It says that there is a first person perspectives that is had, but that having that is not mysterious or metaphysically weird, something that only happens out of nowhere when matter arranges into brains. Instead, what’s happening in brains happens out of somewhere, out of something already going on in the stuff brains are made of, and the stuff that stuff is made of, and so on. That what happens is brains is nothing extraordinary on top of what’s already happening everywhere always, except in the ways already accounted for by functionalist theories.

They're incompatible. — Marchesk

I wouldn't say incompatible, at least not in the sense of contradictory.
It's just that neither seems to derive the other, hence why Levine called the conundrum an explanatory gap.

Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging. — Marchesk

What’s so ‘mysterious’ about emergent properties? This is where most of the panpsychism ideas look juvenile at worst and idiotic at best. Emergence is a CONSCIOUSLY observable (and scientifically measurable) property.

To repeat what I mentioned in the other thread. Heat is an emergent property, but a molecule has no ‘heat’. Such emergent properties cannot be physically measured at certain levels because they make no sense, yet somehow people believe this is a good argument for panpsychism. Why? I’d like to see an argument presenting how ‘heat’ is an innate property of all matter (including molecules). Of course the argument would require talk of a ‘different kind of “heat”’ in order to remain workable.

The main problem standing in the way of our understanding of consciousness is this silly clinging to some holistic ‘panpsychism’ idea that barely makes any sense, lacks rigour, and conveniently plays with words instead of engaging with critical thought and actual idea that possess a common and workable vocabulary.

Chalmers’ zombies aren’t much of an argument either as far as I can see. Meaning that because some artificial being could be created to act ‘as if conscious’ is equivalent to an actual conscious being. If such a ‘zombie’ was, in effect, said to be identical to a human (neurons and all) yet not consciously aware, then I believe this would be breaking the laws of nature - we cannot ‘logical imagine’ what we don’t understand with any degree of accuracy.

I’m more than ready to be combative against a lot of the ideas orbiting panpsychism as a reasonable premise - not ALL but most I tend to see far too often.

Heat is only weakly emergent. Heat is an aggregate of ordinary motion. If you model the motion of all the particles in a physical system, you model all the thermodynamic properties of that system too. Heat is only emergent in the sense that you don't have to model things at the molecular level to get heat -- you can just model the aggregate property and ignore all that finer detail.

Phenomenal consciousness is supposed to be the kind of thing where, even if you modeled the physical aspects of a human being in their entirety, you still wouldn't necessarily have modeled that. It's not supposed to be some kind of aggregate of physical behaviors, but something entirely besides the physical behaviors.

There are only three options with regards to that kind of thing:

#1: Nothing has it. Not even us. We are all philosophical zombies. Nobody actually has any first-person experiences. Third-person observable behavior is all there is to a human being. (This is eliminativism.)

#2: Only some things have it. Even though it's not an aggregate of physical behaviors, it spontaneously starts happening out of nowhere wherever certain patterns of physical behaviors happen. Because reasons. (This is emergentism).

#3: Everything has it, just having it at all is trivial and fundamental, and it's only when aggregates of equally trivial fundamental physical behaviors build up into complex behaviors that aggregates of this trivial first-person experience simultaneously build up into complex experiences. (This is panpsychism).

Heat is only weakly emergent. Heat is an aggregate of ordinary motion. If you model the motion of all the particles in a physical system, you model all the thermodynamic properties of that system too. Heat is only emergent in the sense that you don't have to model things at the molecular level to get heat -- you can just model the aggregate property and ignore all that finer detail. — Pfhorrest

The point was that it makes absolutely no sense to talk about the ‘heat’ of a molecule. I am saying it makes just as much sense to talk about ‘consciousness’ at a molecular level - which some people do. I’m certainly open to the ‘consciousness’ equivalent of ‘motion’ ... which our current guesses lie in combinations of neurons and/or cellular combinations. Anything else looks like vainly trying to the the temperature of an electron.

Do you have any suggestions for the ‘conscious equivalent’ of ‘motion’? I’ve not looked at the microtubules idea for a while, but it looked sketchy at best. I think its biochemical - more than fancy enough (needless to say an atom doesn’t have biochemistry, but then some may insist they do due to up/down quarks and such ... which is the core of my dislike of what I tend to see flaunted on forums).

What’s so ‘mysterious’ about emergent properties? This is where most of the panpsychism ideas look juvenile at worst and idiotic at best. Emergence is a CONSCIOUSLY observable (and scientifically measurable) property.

