1. Subject of the thread you proposed: if a scientific method ("scientific mind") can objectively establish which acts are morally better ("priority"). — David Mo

You start out directly wrong in this by saying I'm looking for a scientific method to objectively establish morally better acts. I'm not, I propose borrowing four cornerstones of the scientific method into a mindset to calculate the most probable good moral act, based on a foundation of well-being and harm. Objectively and probable aren't the same things and that is an important factor for this theory and fundamental to its core.

2. To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. — David Mo

No, not for this, because it doesn't put a value in the act, it puts a value into the method used to calculate the act. This is what I mean by taking a step back from other moral theories that try to define the acts themselves. It's a Kantian duty-type theory, where the duty is the method applied to find out a morally good act, not the act or consequence itself. This theory is a moral anti-realist theory that doesn't focus on either consequence or the act, but how to form a probability around good and bad options before an act.

3. If that method you propose is scientific and objective, it will be based on a set of observable and quantifiable "good" properties. — David Mo

The method is not, the "scientific mind" is not the scientific method, it's an idea about a mindset, a, in other's word, virtue of a person, holding not a thought or absolute idea but a method to think that is drawing on the four cornerstones of the scientific method. It's never meant as a way to calculate objective moral truths.

If I say this is theory is moral anti-realism but still incorporate scientific method as an idea into it, you must take a moment to think about how I actually use the concept within the argument. Because now you are making an assumption about what my argument is really about and then counter-argue it from that point of view, which means you have a misunderstanding of my argument before you counter it.

This can be because of many of the problems that others have pointed out and that my argument is in fact flawed in its inductive reasoning in the OP, that's why I suggest reading through them all to see the ongoing discussion around all the factors that are problematic about the original induction. Because I'm open for counter-arguments as long as they focus on the details of my argument, not a faulty interpretation of it.

A typical case in moral philosophy is the combination of the lesser good for the greater number and the greater good for the lesser number. — David Mo

That has to do with consequences, my argument is more focused on deontology. How someone calculates the probability of the act has to do with the consequences, but what I talk about is that the only moral action we can take is that calculation. What the calculation itself is based on is a set of rules/foundation that guides the calculation, just like the laws of physics guide new hypotheses about physics. I talk about the duty of epistemic responsibility in calculating an act, not the consequences or the act itself. I propose that the duty to calculate is the only moral thing we can do, consequences and acts themselves are impossible to evaluate within moral theory.

The scientific method (verification, falsification, replication, predictability) is always the best path to objective truths and evidence.
A person using the scientific method in day to day thinking is a person living by a scientific mindset, i.e a scientific mind.
A person living by a scientific mind has a higher probability of making good moral choices that benefit humans and humanity.
Living with a higher probability of good moral choices is to be a person with good morals. — Yourself

You wrote this yourself in your opening remarks. It corresponds exactly to the objections I made to you. I think your attempts to avoid those objections have made your ideas more confused, rather than more precise.

It does not make sense to say that you are not talking about using a scientific method but about the fundamentals of a scientific method. It is the same thing, and that is what your opening comment says when you say that "method (verification, falsification, replication, predictability) is always the best path to objective truths". It does not make sense for you to pretend to oppose objectivity to probability. The objectivity of the scientific method that, according to you, the scientific mentality applies, is established in your first commentary. It does not make sense that you now talk about "calculating the probability of a moral act". The probability of what? Of its frequency, of its intensity or of its goodness? What you mean here is to objectively calculate the probability of one act being more moral or better than another ("A person living by a scientific mind has a higher probability of making good morals"). And it does not make sense for you to say that you do not put the value on the act but on the method. In the first comment you specifically talk about the method you propose achieving good moral choices and good morals. In other words, morality is a property of the acts and beliefs (mentality) of the person who uses the scientific method applied to the field of morality.

I think that before recommending to others that we go over your previous comments you should do so yourself. I confirm the criticisms I have made to you previously.

-To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. In other words, what you mean by "good" in a moral sense.
-You have not given a single observable and measurable characteristic that allows you to decide that an act is good.
-If you want to evaluate which acts are better than others in a scientific way, you must establish a quantification of that distribution of traits that make moral an act or choice.

You wrote this yourself in your opening remarks. It corresponds exactly to the objections I made to you. I think your attempts to avoid those objections have made your ideas more confused, rather than more precise. — David Mo

But the argument in the OP is not valid anymore, which has been stated numerous times. So I urge you to read what has been written through the thread first since you ignore that I am trying to expand on the issues to present a new version later. If you only return to the argument in the OP and ignore what I write now I understand that it becomes confusing.

-To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. In other words, what you mean by "good" in a moral sense. — David Mo

Not if moral acts in themselves aren't good or bad. We can establish a foundation around well-being and harm that you then use when addressing all data points surrounding a certain choice. If you exhaust and maximize the data to the best of your ability and question your own biases when doing so while strictly following a ruleset of the well-being/harm foundation you are acting morally good by the process of thought itself. The act and consequence has nothing to do with this, it can be a bad consequence and it could be a bad moral act, but the argument I am describing is proposing that the morally good or bad is within the act of calculating, not the act that is calculated out of it. That the act of actively making the effort of epistemic responsibility is what is morally good, not the consequences of the calculated act or the calculated act itself.

