order (unlike the two groups I mentioned previously) as their definitions rely on the previous to understand each other. They are what I would consider the "fundamentals" which can be constructed given the actual fundamentals (previously explicated).

    Concepts:
    A "concept" is spatiotemporal connection(s) composed of spatiotemporal connection(s).

    E.g. Concept A is comprised of other concepts:

    NOTE: apparently philosophy forum strips white space characters and won't let me upload any images, so I am going to have to represent by diagrams a bit odder.

    '=' will be assigning operator
    '[ ]' will be a set
    '&' will be a reference operator
    '<=>' biconditional operator
    '( )' order of operations

    A = [P1, P2]

    Properties:
    A "property" is a concept, P, which is connected (related) to another concept, C, in a manner of necessity as one of C's comprised parts. In the above example, P1 and P2 are properties of A.

    References:
    A "reference" is a connective, R, which connects its concept to another separate concept, wherein "separate concept" entails that the given concept is not a property of the other concept.

    Concept A, which has two properties, is referencing concept B, which has a property that is not equal to either of A's:

    B = [P3]
    A = [P1, P2, &B]

    Contexts:
    A reference which dictates its concept as conditional on another concept in the manner of IFF (biconditional).

    There are two concepts defined as A, but each is biconditionally referenced to concept B and C respectively (B and C would thereby be considered contexts):

    B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
    C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

    It is important to note that the properties of both A's must be different, otherwise it is not a biconditional and, therefore, not a context.

    Conflations:
    The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties or/and references (see subsequent examples).

    Conceptual Conflations:
    The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties.

    A = [P1, P2]
    B = [P3, P4]

    Conflation: B has property P1 because A has property P1.

    Contextual Conflation:
    The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their references.

    B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
    C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

    Contextual Conflation: A from C has property P1 because A from B has property P1.

    Brief Explanation:
    The entire point of the previous derivation is so that I can more accurately and precisely convey my point of view and is not in any way meant to derail the conversation into a discussion about a different epistemology (although it inevitably sort of requires such insofar as it is my position). To keep this brief, let me elaborate on my previous definitions in contrast to your epistemology:

    Advantages Over Your Epistemology

    Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto.

    Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. In relation to concepts, dissolving of the distinction of "distinctive" vs "applicable" resolves a lot of issues, such as the fact that contextual conflations can occur in distinctive knowledge which seems, in your epistemology, to be an exemption wherein no conflations can occur. Take the elephant example, here's your response:

    Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

    The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case).

    The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible".

    Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. Thereafter, we can easily explain and justify the validity of what you are meaning to distinguish with "possibility". We simply need to provide the concepts of "reality" and "self" (for example) and demonstrate that the two concepts have at least one different properties and, therefore, they are two different subject concepts. Therefore, it would be a conceptual conflation to relate a predicate to both by mere virtue of them being considered synonymous (because they aren't). It is important to note here, as I have defined it, that this would not be a contextual conflation but a conceptual conflation. This is because the approach previously mentioned is differentiating the two concepts by means of their properties and not their references to other concepts. If it were the case that "reality" referenced a context and "reality" referenced a different context, then the use of a predicate for both in virtue of being synonymous would be a contextual conflation. But in the case of comparing properties, the conflation is not occurring contextually. To be clear, a "conceptual conflation" occurs by means of properties and "contextual conflations" by means of references.

    Further, notice that properties, as I defined them, are only essential (because they are utilizing a connection of the nature of necessity) and never accidental (unessential). I think this nicely portrays what the mind really does: if something is an accidentally property, what is actually happening is the mind is determining the accidental property to be "possible" (as I defined it) and therefore noting that the given concept could reference another concept but it is not necessitous. For example, if concept A has one property of "being circular" (to keep it simple) and concept B has one property of "being green", then it is "possible" for A "to be green" (reference concept B: A = [..., &B]) because "being green" does not contradict A. Now, what you are noting, and rightfully so, is that A referenced in the concept of "reality", so to speak, cannot be conflated with a reference to "imagination", which really looks like:

    Reality <=> (A = [Circular])
    Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

    A contextual conflation arises if one were to claim X of Imagination's A in virtue of Reality's A (and vice-versa) because of the referential difference (even though they are the same conceptually in this case, so there's no conceptual conflation). Likewise:

    Reality <=> (A = [Green, Circular])
    Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

    This would be a referential and conceptual conflation if one were to claim X of one in virtue of the other. In this case the conceptual conflation would determine that the concepts of A are not synonymous when compared with each other (in their contexts). Which I think is important as well.

