• waarala
    47


    This is a well known fact. Heidegger's short "explanation" or "self criticism" of his interpretation can be found in a preface to second edition of his Kant book (1950). Heidegger speaks here about endeavour/experiment which tries to start/set in motion a thinking dialogue/discussion (Gespräch) between thinkers; in difference to the methods of historical philology, which has its own task, thinking dialogue (Zwiegespräch) is under different laws (and which are more vulnerable to lacks and neglects).

    [Heidegger writes in German: "Diese ("laws of thinking dialogue") sind verletzlicher. Das Verfehlende ist in der Zwiesprache drohender, das Fehlende häufiger."]
  • Xtrix
    923
    As expected, none of them mention Heidegger, which reinforces my initial statement: Heidegger's Greece is only suitable for Heidegger fans.David Mo

    I'm not a "fan" of his per se, but I have read him and have concluded that he's accurate and deep. But taking myself out of the equation: don't you think there's something more than luck or charlatanism involved in Heidegger's name still being around, books being published about him still, etc., if there wasn't something important there? I would check it out more for yourself, make a real effort to understand it, and then see if the critics are correct.
  • Xtrix
    923
    Of course they do.David Mo

    Fine -- one reference on where "logos" isn't also "gathering," etc. I've read nothing of the kind. The fact that he's unconventional is well established, and known even by him.

    but they say that what Heidegger sees in the text is not in it.David Mo

    No, they don't. At least that's not what I've seen. What they do is disagree with his nuanced way of translating -- which isn't surprising. But I think they're just wrong: take a look at the texts, even those in Intro to Metaphysics, that he discusses. He makes a very convincing case, if one firsts understands the background thought -- otherwise it looks insane.

    So here we both, not as philologists, have a choice: go with one group saying one thing, or another group saying another. There is debate about this. I have preferred to read Heidegger, and I've concluded that he's very clear and very illuminating indeed. His neologisms and funny language, which he also injects into his translations (after a lot of explanation and background), are not that difficult once you learn them.

    It happens that they are not "his critics", it is practically all the experts on the subject.David Mo

    If that were true, Heidegger wouldn't be but a faint memory. It's not settled, and even if it were one still has to ask: did they truly engage with his thought? Nietzsche faces similar problems, as you know -- being anti-semitic, being used by the Nazis, etc. Hegel faces enormous criticism for his supposed incomprehension, etc. Even if Heidegger was way off in some respects -- and if so, I haven't been presented any evidence of this, just appeals to vague authorities -- that's missing the point really. Take "ousia," conventionally translated "substance." Whether Heidegger is completely wrong in highlighting a nuanced meaning of "ousia," his entire critique is based on how its been translated (and thus interpreted) as what it is. Who could argue with that? He thinks it gets further away from what the word meant in Aristotle's day, but we all agree on how it was translated.

    So perhaps first get the general sense of what he's describing, and then we can get into the weeds about accuracy of his own translation.

    I'm quite open to the fact that Heidegger could be completely wrong about everything he said. No sunk-cost fallacy here. But it will take some evidence, and I'm not yet convinced with yours. I would be really shocked, too, given my understanding of his thought.

    Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise
    — Xtrix
    I haven't pretended any such thing at all. I'm not an expert on Heidegger and I've said so several times. My knowledge of Heidegger is limited to three books of him, two monographs and about four articles on him. Regarding Introduction to Metaphysics, I am reading it now -due to your kind recommendation- and I comment on what I am reading.
    David Mo

    Eh, it sounds to me like you're hit this particular issue more to "refute" than learn. And you may be right, but that attitude is never conducive to truly hearing -- that requires an openness, not blind but deliberate.
  • David Mo
    635
    I am sorry I cannot continue this interesting debate right now. But I'll be back, as Patton said.David Mo

    "God is." "The earth is." "The lecture is in the auditorium." "This man is from Swabia." "The cup is of silver.'' "The peasant is in the fields." "The book is mine." "He is dead." "Red is the port side." "In Russia there is famine." "The enemy is in retreat." "The vine disease is in the vineyards." "The dog is in the garden." "Over all the peaks / is peace." (ItM: 68/93)

    These examples are offered by Heidegger to demonstrate his thesis that "Being" is not an empty word, but is paradoxical since it is intuitively understood in its daily use, but mysteriously resists being defined. This is in spite of the fact that, according to him, the term "Sein" is the most "high", that is to say the most general, and is presupposed in every language in such a way that, if it were not understood, the language itself would disappear. Heidegger's analysis of his own examples is disappointing for several reasons.


