I'm fairly sure that under anti-natalist tenets this would amount to a "chain of suffering", or a morality of mutual relief: you should suffer so as to reduce someone else's suffering, and in turn you're entitled to someone else's suffering to reduce yours — Dawnstorm

Could you elaborate. I just don't get what you're saying. Where did entitled to someone else's suffering come from?

to concede that happiness is irrelevant and that the morality of having/not having children is based solely on the suffering that it'll cause. — TheMadFool

Yes that's something we agreed upon beforehand. He was trying to make a case for natalism using negative ethics

However, if you do press the button, one additional person, your child, will be forced into the room and made to kill all 20 — TheMadFool

That makes it rather uninteresting though doesn't it. How about: If you push the button your child will save 4 people. That's more like the situation he had in mind

That makes it rather uninteresting though doesn't it. How about: If you push the button your child will save 4 people. That's more like the situation he had in mind — khaled

To be frank I like the argument from comparable suffering as you phrased it. We can reel in some positive/good effects of having children to bolster the original argument but I think that would be reverting to saying suffering is in equilibrium with happiness, a bridge that seems to have already been crossed if you argue from comparable suffering.

Just to inform you there's another thread on antinatalism and Kant that's also active. From a Kantian perspective there is nothing immoral about having children; in fact not to have children can't be a categorical imperative because it can't be universalized without the extinction of humanity and that seems somehow not what Kant would've wanted. Morality is about how to live and to suggest that that involves extinction of life is like saying the solution of a puzzle is to destroy all traces of the puzzle having ever existed in the first place.

To return to our discussion, I think a similar analogy - that of a puzzle needing solving - applies to antinatalism which is implicitly a consequentialist stance. As for the comparable suffering whether you have/don't have children view I think it only demonstrates that both options lead to undesirable consequences and not that one is preferable over the other. So we need some means other than the consideration of suffering to decide which choice to make; this is exactly what you've proposed by saying, quote, "your child will save 4 people". However, this additional premise contradicts the initial assumption - comparable suffering which presumably concedes the irrelevancy of happiness of any form.

the solution of a puzzle is to destroy all traces of the puzzle having ever existed in the first place. — TheMadFool

That IS one solution yes

I think it only demonstrates that both options lead to undesirable consequences and not that one is preferable over the other. — TheMadFool

That's called natalism

irrelevancy of happiness of any form. — TheMadFool

This isn't a matter of happiness though. If those people don't get saved they will be hurt (killed). So by choosing not to have a child you indirectly killed 4 people, since you could have saved them by having a child (or so the guy I was talking with would say)

Well, I'm still a bit unconvinced about the matter. The argument from comparable suffering as presented by you makes, what I think is, a very subtle distinction: that between you should have children and you may have children. The conclusion of your argument is the latter and not the former.

There's an assumption that instead of two choices, you should/should not have children, there are three:

1. Should have children
2. Should not have children
3. May have children

3 is what you infer with the argument from comparable suffering.

Notice that choice 3 essentially negates both choices 1 and 2 and declares that both options are available but what is of concern to the antinatalist is that it rejects his/her stance that we should not have children.

Your argument gives a degree of freedom, that we may have children, that the antinatalist wants to deny us. Before we even begin to think of how antinatalists would counter this argument we have to consider whether option 3 makes sense or not. What does it mean to say that we may have children? Since all of this is contextualized morally, your argument amounts to the claim that having children or not having children are both morally bad. Is this situation possible? Can I use two premises that contradict each other and arrive at the same conclusion?

