I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example. — Xtrix

Right, this is "being" in the Parmenidean sense. Being is associated with truth, what is, is, and it is impossible for it not to be, and what is not, is not, and it is impossible for it to be. What is, i.e. "being" can be understood as eternal changeless truth.

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis. — Xtrix

I don't see any "original unity". Being in the sense of what emerges is more like Hegel's "being". Are you sure that Heidegger doesn't get his sense of "being" from Hegel?

No, they both relate to being in the sense of phusis mentioned above. They're both aspects of this. Phusis -- the Greek understanding of being -- is not only "stability" or "changeless Form." If that were the case, the only entities that "are," or that "have" being, are those that don't change. But that's absurd: a river "is" just as much as a triangle, matter, or universal concept "is." — Xtrix

This seems a little confused to me. It appears like you are saying that there is a sense of being which means phusis. There is no "being in the sense of phusis". That is a misrepresentation. However, there may have been a "phusis in the sense of being".

Being relates to phusis, and becoming relates to phusis, as two distinct ways of describing what is referred to by phusis. Being represents stability, and becoming represents instability. So you cannot say that being in the sense of phusis is unstable. Being always refers to the stable aspect of phusis, as described by Parmenides, what is and cannot be otherwise, while becoming refers to the unstable aspect, what is changing.

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example.
— Xtrix

Right, this is "being" in the Parmenidean sense. Being is associated with truth, what is, is, and it is impossible for it not to be, and what is not, is not, and it is impossible for it to be. What is, i.e. "being" can be understood as eternal changeless truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well remember what's getting translated as "truth" -- αλεθεια, aletheia. The concept of "truth" has gone through many semantic changes. In fact it says basically the same thing as phusis, as the simple perception of things, as that which shows itself, discloses itself, or in Heidegger "un-conceals" itself. All of this to the Greeks is "true."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.
— Xtrix

I don't see any "original unity". Being in the sense of what emerges is more like Hegel's "being". Are you sure that Heidegger doesn't get his sense of "being" from Hegel? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well it's not really a "sense," it's simply interpreting the texts. Heidegger himself makes very few positive claims about being. Hegel was one of the first to discuss the presocratic thinkers, so perhaps there's some influence in that sense.

But I'm not understanding why you don't see the unity. That which emerges, that which shows itself, which "appears," is the being of entities in the Greek sense. Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing, moving or not moving -- but they all exist, they all "are." To say entities that move or change or "become" do not possess "being" is simply a mistake.

This seems a little confused to me. It appears like you are saying that there is a sense of being which means phusis. There is no "being in the sense of phusis". That is a misrepresentation. However, there may have been a "phusis in the sense of being". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the Greek understanding of being is phusis. When I say "being in the sense of phusis" this means the same: phusis is the word that describes the being of beings. Heidegger says the same, and it's worth going over the reasons for this-- I can't transcribe his entire lecture.

"Phusis in the sense of being" seems to me an attempt to fit things into what you're already expecting, to make "being" something more fundamental as "changeless." But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:

"Phusis is the emergence can be experienced everywhere: for example, in celestial processes (the rising of the sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of animals and human beings from the womb. But phusis, the emerging sway, is not synonymous with these processes, which we still today count as part of "nature." This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-iself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings. Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable." (Intro, p. 15) —

Being relates to phusis, and becoming relates to phusis, as two distinct ways of describing what is referred to by phusis. — Metaphysician Undercover

No: phusis is being itself. You continually come back to separating "being" and becoming" and then want to make phusis 'related' to both -- but rather "being" in the sense you mean (as changeless) and becoming are both aspects of being in the Greek understanding (phusis).

Being always refers to the stable aspect of phusis, — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that's how you're interpreting it -- and you could be completely right, of course. But unfortunately in this case we'll have to get "into the weeds" about it by analyzing Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle.

as described by Parmenides, — Metaphysician Undercover

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.

