• PessimisticIdealism
    30
    P1) A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
    P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
    C1) Therefore, Objective states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P1 and P2)
    P3) Physical states are Objective states.
    C2a) Therefore, physical states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P2 and P3)
    C2b) Therefore, physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C2a)
    P4) Conscious mental states have a Subjective and Objective character.
    C3) Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4)
    P5) An aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states is the “Subject” to-whom and for-which Objects are presented.
    P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself).
    C4a) Therefore, there is an aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject. (From P5 and P6)
    C4b) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (Corollary to C4a)
    C4c) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states which does not have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C4b)
    P7) Physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Restatement of C2b)
    C5) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that is not a physical state. (From C4c and P7 using Leibniz’ Law)
    P8) Reductive physicalism is true iff all aspects of Conscious mental states are physical states.
    C6) Therefore, reductive physicalism is false. (From C5 and P8)

    A Defense of the Argument

    We always find a Subject and Object internally correlated in Conscious experience; and to step outside that correlation would be for us to literally go out of our minds (Bradley, 1927, p. 323). The perspectival character of an Object is not only inseparable from a Subject’s Conscious experience of the Object, but also the Subject’s conception of it. In fact, the inherent perspectival nature of Conscious experience renders any conception of an Object that is absolutely unconditioned by a Subject absolutely futile. In other words, any Object of experience, conception, or feeling always has a determinate and perspectival character, a gestalt constitution, and an ineffable qualitative aspect. Indeed, it is logically inconceivable—in principle—for an Object to remain “Objective” (i.e. for-a-Subject) without said Object being qualitatively and perspectivally determinate or exhibiting a form and character contingent upon an internal relation to a Subject. Philosopher A.C. Ewing held a similar stance on this issue, writing that:

    [To] know any [Object X]…or form any intelligent opinion about X I must ultimately think X as it would be for a [Subject] which was consciously aware of it as a present fact though there may never be or have been such a [Subject]…Thus ultimately we can only think of unperceived physical things in terms of a possible observer in the sense that we must think of them as if they were objects [for a Subject] (Ewing, 1934, pp. 56-57).

    This dichotomy remains the case even when we examine the nature of “Self-Conscious” experience. The "Object of Self-Consciousness” is not the Subject (or Self) simpliciter, rather it is an Object contained within the Subject's consciousness. In essence, it is an Object-for-a-Subject. However, rather than being an Object of the outer sense (i.e. a spatiotemporal Object), it is an Object of the inner sense (i.e. an Object of introspection). To suggest that the Subject can become an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character would be no different from saying that the "eye can see itself,” which is false. The "eye" cannot see itself because it is that which sees. An “eye” cannot be placed in front of itself in order to catch a glimpse of itself seeing itself. If one were to reply, "But I can see my eye in the mirror," they forget that what they are seeing is not their "eye," (i.e. the Subject) but a reflection on the surface of a mirror (i.e. an Object).

    Furthermore, the Subject cannot present itself as an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character because anything that is presented to a Subject is something other than the Subject to whom that something is presented. Subject and Object are two poles of conscious experience that cannot be collapsed into one side or the other without vicious abstractionism—any attempt to do so would destroy the Objectival character that is essential to the Object or the Subjectival character that is essential to the Subject.

    “Experience,” unlike the vitalist’s “élan vital,” is neither a folk-theory, nor an ad hoc explanatory construction; on the contrary, it is the prius of all conceptualization, explanation, description, and investigation. Experience simpliciter is not contingent upon a given conceptual theory or a discursive collection of propositions. Indeed, any conceptual theory derives the entirety of its matter and form from content abstracted from experience. The actual process of designing, reworking, and testing conceptual systems are isolated events that occur within the whole of experience itself. Experience is the vessel that upholds and retains the meaning, significance, and existence of the “concept.” A concept that neither holds a relation to an experiential source, nor tainted by an experiential aspect is pure unmeaning and hardly qualifies as a word. One could transpose some terminology from set-theory to help visualize this. If the concept “experience” is a set that contains all of what has been or ever will be the “stuff” of experience, then the concept “experience” would itself be an “improper” subset of itself. Or, to put it differently, the concept “experience” is an “improper” abstraction from itself because the very material referred to by the concept “experience” is the “stuffing” in-and-out-of-which all concepts (including the concept of “experience”) are contingent upon for their meaning and being.

    Responses/Objections and Replies

    “Isn't this just another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment?”