C = we should have children
~C = we should not have children
B = we have to do something that is morally bad

1. (C v ~C) > B assume for reductio ad absurdum
2. ~B........we don't want to do something bad
3. ~(C v ~C).....1, 2 MT
4. ~C & ~~C....3 DeM
5.~C & C.......contradiction
6. ~[(C v ~C) > B]....1 to 5 reductio ad absurdum
There seems to be an underlying contradiction in the argument from comparable suffering

you should have children and you may have children. The conclusion of your argument is the latter and not the former. — TheMadFool

Yes, I never claimed it was the former

your argument amounts to the claim that having children or not having children are both morally bad — TheMadFool

First off, not my argument but ok
Secondly, Yes that's what it amounts to (just confirming)

1. (C v ~C) > B assume for reductio ad absurdum
2. ~B........we don't want to do something bad
3. ~(C v ~C).....1, 2 MT
4. ~C & ~~C....3 DeM
5.~C & C.......contradiction — TheMadFool

All this shows is that we can't not do something bad given those two options. Nothing about that is problematic. The original premise must be false so either 1 or 2 is false. 1 is true by definition. So 2 is false, we can't do something not bad in this scenario (having or not having children). I don't get how you got step 6 from the above

Only a group of philosophers would sit around trying to decide whether their inaction in saving a man was responsible for his death, when everyone else would just dive in.

Philosophy exists only in action. — Brett

Also lawyers, because somebody needs to decide whether the philosophers are legally responsible for their inaction. And the one person who just doesn't like the drowning guy.

But the OP's friend brought another level to the argument. You're not having children might one day result in the drowning man going unsaved, because your child would have dived in.

However, the neighborhood man might also be a serial killer, so maybe it's good your child isn't born. But then again, he might kill someone even worse. Maybe there's a butterfly effect that determines the fate of the human race generations from now, all based on whether you have children.

But then again, the anti-natalist can just say it's better if the human race goes extinct, so ...

The idea is to avoid a moral blunder i.e. we must not do bad things. Agreed?

The premise you start from is this:
1. If either (you should have children or you should not have children), then you commit a moral blunder
2. We must not commit a moral blunder
Ergo
3. It's not the case that (either you should have children or you should not have children)
(Either you should have children or you should not have children) is a tautology (p v ~p)

Statement 3 negates (either you should have children or you should not have children) and negating a tautology we get a contradiction viz. (you should have children AND you should not have children.)

Ergo, one of our premises is false. It can't be 2 because we agree we mustn't commit a moral blunder. The premise we assumed viz 1, the foundation of the argument from comparable suffering is off in some way.

Let's consider a purely logical scenario with the exact form and we can see the error in the logic

1. (p v ~p) > q.....assume for reductio ad absurdum
2. ~q
3. ~(p v ~p).......1, 2 MT
4. ~p & ~~p.......3 DeM
5. ~p & p.........4 DN
6. ~[(p v ~p) > q].....1 to 5 reductio ad absurdum

The basic assertion of the antinatalist is that it's bad to bring children into this world with conditions as they are — TheMadFool

And as they must be. We will never be able to completely guarantee that a child will not suffer. Most antinatalists, certainly here at PF, have a commandment that one cannot, without consent, put someone in a position where they may suffer. If one interprets giving birth to someone as doing this kind of thing, no amount of technological advancement or world peace or whatever will be a full guarantee.

To deny antinatalism would require the demonstration that either having children is good or that it's morally neutral. — TheMadFool

Or that there are other values to take into account beyond the value of never putting someone else in a situation where they may suffer. Or by arguing that there are no objective morals.

and, according to natalism the inevitable suffering is adequately compensated with the counterweight of happiness; either way both antinatalism and natalism are claiming that having children has a moral dimension. — TheMadFool

One does not have to evaluate life or this issue in terms of plus minus emotions. Life can have value beyond happiness. In a sense this is kind of assuming an emotional hedonism is the correct way to evaluate life.

So, it's false that having children is morally neutral. This then implies that natalism is a claim that having children is morally good and that means we're obligated to do what is good; we must have children according to the natalists. — TheMadFool

That's certainly a possible position. It's not mine. I do not think we are obligated to have children. Nor do i think it is immoral to have them.

There is no wiggle room to say, quote, "there is nothing per se wrong about having children" which to make sense would require having children to be morally neutral and that it is not. — TheMadFool

1) I do think some people should not have children 2) I don't really believe in objective morals. I like life, including sentient life. I hope it continues. That is one of my strong values. I see nothing in the antinatalist manifesto that makes we want to stop valuing life, including life that can suffer, and rooting for it to continue. I don't really need to even think of the phrase 'morally neutral'.