... Heat is an emergent property, but a molecule has no ‘heat’ ... I’d like to see an argument presenting how ‘heat’ is an innate property of all matter (including molecules). — I like sushi

Ditto. Ditto. :up:

Eliminativism & emergentism are non-exclusionary just as e.g. legs & walking (or atoms & strawberry jam) are non-exclusionary.

You all miss the point completely.

Nobody has any problem with the behavior of human brains (weakly) emerging from the behavior of their constituents in the way that heat (weakly) emerges from the motion of particles.

What panpsychism is about is when people ask "Okay that accounts for the behavior of people and their brains but where in any of this emergence of complex behaviors did phenomenal experience start happening and why?"

Then you can either give some answer to where that completely different metaphysical thing started happening (and how do you do that exactly?), or else you say "it didn't start happening, because nothing else besides the behavior happens", or else you say "it didn't start happening, because it was always happening to a trivial degree at the fundamental level, and all that emerged was a more complex aggregate of that trivial fundamental thing."

I don’t believe I missed the point from what you’ve stated above.

I posed my position in terms of the many iterations of poorly articulated positions that claim to be reasonable ones in terms of ‘panpsychism’.

I have no qualms with the idea of some physical property of matter that, at some level, manifests as consciousness. In this sense the ‘mysteriousness’ of emergence is no more (in some cases less so) ‘mysterious’ than some property X that exists in all matter. Consciousness itself - us here now discussing it - is inextricable from the perceived problem as it is part of it.

We may as well argue about the universe ‘starting’ to happen or stars. It makes no difference to the logical position of the situation other than we’re more focus in here on the subjective sense - ie. conscious experience.

If thee was some physical property it would still lead to some kind of gradual progression - on SOME level. Even if it’s an all or nothing situation - much like the firing of neurons - that doesn’t take away from there being level of complexity below that are far from a simple all or nothing mechanism.

I find it to be a reasonable idea to ponder, but not one to adhere to with any degree of serious conviction (until evidence is found in support of it).

To repeat. My MAIN qualm is with people naively suggesting atoms are ‘conscious’ with the poor defense of ‘just a different kind of conscious’ - which is nonsensical. Admittedly those who have put more thought into this don’t say such things without a well articulated reason for doing so. On forums most of what I have tended to see is a wishy-washy form of mysticism that use concepts that are clearly misunderstood and/or poorly cobbled together.

In terms of a defense of panpsychism I’d look to entropy as the ultimate underlying field upon which consciousness exists. From more ‘spiritual’ perspective I also find it reasonable to view humans as that old adage of ‘the universe trying to understand itself’ - fine, no problem there either.

If however we’re talking about atoms having a property of consciousness and then when these atoms accumulate in certain constitutions what we know as ‘consciousness’ emerges ... well, then it’s emergence we’re talking about just in the same sense that every other phenomenal experience of humans is held as a nascent item - framed for the sake of differentiation/orientation as x or y.

↪Pfhorrest Eliminativism & emergentism are non-exclusionary — 180 Proof

Of course they are exclusionary, by definition. Functionalism, for example, excludes eliminativism. Functionalism says that consciousness exists and is a function. Eliminativism says that consciousness does not exist.

To repeat. My MAIN qualm is with people naively suggesting atoms are ‘conscious’ with the poor defense of ‘just a different kind of conscious’ - which is nonsensical. — I like sushi

Indeed, if a panspychist said that I too would disagree with them. Who says this though?

Soon we're going to start talking about definitions.

What panpsychism is about is when people ask "Okay that accounts for the behavior of people and their brains but where in any of this emergence of complex behaviors did phenomenal experience start happening and why?" — Pfhorrest

I'd love to hear an actual answer to this.

Try imagining something. Remember an event that happened. Feel sad. Feel joy. These are things that are mental states. P-Zombies presumably don't do that but somehow act as they do. — schopenhauer1

These are all still qualia. If humans were really P-Zombies and did not entertain qualia (but nonetheless acted just as though they did), would there be any need for panpsychism as an explanation? I'm puzzled by the general line here - if a person can do all the things I do but without qualia, then it seems we could explain these behaviours without recourse to any additional property beyond those uncovered by science so far. Where would panpsychism be required?

