Why should my definition of flourishing align with those of religious people, as you suggest? — Thomas Quine

Because if it doesn't then your claim that "alk moral systems are about human flourishing" is flat out wrong. Some moral systems are clearly aimed at achieving something which you would not define as 'flourishing'.

It may be that all moral systems are aimed at what they themselves consider 'flourishing', but this is barely more than tautology.

If we agree that the problem morality is trying to solve is how best to flourish, my position is that learning from science is your best bet. — Thomas Quine

If we agree with your system, then your system is the best? OK.

I dislike the current state of ethical theory and I want to kick over the whole gameboard. — Thomas Quine

But the implications are huge, because they mean science can tell us what is moral and what is not. — Thomas Quine

You are kind of all over the place in terms of posing the question, which is the single most important thing in philosophy.

At times you seem to be arguing that morality - in the minds and actions of all people, as well as in all moral theories - comes down to the imperative of flourishing. This addresses the question of what moral behavior and moral thought looks like to an observer. (As I have pointed out, it takes only a minimal attention to contemporary and historical moral attitudes and moral theories to see that this is not the case; it is at best only one facet.)

You also put forward a more plausible thesis, which sees that same imperative as an emergent feature of our evolved psychology. This is still an empirical question, but this time concerning the origins and the natural explanation of morality. (I think there is some truth to it, but this is still an oversimplified, one-sided and overconfident narrative.)

Through all this you also seem to be advancing a normative thesis, which is that morality should serve the purpose of human flourishing. And the justification for this thesis somehow relies on the claim that that is what moral attitudes amount to anyway, and/or that this is what has in fact emerged from the biological evolution of human psychology. (The logic of this justification escapes me.)

Finally, when it comes to the concrete solutions, you give us astonishingly banal pronouncements:
- If we want something, we should make our best effort to achieve it!
- Oh! Oh! I know! Let's use Science!
- What a wonderfully refreshing thought!

Really?

Because if it doesn't then your claim that "alk moral systems are about human flourishing" is flat out wrong. Some moral systems are clearly aimed at achieving something which you would not define as 'flourishing'. — Isaac

I thought I made it pretty clear that there are many different, even contradictory views about what best serves human flourishing. It does not matter to religious people how I define flourishing, they have their own definition. They believe that following God's law is the way to achieve what is best for humanity. I believe we need to consult science to determine what best serves human flourishing. Why do you think that I agree with the religious people?

ISIS wanted to create a new Caliphate in the Middle East because they believed that strict Islamic fundamentalism was the path to human flourishing, in this life and the next. Do I have to agree with them, just because I make that observation? It seems to me it led to a bloody nightmare for everyone involved. Does this change the fact that their motivation was to create a better world?

I try to distinguish between people's intentions and the outcomes of their actions. The road to hell and all that.

If we agree with your system, then your system is the best? OK. — Isaac

If you don't agree with my system, then I would love to hear why not. That's why I came to this board, to hear a solid critique from people who think a lot about these sorts of things. Thanks for your help with this.

I don't think following the commands in the Holy Books written by an imaginary God is more conducive to human flourishing than following the advice of science. But lots of people do. — Thomas Quine

It’s a very big mistake to assume that people are rational, or that we’re not all prone to social influence.

I was a little surprised recently to read about some politically fat-right and religious folks condemning the the Pope for supporting efforts to reduce climate change. Apparently, political identity can trump religious identity, in this day and age.

Moral systems tend to, or perhaps inevitably, become a group identity, and when that happens the group becomes primary and actual moral behavior secondary. The development of virtue is discouraged because that leads to independence from the group.

I can't see a difference between the injunction to do the right thing, the injunction to do your duty and the injunction to be virtuous. — Janus

The right thing, in certain circumstances, could be considered a dereliction of duty, where the difference is between a moral sense of loyalty or responsibility and some other moral sense like fairness or care.

I find myself moving away from duty and happiness, towards virtue. — Banno

The stoics believe that eudaemonia is achieved with the development of virtue because, if for no other reason, it’s the one thing that we have complete control of and will therefore be satisfying and something that can’t be taken from us. Responsibility and loyalty are virtues, btw.

I thought I made it pretty clear that there are many different, even contradictory views about what best serves human flourishing. — Thomas Quine

So if we take 'flourishing' to be a variable x (some thing), then your statement "all moral systems aim at human flourishing" becomes "all moral systems aim at something", which seems just trivially true - hence the confusion.

If you don't agree with my system, then I would love to hear why not. — Thomas Quine

The most straightforward answer - the vast majority of moral decisions are either simple enough that we already know the answer (and so don't need a system), or sufficiently complex that linear univariate systems cannot consider all the implications of any choice to a degree significantly better than chance. Like the stock exchange, there's all manner of very detailed systems for working out investment strategies, but economics is sufficiently complicated that none of them perfom better than chance over the long run.