    I think, overall, this really gets at the fundamental situation of reason and how it operates, which is the pinnacle in relation to a given subject.

    As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. Which I think is important to note that the epistemology is never complete, only consistent. The most fundamental is that which is apodictic.

    The last thing I will say is that I can see how this all, at prima facea, seems like I really used what your epistemology states to even derive these terms (e.g. I "created" definitions and applied them without contradiction). However, I actually think that the previously mentioned process is what occurs as the fundamental building block of reason (at least human reason) and your epistemology happens to align with it pretty nicely, but the subtle but vital differences required me to really derive and explicate my position to figure out what wasn't quite adding up for me: I think mine explicates the situation more clearly and precisely. Hopefully that makes sense.

    In terms of your post, I am now going to try to respond to what I think is still relevant to our conversation, but feel free to prompt me to respond to anything you think I left out.

    I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties.

    I would define synonyms as two concepts which have the same properties, where property is connected as necessary. Apart from the obvious difference in semantics, the important part is that non-essential properties no longer exist: they are references to other concepts determined by "possibility".

    But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

    There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive.

    applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

    Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions:

    Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty.

    I see this as a direct contradiction. Which I think is resolved in my position because we no longer need a/d.

    No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

    I think that I was wrong to think the distinction needed to be contextual conflations, it is actually simply conflations in general (both).

    No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction.

    In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. There's a difference between stating "I believe it will rain" and "I don't know if it will rain". The former is an induction, the latter could be either: both are expressing uncertainty. The latter is not a hypothesis, it is a certainty of uncertainty (assuming it was deduced). if I state "IF it rains, THEN ...", I may not be claiming that I "believe" it will rain, I could be claiming "I do not know either way" which is not an induction. That's my only point.

    Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

    I still think hume's problem of induction isn't really answered here. But I completely understand and agree that the most rational thing to do is the hierarchy of inductions. But more on that later as this is very long.

    Bob
  • Philosophim
    1.2k
    Well done Bob, a great analysis! No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

    The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be. The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN. Arguably, the PoN works because we cannot discretely experience a real contradiction ourselves. I have never experienced a situation in which I have existed in two different spots at the same time for example.

    That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience. But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

    Having discussed this with you for some time now, I believe this has been a re-occurring difference between us. You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong. I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

    The d/a distinction applies as a fundamental formation of knowledge from discrete experience. As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system. Your creation of a system does not negate the d/a distinction, but only confirms it can be used to create a system.

    For myself, you have to demonstrate that you can form a system without using the d/a distinction, and that system must invalidate or demonstrate why the d/a distinction is invalid. To do so, I believe you have to show there is something more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience. Or if not more fundamental, something along the lines of that fundamental ability that can lead to knowledge without needing discrete experience.

    But, let me address of a few of your derived concepts that cross into my derived concepts so I can clarify this position.

    Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto.Bob Ross

    Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. Whether a person defines free will, or does not, is irrelevant. What I have attempted to note are situations that separate distinctive knowledge from applicable knowledge. One could use a concept of free will to describe a difference, but its not necessary.

    What is necessary is the concept of a will. A will is an intention of the self, and an outcome is the result of that will. At its most basic, a will is the intention to eat to live. I believe this is very similar, if not identical to our previously agreed upon definition of "reason". It is very clear to any willing/reasoning being that one's intention does not always result in the outcome they wished. Situations in which one's will is provably certain is essentially distinctive knowledge. This is the act of discretely experiencing expressed as memory, identity, and sensations. Some in philosophy might call this, "being".

    But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

    Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals.Bob Ross

    As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN. If I did not applicably know the PoN, you would have to prove it existed correct? Which means you would have to show some application of it that would demonstrate to me it wasn't something you just distinctively identified, but something that can also be utilized apart from our direct distinctions.

    The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case).Bob Ross

    Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context. If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that. The conflation occurs if you think that you have applicable knowledge that a pink elephant exists apart from your imagination. If conflation is allowed to occur in this epistemology without explanation, I would consider that a contradiction and flaw that should be pointed out. I just don't see where this is happening at this time.