Functionalism only addresses the easy problem of access consciousness. Critics then ask “but what about the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness?” Panpsychists reply “that’s a trivial general feature of everything, nothing special in need of explanation.” Critics then ask “So my sock is conscious just like I am?” And we reply “no, not just like, but your sock is functionally different from you too. That difference is an easy problem, already answered by functionalism.” — Pfhorrest

I assume you are defending panpsychism. If an object has no functional role of its own, how is it proposed that it could be attended by mental states (even if limited). A sock has no inherent functionality, its function is derived. The thing with mentality is that we associate it with causal relationships.

Panpsychism simply says that... — Pfhorrest

No, I think it has already also required,

"some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective"
— Pfhorrest

but doesn't seem keen to admit it. — bongo fury

It says that there is a first person perspective that is had, — Pfhorrest

And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?

These are all still qualia. If humans were really P-Zombies and did not entertain qualia (but nonetheless acted just as though they did), would there be any need for panpsychism as an explanation? I'm puzzled by the general line here - if a person can do all the things I do but without qualia, then it seems we could explain these behaviours without recourse to any additional property beyond those uncovered by science so far. Where would panpsychism be required? — Graeme M

Qualia is brute sensation (e.g. seeing green, hearing noise, etc.). Although imagination, and memories probably rely on qualia, etc. they are not the same as qualia. My point was there are other internal states besides just qualia that one can have. And I don't understand why you would be deflating the issue. The very question regarding the Hard Question is to understand how/why internal states are equivalent to brain processes. Anything else is not the world we live in, but P-Zombie world. That is not ours though, so it is a big deal.

Here’s one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_energy_principle

If an object has no functional role of its own, how is it proposed that it could be attended by mental states (even if limited). A sock has no inherent functionality, its function is derived. — Graeme M

Everything has a function, in the sense meant by functionalism, which is different from the sense you seem to mean. A function in the sense that it responds to inputs with some output: if you do something to it, it does something in response. The function of a sock or a rock is very trivial, but it still has one. Imagine for clarity that you were programming a simulation and you had to code what such a virtual object does in response to other events in the virtual world: you have to code in that the rock moves in response to being pushed, for example. That’s a kind of functionality.

And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not? — bongo fury

It depends on the physicist’s philosophical views. If he’s an eliminativist then no, he denies that there is such a thing. If he’s an emergentist then yes, but now he’s got a tricky question to answer as to how the other third-person physical behaviors of things that he normally studies spontaneously generate a first-person phenomenal experience in special circumstances. If he’s a panpsychist, then yes, and there’s nothing special to explain because things having a first-person phenomenal experience is a normal thing not in need of any special explanation.

And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?
— bongo fury

It depends on the physicist’s philosophical views. — Pfhorrest

Not really. I merely want to establish whether the panpsychist does need after all to take ownership of

some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest

as I alleged, and not pretend that they are tidying up after other people's metaphysical confusions.

If he’s an eliminativist — Pfhorrest

Good... if he's prepared to stick to the physicist's menu, yes? Go on...

then no, he denies that there is such a thing. — Pfhorrest

Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference. I wanted to check.

So ownership is needed.

If he’s an emergentist then yes, — Pfhorrest

Possibly. But what about the "weaker" of this species, who is either functionalist or has some other (e.g. @Pantagruel's "systems" or my "symbolic competence") explanation for the emergence, which doesn't at all require that what emerges is anything but an aspect of material behaviour?

These kinds of emergentist won't be taking ownership of,

some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest

Nor of,

where that completely different metaphysical thing started happening — Pfhorrest

... and the like.

Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference. — bongo fury

I, as a panpsychism, think it is.

It’s only emergentism that makes it out to be anything metaphysically weird. The panpsycist, in taking “phenomenal consciousness” to just be the boring ordinary having of a first-person experience, is free to also be a physicalist, because they’re not invoking anything in addition to physical stuff, just a different perspective on that physical stuff.

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.

But what about the "weaker" of this species, who is either functionalist or has some other (e.g. Pantagruel's "systems" or my "symbolic competence") explanation for the emergence, which doesn't at all require that what emerges is anything but an aspect of material behaviour? — bongo fury

That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness. We don’t know if they think there is no such thing, if it somehow emerges from nothing when behavior does the right thing, or if it was always there and just gets refined along with behavior.

Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference.
— bongo fury

I , as a panpsychist, think it is. — Pfhorrest

Your position is about studiously having it both ways, so that's hardly surprising.

It’s only emergentism that makes it out to be anything metaphysically weird. — Pfhorrest

No, you admitted that an eliminativist (usually a physicalist) would rule it out.

not invoking anything in addition to physical stuff, just a different perspective on that physical stuff. — Pfhorrest

Yes, an extra, 'meta' perspective.

