Neglect of Context

Ciceronianus

John Dewey thought that the most pervasive problem of philosophical thinking is neglect of context. He thought it so pervasive that he called it "the philosophical fallacy."

According to Dewey, the philosophical fallacy, in general, "consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions."

"The philosophical fallacy" is a part of a general critique of philosophical thinking that anticipated, I believe, the criticisms made by later philosophers. Dewey felt that philosophical thinking in large part involves abstraction, reification, and a tendency to treat as insignificant, and perhaps even as less than real (not really real)--or even unreal, that which is non-cognitive or pre-cognitive. (Here I'm paraphrasing Gregory Pappas' interpretation of Dewey on this). It's a form of intellectualism, an emphasis on knowing and what can be known, which is a limited view of our experience. Says Pappas, interpreting and later quoting Dewey: "In fact, we have a qualitative appreciation of our surroundings that precedes, underlies, and cannot be reduced to knowledge. Our intellectual activities always operate within the more general context of the world as encountered, lived, enjoyed, and suffered by humans. In primary experience ‘things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized.’ (LW 1:27-28)"

I have no idea whether Dewey used the good ole pencil/stick in water chestnut as an example of this fallacy, but I think it is one. You know it, of course. The pencil/stick appears "bent" when placed in water but, in fact, it isn't bent. Therefore, our senses "deceive" us. We can't rely on them to know what is really the case. And that, of course, means....and on we go.

I tend to agree with Dewey. But apparently unlike him I wonder whether the philosophical fallacy and its variants are not merely pervasive in philosophical thought, but an inherent characteristic of it. In other words, is it inescapable? What is philosophy but abstraction, and what is abstraction but if not the neglect of context, the disregard of it? And if that's the case--whither philosophy?

180 Proof

What is philosophy but abstraction, and what is abstraction but if not the neglect of context, the disregard of it? — Ciceronianus the White

I don't think philosophy is 'nothing but' abstraction; I understand it to consist of complementary aspects: (a) reflective inquiry into ab/mis/uses of abstractions (e.g. language-games, institutional facts), and (b) reflective practice of using meta-abstractions to differentiate correlate and contextualize object-abstractions (e.g. aesthetics of music, dialectical materialism).

And if that's the case--whither philosophy?

Dewey's concern, I think, arises only when philosophers make 'categorical (especially self-subsuming) truth-claims' about matters of fact on the basis of abstractions alone (i.e. "pure reason") e.g. all truthes are relative ... nothing matters ... everything has consciousness ...

Pantagruel

Dewey also applied this principle to the means-end issue. Utilitarianism presumes that certain ends can be imposed on contexts, wherein means can then be selected arbitrarily (i.e. the ends justify the means). Dewey offers that, instead, we should always be prepared to "discover" new ends based on the discovery of new capabilities in contexts. Talcott Parsons espouses an almost identical perspective in his analysis of social action and economics, we should discover new wants based on our new activities, not arbitrarily formulate new wants and attempt to tailor our activities to them.

fdrake

What is philosophy but abstraction, and what is abstraction but if not the neglect of context, the disregard of it? — Ciceronianus the White

Do you think we understand stuff on a day to day basis without abstractions? Treating something as if it is some composite of our experience and thoughts about it looks inescapable to me. If I restart a computer in the expectation that it will fix a software issue, that expectation seems rooted in an abstraction I've made about computers and software. My actions might be specified, but my beliefs which show themselves within them are often conceptual. Concepts seem a lot like abstractions to me - being generalisations from experience.

So I imagine that it's an inescapable source of error in philosophy, but simply because it's an inescapable source of error everywhere - the world won't always behave in the ways I expect it to.

unenlightened

I have no idea whether Dewey used the good ole pencil/stick in water chestnut as an example — Ciceronianus the White

Confucius he say, "Stick in water chestnut make good party food."

Ciceronianus

↪unenlightened

Preferably with bacon.

3017amen

Do you think we understand stuff on a day to day basis without abstractions? My actions might be specified, but my beliefs which show themselves within them are often conceptual. Concepts seem a lot like abstractions to me - being generalisations from experience.

So I imagine that it's an inescapable source of error in philosophy, but simply because it's an inescapable source of error everywhere - the world won't always behave in the ways I expect it to. — fdrake

Well said fdrake! How existential of you!!

3017amen

Confucius he say, "Stick in water chestnut make good party food." — unenlightened

And a good Latino friend once said, " I have party in my panks!!"

LOL, sorry it's almost Friday!

Ciceronianus

So I imagine that it's an inescapable source of error in philosophy, but simply because it's an inescapable source of error everywhere - the world won't always behave in the ways I expect it to. — fdrake

Well, there's abstraction, and then there's abstraction. What we think in particular circumstances may involve abstraction, but we also in most cases do something as well--as a result of abstraction or as a part of it. We encounter a problem in life (a situation we wish to resolve for one reason or another, or end, or which we want to respond to in some sense we find satisfactory) we think about it and then do something which makes it better or worse or leaves the problem in status quo.

All too often, I think, philosophy involves abstraction regarding not what we actually encounter in life, which requires deliberation and action in context, and a result, which may or may not require additional deliberation and action--but mere abstraction where context is at most of nominal concern. There's abstraction in context (in interaction with others and our environment) and abstraction without context, I think.