    The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible".Bob Ross

    If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively. But our definition of square and circles are not applicably necessitous by nature. I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction. In your case, you are using a societally agreed upon contextual definition of square and circle that is both distinctively, and applicably known and proven. Using those current societal definitions and applicable knowledge of square and circle, there are certain things you cannot distinctively conclude. That is a distinctive impossibility. But will the rules and applicable knowledge of a square and circle remain the same tomorrow? That is an applicable unknown. That is where induction comes in.

    Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept.Bob Ross

    If you want to create a system in which you define possibility as when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept, that's fine. I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively. But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong. The fact that I use the word possibility to describe the concept of making a belief that because X is applicably known 1 time, it could be applicably known again, is irrelevant. You and I may be using the same sign/word, but the essential properties are widely different. We can discuss why you may be more interested in a different word than possibility to describe the essential properties of this particular kind of induction, but you have not shown that these particular properties of the induction are flawed in and of themselves.

    As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason.Bob Ross

    This would be a flaw in your proposal then. The d/a distinction has a finite regress of reason. That is to what is discretely experienced. An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions. In other words, an infinite regress cannot be applicably known. You may have created a distinctive set of logic that fit in your mind, but it has no capability of application. The a/d distinction is complete. It start with finite experiences, and ends with them. You can use the a/d distinction in the formulation of the a/d distinction itself. That is a major strength of the theory compared to all others which I know of that are not able to use the very theory they propose to prove the theory itself.

    But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

    There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive.
    Bob Ross

    If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty. You aren't trying to discover anything. Synonyms are identical distinctive knowledge. When we are trying to match an unknown identity with a distinctive identity, that deduced result is applicable knowledge.

    applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

    Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions:
    Bob Ross

    Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property. You can define A as having X property for 1 second, then define A to have Y property the next second. You can even alternate every second for eternity. But there is no uncertainty that at any point in time, what you have defined or not defined as an essential property of A is the distinctive knowledge of A then.

    In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term.Bob Ross

    That may be the case. I do agree there is a difference between "I believe" versus, "I don't know". But the IFF is an affirmative of a possible outcome, which is an assertion that there are other possible outcomes. But we may be splitting hairs at this point.

    I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely. I look forward to hearing from you again Bob.
  • Bob Ross
    98
    Hello @Philosophim,

    No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

    I likewise find it exciting and intriguing. If one isn't out of their comfort zone, then they aren't learning.

    The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be.

    I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper.

    The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN.

    "discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality".

    That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience.

    You derived this via PoN. A common theme that I view as a misunderstanding is to think that the derivation of a "fundamental" should be what one can determine as what they are contingent upon: they were required in the first place. It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). A "fundamental" is that which is an unescapable potential infinite of the subject's manifestations ("thoughts", "reasoning" if you will). I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. I verified "because PoN is true" via PoN: it is a recursive potential infinite. That is the nature of "reason": a succession of finite operations which are constrained to necessary principles.

    But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

    At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is:

    I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

    Other times it is:

    Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed.

    The former implies some form of "free will" regardless of whether the term is constructed or not. The latter denies any such implicit necessity.

    The way I understand it is:

    - If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject.

    - If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both.

    Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): I think you are frequently mapping "distinctive knowledge" to a distinction of free construction, whereas "applicable" is outside of that construction. I don't think you have offered an adequate reconciliation to this issue (but I could be simply misunderstanding).

    Furthermore, being able to always classify something under one of two categories does not entail that that those two categories are fundamentals. Your a/d distinction is like a line drawn in a potential infinite beach of sand, whereas I am trying to examine it by granule. Sure, the granule is either on the left or the right of the line, but that doesn't have anything to do with fundamentals.

    What is necessary is the concept of a will.

    Is this will "creating" the distinctive knowledge? I get heavy vibes that that is not what you are saying, but I could be wrong. If not, then there's a heavy "free will" implication. Even in terms of this will, if it is directing the constructed "distinctive knowledge" and it isn't an act of free will of some sort, then it isn't the subject "creating" anything: therefore they cannot do whatever they want distinctively, but maybe the rudimentary will can?

    But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

    This leads me to believe, instead of "creation"/"abstract" vs "matched"/"non-abstract", you are really trying to convey "certainty" vs "uncertainty", which, again, is not the same thing.