Within a moral context you either should or should not have children. Natalism is the former and antinatalism is the latter. — TheMadFool

I disagree. Certainly some natalists must think that a junkie deciding not to have children is doing a good thing. I am not my whole species. So, right off I deny the universalism. I can also judge the antinatalist project as holding values I disagree with. I think it would be aweful if their values spread to the degree that all sentient life stopped procreating. And the technology to do this without creating suffering could certainly arise, even for animals. I think that's horrible. That's one of my values. I don't think it's an objective one. It's mine. Of course I don't want people to suffer or children to suffer. I share that value to a degree. but I do not think that value should have veto power over all other values. It is extremely puritan. I think there is a hatred of life in it, since it's hope is that all fauna no longer exists. I honestly think that is sick. Not morally sick, but anti-life.

If there's anything wrong with antinatalism then it's that it throws the baby out with the bathwater. After all, they wouldn't have a case IF suffering could be eliminated and this is, in my opinion, a primary objective for humanity as evidenced by how we measure our progress - high life expectancy, low childhood mortality, less poverty, low disease rates, etc. In this respect the future looks bright for our progeny and antinatalism looks destined to become outdated in about a 100 years or so. — TheMadFool

Not if you read antinatalists here. How can we possibly ensure that no parent will not sexually abuse a child (if we can, we have some kind of panoticon Big brother society with other problems). How can we possibly know the child will not fall in love and never get over that first love and not want pills to fix that? There are astronomy level catastrophies that might maim and disable many people. There are people who are born and yearn for things they cannot have.

We have no brave new world that can or should make the antinatalists assume all suffering or all sad lives will be prevented.

And that is the position. Unless one has the consent of the person, you cannot put them in a situation where they may suffer.

And it will always be possible.

I feel alien from saying birth is neutral (or good or bad). I think it depends, in individual cases. But life, I like animal life, including us. Also plant life, which I think it is likely also can feel pain - though this is a tangent. And I do not like what I consider a death preferring perfectionism wihch I see antinatalism as as form of. I think natalism is also off, though less so, since it seems to think we should give birth. I just want some to, hopefully those who can parent well.

Not if you read antinatalists here. How can we possibly ensure that no parent will not sexually abuse a child (if we can, we have some kind of panoticon Big brother society with other problems). How can we possibly know the child will not fall in love and never get over that first love and not want pills to fix that? There are astronomy level catastrophies that might maim and disable many people. There are people who are born and yearn for things they cannot have.

We have no brave new world that can or should make the antinatalists assume all suffering or all sad lives will be prevented.

And that is the position. Unless one has the consent of the person, you cannot put them in a situation where they may suffer.

And it will always be possible.

I feel alien from saying birth is neutral (or good or bad). I think it depends, in individual cases. But life, I like animal life, including us. Also plant life, which I think it is likely also can feel pain - though this is a tangent. And I do not like what I consider a death preferring perfectionism wihch I see antinatalism as as form of. I think natalism is also off, though less so, since it seems to think we should give birth. I just want some to, hopefully those who can parent well. — Coben

Hey you make a great case for antinatalism! :razz:

lol. Well, I can't begrudge you enjoying that part. Such ironies are a part of life. And the truth is one thing that bothers me in general is a certain kind of being facile. I think people, on many sides of many arguments, like to make things too neat IOW they don't want to face the dark side of their positions, the anomolies, to potential side effects that are hard to track but still likely there. So, on this issue, I am obviously arguing against antinatalism. But I think there is a rose colored glasses issue in the position I was arguing against above. And I think rose colored glasses type view of the future, and often dependent on technology, are really quite damaging. There's a wider contest also. I probably share reactions to much of life with antinatalists. I just don't draw the same conclusions.

Could you elaborate. I just don't get what you're saying. Where did entitled to someone else's suffering come from? — khaled

Sorry for being unclear. That's what happens when I edit my post too much. Normaly I just close the window, but this time I somehow posted it. I'm not sure I can do a much better job explaining myself, but I'll try.