But that's the boring answer. The much more controversial one is James Blair. In 1995 he studied some of the world's most vicious psychopaths. Among other fascinating discoveries (I strongly recommended his work), was this gem - psychopaths can behave incredibly morally in many situations. What differentiates them from normal folk is that they don't distinguish between breaking a rule and doing something morally wrong. I seriously worry about any attempt to turn the whole of morality into a series of rules and calculations.

So if we take 'flourishing' to be a variable x (some thing), then your statement "all moral systems aim at human flourishing" becomes "all moral systems aim at something", which seems just trivially true - hence the confusion. — Isaac

"Flourishing" is the constant, not the variable. The variable is the variety of moral systems seeking to achieve human flourishing; the constant is that all the varieties seek the same end: human flourishing.

My argument is that there is a grounding to all these varieties; they all are attempts to solve the same problem.

All moral systems say the same thing: "If we all just do X, we will flourish as a result."

For X insert any moral precept.

My argument is that there is a grounding to all these varieties; they all are attempts to solve the same problem. — Thomas Quine

That makes flourishing of a different character than any specific moral value or system then, no? It plays the role of condition for the possibility of morality, a teleological structure operative within it, and a source of imperatives that does not constrain their character.

Thou shalt flourish - in what way? No no you misunderstand, any way is conceived of in terms of flourishing. What does that tell us about what to do or how to be? It doesn't tell us what to do or how to be, it simply is the purpose that any moral guidance or character growth will act in accord with.

Genes propagate when the carriers survive, merely. Our species is a significant line differentiation, but it’s only one layer out of many possible distinctions. We’re naturally more concerned with human flourishing than that of chimps, and then closer to home, we’re more concerned with national flourishing, then perhaps regional, religious, or political party flourishing, and then family. Does anyone regard all of humanity as they do their own family? Maybe some do ideologically but when push comes to shove genes always win favor. — praxis

Obvious reductionism aside you're absolutely spot on.

That makes flourishing of a different character than any specific moral value or system then, no? — fdrake

Yes, to flourish is not a moral system, it is the objective of a moral system.

My argument is that science can tell us how to flourish, therefore science can tell us what is moral and what is not by seeking answers to the question, "What helps humanity to flourish and what does not?"

Science tells us how to cure disease, what we need for nutrition, how to raise healthy children, etc. Social science seeks answers to questions like how to reduce crime, what causes violence, how to achieve political stability, how a society should respond to a pandemic, whether or not slavery is a viable societal or economic system, and so on.

To apply this approach to moral questions, ask in any situation, "What would best serve human flourishing?" To find the best answer, consult the available science.

I’m pretty sure that science informs us that processed food, refined sugars, fat, overeating, drinking, lack of exercise, smoking, drugs, etc etc, isn’t conducive to humans flourishing, and yet we indulge ourselves anyway.

We’re not an entirely rational species.

You are kind of all over the place in terms of posing the question, which is the single most important thing in philosophy. — SophistiCat

Here is the question: "Is there a universal grounding for morality?"

I look at the things that most people consider immoral:

Theft; murder; sexual abuse; pedophilia; breaking contracts; lying; corruption; slavery; you name it.

I ask, "What do all these have in common?" My answer is, they all are detrimental to human flourishing. Who am I to say? How do I know this? I consult the evidence from the available science.

I look at the things most people consider moral:

Kindness; charity; courtesy; honor; honesty; keeping promises; being a good parent; you name it.

I ask, "What do all these have in common?" My answer is, they all are helpful to human flourishing. Who am I to say? How do I know this? I consult the evidence from the available science.

I therefore suggest there might be a universal grounding for morality. We consider something to be moral if it we believe it serves human flourishing, and to be immoral if hinders it.

Of course people disagree about what best serves human flourishing, and therefore different cultures and subcultures have different moral standards. Some cultures and subcultures have believed or do believe things like racism, human sacrifice, killing infidels, acts of terror against innocent civilians, praying to your favorite God, etc are moral because they are in the best interests of human flourishing.

How can we tell who is right? Consult the available science.

I ask, "What do all these have in common?" My answer is, they all are detrimental to human flourishing. Who am I to say? How do I know this? I consult the evidence from the available science. — Thomas Quine

Again, this can be attributed to violating a negative ethics of non-harm and non-force. Flourishing is only a secondary hypothetical imperative. IF you want long-run happiness THEN there might be some well-trodden ideas about how to gain this. It is not guaranteed, and it often relies on contingencies of various kinds (e.g. personality types, surrounding circumstances), but it can be construed as practical truisms that can be practiced. This (long-run gains) should not be misconstrued as a morality though.