    Let me invoke your definitions from a while back:

    Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.


    Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set

    This is a "creation" vs "matching" distinction. "creation" does not equate to "abstract consideration". "matching" does not equate to "non-abstract consideration".

    You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong.

    I think it is essentially the converse. However, what makes it tricky is that your definitions think higher and equal to mine, which clouds the waters.

    I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

    I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. It works fine prima facea, but as I have been examining your epistemology it slowly breaks down when one gets to a/d. Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. PoN is the focal point and thereafter the other fundamentals follow logically. "discrete experience" is an ambiguous sort of equivalent to the lumping of these concepts: it is the realization that one is experiencing differentiation via the PoN, connections, negatiability, equatability, and spatiotemporal references: we cannot go beyond those, they are apodictic.

    As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system.

    I wasn't trying to note that I used a/d: I was meaning that it seems as though (in anticipation) that I am given the murky waters in the definitions of a/d. You are drawing a line in the sand, I am noting the granules and the granules that make up those, etc to derive what is necessarily always occurring in the finite procession of the manifestations of reason. I am not convinced that a/d somehow is being used to derive PoN, when PoN was required to derive a/d.

    As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN.

    Being able to categorize one granule of sand either as on the left or the right does not have any bearing on what is fundamental. Even if the a/d distinction works for all granules, it wouldn't thereby be a fundamental. The derivation of a/d, I would argue, utilizes my fundamentals to get there. Try to derive a/d without using PoN. Try to derive anything without it.

    Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. There's a definition of "PoN" in my head, which I abstractly had to perform application to know that, and I abstractly apply it to my previous abstract thoughts to determine whether it holds as apodictic: and it does. I would suppose I had to "applicably" know that I "distinctively" knew, not the other way around, because I don't know I had a definition of "PoN" until after I perform the necessary abstract applications to determine I do. "Application" and "definitions" is a murky distinction (just like creation and matching), no different than a/s.

    One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made.

    Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context

    That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. No matter what distinction is made, the subject is necessarily following the same underlying process. All the issues your distinction are supposed to be demonstrating can be resolved simply by noting conflations.

    If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

    Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two.

    If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

    This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by.

    But my point was that concepts can be conflated abstractly and, potentially depending on how you are defining "distinctive", distinctively.

    I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

    The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract".

    But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong.

    There is no underlying system. My proposed system is meant as the underlying system. Your definition of "possibility" implicitly uses mine. The mind necessarily considers in terms of how I defined it. Now, semantically, that is a whole different question. Your possibility's function was to note a contextual conflation, which is accounted for in my system without redefining possibility in a way that creates confusing different "could" terminology (i.e. "I speculate I could" vs "I possibly could").

    This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

    Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational).

    Although I am interested to hear your reasoning, I didn't get the impression that your epistemology proves itself in that sense: it is consistent, but not complete. There's nothing wrong with that.

    Thirdly, I think this is a strength of my system is that it explicates the true nature of reason: potential infinite regressions and one circular reference. This is why PoN is the focal point, as it is the one valid circular reference:

    It is a potential infinite circular cycle of "X is true because of PoN", where X can also be PoN. There's nothing wrong with that: that is why it is an axiom. The reason that isn't special pleading is because all other circular logic depends on PoN and we can demonstrate therefrom their invalidity. Apodictic doesn't mean complete, it means demonstrably true (not to be confused with absolutely true). When a subject tries to prove PoN, they have to eventually give up under the conclusion that it is true as they follow the potential infinite path of derivation, which is cyclical. I don't think, in action, you can demonstrate that to be false (as that very proposition is presupposing PoN). That's why it is an axiom.

    The potential infinite regressions (recursions to be specific) is simply noting what concepts are and how they exist in a infinite recursive pattern. Similar to how PoN is cyclical but yet valid, noting that when one derives any concept they can perform the finite operation to all of its properties, sub-properties, sub-sub-properties, etc for a potential infinite. All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. This is provable by means of simply trying to invalidate it: try to come up with a concept that isn't derive from other concepts. The nature of reason is a continuity: there's no stopping point. This does not rest on its own assumptions.

    If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

    There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. They had to dissect the concept of A, and the act of dissecting implies uncertainty. This is not the same as claiming they are formulating inductions.

    Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

    This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions.

    I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely.

    I appreciate your response, I hope I wasn't too reiterative from previous posts here.

    Bob
  • Philosophim
    1.2k
    I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper.Bob Ross

    Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

    "discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality".Bob Ross

    As a reminder, one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience. Its been a while since we last discussed this, but if you recall, the same with differentiation and spatiotemporality. Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

    As a reminder of discrete experience, a camera lens that takes a picture is a non-discrete experience. Everything that comes into the camera lens is spit out on the picture without the lens being able to differentiate anything within the light it receives. All it does is receive light. A being that can discretely experience can parcel that experience into things that it might later identity and differentiate into colors, shapes, etc.

    Therefore a fundamental which a being must have before it can identify, is it must be able to discretely experience.

    It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN).Bob Ross

    We used the PoN to deductively assert that we discretely experience. But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

    I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true.Bob Ross

    Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are. I believe truth and falsity are more fundamental than the PoN. While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

    I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

    I believe you have mentioned prior the idea of temporal fundamentalism. In other words, the order of discovery determines what is "fundamental". If for example, molecular theory was used to discover atomic theory, you would say molecular theory was more temporally fundamental.

    Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole. While we may have discovered molecular theory first (hypothetically) molecules are fundamentally made up of atoms and rules that we might not have been aware of. But the use of a tool which discovers another fundamental does not mean that the underlying make up of the tool is not fundamental, nor that we necessarily needed that particular tool to discover the underlying fundamental. As we could use molecular theory as a starting point to discover atomic theory, we can also use atomic theory to discover molecular theory once we discover atomic theory. A fundamental when discovered, either confirms the higher order we used to discover the lower order, or adds clarity to that higher order concept.

    I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts. Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are. As such, I think its been clearly shown that the PoN has parts and logic prior to its logical construction, and is not a fundamental.

    At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is:Bob Ross

    I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

    I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense. But you cannot use derived systems to explain the fundamental system that allows those derived systems to exist. I think this is ultimately the source of your misunderstanding and confusion. You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental. What I've tried to demonstrate is your system is derived, and rests on the assumptions you are trying to negate. Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

    I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

    Other times it is:

    Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed.
    Bob Ross

    "I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

    Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications):Bob Ross

    But I'm not implying free will. I think you're mapping your own outlook on this when it has never been my intention.

    The way I understand it is:

    - If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject.
    Bob Ross

    No. Distinctive knowledge is the creation of the discrete experiencer. If I see the color red within the sea of existence, that is my creation. If I am color blind, then what I discretely experience might be different. A person might see a tree while another sees two plants, "green leaves" attached to "brown trunks". A camera lens cannot see the color red within the light that it absorbs. It is unaware of any difference. There is no "I" within the lens. There is no distinction.

    - If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both.Bob Ross

    As I've noted, its about deduction vs induction within your chain of reasoning. It depends on your context of what you mean by "abstraction". In one context, everything is abstraction. Our sensations are abstractions, as well as thoughts. Arguably a person could state we never experience "the thing in itself".

    Distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the experience itself, knowledge of the abstraction one creates. The key is that there is no deduced uncertainty of one's will. If I see red while you see blue, we both distinctively know our own experiences. But the moment I introduce deduced uncertainty, "You see the color blue, while I see the color red," that is a belief that my will alone cannot assert. Have I experienced how you see the world? No. That is an application I must experience before I can determine if my belief is true. Do I have the distinctive knowledge of this belief? Yes. Is that belief applicable knowledge? No. At best, such a belief is an inapplicable speculation.

    I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term.Bob Ross

    This is why it is a fundamental. A fundamental is part of everything that derives from it. Atoms are the fundamentals of molecules. We don't have to create the concept of molecules, and the fundamentals of atoms will still exist. Discrete experiences are the necessary atoms that make up your higher level concepts. That's not an ambiguous lumping. All I'm noting is your molecules are made up of atoms, and atoms can be used to make more than the molecules you are noting.

    Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience.Bob Ross

    I think I've shown the thinking that they do not arise out of discrete experience to be incorrect. Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false? Each of your terms rest on concepts that you have not proven yet, or shown where they come from. Mine does. Negation is the discrete experience of one thing, and then that thing not being experienced anymore. True is what is and can be discretely experienced, while false is what cannot. From this, I can derive the PoN. Can you derive the PoN differently, or demonstrate how my derivation is incorrect?

    Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately.Bob Ross

    As with everything, you must clarify whether your knowledge is distinctive or applicable. The problem with epistemology has been it has lacked this distinction, and has conflated very two different identities. I can distinctively know of a pink elephant, and I can applicably know if I've encountered one. What one distinctively knows does not necessitate it can be applied.

    One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made.Bob Ross

    Notice how you used "know" without clarifying whether this knowledge was distinctive or applicable. If you don't clarify what type of knowledge, then you aren't using the epistemology. At that point you aren't disproving the epistemology through a contradiction of use, you are simply showing how not using the epistemology causes confusion.

    Let me reconstruct your sentence. "One cannot applicable know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that." While that sentence still doesn't make much sense, it is not addressing distinctive knowledge. Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

    Perhaps what you meant was that you cannot distinctively know something prior to experiencing it. Which is true. But you also cannot applicably know something before you experience it. If the a/d distinction cannot be used to divide a generic use of knowledge or runs into a contradiction, then I think we can safely say there is a flaw. But using a generic definition of knowledge alone is a straw man.

    That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge.Bob Ross

    Knowledge is a chain of deductions. The difference between distinctive and applicable knowledge has been clearly made. Do they both use deductions as an underlying fundamental? Yes. But it is clear that we run into situations in which we have beliefs that must be resolved, and cannot be resolved by our will alone. When a chain of inductions contains a resolved induction, it is an important enough difference to note a new identity. The separation of the knowledges notes this important event, and avoids the problems other epistemologies run into.

    If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

    Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two.
    Bob Ross

    Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

    If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

    This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by.
    Bob Ross

    No disagreement, as this is a logical consequence of using a logic derived from the context of distinctive knowledge.

    I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

    The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract".
    Bob Ross

    I will note, I did not introduce the term "abstract" into the conversation. It depends on your context of "abstract". Applicable knowledge comes about from the deduced realization of an uncertain belief. The "uncertainty" is a deduction that our will alone is not enough to ascertain it cannot be contradicted. I may believe this apple is healthy, but upon eating it I discover it was rotten on the inside. Can the terms "eating, rotten, apple, action, etc" be all termed as abstractions? Sure. Can everything in the mind be termed an abstraction? Yes. This is probably where the confusion comes from. You are using a general word that can have its essential properties switched with its accidental properties depending on the context you are using.

    As such, if I have used the terms "abstract" it has been to meet what I evaluated your context to be at the time. In the largest abstract of the word, discrete experience can be called an abstraction, and everything is made up of discrete experiences, including applicable knowledge. If we are to use the term abstraction going forward, could you define it clearly in your own terms so I can understand your meaning?

    This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

    Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational).
    Bob Ross

    What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN. I assumed several higher order logics to be true, and I can use the epistemology to demonstrate why logic works. I may ask the question, "Why do I discretely experience?" but that answer is not necessary to know that I discretely experience, and can use it to form knowledge. Just like I don't need to know molecular theory to use a ruler for measurement. There is (to my mind) nothing underlying or apart from the theory itself that needs to be given to explain the theory itself.

    Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free. Goedel's is also not a free pass to set up an infinite regress. What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation. Such an argument is flawed, and as my system is more fundamental than yours, can conclude Setting up an explanation for knowledge as infinitely regressive is therefore a flaw. I can construct your system distinctively, but it is inapplicable. My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress. Because an infinite regress is inapplicable, it is an inapplicable speculation, or induction. Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

    All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion.Bob Ross

    No. I avoid that flaw that most other epistemologies fall into. Everything starts with the foundation that I discretely experience. All distinctive knowledge boils down to that. I need no other outside reference. If I do, please show how I do.

    If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

    There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was.
    Bob Ross

    Correct. My note was there is no uncertainty in distinctive knowledge. When there is uncertainty, or when it is deduced that one's will, will not necessarily result in the will's outcome, we have a situation in which we must experience the deduced outcome of that induction. That is acting upon a belief until that beliefs outcome is found.

    There is no application within distinctive knowledge, because it is our experience itself. You don't match the experience itself to the experience itself. It is simply the experience itself. The act of being. What you are, is what you are. What you remember is what you remember. What you define something as, is what you define something as. There is no regress. There is no induction in this. This has been deductively shown by noting that you discretely experience, and all of these things logically flow from this fundamental.

    Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

    This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions.
    Bob Ross

    Poor wording with lots of implicitness on my part. Let me rephrase it.

    Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

    And no worry Bob if we retread old ground a bit! Many of those subjects were disparate, but now we have a nice consolidation.
  • Bob Ross
    98
    Hello @Philosophim,

    Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

    I appreciate that, and same to you! Most of my conversations on this board, apart from ours, hasn't been very fruitful. It seems as though most people on here like swift abrupt responses and then get bored and move on to the next topic. I, and I think you as well, like longer, thought-out discussions that really go much deeper. That's why I really enjoy our conversations, as you are very respectful, genuine, and are providing thought-provoking responses.

    The fundamental issue between us is becoming clearer and clearer for me, and I suspected as much but now I think it is pretty solidified. I think this is the pinnacle of our fundamental disagreement:

    Philosophically, you seem to be taking a heavy realist methodological approach whereas I seem to taking a heavy anti-realist methodological approach.

    Consequently, I am performing derivation starting with the mind and working my way outwards onto the "real" world, whereas you seem to be starting with the "real" world and working towards your mind. Now, firstly, I want to disclaim that I am not in any way trying to put words in your mouth or unfairly fit you in a category, I am merely explicating what I think is the root issue here, which is reflected quite clearly (I think) in our disagreement in terms of what a "fundamental" is. Secondly, when I stated you seem to be working "towards your mind" from the "real" world, obviously you are thinking and therefore are starting with your mind in that sense, but what I mean is that you are grounding fundamentals in the "real" world, whereas I don't. Subsequently, I think you would hold (correct me if I am wrong) that your mind is from a brain (which the latter would be more fundamental than the former) and, as you mentioned, the atom is would be more fundamental than the brain. That kind of derivation, if I am allowed to say so, is a realist approach which I would gather, if I may guess, you are probably somewhere along the lines of an ontological naturalist. Again, not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to get to the root of the issue between us, as I don't think that our disagreement is as easy as "fundamental" semantics.

    I, on the other hand, although I used to be in that boat of thinking (ontological naturalist, materialist), approach it from a heavy anti-realist position. It took me a while to recognize the shift in my thinking over the years, but in hindsight it is quite obvious. I start with the mind and, therefore, only subscribe to methodological naturalism (as opposed to ontological).

    I think, in light of the aforementioned, it is glaringly clear to me why I am thinking PoN is a fundamental whereas you think it is discrete experience. I don't think going back and forth about "you had to use PoN to claim that" (me) and " one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience" (you) is going to get us anywhere productive. I would simply respond with the same counter argument that you already know well, and thusly I don't think you find it productive either.

    I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). Now, I don't think that is how you explained it, but I think that is a pretty fair (admittedly oversimplified) generalization.

    I understand that, and in contemplation of my body as an object I agree. In contemplation of other bodies, objects, I agree. But in relation to myself, wherefrom derivation is occurring, I start with PoN and derive the relations of objects (and one conclusion is that the brain produces discrete experiences wherefrom it makes sense contemplation of PoN can arise). However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold.

    Before I dive into direct responses, I want to explicate clearer what I mean by "fundamental". I am not talking about a contextual fundamental in relation to another object. Yes, atomic theory is more fundamental than molecular theory (I vaguely remember that conversation, and if I argued the converse then I was mistaken) contextually within that relation. I am talking about, do I dare say, the absolute fundamental. By absolute I need to be careful, because what I don't mean is that it is unquestionable: I mean that amongst all contexts (and the derivation of what a context is in the first place) it is necessarily true.Now, what I mean by "all contexts" is in relation to the subject at hand: I am not extending this out objectively or inter-subjectively at this point.

    Let me try to explicate this clearer in my direct responses:

    Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

    This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes).

    You are explicating a correct derivation of a fundamental contextually in relation to when discrete experience arises out of objects (this is an analysis of the mereological structure of objects, which is fine in its own accord) . However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself.

    But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

    Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. I am not talking about what is necessary to argue for PoN, I am talking about the actual utilization of PoN regardless.

    Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

    I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". That claim doesn't thereby grant you some kind of obtainment outside of PoN, or what exists beyond it because you just thereby used it.