It's easiest, I think, to start from an example, so let's go with this:

My interlocutor went so far as to say that if I knew my child would cure cancer and didn't have said child then I am a direct cause that cancer is still around and thus, have done something wrong. — khaled

There is, I think, a fundamental difference in world view between what this person said, and what an anti-natalist would say, and this difference remains unaddressed.

Cancer is a form of suffering, but not the only one. Your interlocutor sees suffering as a problem to be solved, but an anti-natalist sees cancer as a symptom of larger problem that cannot be solved. Anyone who would choose to live despite such suffering is making a hypothetical choice; and a choice that someone who would forgo being born under such conditions would not make (maybe; I'm not an anti-natalist, and I'm not an expert on anti-natalism either).

So what your interlocutor and my imagined anti-natalist have in common is that they view cancer as a form of suffering. Cancer as a form of suffering has a different status in their respective world views, though. For your interlocuter, for example, the struggle against cancer might be a goal that gives meaning to their life. But for an anti-natalist it might be part of the package of suffering that comes with cancer: a tedious necessity, something to do. And it's also sisyphean task, not because you can't cure cancer, but because even if you cure cancer, there's plenty of other forms of suffering to take its place.

From this point of view, an anti-natalist could accept that he's partly responsible for the continued existence of cancer ("direct cause" is a stretch, but I don't want to address this here) without missing a beat. It's not an argument against anti-natalism. While you're around, you might as well cure cancer. But all you accomplish is shift the balance of suffering around a little. Most suffering isn't anything as extra-odrinary as cancer - suffering is a banal fact of existance, and your interlocutor might look a little like Don Quijote. On the other hand, my imagined anti-natalist would look like a defeatists to your interlocutor. Someone who gives up way too soon, dignifies his laziness as a sort of philosophical suffering, and so on. There is no common ground on which they can have an argument.

I'm hoping that the concept if we focus on the concept of responsibility, we can create a common ground. Responsibility is always responsibility to someone (someone else or yourself). It's a way of talking about demands, negotiating consensus, and so on. For example, if an anti-natalist might have to commit to the proposition that they're primary responsibility is to their child, and that's something you can talk about. This opens up questions about how to abstract (for whom is "getting rid of cancer" good, both in particular and in general?). It becomes a discussion about who makes what demands from whom.

So for the sake of argument I (roleplaying an anti-natalist) know that my child would cure cancer. What else do I know? Let's say I know that my child's attitude towards life would be such that he wouldn't have chosen to be born if such a choice were possible. What then? Are you asking me to put the cure for cancer over my child? Are you asking my child to suffer through a life he doesn't want just so he can cure cancer?

So someone's suffering from cancer. My non-existent child would have cured cancer. So I share a part of the responsibility to that person for their suffering of cancer. But so do the parents who gave birth to that person. Your interlocutor doesn't address that latter part at all, and in consequence there's no way to talk about the balance of values involved. Conceding responsibility turns an anti-natalist into a villain with little recourse to appeal. It's a judgment, not an argument.

(Note that I'm having as much of an issue with "hypothetical consent before birth" as I do with your interlocutor's "direct cause". I'm not really taking sides, here, even though I have to admit that my sympaties tend more towards the anti-natalist position.)

I hope I'm making a little more sense in this post. It's not an easy topic for me to discuss as I'm not confident that I represent consent-based anti-natalism correctly in the first place, and so I keep second guessing myself, which makes it hard to keep my thoughts straight.

Or that there are other values to take into account beyond the value of never putting someone else in a situation where they may suffer. Or by arguing that there are no objective morals. — Coben

One does not have to evaluate life or this issue in terms of plus minus emotions. Life can have value beyond happiness. In a sense this is kind of assuming an emotional hedonism is the correct way to evaluate life — Coben

I'm interested to know what can be more valuable than acquiring happiness and avoiding suffering. Bear in mind that however you answer that question you will have to provide a viable alternative to hedonism and as we all know this is impossible for hedonism subsumes everything; by that I mean value for humans is based off of whether there's pleasure or pain involved. The more pleasurable a thing is, the greater its value and the more painful a thing is, the lower its value. Think of anything humans value, either positively or negatively, and invariably these are hedonistic evaluations.