Again, this can be attributed to violating a negative ethics of non-harm and non-force. — schopenhauer1

Don't know much about negative ethics, but at first glance it appears to be more of a thought experiment than a moral system that any culture has embraced.

There is a reason most people think suicide is immoral: our DNA tells us we should be instead trying to survive and flourish.

Don't know much about negative ethics, but at first glance it appears to be more of a thought experiment than a moral system that any culture has embraced. — Thomas Quine

It just means, either preventing a negative or not violating a right. So preventing harm to others or not unnecessarily forcing things upon others.

There is a reason most people think suicide is immoral: our DNA tells us we should be instead trying to survive and flourish. — Thomas Quine

This sounds like an appeal to nature fallacy. For example, aggression is also a part of most human experience. It doesn't mean it is always called for. Humans tend to like feeling good.

It may be wise to maximize happiness in the long-run by downplaying short-term gains and emphasizing things that will build over time. However, this tendency to like happiness, and this folk-wisdom to try to maximize long-term gains does not necessarily amount to a morality, or how to treat other people in theory or in practice. Rather, it is just a sort of hypothetical imperative, that may be prudent.

I think it's common, but only with the caveat I introduced earlier (that we're talking about complex moral decisions, not whether to beat a child). — Isaac

OK, but I'm trying to drill down further; what does a virtuous person generally look like to the common eye? Cruel, indifferent, manipulating, exploitative, vicious, resentful, vengeful or kind, considerate, respectful, giving, loving, forgiving and so on? It seems obvious to me that people generally admire the second set of characteristics and not the first. And the former is a picture of someone who does not care for others well-being, for their flourishing, in fact may even take pleasure in hurting, punishing others, and the latter picture is of someone who does care for others, for their well-being and flourishing.

So, i think we can talk about this phenomenologically, and that it's quite easy to see the conceptual and associative logic behind moral thinking. Very simply a moral act is an act motivated by care, an immoral act is motivated by self-interest and an amoral act is an expression of indifference. Although it might be the case that many people will think that it is immoral to be amoral; that such a person, even if they do no harm, are still immoral insofar as they might fail to contribute.

There is a reason most people think suicide is immoral: our DNA tells us we should be instead trying to survive and flourish. — Thomas Quine

I think it's more because such an act shows the person to be concerned with themselves more than others. The act hurts those who love the suiciding person. Do you believe suicide would be considered immoral if the person who suicides were outcast, totally alone and scorned by all?

I’m pretty sure that science informs us that processed food, refined sugars, fat, overeating, drinking, lack of exercise, smoking, drugs, etc etc, isn’t conducive to humans flourishing, and yet we indulge ourselves anyway. — praxis

It depends on whether a person would be miserable without indulging in those things. There is always a tradeoff.

all moral precepts are an attempt to answer the question, “What best serves human flourishing?” — Thomas Quine

This whole thread has a bit of a smell to me. Throughout this thread, this has been your general proposal. To some particular challenges to morality you have defended your general proposal by explaining how some particular moral precept which does not actually seem to serve human flourishing is, in fact, an attempt to answer the question of flourishing.

I would like to just start with the presumption that anything that anyone proposes, you would be able to fit to this thesis. So let's talk about that generically... what about the society of X-ists, who propose a moral principle of Y, which obviously is not about human flourishing? Well, here's the thing. Y might not really look like it's about human flourishing, but if you look at the X-ist society, their Y moral principle is an attempt to Z because they believe Z is the reason behind flourishing. This seems to be the generic recipe.

And that is where the smell comes in. So here's my challenge. If this is, in fact, a principle whereby you can always apply this recipe to defend your original thesis, then what is your general thesis actually saying? Another way to phrase this is, what sort of moral principles might we hypothetically find in some human society that would actually not follow from your thesis, but that we find in practice always (generally?) does follow? I would propose that if there is no such hypothetical violation, then the entire thesis can be dropped as being meaningless. The test of the thesis being useful is that there is such a hypothetical violation but we find in practice it's never (or maybe even rarely) violated.

The test of the thesis being useful is that there is such a hypothetical violation but we find in practice it's never (or maybe even rarely) violated. — InPitzotl

I don't know about the OP, but I would say that it is simply an attempt to identity the basic logic underlying moral thinking. And it would not be the basic logic of moral thinking if there were exceptions, so your attempted critique seems to fail here.

Remember this is more phenomenology than science. Phenomenology says things like such and such is the way it is for humans and gives its reasons for saying that. It does not imagine hypotheses which generate predictions to be empirically tested like science does.

And it would not be the basic logic of moral thinking if there were exceptions, so your attempted critique seems to fail here. — Janus

I'm more after meaning than science. Yes, this looks similar to falsifiability, but the basic idea is that if the thesis can explain everything, then it explains nothing.