    Very good question. I would have to say no, the argument is not another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment. I say this because my argument does not seek to demonstrate that "qualia" are non-physical (although they very well may be non-physical). Rather my argument looks to the nature of the relationship between Subject and Object in conscious experience—a dichotomy which serves as the basal structure of conscious experience itself. One might even be justified in saying that qualia are contingent upon their being an “Object-for-a-Subject” or a “Subject-having-an-Object.”

    Unlike the Subject to and for whom the Object is presented, qualia always manifest themselves as the formal, perspectival, and aesthetic quality (and value) of that Object. Indeed, qualia always clothe the Object in an aesthetic, qualitative, and gestalt shroud that possesses a tacit, felt character that is unique to the Subject to-whom and for-whom the Object is presented. The Subject is never given in such a way; nor could it be without ceasing to be Subject and becoming an Object (a transition that necessitates a new Subject to apprehend that new Object).

    Unlike the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment, my argument looks to the structure of experience rather than the content of experience. I’ll briefly summarize my argument and then contrast it with Frank Jackson’s argument:

    My Argument (roughly sketched)

    (Premise 1) Whatever cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation (An Objective explanation implies an Object being described/explained).
    (Premise 2) The Subject is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject.
    (Conclusion 1) Therefore, all Conscious mental states have an aspect which is incapable of being given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (From (P1) and (P2))
    (Premise 3) Physical states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.
    (Conclusion 2) Therefore, there is an aspect of all conscious mental states which is not a physical state. (From (C1) and (P3) (using Leibniz’ Law))

    Jackson’s Argument (Taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

    (Premise 1) Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her release.
    (Conclusion 1) Therefore, Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision before her release. (From (P1))
    (Premise 2) There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision that Mary does not have before her release.
    (Conclusion 2) Therefore, there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release. (From (P2))
    (Conclusion 3) Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human color vision. (From (C1) and (C2))

    Works Cited

    Bradley, F. H. (1927). Ethical Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
    Ewing, A. C. (1934). Idealism: A Critical Survey. London: Methuen.
  • Heiko
    519
    P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.PessimisticIdealism
    Not at the same time. See Quantum Mechanics.

    P3) Physical states are Objective states.PessimisticIdealism
    Yes and no. The house you see through the window is hit by photons if you look there or not. If you shoot photons at electrons to see them you know how an electron shot by photons looks like.
    ->

    Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4)PessimisticIdealism
    Therefor one of the mental states has elecrodes pinned at his head.

    You could just as well say imagine an object that cannot be imagined. As it cannot be imagined there is no object and hence it cannot be an object. This clearly shows there is no subject as such subject would have imaged an object.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30

    Your objection seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what is meant by "Subject" and "Object." All "Knowledge" is a relationship between a knowing "Subject" and a known "Object." Whatever is an "Object" is merely something that is either known or knowable by a "Subject." If something is an "Objective" state, then it can become an Object-for-a-Subject in principle. The "in principle" is very important. All of our knowledge about a physical state is by virtue of a relation between the physical state (which is the "Object") and a knower (i.e. a "Subject").
  • Heiko
    519
    Whatever is an "Object" is merely something that is either known or knowable by a "Subject.PessimisticIdealism
    But to be an object it cannot be a subject. It just has to be there to be an object. An object is per definition what is not-the-subject. So what are your speaking of?
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30

    I can't tell what you are trying to get at here.
  • Heiko
    519
    You cannot have a relation between two points where one end is defined by the relation.
    Either there is something to relate to or there is not. :grin:
  • Vanbrainstorm
    15
    Why haven’t u considered the subjective aspect of consciousness originating from the objective one, thus rephrasing the first premise roughly:
    A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
    i.e the emergetive theory of consciousness’s subjective aspect from the processing of information in an objective medium.
  • Heiko
    519
    Why haven’t u considered the subjective aspect of consciousness originating from the objective oneVanbrainstorm
    There even are philosophers who actually explain the objective aspect from the subject itself. Although coherent in themselves none of them could be used for a "proof" of this kind I guess.