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism. — Pfhorrest

No, but it is usually implied by it.

That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness. — Pfhorrest

For someone who has defined that question in metaphysical terms, perhaps not.

We don’t know if they think there is no such thing, — Pfhorrest

Ditto.

if it somehow emerges from nothing — Pfhorrest

Remember, it doesn't have to be a substance: a physical goo or a metaphysical woo.

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest

No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury

Physicalism regarding consciousness is the view that consciousness is real, and it is physical. Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real (at least not in one of the main commonly meant senses).

Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real — bert1

And usually reached on physicalist grounds. As I said, the one implies the other, so the comment about non-identity was rather pointless.

Qualia is brute sensation (e.g. seeing green, hearing noise, etc.). Although imagination, and memories probably rely on qualia, etc. they are not the same as qualia. My point was there are other internal states besides just qualia that one can have. And I don't understand why you would be deflating the issue. The very question regarding the Hard Question is to understand how/why internal states are equivalent to brain processes. Anything else is not the world we live in, but P-Zombie world. That is not ours though, so it is a big deal. — schopenhauer1

You confuse me here. Perhaps my confusion confirms my ignorance about the topic? My understanding of the hard problem is that there is "something that it is like" to entertain mental states. This state of affairs, this quality if you like, is what we refer to more generally as the experience of qualia. The feeling of warmth, the colour blue, the memory of a red car, the sight of my child, and so on. When we entertain mental states they are something we can introspect upon - they have some kind of presence. If they did not, we should in a literal sense be in the dark. Our brains can and do compute a vast amount of information for which we have no felt analog. That is also what we assume computers do - undertake complex computations for which there is no felt analog, no inner experience. No qualia. Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes.

Stanford says:

"The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. If you are told to focus your attention upon the phenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doing so you are aware of certain qualities. These qualities — ones that are accessible to you when you introspect and that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience are sometimes called ‘qualia’. C.S. Peirce seems to have had something like this in mind when he introduced the term ‘quale’ into philosophy in 1866."

My proposition is that, on this kind of definition, were mental states not experienced (were they not attended by qualia) they should not require an explanation. There'd be no hard problem and as a consequence no claims for panpsychism.

Everything has a function, in the sense meant by functionalism, which is different from the sense you seem to mean. A function in the sense that it responds to inputs with some output: if you do something to it, it does something in response. The function of a sock or a rock is very trivial, but it still has one. Imagine for clarity that you were programming a simulation and you had to code what such a virtual object does in response to other events in the virtual world: you have to code in that the rock moves in response to being pushed, for example. That’s a kind of functionality. — Pfhorrest

I shall have to leave that as I am not familiar with the concepts. Function for me denotes an active sense of the term - that is, the term "function" in this context describes the state of affairs in which an object or system undertakes an operation where an operation is a causal physical process. A rock being moved by my foot is not a function of the rock, though it might be a function of my foot. A sock sitting on a bed is an object, not a function. It has a function, but derivatively. It can be a member OF a function, but is not A function. So I guess there is a lot more to this question of what constitutes a function.

ur brains can and do compute a vast amount of information for which we have no felt analog. That is also what we assume computers do - undertake complex computations for which there is no felt analog, no inner experience. No qualia. Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M

This is the difference between cognition and behavior. It is doubtful most computers are cognizant, but certainly they perform behaviors which might be called "processing". These presumably come with no internal states, however. The exact problem here is how processing is internal states.

Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M

Again, imagination, introspection of any sort on any feelings, awareness of something, remembrance, future projections, etc. These are all introspective inner qualities that are more than just qualia. Imagine a friend right now. That is more than just qualia. You are actually reconstructing a whole set of things beyond simply colors, sound, feel, etc. Qualia are simply sensations. Unless you think all introspection is just sensations, then this is wrong. As I stated before, sensations may be a necessary part of the all introspection, but not sufficient to account for all of it.

My proposition is that, on this kind of definition, were mental states not experienced (were they not attended by qualia) they should not require an explanation. There'd be no hard problem and as a consequence no claims for panpsychism. — Graeme M

Even if you reduced the idea of inner experience to the term "qualia", then qualia would simply encompass all the phenomena I mentioned, and yes, this still would have to be accounted for. It is not like this minimizes the problem, it just encompasses everything under one term.