I think it’s more a question of valuing sense pleasure/immediate gratification vs something more eudaemonic, which may be why I find this discussion a little frustrating or too one dimensional. Thomas seems to be claiming that we all seek well-being and that with the help of science, of all things, we could readily achieve it. Science cannot change our values, at least not until neural implants with mind control is invented.

The point I'm making is that it's not a thesis, but an identification of underlying logic. It's not so much meant to explain anything as it is merely to clarify what's basically going on. To be after explanations is to be wanting to do science; to be after meanings is to be wanting insight, clarification.

You might take issue with the OP's thesis that this basic logic of moral thinking is evolved and encoded within our DNA. What hasn't evolved? So I would have no argument with that. However to say it is encoded within the DNA is a theses I would not attempt to uphold.

Yes, it's one thing to say that morality is basically concerned with human flourishing, and another thing entirely to identify just what that flourishing consists in. That why moral deliberations are often plagued by conflicts of interest.

It's not so much meant to explain anything as it is merely to clarify what's basically going on. — Janus

I don't see a difference. "X is what is basically going on" is the explanation. I'm suspecting the potential for illusory meaning... what exactly are you objecting to?

You might take issue with the OP's thesis that this basic logic of moral thinking is evolved — Janus

^^- FTR I made no mention of that.

Sure you can call it an explanation, but it is not really much of a one. A proper explanation would not merely identify what is going on, but explain just how and why it is going on.

Sure you can call it an explanation, but it is not really much of a one. — Janus

Sure, but it is one.

A proper explanation would not merely to identify what is going on,

Okay, so it's not a "proper explanation". Let's call it a clarification. But this clarification of morality proposes that moral precepts are attempts to answer the question about what best serves human flourishing. If all moral precepts, even hypothetical, even contradictory, could be argued in some convoluted sense to still be an attempt to answer the question about what best served human flourishing, then what value does this clarification actually have... what exactly is it clarifying?

But this clarification of morality proposes that moral precepts are attempts to answer the question about what best serves human flourishing. — InPitzotl

That may be what the OP says, but it is not what I would say. I would say that moral thinking is driven by concern for human flourishing; so that concern is its underlying logic. The further questions then would be just what human flourishing in general consists in, and just what acts and/or kinds of acts contribute to or detract from that flourishing. That then would be the empirical part of the investigation which follows on from the basic logic of our moral intuitions and feelings. Actual moral deliberations in the everyday world then would be attempts to answer that second question, not in general terms, but in specific situations.

the basic idea is that if the thesis can explain everything, then it explains nothing. — InPitzotl

Well here's what I think is the value of this approach. For the sake of argument, bear with me, let's accept the following as true:

1. Human beings are active, agentic creatures who seek to flourish both as individuals and in community.
2. All morality is an attempt to answer the question, "What best serves human flourishing?" What kinds of rules can we come up with that will help us to all get along and prosper?
3. Science can tell us a lot about what best serves human flourishing.
4. Therefore, science can tell us what is moral and what is not.

If all that is true, and I await a cogent refutation, we have an objective basis for morality and right conduct.

If true, the thesis poses a moral challenge to religion, to policy-making, to the way business is done, to ideologies such as American exceptionalism and constitutional originalism, to law, justice, political regimes, etc. To all the ideologies, policies, laws, and regimes that hinder human flourishing.

So I've no problems with 1. Regarding 2, "all" is a gigantic ask, and I'm not quite sure this is accurate. There are animal rights activists who favor the rights of non-human animals in their morality not from the perspective of human flourishing, but rather for the sake of the animals themselves. There are also in some moralities weightings of narrower groups, sometimes to exclusion of other human groups. We might also consider some moral precepts as favoring non-human groups (gods, the organization, etc).

Consider for example the animal rights activist. In particular, he might be morally against the avoidable torture of non-human animals. I would interpret your claim that his moral precept is an attempt to answer the question of what best serves human flourishing somewhere along the line of, if you were to convince said activist that such torture had no effect on human flourishing, he should be okay with it. But I'm a bit skeptical that once convinced of such a thing, your job is done; I equate that to his moral precept not being an attempt to address the question of human flourishing, but rather to be based on something else.

If all that is true, and I await a cogent refutation, we have an objective basis for morality and right conduct. — Thomas Quine

Not quite yet; it gets a lot muddier in the details. But we need not go there... one would have to agree that we're after human flourishing in particular to start down this road (i.e., agree with 2).
ETA:

If true, the thesis poses a moral challenge to religion, to policy-making, to the way business is done, to ideologies such as American exceptionalism and constitutional originalism, to law, justice, political regimes, etc. — Thomas Quine

I'm not quite sure this proposal is needed to analyze faults in some of these areas (see e.g. this thread).