    A "relation" is always (at least) binary. To get the object from the subject, in logical mathematical terms, you need a function like y = f(x) and can then write rel(x, y). Just as the other way around one would just have to buy that y=f(x), though. :D
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    Why haven’t u considered the subjective aspect of consciousness originating from the objective one, thus rephrasing the first premise roughly:
    A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
    Vanbrainstorm

    This is a very interesting idea, and I have spent a great deal of time thinking about whether or not such an explanation can do justice to the whole and its manifold aspects. If Q originates from P, then Q could be given a "reductive" explanation that exhaustively explains every aspect of Q exclusively in terms of P. Your rephrasing of the first premise seems to permit Q's "relation" to P as the necessary and sufficient condition for an exhaustive explanation of Q exclusively in terms of P. I don't think that merely "relation" simpliciter warrants such a conclusion. Take, for example, John and Mary, a husband and a wife respectively. The John and Mary enter into an internal relation (i.e. that of matrimony) and this would mean that John is the husband of Mary, and Mary is a wife of John. If John were to die, John's death would change Mary's relationship to John (because of the internal relation). Mary would become a widow. The relation is symmetrical and effects both terms that have entered into the relation. Going back to your rephrasing to the first premise, I would have to disagree that a mere "relation" satisfies the conditions necessary for an exhaustive explanation of Q that is exclusively in terms of P. Tornadoes and Hurricanes are both weather phenomena (and thus are related to one another by virtue of both being weather phenomena), yet no one would say that you could exhaustively explain hurricanes exclusively in terms of tornadoes. This is why I think there is a significant difference between my first premise and your rewriting of it.

    My first premise:

    P1) A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.PessimisticIdealism

    Your rewriting of it:

    A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.Vanbrainstorm

    If the Subjective aspect of consciousness is reducible to the Objective aspect of consciousness, then the Subjective aspect of consciousness could be given an Objective description that exhausts the Subjective aspect's subjectival character. If you can exhaustively explain Q exclusively in terms of P, that implies you can exhaustively describe Q exclusively in terms of P. In fact, an explanation of anything would presuppose a description of what is to be explained. If Q cannot be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P, then Q is not identical to P, because P can be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P. Before going further into this, I'll wait for your response.
  • Theorem
    127
    P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself).PessimisticIdealism

    This seems to be denying the possibility of self-knowledge.
  • Zophie
    176
    I'm afraid I don't see what the subject has to do with this. For me your argument-for-god fails there.

    Edit: Also worth noting iff is bivalent equivalence, not an identical equality.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    If we restrict the meaning of "self-knowledge" to the Subject making itself an Object of knowledge while retaining its "Subject-hood," then yes, "self-knowledge" would be impossible in principle. The reason for this is that the Subject is unable to make itself an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character without positing a new Subject to apprehend this newly posited Object, and this new Subject would be the one doing the "knowing." I don't think we need to limit that ancient maxim to something as confined and restricted to something as technical as the Subject-Object dichotomy.
  • Theorem
    127
    I'm going harp on this a little. You said:

    All "Knowledge" is a relationship between a knowing "Subject" and a known "Object."PessimisticIdealism

    If subject can never become object, then subject can never know itself as a subject. But your entire argument depends on knowledge of the subject (e.g. it contains knowledge claims about subjects). Therefore, your argument is self-undermining.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    Well that's a petty dismissal. Nowhere in any of my posts have I mentioned god or arguments for god. Also, regarding the bivalent equivalence and identical equality issue, I think your reading too much into the use of "if and only if." Surely we would agree that X can be given an exhaustive description exclusively in terms of Y iff all aspects of X satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for an exhaustive description exclusively in terms of Y.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    I would argue that it is not self-undermining. When I speak of my "I", I am unable to ostensively point to it or describe it as I would an Object. Whatever I know as an Object can describe in Objective terms that distinguishes my "Self" from what I am describing. The Subject as Subject cannot be described in Objective terms because that which would be described is going to be an abstraction (such as an Object of thought or reflection) in the Subject's consciousness. Here is a diagram that might make things more clear:
    F54fvfQ
  • Theorem
    127
    But the statement "I know that I am knowing" implies knowledge of self as the subject of knowledge. Right? Such statements only count as knowledge (per your definition of knowledge) via the objectification of the subject. Even the statement "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" also implies an objectification of the subject. How can you know that knowledge is a relation between subject and object unless you can objectify both the subject and the object?
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    The "Objectified Subject" is not The Subject, rather it is "Subject'" (which is not identical to the Subject doing the knowing). It is purely an Object of consciousness. If relations always have at least two terms, and knowledge is a relation, then all "knowledge" relations have at least two terms. One term alone cannot enter into or constitute a relation.