    First of all because it is not true that the use of a term means any defined "intuitive" understanding. Nor is it true that without a perfect understanding of "is" there would be no language. Words are learned through successive trials and errors until they reach an acceptable use by the community of speakers. This does not imply that our use or "understanding" of that word is "defined", nor that there is a universal community of speakers. On the contrary, both children and adults are often called upon to misuse a word they thought they were using correctly. Therefore, the question of "Being" does not make much sense if we do not look at the uses of "being" in various communities of speakers. It is not true, then, that in order to use the word "tree" one must have a knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees that have been presented to the speaking subject. The concept is formed from them and used in a process of continuous variation. It does not exist as an immutable entity and prior to the use of language achieved by who knows what mysterious intellectual intuition. The same with "tree" as with "being".


    There are some fundamental observations in the examples Heidegger proposes that he "surprisingly" overlooks. First, they involve three different uses of the word "being" that correspond to three different language communities. Most are simple copulations that attach a predicate to the subject of the sentence. Ex: "The cup is of silver". These are the ones that correspond to the common language and do not offer any metaphysical difficulty. Another, "Over all the peaks / is peace" is a poetic language that, as is well known, is not descriptive but metaphorical and emotional. We can park it because it does not enter into the subject.
    But the first two sentences are properly metaphysical or theological. In ordinary language no one says "The dog is". But a metaphysician will say "God is."

    As Carnap says, the problem with Heidegger is that he makes a jumble of all these uses to build a fictional "entity", which is-but is not-one thing or a "fact": the " Being". In the Heideggerian explanation any use of "is" is confused with "exist". Now, when a theologian speaks of God's "being" he can say two things: his existence or his essence. God exists or God is immutable, eternal, etc. When a normal person wants to say that a communist exists or is in the garden he uses expressions like "there is," "is in" (or he names it while pointing it out!), but he does not make "Existence" a problem. In fact, the problem of the existence of something is easily solved because it is understood as the "absolute position of the thing"--I think the phrase is from Kant--the relationship that is established between one thing or event and others in the world. When I say that "there is a communist in my garden," I am not referring to a mysterious quality of being of that communist, but I am putting it in relation to the context of the world of speakers. If I say that God exists, it is because I establish some relationship between God and my world.

    If what is spoken of is the essence of God, what is mentioned is the set of attributes that define the word "God". It's the same as if I say "That communist is honest". But it is important not to confuse the two things.

    Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem.

    Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination!

    Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. I would say it's some sophisticated form of delusion. Much less when he's able to transfer his monomania to many intelligent people. Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt. So I see no reason to insult anyone for it, unless their monomania becomes a danger to others. That Heideggerian monomania necessarily led to the justification of Nazism is an interesting subject that we can leave for another time.
  • Xtrix
    923
    It is not true, then, that in order to use the word "tree" one must have a knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees that have been presented to the speaking subject. The concept is formed from them and used in a process of continuous variation. It does not exist as an immutable entity and prior to the use of language achieved by who knows what mysterious intellectual intuition. The same with "tree" as with "being".David Mo

    Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being? He's not echoing Plato.

    It's not independent knowledge -- but it is a kind of understanding, which he calls the a pre-ontological understanding of being.

    You get at it better here:

    First of all because it is not true that the use of a term means any defined "intuitive" understanding.David Mo

    Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language. This is not profound -- it's a truism. It's like saying there's an awake human being, or consciousness, uttering the sentence. Big deal. That shouldn't be controversial. The question is: what IS a human being, and what IS consciousness? Likewise, what is this "pre-theoretical, pre-conceptual" understanding of being?

    As Carnap says, the problem with Heidegger is that he makes a jumble of all these uses to build a fictional "entity", which is-but is not-one thing or a "fact": the " Being".David Mo

    This is just way off. A pretty common misunderstanding. Being isn't a "fact" or an "entity" at all. That does indeed seem strange, admittedly, and can make sense only in the context of his philosophy. Read in isolation, it's almost gibberish.

    In the Heideggerian explanation any use of "is" is confused with "exist".David Mo

    I can't think of any examples where "is" doesn't imply that something appears, is there, or "exists" (as in being) in some respect. So I fail to see how it's confused.