There is a sense in which what you say appears to make sense: sometimes we either forgo happiness or endure suffering. However, this paradoxical state is easily explicable with the presence of greater pleasure to be achieved or greater [isuffering[/i] to be avoided. It's as if pleasure and pain are goods to be traded with using some kind of a felicific calculus.

1) I do think some people should not have children 2) I don't really believe in objective morals. I like life, including sentient life. I hope it continues. That is one of my strong values. I see nothing in the antinatalist manifesto that makes we want to stop valuing life, including life that can suffer, and rooting for it to continue. I don't really need to even think of the phrase 'morally neutral'. — Coben

I suspect that you're not the only one who makes statements like "I like life, including sentient life"; this is a widely expressed sentiment and thus gains a level of legitimacy that antinatalism, to be a sound philosophy, must deal with. Why do so many people like life? Either life is likable or we have a biased sample on our hands. Which do you think is probable? That there is a philosophy that discourages birth suggests that all is not well in this world. You know, no smoke without fire. What weighs in on this is the undeniable fact that if one is suffering there really is no way we could say, "I like life". It would be the mother of all lies.

We could dig a little deeper though and come to the realization, if it is one, that when one is not in a position to say, I like life", as when one is suffering, it doesn't mean one dislikes life: after all we all, more or less, share the sentiment that life is likable. The bottomline is that if there's anything we loathe it's suffering. Similarly, we don't like life per se but the opportunity that it provides to be happy.

Somewhere, sometime, for some of us, suffering exceeds, either in intensity or duration or both, the limits of our endurance and suffering becomes life itself. The clear line between life and suffering vanishes and the two become one. At this point, when life = suffering, having children, if they share the same fate, becomes a criminal offence committed against unconsenting innocent beings.

I disagree. Certainly some natalists must think that a junkie deciding not to have children is doing a good thing. I am not my whole species. So, right off I deny the universalism. I can also judge the antinatalist project as holding values I disagree with. I think it would be aweful if their values spread to the degree that all sentient life stopped procreating. And the technology to do this without creating suffering could certainly arise, even for animals. I think that's horrible. That's one of my values. I don't think it's an objective one. It's mine. Of course I don't want people to suffer or children to suffer. I share that value to a degree. but I do not think that value should have veto power over all other values. It is extremely puritan. I think there is a hatred of life in it, since it's hope is that all fauna no longer exists. I honestly think that is sick. Not morally sick, but anti-life. — Coben

I think it depends, in individual cases — Coben

Like I said, life is an opportunity to be happy even if that maybe a journey few will ever complete. Some are both fortunate and wise to achieve happiness; I salute them and envy their luck and wisdom. However most of us are neither blessed by fate nor wise enough to achieve this state and so it behooves us, at least as a gesture of sympathy, to grant them a negative outlook on life.

I'm interested to know what can be more valuable than acquiring happiness and avoiding suffering — TheMadFool

People want to create and achieve, for example.

Bear in mind that however you answer that question you will have to provide a viable alternative to hedonism and as we all know this is impossible for hedonism subsumes everything; by that I mean value for humans is based off of whether there's pleasure or pain involved. The more pleasurable a thing is, the greater its value and the more painful a thing is, the lower its value. Think of anything humans value, either positively or negatively, and invariably these are hedonistic evaluations. — TheMadFool

Sure, there will always be things one can point at and say 'see that gave you pleasure' but these are often side effects. And the onus would be on you to prove that long distance runners ultimately experience more pleasure and/or less pain than they would if they chose a set of goals that did not cause incredibly amounts of pain. And yes, I now there are pleasures. But that is not the value. We're not all hedonists or the term would have no meaning.