No, you admitted that an eliminativist (usually a physicalist) would rule it out. — bongo fury

Yes, but in ruling it out, they’re not proposing that the weird thing happens. (But they’re also denying the most ordinary familiar thing, by conflating it with something metaphysicall weird).

Panpsychists say something happens (that familiar having of first-person experience), but that it’s perfectly ordinary and nothing weird.

Only emergentists (about phenomenal consciousness, because that’s the context here) say that a weird thing that calls for philosophical some explanation happens.

Yes, an extra, 'meta' perspective. — bongo fury

There’s nothing meta about it. Reflexive SELF-awareness, which is what I think ordinary people usually mean by “consciousness”, is meta. But simple first-person perspective is no more meta than third-person is.

No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury

Which direction do you mean that implication to go? Eliminativists are usually physicalists, sure, but it’s quite a stretch to say physicalists are usually eliminativists. More often they seem to be emergentists, because nobody wants to deny the reality of their own first-person phenomenal experience unless they’ve got a serious philosophical axe to grind.

That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness.
— Pfhorrest

For someone who has defined that question in metaphysical terms, perhaps not. — bongo fury

You’re not clear here, but I think you’re missing something definitional. Phenomenal consciousness is defined as the having of first-person experiences. It’s what people are asking about when you suppose someone has made something that acts exactly like a human being and they ask “But does it have the same experience as a human being or does it just act like it does?” You can say “no”, because nothing has such experience, or say either “no” or “yes” and explain what is happening that does or does not give rise to that in this particular thing but not always in all things (some explanation not about the behavior of it, because that’s already explained and not what they’re asking about), or you can say “yes” because everything has one, so everything that’s like a human has one like a human.

We don’t know if they think there is no such thing,
— Pfhorrest

Ditto. — bongo fury

What? You’re not making any sense.

if it somehow emerges from nothing
— Pfhorrest

Remember, it doesn't have to be a substance: a physical goo or a metaphysical woo. — bongo fury

I never implied it was. This is a non-sequitur.

First, the argument goes that all objects, presumably down to very small scales (atoms?) must have some kind of mind. . — Graeme M

In the form of panpsychism I defend the fundamental units of nature are “quantum events occurring in space-time”. In Whitehead’s form of process philosophy “Process and Reality” the most fundamental units are “actual occasions” which invariably have both a mental aspect and physical aspect or pole. The mental or experiential pole has to do with incorporation of elements of the past and possibilities of the future as well as relations to other events (what Whitehead calls prehension). I have a read a lot of presentations of panpsychism and this is the form which I defend.

Second, minds are expressed to varying degrees of sophistication according to the sophistication of the system (object), perhaps to the greatest sophistication in humans (in our experience, at least). . — Graeme M

Yes there are many different forms and kinds of mind but they are all of the same ontologic nature. There are many different forms of physicality but they are all the same ontologic nature. In fact the physical and the mental are dual aspects of the same fundamental unit of nature (neutral monism). I won’t defend any form of panpsychism other than a monistic variety. The kind of unified, integrated experience that we call “human consciousness” can only be present in a unified integrated structure like the brain. Physically damage the brain and you damage or lose “consciousness”. I won’t defend the statement “rocks are conscious”. I won’t defend the statement “electrons are conscious”. Consciousness in my mind is a relatively rare form of mind or experience
.

Third, mind is not an actual physical substance (I use the term loosely and am aware it probably means something in philosophy different from my usage). That is, it isn't like say gravity or the electromagnetic force which can be measured and which have a direct causal relationship to the world. . — Graeme M

Our “experience”, our “mind”, our “consciousness” cannot be adequately or satisfactorily explained in purely physical terms. No description of neural pathways, metabolic activity, neurotransmitters or brain waves entails the actual “experience” of the subject. This is sort of Mary’s and red, the scientific description versus the first person experience. One should also asks who or what is conducting science, asking the questions, doing the experiments, interpreting the results, you can not take the observer out of the science completely.

Fourth, matter isn't a manifestation of mind but rather mind is a manifestation of matter. Minds emerge from, are caused by, or are separate from, matter, nonetheless minds are directly attributable to material events. — Graeme M

Mind (experience) and Matter (the physical) are inseparable aspects of the same fundamental basic neutral monistic ontology (events, occasions). Reality is a process not a “thing”, a becoming not a “being”. When we talk about particles with properties we are really talking about events with relations (to other events, to the past and to the future).