    Now, when a theologian speaks of God's "being" he can say two things: his existence or his essence. God exists or God is immutable, eternal, etc. When a normal person wants to say that a communist exists or is in the garden he uses expressions like "there is," "is in" (or he names it while pointing it out!), but he does not make "Existence" a problem. In fact, the problem of the existence of something is easily solved because it is understood as the "absolute position of the thing"--I think the phrase is from Kant--the relationship that is established between one thing or event and others in the world. When I say that "there is a communist in my garden," I am not referring to a mysterious quality of being of that communist, but I am putting it in relation to the context of the world of speakers. If I say that God exists, it is because I establish some relationship between God and my world.David Mo

    I'm afraid I don't see how any of this is relevant. From Intro to Metaphysics, p 62:

    "In these lectures, we constantly return to the Greek conception of Being because this conception, though entirely flattened out and rendered unrecognizable, is the conception that still rules even today in the West--not only in the doctrines of philosophy but in the most everyday routines. Because of this, we want to characterize the Greek conception of Being in its first fundamental traits as we follow the Greek treatment of language.
    This approach has been chosen intentionally in order to show, through an example from grammar, how the experience, conception, and interpretation of language that set the standard for the West grew out of a very definite understanding of Being."

    From 64 (so there's no mystery):

    "What grounds and holds together all the determinations of Being we have listed is what the Greeks experienced without question as the meaning of Being, which they called ousia, or more fully parousia. The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely. In German, we have an appropriate expression for parousia in our word An-wesen <coming-to-presence>. We use Anwesen as a name for a self-contained farm or homestead. In Aristotle's times, too, ousia was still used in this sense as well as in its meaning as a basic philosophical word. Something comes to presence. It stands in itself and thus puts itself forth. It is. For the Greeks, "Being" fundamentally means presence."

    This is the thesis, and in this context regarding language speficially (the chapter title being "The Grammar and Etymology of 'Being'").

    Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem.David Mo

    What "problem"?

    In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will," or else tacitly assumed in everyday life and discernible based on average, everyday actions and routines (what it means to be a human, what it means to be anything at all, etc -- just as looking at what ants do will tell you something about their pre-theoretical nature).

    The point is to re-awaken the question.

    Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination!David Mo

    No, this is your own interpretation (apparently), which is a misunderstanding. Which is easy to demonstrate: nowhere, not ever, will Heidegger claim that "being" means a being. I would challenge you to provide textual evidence if you believe it so. Thus, to say he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger. Perhaps it's due to a lack of imagination?

    Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. I would say it's some sophisticated form of delusion. Much less when he's able to transfer his monomania to many intelligent people. Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt. So I see no reason to insult anyone for it, unless their monomania becomes a danger to others.David Mo

    It's fairly clear to me, however, that you don't really understand what the "problem" is -- thus, hardly in a position to talk of a "pseudo-problem." Because if, in your interpretation, the "problem" is one of defining being, or attempting to link being with A being, etc., then you've completely missed the point.

    I repeat myself:

    it sounds to me like you're hit this particular issue more to "refute" than learn.Xtrix
  • 180 Proof
    1.4k
    "For the Greeks, ..."Xtrix
    So Heidi says.

    "'Being' fundamentally means presence."
    "Presence" of ???

    Perhaps it's my stumbling-block too, Xtrix, like Heidi's references to "what is" - what is ???

    His tedious ruminations on vague, indefineable, underdetermined 'utterances' are framed - reimagined by him - in a context of epochal "forgetting" which I, like many others, suspect is an alibi for Heidi's own peculiarly evocative, though nonetheless, inchoate misunderstandings (and, thereby, antiquarian, syntax-tortured, misappropriations). However, if this read of him uncharitably misses the mark, why didn't he just come right out and say, paraphrasing Laozi's nameless dao and Buddha's anatta-anicca, or Schopenhauer's noumenon (à la natura naturans), that "the meaning of Being" is ... Bergson's la durée? Why the (crypto-augustinian re: "time") mystery-mongerer's career? All that rambling, oracular, mystagogy just buried the lead, as they say, making it easier for everyone (even old Marty at the end mumbling, bumbling & stumbling through 'das Geviert') to lose the plot.

    The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.

