• Philosophim
    2.2k
    Another weekend arrives! Lets continue.

    But a decision that "contradicts reality" simply cannot be made.TVCL

    In the sense that one decides to do something, yes, a contradiction to reality cannot be made. That does not stop us from believing we can. Now in the case of one's first formation of knowledge, you just have to take a stab in the dark. But once you know a few things, you can build upon it. If I know addition I can then develop and know a method called multiplication, which is adding the same thing many times. If I know Geometry, I can know what angles and lengths of planks I'll need to construct a house.

    "If you want to be a mafia boss you cannot be an honest man at the same time."TVCL

    If you are seeking knowledge, you will realize this. But maybe the guy isn't. Maybe he wants to commit crime, but then say, "But I'm honest otherwise". Sure, he's not, but he doesn't care about knowledge in this case. Because he does not care about knowledge, he does not see the contradiction. If you are not using knowledge, then you can believe in things that are contradicted by reality. People still believe in Bigfoot and the Loch Ness monster. If they were looking for knowledge, they would see their belief is contradicted by reality. But they're not looking for that. They are dismissing all contradictions, and looking for that one conclusive affirmation that they hope to discover some day.

    And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge.
    — Philosophim

    Not if the question is "How do I know what goals a person should pursue?" ...
    TVCL

    Heh, true. I should clarify what I mean. We can use the application of knowledge to help us find the answer, but the process of knowledge itself, does not give us the answer. So it is not that we don't use the process of knowledge to find the answer, its just the definition of knowledge is not the whole story.

    The model does not equate goals with beliefs. Instead, it recognises that goals contain implicit beliefs.TVCL

    I want to mention these are all good points you have made, and are giving me pause before I reply. Perhaps the tie in is the pursuit of a goal, versus the identification of a goal. This is where the language gets a little funny. A belief that a goal can be obtained can be based on knowledge, but it can also be just an inductive guess. If one recognizes the uncertainty in reaching the goal, one both believes there is a chance of success, and a chance of failure.

    For example, I buy a lottery ticket with the belief I might win, but I believe I might also lose. Now if I do the math, I can know that my chance of winning is ridiculously small, and my chance of losing is ridiculously large. In the first case where I did not examine the math, I might believe really strongly that I will win, even if its unlikely I will win. In the second case, I can safely make the statistical decision to not buy the lottery ticket, because I know I will likely waste my money. Essentially the weight of my belief that I will lose is tipped to be greater than the weight that I will win.

    In this case the knowledge of the likely outcome, combined with the cost and time investment in buying the ticket, have persuaded me not to buy a lottery ticket. Sure, I might have won, but I will take the safe odds that I will lose.

    Pursuing goals is often an act of induction. Meaning we often do not know the outcome until we try. Perhaps you can take your set of knowledge and apply it to inductions to see which inductions are more reasonable than others? I leave you with that to think on.
  • TVCL
    79


    Thanks for the engagement. This is to chime-in to say that I am currently working on this problem. Also, I am currently trying to update the initial draft that I wrote in order to improve its structure and clarity. I'll definitely proceed with the discussion but don't want to rush anything and so I don't know how long I'll be - just wanted to give the heads-up.
  • Philosophim
    2.2k


    Understood! I've been making sure I have plenty of time in my replies as well, as the questions at this point take more time to work through. Fantastic work as always!
  • TVCL
    79


    Discovered a fragment of the argument today which is worth throwing your way... please note that I am no longer focusing on how the argument is directly normative/ethical (although whether it is in any respect is still to be seen). Instead, I am trying to reflect on the direct connection between the knowledge-seeking model and our decision-making.

    Also note: "true belief" = knowledge
    This follows from the argument because knowledge = "belief that accords with reality"

    "Reality, by its very nature, demands that we live in accordance with it - we cannot do otherwise. What we can do is choose whether our beliefs are in accordance with it or not. Whether they are or not and what does or does not accord with reality is what is revealed by the search for knowledge.