But I'm not understanding why you don't see the unity. That which emerges, that which shows itself, which "appears," is the being of entities in the Greek sense. Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing, moving or not moving -- but they all exist, they all "are." To say entities that move or change or "become" do not possess "being" is simply a mistake. — Xtrix

I think I see the problem right here. You start out by referring to "the being of entities", and that is consistent with the ancient Greek usage of being, which is a verb. The you switch to equate "being" with an entity ("Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing..."), and that is to use "being" as a noun. This usage, to refer to "beings" as things, rather than "being" as the activity of a thing, I do not think is consistent with ancient Greek usage. That usage I believe developed later from Latin, the human being, etc..

So I see a bit of equivocation in your paragraph here. You are switching from "being" as a property of a thing, to a being as a thing itself, and the latter is not consistent with ancient Greek usage.

No, the Greek understanding of being is phusis. When I say "being in the sense of phusis" this means the same: phusis is the word that describes the being of beings. Heidegger says the same, and it's worth going over the reasons for this-- I can't transcribe his entire lecture. — Xtrix

So we can talk about the being of things, and the becoming of things, but this is not to talk about the same aspect of the things. There is no unity of being and becoming because they are distinct ideas, but it is supposed that the thing itself provides some unity, by having both being, and becoming.

But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings: — Xtrix

Now you're switching "being" to a noun, talking about "beings", and this is not consistent with the ancient Greek. So this is not how the Greeks apprehended beings, they did not actually apprehend "beings". There was this type of thing, and that type of thing, "species", and fundamental elements which all types of things were composed of, but they didn't have an overall concept of "being" which could be used to refer to any different thing as "a being".

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however. — Xtrix

He says that what is, is, and cannot not be. This means impossible to change, therefore stable. If he said that what is, is possible to not be, then it would refer to instability.

That intellectual virus "First we must define our terms" infects this thread.

No, you don't need to find the basis for modern science in order to do science.

'cause we didn't, yet we're doing it.

As Tolkien put it, the tale grew in the telling.

No, you don't need to find the basis for modern science in order to do science. — Banno

True, no more than you need to find the basis of "sports" to play basketball. What's your point?

That intellectual virus "First we must define our terms" infects this thread.

You start out by referring to "the being of entities", and that is consistent with the ancient Greek usage of being, which is a verb. The you switch to equate "being" with an entity ("Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing..."), and that is to use "being" as a noun. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the being of entities is phusis, the emerging sway.

That "entities may be seen as changing or not changing" is indeed discussing beings. There is a distinction (which Heidegger calls the "ontological distinction") between Being and beings (I capitalized the former in this case for clarity). Being is the basis on which any particular entity (a being) shows up, but "it" is not an entity. Being is not a property, either.

I can't find where in my statement you think I meant anything like this, but if it came off that way that was not my intention. Being is not an entity or a property. But do all beings "emerge"? Of course, or they wouldn't be beings for us at all. This "emergence" is phusis -- the Greek term for Being.

Hopefully that was clearer.

So we can talk about the being of things, and the becoming of things, but this is not to talk about the same aspect of the things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Translate your sentence this way: "the being of beings and the becoming of beings." You see where the problem is, I think. The equating of "being" as something changeless, as something opposite of "becoming," of all change and motion and flux -- this is the mistake. Better to say "the permanence of beings and the becoming of beings." In that case, I totally agree they're very different aspects.

Substituting "being" for "permanence" and than contrasting it with "becoming" is just a mistake, or at the very least confusing. Why? Because as you say here:

but it is supposed that the thing itself provides some unity, by having both being, and becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "thing" (the being) itself exists, of course -- whether changing or otherwise. It has being. "Becoming" in general has "being."

But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:
— Xtrix

Now you're switching "being" to a noun, talking about "beings", and this is not consistent with the ancient Greek. — Metaphysician Undercover

Beings are nouns, yes. Being, on the other hand, isn't a noun, or a "thing." The being of beings is what we're discussing, in fact. If no-thing emerged or showed up in any way for us, there'd be no question of being at all.