Ciceronianus

Dewey also applied this principle to the means-end issue. Utilitarianism presumes that certain ends can be imposed on contexts, wherein means can then be selected arbitrarily (i.e. the ends justify the means). Dewey offers that, instead, we should always be prepared to "discover" new ends based on the discovery of new capabilities in contexts. — Pantagruel

Yes. Though "the philosophical fallacy" is more evident in metaphysics and epistemology, it occurs in ethics as well. Dewey's concern to avoid the ill effects of the fallacy has made him seem to be a relativist to those who think certitude is needed, but his commitment to the application of intelligent method to problems in context and intelligent judgment of the results of the method saves him from relativism.

Ciceronianus

Dewey's concern, I think, arises only when philosophers make 'categorical (especially self-subsuming) truth-claims' about matters of fact on the basis of abstractions alone (i.e. "pure reason") e.g. all truthes are relative ... nothing matters ... everything has consciousness ... — 180 Proof

Yes, I'd agree that's his primary concern. And I think philosophy remains useful, along the lines you note. But its role then becomes something very different from the role it's played for centuries. Does its role then become one of developing and employing a method of addressing and resolving what Dewey called "the problems of men" as opposed to "the problems of philosophy"?

deletedmemberal

Dewey felt that philosophical thinking in large part involves abstraction, reification, and a tendency to treat as insignificant, and perhaps even as less than real (not really real)--or even unreal, that which is non-cognitive or pre-cognitive. — Ciceronianus the White

The same is true for economic models. The reason behind it is that it is just impossible to create a workable and applicable model if you do not have some constants or assumptions, as changeable as they may be. One of the fundamental assumptions that economics make is that every individual is rational and maximizes his utility. This is very easily refutable when you walk into a supermarket and buy goods based on preferences and pangs of desire instead of optimizing you disposable income.
I suppose that the same kind of logic applies to philosohpy making

Ciceronianus

↪Alejandro

But I imagine (wrongly, perhaps) that economic models may still be useful if they are shown to apply accurately to a certain percentage or extent, based on statistics. That wouldn't be the case with philosophy or philosophical models, if there are such things.

fdrake

All too often, I think, philosophy involves abstraction regarding not what we actually encounter in life, which requires deliberation and action in context, and a result, which may or may not require additional deliberation and action--but mere abstraction where context is at most of nominal concern. There's abstraction in context (in interaction with others and our environment) and abstraction without context, I think. — Ciceronianus the White

With the risk of being too abstract; this sounds about right to me. The distinction between the two flavours of abstraction; philosophical and practical; looks to me like:

(1) Practical abstractions arise in all practical activity; they inform how we act in context.
(2) Philosophical abstractions arise in in a context of the exercise of reasoning about something.

I imagine that when we're reasoning about something, in that act of reasoning taking a topic to be reasoned about circumscribes its apprehended character; some things will be immediately relevant to it, some things will be irrelevant to it, so judges the reasoner. Making too much irrelevant to whatever we are reasoning about looks like a particularly fecund site of this error. Generalizing too much comes with inappropriately fixing the contours of what is inquired about. There will always be the question of what is too much generalizing, and that depends on the context.

I think that paints philosophical abstractions as more abstract than practical abstractions; insofar as philosophical abstractions are informed by practical abstractions. The pertinent question seems to me - does that work the other way around too? In answer - presumably, when it seems relevant to the thinker. Reasoning diligently seems to me to have the power to change how we behave and form those practical abstractions.

Should anyone expect philosophy to behave differently? It's an exercise in reason, if the problems of men are helped solely by practical abstractions, philosophy will not be seen as helpful most of the time - it is the wrong kind of thought. If philosophy is used in a manner that modifies the formation of those practical abstractions - it will impact the problems of men.

Ciceronianus

Philosophical abstractions arise in in a context of the exercise of reasoning about something. — fdrake

Dewey's criticism seems to be of a surfeit of reasoning, though. Mere reasoning, divorced of context, is what he seems to feel is the error that pervades philosophy. Context seems to him to include unreasonable elements, non-cognitive elements, the understanding of which isn't subject to abstraction; or which abstraction disregards. Practical abstraction, practical reasoning, involves means and ends and arriving at a conclusion. Philosophical abstraction doesn't, presumably because of "neglect of context."

This obviously is merely one interpretation of Dewey's position. It's an interpretation which suggests that Dewey's criticism of philosophy is such that it renders philosophy as traditionally practiced not meaningless, and not useless (as philosophical abstraction may in some cases be useful) but ultimately misguided and unable to provide an understanding of the world.

180 Proof

Yes, I'd agree that's his primary concern. And I think philosophy remains useful, along the lines you note. But its role then becomes something very different from the role it's played for centuries. Does its role then become one of developing and employing a method of addressing and resolving what Dewey called "the problems of men" as opposed to "the problems of philosophy"? — Ciceronianus the White

I don't conceive of these "roles" as "opposed" to one another but as complementaries of theory (i.e. 'how best to think') and practice (i.e. 'how best to live') in a positive feedback loop relation such as (Gramsci/Arendt) praxis.

Neglect of Context

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