Ok, well I did my best to get you to notice where I think your argument tricks you into thinking it is deflationary while it is anything but. Something which is hard to notice, and needs focus... which we've lost.

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest

No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury

Which direction do you mean that implication to go? — Pfhorrest

:roll:

In the form of panpsychism I defend the fundamental units of nature are “quantum events occurring in space-time”. In Whitehead’s form of process philosophy “Process and Reality” the most fundamental units are “actual occasions” which invariably have both a mental aspect and physical aspect or pole. The mental or experiential pole has to do with incorporation of elements of the past and possibilities of the future as well as relations to other events (what Whitehead calls prehension). I have a read a lot of presentations of panpsychism and this is the form which I defend. — prothero

:up: :100:

What problem is it that panpsychism attempts to answer? — Graeme M

Good question! It's the same old problem that philosophers and scientists have been wrestling with for millennia. David Chalmers gave the Mind/Body problem its modern name : The Hard Problem.

Problem? What Problem? : The problem of consciousness is arguably the central issue in current theorizing about the mind. . . . We need to understand both what consciousness is and how it relates to other, nonconscious, aspects of reality. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

maybe something such as the mind of God. — Graeme M

The notion that the physical world is an idea (or dream) in the mind of god, is an ancient explanation for the existence of reality. Dreaming was believed to be magical, in the sense that things that don't exist in reality can be conjured up in dreams. That made sense to primitive people, but in our scientific age, we want more details about the hows & whys. In any case, a Creative Mind of some kind has always been the ultimate answer to those basic questions. The only alternative answer atheists have to offer is the shoulder shrug of Multiverse theory : "it is what it is --- don't ask why".

As I understand it, panpsychism is the claim that mentality (consciousness, experience?) is a basic constituent of the universe. — Graeme M

Psyche (soul) was indeed their best explanation for the emergence of Life & Mind from ordinary matter. And Psyche was most closely identified with human consciousness and reasoning ability. But the weakness of Panpsychism is the implication that stones and atoms are conscious of the outside world, including their fellow stones and particles. Yet, again modern thinkers find it hard to believe that dumb rocks have a "life of the mind" . That's why I prefer to use a term that has less religious and philosophical baggage : Information. It's similar to Spinoza's Single Substance of the Universe. And is now thought to be the "basic constituent" of the universe, by some scientists.

Is Information Fundamental? : https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/is-information-fundamental/

Spinoza's Universal Substance : The most distinctive aspect of Spinoza's system is his substance monism; that is, his claim that one infinite substance—God or Nature—is the only substance that exists. https://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoz-m/

Second, minds are expressed to varying degrees of sophistication — Graeme M

"Sophistication" may be a better word for the evolution of Mind, than the more common term "Complexity". Information is not just numerically complex, it is integrated and irreducibly structured. The Santa Fe Institute has been studying Complexity for thirty years, and that includes Information Theory. But, as scientists, they were mostly looking into meaningless syntax-only Shannon Information, defined as structure-destroying Entropy. They are now studying meaningful semantic structure-creating Bayesian Information, in pursuit of Big Questions and Hard Problems.

Santa Fe Institute : https://www.santafe.edu/engage/learn/courses/introduction-information-theory

Beyond Center : https://www.amazon.com/Matter-Life-Information-Causality/dp/1107150531

Can Integrated Information Theory Explain Consciousness? : https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/can-integrated-information-theory-explain-consciousness/

Enformy : http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

Third, mind is not an actual physical substance — Graeme M

True. Mind is not a physical thing, but a process of enforming (making sense of) experience. But in it's generic form as Information, it's an ontological meta-physical "substance" : the essence of Being, not the atoms of Objects.

Substance : The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

Fourth, matter isn't a manifestation of mind but rather mind is a manifestation of matter. — Graeme M

Yes. Mind is a function of the material brain. It's what living brains do. It converts physical sensations into metaphysical concepts. But, according to the Enformationism Thesis, Mind-stuff and Body-stuff are merely different forms of Generic Information (causal, creative, power to enform, energy).

if the problem of qualia were to be resolved in like manner to other physical matters (ie qualia are a describable and measurable physical event), would that undercut the rationale for positing panpsychism? — Graeme M

Your hypothetical question answers its own query : Qualia are not "describable and measurable" Quanta. Hence the necessity for a different way to measure and describe Qualia and there role in physical Reality. We need to understand mental Qualia, because they are what gives meaning to life in a material world. :smile:

Qualia : http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page17.html