There was this type of thing, and that type of thing, "species", and fundamental elements which all types of things were composed of, but they didn't have an overall concept of "being" which could be used to refer to any different thing as "a being". — Metaphysician Undercover

They did: phusis. That's the entire point.

Heidegger says it better than I:

"What we have said helps us to understand the Greek interpretation of Being that we mentioned at the beginning, in our explication of the term "metaphysics" -- that is, the apprehension of Being as phusis. The later concepts of "nature," we said, must be held at a distance from this: phusis means the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself. In this sway, rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originally unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which that which comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings. But this sway first steps forth from concealment -- that is, in Greek, aletheia (unconcealment) happens -- insofar as the sway struggles itself forth as a world. Through world, beings first come to being." —

That is from page 64.

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.
— Xtrix

He says that what is, is, and cannot not be. This means impossible to change, therefore stable. If he said that what is, is possible to not be, then it would refer to instability. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's discussing Being. One may interpret this as opposing being to not-being in the sense of "nothing," and thus arguing that "nothing" is impossible. The argument that any change is impossible is another interpretation, and one I never found very compelling from reading the fragments.

That intellectual virus "First we must define our terms" infects this thread.

This is your point?

In that case I don't see the evidence for it. Neither I nor others have made any such claim, so far as I can tell. Speaking only for myself, "first we must define our terms" completely misses my aim in creating this thread.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology — Xtrix

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology — Xtrix

Yes, very much so. I wholeheartedly agree! And well said, if I might say so myself. :)

I still don't see how this equates to "First we must define our terms before we do science." I'm discussing the ontology of science in the sense of "nature" -- the study of nature, the "naturalistic stance" that pervades it, etc. That's a very concrete framework, a view about the universe.

To trace the concept of naturalism and thus "nature" historically can tell us something about the philosophical (ontological) basis of our modern science. This is the point of this thread. It's not that science has to suspend while we explore its theoretical evolution, however, and it's not simply a matter of definition. In that case I would simply ask: "What is the definition of science?"

Yawn.

Hopefully that was clearer. — Xtrix

Not at all. I wanted to know in what sense you were talking about "being". Are you discussing what things have in common, "being", existence, like when we say that a thing "is", instead of a fictional thing which is not? In this case "being" is a verb, what a thing is doing, existing, and I think that this is the sense which the ancient Greek's used. Or, are you talking about "being" in the sense of a thing, a being? In this case "being" is a noun. I think that this is a more modern sense, developed through Latin. You seemed to be switching back and forth between the two.

Instead of giving me a clear answer, you've introduced a third sense of being, a capitalized "Being", which appears specific to Heidegger, but you want to assign it to ancient Greece. It is not the verb I described above, because you say it is not a property of things, the activity which is proper to things as "being". Instead, you assign to it the mystical description of "emergence", or "emerging sway". The problem though, as I explained to you already, is that these concepts are better associated with the ancient Greek "becoming", rather than "being", and these two are distinct in ancient Greek conceptualization.

Translate your sentence this way: "the being of beings and the becoming of beings." You see where the problem is, I think. The equating of "being" as something changeless, as something opposite of "becoming," of all change and motion and flux -- this is the mistake. Better to say "the permanence of beings and the becoming of beings." In that case, I totally agree they're very different aspects. — Xtrix

OK, so you want to remove "being" in the sense of the verb, "the 'being' of beings" and replace it with "the 'permanence' of being". That's fine, if it makes more sense to you this way, but the problem is that we are discussing how the ancient Greeks talked about it, and they used what is translated as "being", and Parmenides described this in terms of permanence. So you cannot remove the fact that the Greeks spoke of this as the "being" of things, just because it makes more sense to you to call it the permanence of things. Furthermore, as I explained, the Greeks weren't really calling things beings, so it would be more like "the being of a man", "the being of an animal", "the being of a plant". And, since they all seemed to have this property in common, "being", Aristotle asked what is this thing "being", as being itself, which they all have in common.