    Edit: Here is a link to the diagram (the image wasn't popping up in the previous comment)
    Diagram
  • Mww
    4.5k
    The Subject as Subject cannot be described in Objective terms because that which would be described is going to be an abstraction (such as an Object of thought or reflection) in the Subject's consciousness.PessimisticIdealism

    Agreed. It is impossible to intuit the self, for intuition is always an undetermined phenomenon, and all phenomena, hence all empirical intuitions, are predicated on sensibility. Therefore, to intuit the self is to have it met with perception, which is impossible. But it is nonetheless not contradictory, to think and thereby conceive a representation of the unity of consciousness in one transcendental object, and name such representation as “I”. While all that does is nip infinite regress in the metaphysical bud, whole philosophical paradigms have faithfully clung to it. For better or worse.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    I agree with you here. The represented "I" that we "know" in "Self-consciousness" (pardon the expression) is not the "concrete" knowing Subject, rather it is an abstraction that does not exhaust the "transcendental" character of the Subject. This is why The Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective description in exclusively Objective terms.
  • Mww
    4.5k


    Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument?

    But that’s alright....I don’t want to sidetrack the progress of the standing dialogue.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument?Mww

    In the context of what we are dealing with here, I don't think the fact that we cannot in principle make the Subject an Object for-itself (while retaining its Subjective character) threatens us with an infinite chain of homunculi. The grounding of the "Self" in the "Subject" saves us from the vicious regress that would ensue if someone were to ask, "What is my Self?" and the interlocutor replies, "Your Self is your mind?" or "Your Self is your body."
  • Mww
    4.5k


    Understood.

    Thanks.
  • javra
    2.4k


    I’m working on something related to this at the moment. The difficult part is in conveying via what can only be a conceptualization what is referenced to be a first person subjective state of affairs – a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware. Without examples of actual experience this would likely go nowhere. So here are some:

    First person knowledge of being thirsty, sad, confident, elated, in pain, meditative, angry, anxious, in love, sleepy, and so on.

    To express these states of being is, of course, to convey concepts which, as such, are other than the subject which holds conscious awareness of the given concepts – concepts which the utilized language conveys. Yet when one is thirsty, sad, confident, etc., that which one is aware of is no way differentiated from that which is aware. Rather it is the thirsty, sad, confident, etc., subject of awareness that then holds thus colored awareness of anything other – from physical objects, to concepts and intuitions as other than the subject so aware of them to, to awareness of other subjects, etc.

    Our wording in at least the English language reflects the reality of this state of affairs: one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (which expresses one as subject of awareness experiencing some object of awareness via feeling) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc.

    I’ll try to further comment and support this, but for now I’ll keep it relative short.

    Ps. I’m not one to believe that that which is real is created by the language(s) which we use. So, while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of, this of itself to me doesn’t negate the personal experiences of this, which we all have – which, as experiences, I deem to be real. In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”. So, we are autologically aware of our own states of being as subjects of awareness. It if helps, one can critique this post’s understanding by so addressing the subject matter as autological awareness.
  • Theorem
    127
    Yeah, I see what you're saying, but if there is an aspect of the subject that cannot become an object-for-a-subject, this would imply we could never know it. You're dividing the world up into that which can be known (objects-for-a-subject) and that which cannot be known (subjects qua subject) and defining knowledge as a set of one-way relations from the latter to the former. This implies that any claims made about the latter cannot count as knowledge. The model you have laid out in your argument implies that the claims in your argument (including the conclusion) can never qualify as knowledge.
  • Mww
    4.5k


    I’ll defer, designate myself as second chair.
  • javra
    2.4k
    Bummer, but OK. :cool:
  • javra
    2.4k
    Feel like I should also mention, yours was a good point.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30
    Yeah, I see what you're saying, but if there is an aspect of the subject that cannot become an object-for-a-subject, this would imply we could never know it.Theorem

    The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself.

    The model you have laid out in your argument implies that the claims in your argument (including the conclusion) can never qualify as knowledge.Theorem

    Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge."
  • Heiko
    519
    The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself.PessimisticIdealism
    It is known as the form of it's perception. There is always the perceiving and the perceived. But this only establishes it's mere existence. If it was felt, this would belong into the realm of the perceived.
  • PessimisticIdealism
    30

    It's not "perceived" because the Subject is not perceived by any sensory modality. When I use the term "feeling," I mean something much more subliminal than an emotion, a discomfort, or any kind of proprioception. The Subject is felt as repelling its Object, or as being in opposition to it. The Subject is felt as that which determines its Object's perspectival character, gestalt form, and aesthetic qualities.
  • Mww
    4.5k
    while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of (...) In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”.javra

    Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)

    Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting.
    ——————-

    a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware.javra

    one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (.....) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc.javra

    These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent.

    (On soapbox)
    Still....congrats on the depth of your investigations. The dearth of good philosophy is understandable these days, given the mere crumbs left by the masters.
    (Off soapbox)
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