-You have not given a single observable and measurable characteristic that allows you to decide that an act is good. — David Mo

Because you are still talking about the act. This method I talk about here has nothing to do with good or bad acts, it has to do with calculating the act. Ignore the argument in the first post, it is outdated.

-If you want to evaluate which acts are better than others in a scientific way — David Mo

Still not what this is about.

Ignore the argument in the first post, it is outdated. — Christoffer

As I told you, the problem is that your first comment had a clear (and wrong) meaning and after modifying it it has become a series of vague and confusing phrases. Like the ones I pointed out to you and the paragraph that follows.

Not if moral acts in themselves aren't good or bad. We can establish a foundation around well-being and harm that you then use when addressing all data points surrounding a certain choice. If you exhaust and maximize the data to the best of your ability and question your own biases when doing so while strictly following a ruleset of the well-being/harm foundation you are acting morally good by the process of thought itself. The act and consequence has nothing to do with this, it can be a bad consequence and it could be a bad moral act, but the argument I am describing is proposing that the morally good or bad is within the act of calculating, not the act that is calculated out of it. That the act of actively making the effort of epistemic responsibility is what is morally good, not the consequences of the calculated act or the calculated act itself. — Christoffer

I don't know what it means that acts are moral "in themselves". An act will be moral if it meets certain conditions that you refuse to specify clearly. However, it follows from the above paragraph that for you an act is morally good if it is strictly inferred from a set of rules (ruleset) based on well being.
In the end you are saying the same thing that you said at the beginning, but in a more inconcrete way.

My objections, therefore, still stand. For the above to make sense, you will have to specify the concept of well being, the precise set of rules that you are proposing, why the well being that you have defined is the basis of morality. You will have to explain how you evaluate different concepts of welfare that men have. Etc.

As long as you don't do all this, your proposal remains in the field of indefinition and doesn't seem to lead anywhere. If you try it you will find all the difficulties that it entails. You will realize that these difficulties have already been dealt with in moral philosophy many times without finding a solution that satisfies everyone. Therefore, talking about things like "scientific" or "strictly" does not have much future in the field of ethics. With apologies from Sam Harris, Dawkins, de Waal and others like you who seem to be excited by this possibility.

As long as you don't do all this, your proposal remains in the field of indefinition and doesn't seem to lead anywhere. If you try it you will find all the difficulties that it entails. You will realize that these difficulties have already been dealt with in moral philosophy many times without finding a solution that satisfies everyone. — David Mo

This. Your objections will always stand because Chris doesn't even understand half of the criticisms being put in front of him. His responses clearly demonstrate that.

Morality exists in a state (present universe) of a good catalyst (such as pre-genesis of universe). Good is in the case of catalysts, and is not, in the case of states, states however can be moral supporting, or do not damage too much good.

Science can be immoral, but there is morality of natural, elemental ideas or pleasurable and efficent ideas, where science is actually moral.

Existentially is this a problem?

Theoretically a stronger matter might exist in multiverse times, different universes, making our stars look weak. Supposedly that's what drives the catalyst. Potentially around it's own environment.

My objections, therefore, still stand. — David Mo

Of course, I need to go back to the drawing board, as I have said numerous times. I have tried to explain the foundation I'm building the argument upon. But since you pick and choose and even said to ignore other writings in this thread I don't think you want to understand my point of view here, you want to enforce your own.

For the above to make sense, you will have to specify the concept of well being, the precise set of rules that you are proposing, why the well being that you have defined is the basis of morality. You will have to explain how you evaluate different concepts of welfare that men have. Etc. — David Mo

Which I could try and do when updating the argument. It's also the core element that is the weakest in the argument and that has already been addressed by others, as said.

As long as you don't do all this, your proposal remains in the field of indefinition and doesn't seem to lead anywhere. If you try it you will find all the difficulties that it entails. You will realize that these difficulties have already been dealt with in moral philosophy many times without finding a solution that satisfies everyone. — David Mo

I know that there are plenty of sources that are like this argument and I'm drawing from many of them, trying to unify different ideas. But the problem I have with your objections is that you seem unable to view upon an unfinished set of ideas and understand the concept of it, that is what I have been trying to explain. This is why you confuse the scientific method with what I am actually saying. You cannot move past that you think my concept is about using science to determine morality, that is not what I'm saying. But you keep at it. If you can't understand the basics of the concept I have been trying to explain, then you absolutely will find things vague.

So, by me saying "borrowing the four cornerstones of falsifiability, verification, replication and predictability from the scientific method to apply to the method of thought in order to come to rational conclusions of a situation", does that sound like "using the entire scientific method to research moral choices"? Forget about the now invalid argument in the OP, read this thing again and tell me what you think I'm talking about here specifically.