The "thing" (the being) itself exists, of course -- whether changing or otherwise. It has being. "Becoming" in general has "being." — Xtrix

This makes absolutely no sense to me. Plants and animals have being, as described above. What could it possibly mean to say "becoming has being"?

Beings are nouns, yes. Being, on the other hand, isn't a noun, or a "thing." The being of beings is what we're discussing, in fact. If no-thing emerged or showed up in any way for us, there'd be no question of being at all. — Xtrix

This I don't understand either. What do you mean by "showed up"? You say here that you want to talk about the verb "the being of beings". But then you proceed to define "being" with the terms of "emerged" and "showed up", and these are the defining terms of becoming, not being. So you appear totally confused. "Being" refers to the existence of the thing, not what the thing shows through emergence. Are you familiar with the Latin distinction of existence and essence? Existence is associated with the being of the thing, and essence (what the things is), can be associated with what the things shows up as.

I agree that if there were no showing up of the thing (essence), there would be no existence of the thing. That is a fundamental ontological principle, an existing thing must have a form, essence. But we ought not confuse the existence of a thing (its being), with the essence of the thing (how it shows itself to us). Therefore it is a mistake to say that the being of a thing is what it shows up as.

They did: phusis. That's the entire point. — Xtrix

"Phusis" does not mean the same as "being". You're wrong to equate these two. They are completely distinct. So if that is your "entire point", it's wrong. Your quoted passage says that "Being" (it's capitalized, so this is the third sense, the Heideggerian sense) is equivalent to the ancient Greek "phusis". But this sense is not "being" in the ancient Greek sense of "being", it's a new sense created by Heidegger, signified by the capitalization.

He's discussing Being — Xtrix

No, "Being" refers to a concept created by Heidegger. How could Parmenides have been discussing it?

I wanted to know in what sense you were talking about "being". Are you discussing what things have in common, "being", existence, like when we say that a thing "is", instead of a fictional thing which is not? In this case "being" is a verb, what a thing is doing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying it's a "verb" isn't quite accurate either, but yes I mean it in the former sense of "is-ness" you mentioned.

You seemed to be switching back and forth between the two — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, although being can only really be discussed through beings. If you take away all beings, it's not that there is left over "being" as a void of some kind.

Regardless, using your terms of verb vs noun, I've been clear about the distinction between being and beings. Again, this is the ontological distinction.

Instead of giving me a clear answer, you've introduced a third sense of being, a capitalized "Being", which appears specific to Heidegger, but you want to assign it to ancient Greece. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no third term. I mentioned that i capitalized it for clarity only, so you wouldn't take it to mean "permanence" and so not to confuse you. I may have failed but that was the only reason - no third term.

It is not the verb I described above, because you say it is not a property of things, the activity which is proper to things as "being". — Metaphysician Undercover

You're the one defining being as a verb. I never said that. Being is that on the basis of which beings "are" at all. It's not an easy concept to define. Maybe "existence" is better, but even that doesn't quite capture it because of historical connotations.

Instead, you assign to it the mystical description of "emergence", or "emerging sway". The problem though, as I explained to you already, is that these concepts are better associated with the ancient Greek "becoming", rather than "being", — Metaphysician Undercover

But you see that you're begging the question. You're simply starting with the dichotomy of being vs. becoming and trying to fit the data in with this dichotomy. But emerging is phusis, and not simply change and motion. It's the "is-ness" of anything at all, and the fact that it is - whether it changes or moves or is at rest. It's not an action, it's not a property, it's not an entity. When we ask about becoming, we say "becoming 'is' xyz" - we're presupposing being. In this sense "change" has a kind of being as well. Just because it's a verb or an activity doesn't matter. Ditto for whether something is abstract or "not real" like unicorns or imaginary numbers. They all "are."