The more pleasurable a thing is, the greater its value and the more painful a thing is, the lower its value — TheMadFool

Tell that to ascetics, people who choose extremely restrictive body practices for whatever reasons, and Navy Seals. And yes, I know there will be certain kinds of self-esteem and other pleasures, but I truly doubt these outweight the unbelievable pain these people go through, the risk to their lives, the pain of the loss of colleagues and so on. There a many people, in fact most who are not hedonists.

You know that story about the rats who kept taking cocain or stimulating the pleasure centers of their brains? Well, those rats had boring cages. If you give rodents complex and interesting environments, they will not become addicted.

There is a sense in which what you say appears to make sense: sometimes we either forgo happiness or endure suffering. However, this paradoxical state is easily explicable with the presence of greater pleasure to be achieved or greater [isuffering[/i] to be avoided. — TheMadFool

The onus is on you to somehow measure the pleasures and show they outweigh the pains and that people's purported values (which are also obvious given what they choose to do) are not really their values, but that underneath they are just seeking pleasure in a more complicated way. And certainly anyone who risks their life knowingly is quite willing to set aside all future pleasure and even suffer torture (say with Black ops teams as an example when captured) in the name of values other than the pride, say, they feel for doing their work.

When you have a way to measure all this, they we can tell these people that, no, actually, you are just hedonists.

*And then let's look at the context. If everything.....

everything....

has to do, really, with gaining pleasure.


Then any life, with any handicap, can have more pleasure than pain. Because one's attitude and goals in that life can give one pleasure, regardless of what one experiences.

So this undermines the whole antinatalist position in a different way. Since every child would just be another closet hedonist with a way to enjoy life, regardless.

I suspect that you're not the only one who makes statements like "I like life, including sentient life"; this is a widely expressed sentiment and thus gains a level of legitimacy that antinatalism, to be a sound philosophy, must deal with. Why do so many people like life? Either life is likable or we have a biased sample on our hands — TheMadFool

It is inherent in life. The organism is choosing life. Until it does not. Some do chose not to live. But as long as you are tyring to get food, avoiding danger and you cells are doing their work, you are an organism choosing life, because that's what life does.

That's the problem with anti-natalists 'consent' issue. It's actually a silly one. I understand why it looks valid, but it's not. If the fetal organism does not want to life it'll miscarry. But there is it sucking up nutrients from the mother. Nothing gets born without struggling forward to get born. I understand, there may come a time when an organism does not want to live. But up to then it has been voting with its cells to live, in it's nonverbal way.

You know, no smoke without fire. What weighs in on this is the undeniable fact that if one is suffering there really is no way we could say, "I like life" — TheMadFool

I am suffering. I have more, by far, then the average citizen in a Western society. At least, if one goes by traumas experienced and how I would describe the struggles of living compared to others.

When I say I like life. I was not saying I like being alive. That is also true. But that is not what I meant. I meant, I like that there are animals. I like that humans exist. I value that. I want that to continue, even though I suffer and even though others suffer. Even though there are all sorts of problems.

Anti-natalists have, at core, one determining value that outweighs all others.

Thou shalt not risk, via procreation or any other act, that you are putting someone without their consent at risk of suffering.

That single value outweighs, for them, all other values.

I don't share that domination of that value

My goodness, I would love to avoid hurting anyone without their consent. But that kind of puritanical perfectionism - which in this case entails rooting for and arguing to achieve the end of humanity and all pain experiencing life - I do not share.

And by the way - I think they are hypocritical. Because they may be fallible and they should know this. So their goal of convincing people to be antinatalists might actually be wrong. I understand that they can see no reason, now, for believing that. But they take a risk every time they present their argumetns that they are doing harm.

If they take that risk, they cannot tell others not to and be consistent.

We could dig a little deeper though and come to the realization, if it is one, that when one is not in a position to say, I like life", as when one is suffering, it doesn't mean one dislikes life: after all we all, more or less, share the sentiment that life is likable. The bottomline is that if there's anything we loathe it's suffering. Similarly, we don't like life per se but the opportunity that it provides to be happy. — TheMadFool

No, that is not correct for me. I like life at a much more fundamental level than this. I also don't loathe suffering. I loathe what I loathe and this causes suffering, often. But I don't even loathe all that. I even appreciate getting to loathe certain things. I value life, not just for when I am happy, which is fairly rare. I am engaged often, and often the engagement increases my suffering. But when I am engaged even if it causes suffering, I am alive, being me. I value you that.