    In the most radical example, if I could hypothetically prove without a doubt PoN was false (even just in terms of some kind of distinction), that would be in relation to PoN. Again, I think this disagreement is really at a deeper level than this because I suspect you were anticipating this response.

    While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

    In terms of fundamentals contextually in object relations, you are correct. But in terms of the absolute pin point of derivation, I think you are incorrect: that is why PoN is called an axiom: you can't prove it in the sense that you can prove something via it.

    I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

    I appreciate you demonstrating this, but I think it is fundamentally still using PoN. First your entire derivation here is utilizing it: "truth = what can be discretely experienced" is an argument from PoN and so is "false = what cannot be discretely experienced". To claim that impossibility is to discretely experience and not discretely experience in the same time is utilizing the more fundamental aspect of your mind: spatiotemporality. Our minds will not allow for something to be in two places at the same time, nor one place at the same time. This is because the mind considers it a contradiction in its continuous understanding, which inevitably is based off of PoN. I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. Likewise, try to justify not that one thing being at two places at the same time is a contradiction but why it is a contradiction without using PoN: you can't. Try to point to something objective to prove it, I don't think you can: not seeing something right now in two places at the same time is not a proof that it cannot occur.

    Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole

    In mereological consideration of objects it does: not holistically. I am using it more in terms of (from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fundamental):

    "serving as an original or generating source"
    "of central importance"
    "belonging to one's innate or ingrained characteristics"

    I am not referring to what constitutes as the parts of an object or all objects (like fundamental particles).

    I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts

    Hopefully I demonstrated why it is not made of component parts. You aren't contending with PoN itself but, rather, utilizing it to define it differently (which is completely possible).

    Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are.

    It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. The contemplation of the understanding is fundamentally in terms of spatiotemporal references (e.g. I can redefine PoN in terms of something else as long as it does not violate these underlying principles, if I were to define it as "discrete experience of X and Y at the same place in the same time" then that obviously wouldn't fly, but why?--because I am inevitably playing by the rules of my own mind and so are you regardless of whether either of us realize it). This happens before consideration of what must exist for us to transfer our views to one another.

    I am not sure how relevant defining "true" and "false" are with this respect, because "true" is simply a positive affirmation, and "false" is a negative affirmation (denial). I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. Likewise, if X had the capability to be in two different places (even merely in abstract consideration), then X can be "true" and "false" at the same time because it isn't in the same place.

    I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

    I can assure you I am not meaning to straw man your position: if it is the case that not even "certainty" and "uncertainty" relate to it, then I am not sure yet what to do with your distinction. I am not saying it is wrong in virtue of that, I am simply not understanding yet.

    I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

    I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me.

    You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental.

    For you it is higher, for me it is lower. For you "higher" is the mind, "lower" is the objects which constitute the production of the mind. For me, "lower" is the mind, and "higher" is the derivation of the objects. For me, "lower" and "higher" aren't really sufficient terms because they more relate to mereological structure, which pertains to objects alone.

    Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

    I feel like my response so far should clear up the confusion here (not saying you are going to agree with me though of course (: ).

    "I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

    I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. If I walk up to a hard determinist and say that they are definitely going to catch on to that implication very quickly.

    Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

    Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. Explain to me how you can validate causality holistically: the best one can do is systematically validate one connective (relation) of two objects by virtue of assuming the validity of another connective (or multiple): this occurs for a potential infinite.

    Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

    The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. Your distinction is not separable in that sense like I would imagine you think it is.

    Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

    Of course. Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. The concatenation of concepts is not the same as the union of them.

    What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN.

    I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S.

    Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free.

    I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof".

    What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

    It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual.

    My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

    You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible.

    Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

    If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable.

    Because I am not fully understanding (I would suspect) the a/d distinction I am going to end this with a step by step analysis of your definition here and you tell me where I am going wrong (thank you by the way for elaborating):

    Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

    1. Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept.

    Makes sense.

    2. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience.

    The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. You know it because your mind related the objects in that manner in accordance to the rules you inevitably submit to. Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth.

    3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

    I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness.

    4. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

    I agree that it is not PoN, but you are necessarily using it here. Just because you can discover it doesn't mean you weren't using it fundamentally to discover.

    I look forward to hearing from you,
    Bob
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