    To choose that our beliefs not be in accordance with reality requires that we divorce our beliefs from our decisions because all decisions must bend to reality, whereas all beliefs need not and so, if decisions are based on belief, only those decisions based on true belief will be made (or indeed can be made). If we choose to have beliefs that are not even potentially true but explicitly not true, no decisions based upon these beliefs can be made because these are decisions that reality does not allow by definition.
    Therefore, if we choose to not have true beliefs (knowledge) we must divorce our beliefs from our decisions.
    Therefore, if we choose to not divorce our beliefs from our decisions we must have true or at least potentially true beliefs (knowledge)."

    The general movement of the thinking is towards the argument that, like the search for knowledge itself, acting upon our beliefs is not something that is necessarily given, but a choice and therefore a contingency. However, if this choice is made, like the choice to search for knowledge, it is another basic axiom that leads directly to the search itself and, therefore, necessitates the model.

    --------

    On a slightly unrelated note:

    We can use the application of knowledge to help us find the answer, but the process of knowledge itself, does not give us the answer. So it is not that we don't use the process of knowledge to find the answer, its just the definition of knowledge is not the whole story.Philosophim

    Was probably your best insight in your last set of comments and makes me think that you might be coming to understand my philosophy better than I do.

    All the best.
  • TVCL
    79


    Also, as a side note I thought I would throw this your way...

    It's a passage that I've just written up near the outset of my second draft which might help to clarify the foundations of the argument:

    ---------

    "How do we know before we know how to know?" This is the question that is trying to be answered and positing the question itself provides the first axiom that the argument starts from. That axiom is that there is a search for knowledge. If there was no search, we would not be searching for knowledge even about knowledge itself. This axiom is contingent in one sense and necessary in another. It is contingent in the sense that merely asserting that there is a search does not necessitate that there must be a search. A man might be searching for knowledge at a given time, and he might not. As such, the argument does not progress from the axiom that there must be a search for knowledge. Instead, the argument progresses from the axiom that if there is a search for knowledge, the rest of the argument is entailed. The axiom is necessary in the sense that it necessarily follows from the search. This claim is as clear as a tautology: if there is a search for knowledge, it necessarily follows that we must recognise the axiom that there is a search for knowledge. This axiom is the necessary underpinning for all epistemology and proto-epistemology.

    This is an important point to make a clarification in light of this previous claim. The claim being made is that the axiom that there is a search for knowledge is necessary for epistemology or proto-epistemology, but not for all knowledge as-such. This is because epistemology entails the study of knowledge which is distinct from simply knowing something. The study of knowledge entails that knowledge is sought, even if the knowledge sought is simply knowledge about the structure of knowledge - even those parts of it that we come to know without seeking. That is to say, some means of attaining knowledge might be passive, but to seek an understanding of those passive elements is active. A man may, for example, know that a tree is green by passively receiving the image of one as he walks, but for that same man to know how he knows that the tree is green, he must seek knowledge. Moreover, once the man inquires whether the tree is green or not he is searching for knowledge. This proto-epistemological model is not concerned with how the man passively receives knowledge of the green tree, but is only concerned with the fundamentals that are entailed once he asks any questions of his knowledge, whether that be a given subject of knowledge such as the tree or the very structure of knowledge itself. By extension, this proto-epistemological model is concerned with all inquiries as such. Once we ask how we know something, a search is commenced. This does not limit the scope of this argument - this is the largest possible scope that it can cover because none who ever make an inquiry are not searching for knowledge; they are attempting to discern whether what they might believe does or does not accord with reality. Hence, an active search is taken as the basic axiom of the model because a method of discernment is irrelevant to anyone who would not and does not actively discern, by definition.

    Therefore, we have the fundamental axiom of proto-epistemology: that there is a search for knowledge.
  • Philosophim
    2.2k
    Hello again TVCL!