Perhaps you are a hedonist. And I understand how you can simply translate the above and say, oh, that's giving you pleasure.

But you are just translating, with no proof, that really what that is is pleasure. A little humility here is in order when telling other minds what all their values really are. And how much pleasure they are getting from what they value and how this outweighs the pain they consciously and unconsciously head towards from their values. Unless you are making a psychic claim about all other minds, at least qualify your translation of my and everyone else's values into what you value. Qualify with phrases like 'I think'.
because you don't know.

At this point, when life = suffering, having children, if they share the same fate, becomes a criminal offence committed against unconsenting innocent beings. — TheMadFool

So, if I read this and I feel bad, cause my wife is pregant and later kill myself

did you commit a criminal act?

I think it is consistent with your logic to say you did.

But you allow yourself this. Perhaps I 'should have known' that reading a thread on antinatalism would make me feel terrible and guilty. I'm an adult. I chose to read the thread.

But my wife is going to suffer my suicide immensely. And she didn't choose to read this thread.
And my 8 year old didn't.

But you take this risk that your actions will cause pain and suffering in people who did not consent to it.

Why are you free to take these risks but others cannot?

Like I said, life is an opportunity to be happy even if that maybe a journey few will ever complete. Some are both fortunate and wise to achieve happiness; I salute them and envy their luck and wisdom. However most of us are neither blessed by fate nor wise enough to achieve this state and so it behooves us, at least as a gesture of sympathy, to grant them a negative outlook on life. — TheMadFool

Nohting I have said means that others must have any outlook on life. I love many artists, for example, with incredibly dark views of life. I know
vastly better than most,
exactly what they are on about.

In fact, I think I know this better than you do, because you thought, a few posts back, that we could guarantee happy lives, perhaps in a few generations. Honestly I think that's as Pollyanish as most anti-natalists are going to think that is.

I don't fault the antinatalists for have a negative view of life and many of its facets. heck, I suspect sometimes that some of these guys actually enjoy life more than I do. That there is something more hobbyish in their anti-natalism. Not all of them. I do not mean that as an ad hom aimed at the position. I am sure some are suffering immensely and of course they could be right even if they are not, since they are concerned, at least many, about consent. I am just saying that you seem to be a hedonist, and you assume hedonism is everywhere. It's not. But in infects the way you interpret my posts, my life, my reactions to antinatalists.

That's how precious life is to me. It's despite all the pain precious to me.

That's how precious life is to me. It's despite all the pain precious to me. — Coben

I don't have time to respond to all your points, but I want to bring up this one. My ongoing thread discusses the idea of what justifies a "positive ethic" over and above a "negative ethic". By this I mean, what justifies people forcing other people into a view rather than not forcing them into a view. Let us say that modern Western life more-or-less presents a set of challenges. We can call this X. This consists of the broader globalized socio-economic industrialized economy we live in. Then we can say, each child is born into a particular sub-environment that are degrees of better or worse on the socio-economic scale. We can call this X1. Then we can say, that each individual family dynamic could be different (abusive, loving, this or that). That would be X1A. Then we can add on each individual personality/temperament/outlook/experiences (good or bad) and call that X1A'. Admittedly, I think the last one is weighted the most important.

