De Jure and De Facto Rigidity

Shawn

I'm reading some of Routledge's Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity, and have stumbled on an interesting philosophical question.

On pg. 62-63 the author writes:

This is really abstract; but, essentially, Kripke is saying that de jure and de facto rigity sometimes interchange. When he say's later about the definition of a name as the referent itself in a world will always be true within that reference frame.

What do you think about this?

Snakes Alive

I'm not sure what you're asking, or what about that text shows that 'Kripke is saying that de jure and de facto rigidity sometimes interchange.'

Shawn

I'm not sure what you're asking, or what about that text shows that 'Kripke is saying that de jure and de facto rigidity sometimes interchange.' — Snakes Alive

I believe this is best explained through the last portion of the text, in that;

"the length of stick S is not ridged at time t",

where,

"one meter" is a ridged.

Snakes Alive

I'm not sure I follow. "The length of S at t" is a non-rigid designator, and "one meter" is (supposed to be) a rigid designator.

That doesn't have to do with the distinction between de facto and de jure rigidity. Both de facto and de jure rigid designators are rigid.

De Jure and De Facto Rigidity

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