    Also note: "true belief" = knowledge
    This follows from the argument because knowledge = "belief that accords with reality"
    TVCL

    I would be careful here. There is a whole libraries worth of devotion in epistemology to destroying the phrase, "true belief". Also, it is not that our belief accords with reality, it is that our belief is not contradicted by reality upon application. This does not mean our belief is true, only that it is reasonable within the current consistent constructs of our beliefs, and that particular application. It still may be the fact that our application did not consider factors we are unaware of.

    Here's a quick example. Imagine you spy a sheep in a field. You walk past it, pet its wool, and move on. Unknown to you however, people have created a mechanical sheep that is very convincing except for a visible switch underneath its belly. Now, you don't know about the switch, so you don't even think to look for it. It is entirely reasonable for you to say, "I knew that thing as a sheep." But it doesn't mean it is a true sheep.

    Thus, there must be a different argument as to why we should follow rational beliefs, (knowledge) versus unexamined beliefs. I believe a rational belief should be followed, as a rational belief leads to a necessary conclusion from what you are aware of. A belief which is not rational, but inductive, leads to a conclusion that is not necessary from what you are aware of. In terms of odds, it would seem rationality would win in your likelihood of being correct.

    This can be shown with some quick math. X is knowledge, and Y is an unexamined belief. Z, will be the underlying reality.

    X is one claim to reality. If Z does not contradict X, there is no alternative to X. But if Z does not contradict Y, there are still alternatives to Y. In the case that both X and Y are contradicted by reality, neither has an advantage. But X will always have the advantage if Z does not contradict X and Y.

    Was probably your best insight in your last set of comments and makes me think that you might be coming to understand my philosophy better than I do.TVCL

    Why thank you! What a compliment! =D

    To your second excerpt, it seems too wordy to get to your point. If I recall, you wanted this epistemology to reach the lay person in a clear, manageable and easily understood format. I think your theory can do this. I would try to translate everything you're trying to state into as concise a format as possible. The lay person will want the meat of the idea straight to them. You can add the details as you then dive into the specifics of the argument, and sum up more in this fashion after the reader has read the crux of your argument. Of course, this is just an opinion. Another reader may have different feedback for you on this type of criticism, so I would show it to others besides myself before changing it.
  • TVCL
    79


    Just a couple of points/questions quickly...

    To the first post:
    Doesn't your counter-argument run the risk of making the concept of "truth" convoluted by assuming that when we claim access to truth we claim access to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

    To claim that something is true does not necessarily entail that we deem it to be certainly true or objectively true or eternally true etc. Now, I believe that such truths exist but the simple claim that truth is "accordance with reality" appears to be basically tautological and need not bring these other assumptions in which appear to confuse the issue.

    Also, this was not an essential point for the first post. Aside from this issue, what are your thoughts on it? Is it cogent?

    To the second post:
    Admittedly, I've flip-flopped on this a bit. I have two problems to deal with: what the argument is and how to convey it and I don't really have the mental room to solve both problems at the same time, at least not optimally. Also, it's true that I want my argument to appeal to the layman but I've since decided that should probably come later and that I should appeal to the philosopher first. After all, if the argument does not get past the philosopher but gets to the layman that would feel like a kind of lying. And so, it seems worth making a rigorous version of the argument first and then condensing or simplifying it later once the work earns the confidence to do so. Also, when I talk about appealing to the philosopher I'm not talking about all philosophers at all levels. What I'm trying to do is write the argument so that it is i) rigorous, thorough and as airtight as possible, and ii) so that it can be understood by anyone with a nominal understanding of philosophy (much like you and I or better educated laypeople).

    In light of that, what is your opinion of the second post?
  • TVCL
    79


    [In referece to the second post]

    the main thing that I would like to know is whether the argument is valid/rigorous or not. There were some additions in that passage compared to the first draft.
  • Philosophim
    2.2k
    Good morning TVCL! My apologies, but with holidays I've been out of town. I thought I would post this real quick, but I should be back next week. Cheers!
  • TVCL
    79


    No worries mate, thanks for letting me know.
  • Philosophim
    2.2k
    And finally back in the saddle! Its been a while since I've read these, so pardon me if I miss something.