Greek "becoming", rather than "being", and these two are distinct in ancient Greek conceptualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. This distinction has its origin in ancient Greek thinking, it's true, but it grows out of an originary unity, the Greek notion of being is phusis. Once we get to Plato and Aristotle, the split between being and becoming and "being and seeming" take off. But we're attempting to go back even further, to the milieu in which they grew.

OK, so you want to remove "being" in the sense of the verb, "the 'being' of beings" and replace it with "the 'permanence' of being". That's fine, if it makes more sense to you this way, but the problem is that we are discussing how the ancient Greeks talked about it, and they used what is translated as "being", and Parmenides described this in terms of permanence. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he didn't. That's how you are using it. Permanence and impermenance applies to beings. Parmenides is talking about being. Heraclitus is, likewise, talking about being. Our predominant interpretations and translations of these men are simply wrong. Now this is a big claim to make, and needs to he supported. I'm prepared to do that through the fragments themselves, but it could take a while. For the time being, just briefly suspend incredulity and assume it, at least to fully understand my position.

This I don't understand either. What do you mean by "showed up"? — Metaphysician Undercover

They are present before us, they appear to us, they "are."

"Phusis" does not mean the same as "being". You're wrong to equate these two. They are completely distinct. So if that is your "entire point", it's wrong. Your quoted passage says that "Being" (it's capitalized, so this is the third sense, the Heideggerian sense) is equivalent to the ancient Greek "phusis". But this sense is not "being" in the ancient Greek sense of "being", it's a new sense created by Heidegger, signified by the capitalization. — Metaphysician Undercover

Phusis was the Greek term for being, yes. This is exactly what Heidegger says, and he's correct. You're hung up on the capitilization, but that's irrelevant. It doesn't signify anything. I only used it, mistakingly, for clarity. It's not a special "Heideggerian" sense at all. Being is often capitalized in translations, yes...but EVERY noun in German is capitalized. There's no reason to capitalize it, and in many translations they don't. So you're simply wrong about that.

As for whether Heidegger is correct in claiming phusis is the Greek understanding of being - well, that's the topic- one may find convincing or not. It convinces me.

Phusis was the Greek term for being, yes. This is exactly what Heidegger says, and he's correct. — Xtrix

No, phusis was not the Greek term for being. So if Heidegger introduced a concept of Being which is supposed to be equivalent with the Greek concept of phusis, then this Heideggerian concept of Being is not the same as the Greek concept of being.

No, phusis was not the Greek term for being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is. Ousia as well, later on. The evidence doesn't support you on this. I'll stick with Heidegger's extensive scholarship over yours, unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration.

So if Heidegger introduced a concept of Being which is supposed to be equivalent with the Greek concept of phusis, then this Heideggerian concept of Being is not the same as the Greek concept of being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Heidegger didn't introduce anything of the kind, as I've already made clear. What he does do, knowing Greek, is analyze the texts thoroughly, giving convincing evidence.

All you've done, on the other hand, is repeat a dichotomy which he repeatedly says is a mistake and due to poor translation over many centuries. I've given you the sources, quoted extensively, and offered to go into the weeds if necessary; you don't seem particularly interested in that. That's fine. I take partial blame for not being clearer, and appreciate your time.
__________
For the rest of us, let's get back on track:

Phusis is the Greek understanding of being as emerging, abiding sway. Being and becoming, and "being and seeming" come out of this originary sense. Later, "being and thinking."

The basic feature throughout Western thought which has dominated all thinking since the inception has been presence. From this soil we get the changeless Forms, substances, matter, existentia and essence, subjects and objects, God and creation, "nature," physics, metaphysics, etc. All presuppose presence.

Our modern age is a secular and scientific age. We go to scientists for the "truth" now, using their stories rather than myths and legends. But this understanding of being as "nature" or as "subjects and objects," has led both to a peculiar view of what it is to be human and, ultimately, to nihilism.