Therefore, talking about things like "scientific" or "strictly" does not have much future in the field of ethics. With apologies from Sam Harris, Dawkins, de Waal and others like you who seem to be excited by this possibility. — David Mo

Sam Harris ignores previous philosophy, thinks we can define everything by (in his case) sloppy neurological research, have nothing to support claims and has segments just about blasting religion because he... dislikes it. I understand that Sam Harris and my argument seem alike, but they're not. If you misunderstand how I include "science" in my argument I can see how you draw that conclusion, but you are mistaken again.

because Chris doesn't even understand half of the criticisms being put in front of him. His responses clearly demonstrate that. — Wolfman

Does my edit of the first post not show just how well I understand the criticism? Do you think philosophy is about accepting "defeat" and that it's about who's right, wrong and that it is a contest? I can't begin to tell you how sloppy it is to write such a thing during a philosophical dialectic. Please refrain from such things. It's the equivalent of all the unknown philosophers over the course of history who's names go unnoticed because all they do is attack with closed minds.

I have never claimed to have a bulletproof argument, even stated so in my opening post. I have always said it's a work in progress that I wanted to test the merits of at the moment. I have taken all the criticism into account for the next revision of it and tried to explain the point of view I'm working from in order to get more discussion out of it, that's it.

If you want to gloat at a work in progress, you're clearly misunderstanding the basics of philosophy.

So, by me saying "borrowing the four cornerstones of falsifiability, verification, replication and predictability from the scientific method to apply to the method of thought in order to come to rational conclusions of a situation", does that sound like "using the entire scientific method to research moral choices"? — Christoffer

Is there a branch of knowledge that is based on these "four cornerstones" and is not science? I don't know of any.

Is there a branch of knowledge that is based on these "four cornerstones" and is not science? I don't know of any. — David Mo

Contemporary Freethinkers is closest to mind. It's not science per se, but the method of thought. It's from Clifford and Russel I draw from when forming the argument. If that is the method, the problem is its foundation, as you and others mentioned. The method can't work outside clearer defined aspects of well-being and harm. If the method is close to what freethinking is, a clearly defined foundation of well-being and harm can place it into rationality-based moral theory that is solid enough within an anti-realist approach.

I have read some of Russell's books on morality. I have never read a reference to the "four cornerstones" of the scientific method applied to morality.
I didn't know William K. Clifford. I consulted the article dedicated to him in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I have not seen any reference to the "four cornerstones" of the scientific method applied to morality.

Perhaps if you can offer a specific example of their science-inspired moral philosophy we can get out of this impasse.

I have read some of Russell's books on morality. I have never read a reference to the "four cornerstones" of the scientific method applied to morality. — David Mo

Because that's the line of ideas I'm pursuing. If everything about philosophical discourse is about referencing other philosophers and never build upon them, then all the dialectic becomes is a quoting contest.

I draw upon their perspectives, trying to create another argument based on their ideas on epistemic responsibility and Russels Value of Free Thought. The challenge is, as mentioned by many, the definition of well-being. The phrase makes people view my argument as a duplicate of Sam Harris, but his ideas are so ill-supported in his writing and without any arguments at all, which makes my attempt a bit more leaning towards analytical philosophy. I want to make the argument solid, as solid, it can be. The problem is definitions, without them the argument fails. Sam Harris never cares for definitions, I do.

The key thing about the argument is that it denies the act and consequence to be in themselves objectively moral. The moral or immoral value of the act and consequence is impossible to predict, which is why most moral theories fail. What I'm aiming at is that while the act and consequence can't be defined, we can define the method of choosing how to act.

In essence, how do people arrive at moral choices, not which specific method leads to good acts. The method, by way of freethinkers, is about detaching yourself as much as possible from the choice you make, minimizing biases and assumptions. A scientific mind has to do with a mindset borrowing cornerstones of how scientists handle epistime. It's not about applying the scientific method of testing, gather data, statistics and so on, but applying an unbiased approach when making a choice. I could easily say unbiased rational thinking, but what does that mean?

What is the practical way of doing it? The four cornerstones that I borrow from the scientific method give hints on how to think when making a choice. Can I verify my choice by any data? Can I replicate my choice as something many could do? Can I test my choice, falsifying it so that I know there are no other possible choices? Can I predict different outcomes of my choice?
This is not the scientific method, but it's borrowing parts of how scientists handle information and data. Borrowing these things from the scientific method and applying to thought when making choices in life gives you a method of doing unbiased rational thinking.

There's no point in asking for unbiased rational thinking when people clearly approach such methods in biased ways. So a method of thinking, a mindset, a scientific mindset is my suggestion for the approach. It might sound pedantic, but I argue it needs to be clear.

I really don't see the ways of thinking unbiased rational thoughts, conducting freethinking methodology is where my theory suffers, since it's just a practical way of following Clifford and Russel's philosophies. My theory suffers in defining well-being, as mentioned, and to complete it as a moral theory, that definition needs work. Which is why I think you argue against my theory from the wrong angle. I think my idea about borrowing from the scientific method to apply practicality to freethinking based on Clifford and Russel is pretty clearly explained.