    To the first post:
    Doesn't your counter-argument run the risk of making the concept of "truth" convoluted by assuming that when we claim access to truth we claim access to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

    To claim that something is true does not necessarily entail that we deem it to be certainly true or objectively true or eternally true etc. Now, I believe that such truths exist but the simple claim that truth is "accordance with reality" appears to be basically tautological and need not bring these other assumptions in which appear to confuse the issue.
    TVCL

    I believe that's what truth is. You can't really have partial truth. You can have knowledge of part of something true. But truth itself is not partial. It is simply what is. I think you're backtracking into equating knowledge with truth again (an easy thing to do). At the end of the day, knowledge is a rational assessment of what the truth is, but truth itself can not be provably grasped.

    As for the sense of what you have written, I also do not think it is necessary to address your search for knowledge in such a way. I think you are overcomplicating it. While we may decide to search or not search for truth, I believe what you are implying is there are rational and necessary steps one must do to fulfill this search. I believe the word choice and examination is overly laborous for the audience you are trying to reach. If you view a second pass on your work as only stating what is absolutely needed to convey your intent, it will clean up nicely.

    I think in the end you are trying to convey that epistemology is the study and examination of those necessary steps that occur when a person searches for knowledge. Again, I could misunderstand this.

    Even if you are not trying to appeal to the layman at first, I still think it just needs a cleanup pass.
  • TVCL
    79


    Hope you are doing well.

    As to the matter of truth...
    I've decided to keep it, whilst including a section comparing it to knowledge. Allow me to explain... It's unwise to drift too far away from our common-sense understanding of things in order to be clear and when all is said and done, what the model reveals is actually closer to the dictionary definition of truth than it is with knowledge. Truth is "that which is the case" and the model reveals what the case is by revealing what it allows. Admittedly, there are two qualifications: first, we do not technically have direct access to the truth (maybe). Instead we have knowledge of the truth (although, if there is no access to it whatsoever, we might ask how we can speak meaningfully of it in the first place). Second, when we "access" the truth we do not access the entire thing. We may come to know some part of the complete truth, but not the whole and therefore, the possibility is open for us to have presumptions based on the parts that we currently know, and for these to require revision when we come to know more.

    In brief, the model will be described as a model for searching for truth because that is it's function. When we distinguish belief, knowledge and truth (or "reality") we are framing the model such that must test, access and therefore "find" truth in order to form knowledge. Attempting to side-skirt this conclusion would actually make the argument less coherent and more complicated.

    As to the writing...
    Your message came in good time. Thank you; it had a sobering effect. I was attempting to write a fourth draft of the work and make it very thorough but the thing was fast becoming very dense, dry and wordy.

    On the other hand, I listened plan that I'd made a while back and noted that in that I'd recognised that this work should not and would not be for a layman because the work regards someone who is formally searching for truth. In short, on the one hand the work could be too over-complicated if I either try to make it extremely thorough or extremely clear (which is also ironic because I'm a Wittgensteinian and know that nothing can be so clear as to not be misunderstood).

    In any case, the work should be aimed at our level or just below is. My plan it to write as if I am explaining the idea to someone like yourself or a young philosophy student as if for the first at - say - a meal or on a long walk, whilst not missing any of the major points.

    My next post to you will be about a final piece I need to think through which is how the model allows for the choice between models.

    Best Regards
  • Philosophim
    2.2k
    Hi TVCL, sorry for the late response on this. Your philosophy is your own. If you wish to take it down that route, that is your choice. Just know that the criticism I gave of knowing truth will come back again and again, especially if you wish to make this better than a layman's theory. I am not saying you are wrong to conclude as you are, just spend a lot of time thinking on how best to answer these criticisms from people who are serious about epistemology. If you cannot give an adequate answer to their criticisms, it will cause a fatal hole in your theory.

    And yes, I understand about the writing! I've been there myself, I'm glad my points helped. Keep at it, there's a lot of promise here!

    I am going to be back on these boards a lot more this week, even with Christmas. I look forward to your details on choosing models!
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