I'll fill this out more in a future post, with references.

unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration. — Xtrix

It appears like you haven't read any of my posts, because that is just about all I've been doing here, is justifying this claim.

unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration.
— Xtrix

It appears like you haven't read any of my posts, because that is just about all I've been doing here, is justifying this claim. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in that instance. But yes, you're right -- that wasn't entirely fair. On the other hand, you've quoted very little -- if anything -- from the texts themselves and thus offered little philologically. Heidegger, on the other hand, provides a great deal -- a sampling of which I have already given.

To make it concrete: you declare "phusis is not the Greek term for being," but offer no real alternative outside of the "being and becoming" dichotomy. You keep saying that "being" is essentially something "changeless," which is a very common interpretation and which constitutes one side of the being/becoming dichotomy -- and this is precisely what I reject.

I've pointed out repeatedly that this is not what phusis means, and you seemed to agree -- but that you equate it more with "becoming." But becoming -- change itself, let's say -- has being. It "exists." This is hard to comprehend ONLY if you equate "being" with "the un-changing, the permanent" -- but then we're at step one, since this is what you do. I've asked multiple times that you try suspending that interpretation so as to better understand where Heidegger and myself are coming from.

You've invoked Parmenides but never quoted him. Heidegger has an entire book on the man, which is enlightening. To give only a cartoon sketch: the goddess truth, aletheia, turns out to be directly related to phusis.

I think it's virtually meaningless to speak of a physical world when we don't know what the physical world is. And again, I can just as easily claim that matter is how mind happens to seem.

What we know is that nothing is concrete. Everything is in flux, in motion, changing from one moment to the next. And to me this has more in common with a dream than a concrete physical reality.

Actually Zeno's paradoxes prove that the "continuum" is a faulty idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

Zeno’s paradoxes only prove that calculus hadn’t been invented yet.

What we know is that nothing is concrete. Everything is in flux, in motion, changing from one moment to the next. And to me this has more in common with a dream than a concrete physical reality. — neonspectraltoast

If nothing is concrete, is that statement concrete?

No. It's some kind of paradox. Because of its truth it is made untrue.

:up:

What we know is that nothing is concrete. Everything is in flux, in motion, changing from one moment to the next. And to me this has more in common with a dream than a concrete physical reality.
— neonspectraltoast

If nothing is concrete, is that statement concrete? — Xtrix

No. It's some kind of paradox. Because of its truth it is made untrue. — neonspectraltoast

So no, that statement isn't "concrete," but yet it's "true." But then because it's true, it's untrue.

To wave your hand and say this is simply a "paradox" is a cop out. I could use the same justification for the opposite claim -- namely, that everything is NOT "in flux" and changing, but is rather always the same, and that this is the only concrete. Why? "It's a paradox."

Normally I'd ignore comments like yours -- as most others do, I find. When it's a thread I've created, I don't take that attitude. I don't like when people jump into these discussions by blurting out whatever comes to their head. This isn't Twitter.

Rough sketches:

--

"Being" has been Heidegger's main concern right from the beginning. From this one could ask, that is Heidegger interested merely in something static? Is he not interested in change or becoming at all? Is he reducing becoming to being? Already in Being and Time being was interpreted to mean something temporal. Is not temporality or time becoming? If being is temporality it seems that being is becoming. But I think the question is about the relation between constant change and something that sustains itself through the change. That there is some relatively enduring whole through the accidental continuous change.

---

I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth. Dasein is historical change which is becoming but this change is not just accidental or random. There is enduring wholes involved in change. There is being in the becoming. Or the becoming can be meaningful which means that it i s something. If it would be merely becoming it couldn't be understood at all. Is the becoming something (relatively) teleological or just random change? I think that the word "become" means something teleological. Something that already is, is becoming itself.