    (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)
    — Twilight of the Idols, How the True World Finally Became A Fable. The History of an Error.
  • Gregory
    1.1k
    The essence of Buddhist philosophy of nature is that everything is completely impermanent. These Buddhist thinkers say there is nothing underlying every thing. The principle at the bottom of the universe is that A causes B, B causes C, and C causes A. So a circle. This takes the bottom out of the universe. I'm wondering how far Heidegger would agree with considering that he thinks Being is real

    P.S. Being and Time, in my opinion, was written as a response to Aquinas, who had said that actuality is prior to potentiality. Heidegger seems to say that opposite in the book. But saying there is actuality/Being seems to reject Buddhism. I still don't understand what Heidegger's position on nothingness is
  • Gregory
    1.1k
    Hegel wrote: "Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since in nature the Idea is as the negative of itself or is external to itself, nature is not merely external in relation to this idea, but the externality constitutes the determination in which nature as nature exists."

    Hegel posits nothing and being as the abstract form of the Idea which sublate each other into the world, which is pure becoming (Shunyata). I am very interested in reconciling Buddhism, Hegel, and Heidegger
  • Xtrix
    923
    So Heidi says.180 Proof

    Yes, with reasoning and evidence which is quite convincing, at least to me.

    "'Being' fundamentally means presence."
    "Presence" of ???

    Perhaps it's my stumbling-block too, Xtrix, like Heidi's references to "what is" - what is ???
    180 Proof

    The presence of whatever is before us, whether numbers or trees. Whatever persists (or "holds sway"). To say "presence of" you may be implying a subject/object distinction, but I'm not sure -- if that's the case, perhaps that's the stumbling block. It was for me as well. It's just hard not to think of any phenomenon as an object or representation for a "subject" or a "thinking thing" (res cogitans). This is why he emphasizes "being and thinking" as the fundamental way we "relate to" and thus "interpret" being:

    "The entire Western tradition and conception of Being, and accordingly the fundamental relation to Being that is still dominant today, is summed up in the title Being and thinking." - p. 220 (Intro to Metaphysics)

    BTW, I'm well aware of how Heidegger looks from the outside. I'm sure it must appear like Zizek or Derrida appear to me. I'd be very skeptical as well, especially if you peruse their "work." All I can say is that, for me, once I took the time (over a year) to do a careful study of his thought, the more and more I've learned and the more convinced I am that he has a very simple (when boiled down), but very deep, analysis of history, of time, and of our interpretation and relation to "being" itself. I've found it very useful indeed -- though not in the same way as studying physics, mathematics, biology, economics, or world history. But he's not intending to shed direct light on any of those subjects anyway.

    However, if this read of him uncharitably misses the mark, why didn't he just come right out and say, paraphrasing Laozi's nameless dao and Buddha's anatta-anicca, or Schopenhauer's noumenon (à la natura naturans), that "the meaning of Being" is ... Bergson's la durée? Why the (crypto-augustinian re: "time") mystery-mongerer's career? All that rambling, oracular, mystagogy just buried the lead, as they say, making it easier for everyone (even old Marty at the end mumbling, bumbling & stumbling through 'das Geviert') to lose the plot.180 Proof

    Good questions: because those are all interpretations of being. The Dao, nirvana, the will to live (which Schopenhauer associates with Kant's noumenon, but not completely -- even he says it's simply the "closest" we can get to it while still "within" time), are all dealing with similar things, it is true -- as is "God," for that matter. They all interpret beings and being. Heidegger isn't interested in interpreting it by way of a definition himself, but in reawakening the questioning of being, and so our interpretation of it (and thus human being).

    As far as Bergson, Heidegger actually mentions him often enough, as one thinker in a chain (since Aristotle) who has tried interpreting time. Needless to say, he does not think Bergson gets it right with duration. Spinoza's natura naturans, from what I understand of it, seems very close to Heidegger's treatment of phusis -- which shouldn't be a surprise, as the Latin "natura" is how phusis was translated. But again, my reading of Spinoza is restricted only to the Ethics. If you care to say more about it, I'd be interested.

    Heidegger will talk much about "time," as you know. From his perspective, there's "time" as a sequence of "nows," since Aristotle, and there's temporality, or as someone one here said "existential time," which is essentially the structure of how we live: thrown, anticipating, and absorbed (past, future, present). He will say being, but also time itself (as ordinarily understood), has been interpreted from the "perspective" of one aspect of temporality: the present.