---

I think it is for Heidegger self evident that we always "have" something or that there i s something. This is his phenomenological-"ontological" starting point. There is no any comprehension to start with if there is only change or becoming. Pure becoming is nothing. There is always being and the change of being. But the change of being can't be pure becoming (change) or nothingness for us. Actually, nothingness is important concept for Heidegger. Somehow he recognizes this pure becoming as a "potential moment" in the whole. There is this purely accidental moment involved here. It refers to meaninglessness or that there is no "world" involved at that moment?

Is he reducing becoming to being? Already in Being and Time being was interpreted to mean something temporal. Is not temporality or time becoming? If being is temporality it seems that being is becoming. — waarala

This is the issue I tried to address earlier. It appears like Heidegger may be reducing being to becoming, in the Hegelian way.

But I think the question is about the relation between constant change and something that sustains itself through the change. That there is some relatively enduring whole through the accidental continuous change. — waarala

This is the classical way of looking at the issue, the Aristotelian way, it separates the aspect of the thing which is changing (the form) from the aspect of the thing which remains constant (the matter). Aristotle assumes himself to have satisfactorily demonstrated that the two are incompatible.

Somehow he recognizes this pure becoming as a "potential moment" in the whole. There is this purely accidental moment involved here. It refers to meaninglessness or that there is no "world" involved at that moment? — waarala

This is the Hegelian reversal of Aristotelian principles which the Marxists and dialectical materialists take hold of. Prime matter, pure potential, in the Aristotelian sense, cannot itself be classified as "becoming", because it is necessarily unchanging. Matter is defined as what persists through change. The concept of "matter" is introduced by Aristotle to account for the continuity (being) which exists within change (becoming), what stays the same. Hegel appears to have reversed that principle of continuity, allowing being to be subsumed within becoming, such that there is nothing to provide the necessity for continuity, hence allowing for the accidental moment of no world.

Heidegger's relation to Aristotle's form/matter -distinction and Hegelian dialectics are obviously very difficult subjects. But these themes as contrasts are involved here too. For Heidegger they are part of the traditional, conventional understanding of being. That is, they remain "naive" metaphysics, they don't reflect themselves or their concept of being.

Yeah, I realized early on this site is full of know-it-all pricks who would rather listen to themselves talk than to give a guy a break. Frankly, I'm not interested in your asinine rebuttal. — neonspectraltoast

What a funny demonstration of hypocrisy. It's funnier that you don't see it, I guess.

Not interested in my reply, yet everyone in this forum is a "know it all prick" who "would rather listen to themselves talk." Hmm...takes one to know one? Apparently.

Next time, try Twitter if you want to utter nonsense.

"Being" has been Heidegger's main concern right from the beginning. From this one could ask, that is Heidegger interested merely in something static? — waarala

No.

Is he not interested in change or becoming at all? — waarala

He is, yes.

Is he reducing becoming to being? — waarala

No more than we'd reduce "becoming" to a word or a concept -- or any-thing at all. Does becoming have being? Sure. Is that "reduction"?

Already in Being and Time being was interpreted to mean something temporal. — waarala

Not really. If you have a passage you're thinking specifically about, please direct me to it.

Heidegger often says that time, "temporality," is the horizon for any understanding of being. That's a difficult sentence to get your mind around, but since we're essentially caring, temporal beings (human beings), and we have an understanding of being, it is only through temporality that something like "being" can be understood.

Being is not an entity, an object, a process, or a property, remember. Yet every time we use "is," we're operating in a pre-theoretical understanding of being. This is what he analyzes in Being & Time, although he never finished the rest -- as you know.

So it's not that being = temporality, but any understanding we have about being occurs in the context of, or on the basis of ("horizon"), time. Ultimately he will show that in the Western tradition, from the Greeks onward, our understanding of being has taken place by privileging presence -- and so a definite aspect of time: the present.

I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth. — waarala

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean?

But the change of being can't be pure becoming (change) or nothingness for us. — waarala

What does "change of being" mean? How can being change? It's not a property or a being (entity).

No. Feel free to go away and use Twitter.

I've reported your posts -- which should, rightfully, be removed soon. Take care.