    "But this 'time' still has not been unfolded in its essence, nor can it be unfolded (on the basis and within the purview of 'physics'). For as soon as meditation on the essence of time begins, at the end of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself must be taken as something that is somehow coming to presence, ousia tis. This is expressed in the fact that time is conceived on the basis of the 'now,' that which is in each case uniquely present." (p 220)

    The true world — Twilight of the Idols, How the True World Finally Became A Fable. The History of an Error.

    I think Heidegger would agree wholeheartedly with Nietzsche here. Heidegger wants to get outside the tradition which Kant himself (whom Nietzsche is essentially referring to here, along with Plato) is still very much a part of. Thus all the examples of "hammering" and "average everydayness." This is the pragmatic part of Heidegger, and why he carries on so much about phenomenology and the "hidden" and "concealed" aspects of life, which philosophers have nearly always ignored (in his view).
  • Xtrix
    923
    The essence of Buddhist philosophy of nature is that everything is completely impermanent. These Buddhist thinkers say there is nothing underlying every thing. The principle at the bottom of the universe is that A causes B, B causes C, and C causes A. So a circle. This takes the bottom out of the universe. I'm wondering how far Heidegger would agree with considering that he thinks Being is realGregory

    I myself see a number of parallels to Buddhism and Daoism in Heidegger. But when you say he thinkers Being is "real," I'm not sure what you mean. He has a lot to say about the concept of "reality" in Being and Time, in fact. It's true that a core principle in Buddhist philosophy is the concept of anicca[/i (Pali), impermanence, but I don't see how this is rejecting "reality" while Heidegger is somehow accepting it.

    Hegel posits nothing and being as the abstract form of the Idea which sublate each other into the world, which is pure becoming (Shunyata). I am very interested in reconciling Buddhism, Hegel, and HeideggerGregory

    Heidegger has much respect for Hegel and published a great deal of lectures on him. He sees has as the end of the Western tradition from the inside. Nietzsche marks the end of it completely (although Heidegger will argue his "eternal recurrence" is simply his interpretation of 'being').

    If we're to reconcile them, I think Heidegger would agree with the Buddhists (and Daoists) that we need to "get in touch" with our being again. Buddhists will do so through the practice of meditation (vipassana), while Heidegger wants to "reawaken the question of being" approached as a thinker. He sees this as necessary to creat a new interpretation of being, since our current interpretation (which has its roots with the Greeks) as resulted in nihilism (here he agrees with Nietzsche) and has been completely forgotten.

    As far as Hegel goes -- Heidegger is certainly historical and likewise interested in the presocratics. Where Hegel's dialectic fits in with Heidegger, or his ideas of Being and Nothing, I don't feel confident enough to comment on -- I'm only in the beginning stages of reading Hegel, and I can't from memory recall much of what Heidegger says about him, unfortunately.
  • Gregory
    1.1k
    I don't see how this is rejecting "reality" while Heidegger is somehow accepting it.Xtrix

    My understanding is that being reveals itself to us (according to Heidegger), while there is nothing to be revealed for a Buddhist

    Heidegger has much respect for Hegel and published a great deal of lectures on him.Xtrix

    Where can I get those lectures?
  • David Mo
    635
    Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being?Xtrix

    How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such, as trees—how are we supposed to be able even to look for such things as trees, unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance? (…) Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what "tree" means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being. — Martin Heidegger: Introduction ot Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 84

    It is obvious that the postulation of a special Being whose meaning does not depend on particular entities forces Heidegger to invent an extra rational knowledge that I have called "intuition" to make it intelligible. To speak of "pre-ontological", as Heidegger does, seems to me to introduce an unnecessary neologism for what classical philosophy defined as what is neither empirical nor discursive: intellectual intuition.

    Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language.Xtrix

    The word "Being" is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. "Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely indefinite. According to the usual logic, we have here an obvious contradiction. — Heidegger, Op. Cit., p. 82

    Therefore, there is a special knowledge ("pre-ontological") that goes beyond the individual entities.
    This means opposing the empirical to the irrational intuitive which is becoming more and more complicated. Because if Heidegger recognizes here a logical contradiction he does not have any other choice but to impugn the own logic, which he does in another part of the book. He has already challenged philology and the history of philosophy. Now logic and experience fall. Open field for irrationalism.


    I can't think of any examples where "is" doesn't imply that something appears, is there, or "exists" (as in being) in some respect.Xtrix

    Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo

    What "problem"?
    Xtrix

    Being isn't a "fact" or an "entity" at all.Xtrix
    In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will,"Xtrix
    ... he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger.Xtrix

    I would say that the problem is not only with Heidegger, but also with you (so much love gets contagious). You cannot deny that Heidegger speaks of Being as " something " and say at the same time that it implies the designation of " something ". In fact, Heidegger is forced to adopt a substantialist language to define Being. But as he had said before that it was "ineffable" he now has to camouflage it as a "common horizon" to all the diverse meanings of being (this is just what meaning is):

    The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth. — Op. Cit., p. 96

    Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. And from contradiction to contradiction this Being is becoming more and more like God: ineffable, an entity different from the entities but by which the entities are what they are, the object of an intuitive knowledge and the end to which all things must tend. Without God, I mean without Being, even nations sink into the darkest decadence. And, of course, this Being also has his prophet: Heidegger.

    In short:
    Heidegger is forced to assume an irrationalist position because of all the confusion introduced by his lack of a semantic analysis of the concept of being. You affirm, with Heidegger, that the concept of being has a meaning ("horizon", he says) only that you assimilate to the existence. Heidegger, who never wants to be clear, adds to the existence ( presence ) the substance. It would be necessary to conclude that this Being is something with substance (then definable) and existence (then detectable). But, obviously, all of us who are not Heidegger or related do not have such capacity of a "pre-ontological" knowledge, it appears that is justified only by the supposed capacity of all languages to use intuitively the word being in a "defined" way.

    Against this claim I wrote in a previous comment. In short, my arguments were basically two:
    The word "is" does not exist in all languages. It is not universal in that sense.
    Nor in all languages does "to be" mean the same thing.
    When used as a copulation, for example, "is" does not mean that something exists, but rather that a property is linked to a subject. It can be said that there are things that exist or not, but this is not said in common language with "is", but by "exists", " there is", etc. The confusion between being as existing and being as a logical link is caused by the twisted use of the same word. In some languages, especially the logical ones, but also common ones, there are resources to express this difference without resorting to a common term like "is". Of course, you can pretend it's “implied”, but that's cheating. First, because we're talking about the meaning, not the circumstantial implications. Second, because if even the absence of Being – Nothingness – , is Being, Everything is Being and the concept of Being lacks meaning, sorry “horizon”. Not to mention that we have killed Parmenides, who was supposedly a venerable idol. You know, what the goddess forbade Parmenides in the first place, the way of foolishness: Not-being is. (Let us not talk about Heraclitus, who is worse).
  • 180 Proof
    1.4k
    When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem.David Mo
    How Witty of you. :up:

    Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination.
    A reification fallacy common to platonists & sophists alike.

    Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. [ ... ] Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt.
    Well, "smarts" isn't mutually exclusive with respect to stupidity - often it's the enabler (re: Kahneman-Tversky, Dunning-Kruger). I agree that Heidi isn't a "charlatan"; rather he was a 'great philosopher' who, like e.g. Hegel, IMO, shows another way how not to do philosophy.

    Good questions: because those are all interpretations of being.Xtrix
    And poor Heidi adds nothing - yeah, he's interpreting it too, don't believe his hype - that either improves upon or invalidates these other 'ontologies'; that there are so many (much more than I'd care to list) both within the European philosphical tradition and other traditions, makes it clear that the "forgetting of being" is only, or mostly, a parochial Wilhelmine anomaly which, no doubt, the Nazi movement under the spiritual guidance of the good Herr Rektorführer was "called by destiny" to remind das Herrendasein, das Man und andere Üntermenschen that  “das Nichts nichtet". :eyes:
  • tim wood
    4.6k
    "'Being' fundamentally means presence."
    "Presence" of ???
    180 Proof

    Participle presencing. Whole different animal.
  • David Mo
    635
    A reification fallacy common to platonists & sophists alike.180 Proof

    Not all sophists, I think. Gorgias: "Being is not; if it were it could not be known and if it were known it could not be expressed".(I quote from memory). This is a direct attack on Parmenides and his Platonic aftermath.

    In general, sophists establish an interesting distinction between physis and nomos and are sceptical about the former in some/ quite a few cases. "Man is the measure of all things; of things that are in so far as they are and of things that are not in so far as they are not" (Protagoras), also gives cause for thought.

    In your criticism of Heidegger I think we agree very much.
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