Thus when a parent forces another life into the world (whether knowingly or not), the parent is thrusting the agenda of X1A' onto another life. Essentially what the parent is saying is "I declare agenda X1A' for this person to be more important than preventing any and all harm". The antinatalism in their "puritanical outlook" can still say at the end of the day, they forced no agendas onto others. The antinatalism can still say, by simply following the negative ethic of preventing a future child, no suffering ensued AND no actual person was deprived. No one suffers because Mars does not have children to feel happiness. No one laments because someone across the world isn't having children to feel life or joy or happiness right now. No, that is usually not how that works. What you are saying is that YOU X1A' therefore everyone should like X1A'. You accuse antinatalists of a sort of purtianical arrogance, but I don't see how this agenda which you prefer being foisted on others with consequences is not so.

the foundation of the argument from comparable suffering is off in some way. — TheMadFool

Sorry but this sounds like pure handwaving to me. Let's look at an example: You locked 200 people evenly in two different rooms. You have a button. If you press the button, people in room A die, if you don't press the button people in room B die. This is exactly like this scenario. Whether or not you press the button/have kids you have still done something bad. What's the problem with this

It can't be 2 because we agree we mustn't commit a moral blunder. — TheMadFool

No we agree we must try not to commit a moral blunder. You conflate that with "We haven't commited a moral blunder".
Premise 1 is: It is wrong to have or not have children.
Premise 2 is: We have not commited a moral blunder.

If you get a contradiction one of these is false, that being 2.

What your argument says is: "In order not to commit a moral blunder, assuming it is wrong to have or not have children, one must have children AND not have children". That's obviously impossible, so assuming it is wrong to have or not have children, it is impossible not to commit a moral blunder.

Are you asking my child to suffer through a life he doesn't want just so he can cure cancer? — Dawnstorm

Exactly what he asked for when I presented the hypothetical actually

Exactly what he asked for when I presented the hypothetical actually — khaled

That's being "entitled to someone else's suffering", then, no? A cure for cancer is good only in the sense that it removes a particular source of suffering; it's value is "reflief". I've furhtermore assumed that other people would be asked to do whatever they can to reduce the suffering of "my child" in this context. It's a morality of mutual relief, if you're not introducing something that makes it all worthwhile. There's a hidden variable here somewhere. It's not really about action/inaction. To an anti-natalist curing cancer must look like pointless busywork when you look at the big picture. In the particular situation - i.e. now that I'm already here - curing cancer can look like worthwhile in comparison to other activities. But the "now that I'm here" is rather important to an anti-natalist, and I don't see what a consequentialist argument from inaction says about this.

I don't actually know how important the now-that-I'm-here aspect is in this context. Thought experiment: You're an anti-natalist. You come across an unconscious man in a wintry street who'll freeze to death if you don't intervene. Obviously you can't ask for consent. Should you save his life? In what ways is this situation different from a non-existent, potential child. What difference does the now-that-he's-here aspect make? I have no answer to that question, but it's intuitive to non-antinatalist me that not giving birth isn't the moral equivalent to letting someone die.

That's being "entitled to someone else's suffering", then, no? — Dawnstorm

Yea I know. I got what you were saying

Should you save his life? — Dawnstorm

From my stance: Whether or not you do is completely neutral. You didn't freeze him, you don't have to save him.

Premise 1 is: It is wrong to have or not have children.
Premise 2 is: We have not commited a moral blunder. — khaled

These two are inconsistent. If it is wrong to have or not have children then we have already committed a moral error if either option obtains and premise 2 (we have not committed a moral blunder) has to be false.

Premise 2: We have not committed a moral blunder suggests a third viable alternative to both having and not having children and that's impossible. According to you, having children is immoral AND not having children is immoral. If you think in terms of not having committed an immoral act then you'll need to put a third option on the table. What is it? Bear in mind having children or not having children is a tautology and to negate that, as you must, would entail a contradiction.

I feel your argument is basically a dilemma that invalidates the antinatalist argument from suffering. The claim for them is rather straightforward: if we have children then we cause suffering and so we must not have children if you want to alleviate/eliminate suffering. Your argument demonstrates that even not having children can produce the same amount of suffering. So, not having children doesn't solve the problem.

Let's go to your beautiful example of the two rooms A and B, each with 200 people and you have a choice to either press the button or not but the consequences are same; 200 people die. As you can see the only difference that there is the pressing or not pressing of the button and so the solution to the dilemma must lie therein. Arguably, having children corresponds to pressing the button and not having children to not pressing the button. Ultimately, it boils down to the moral nature of action vs inaction. This aspect of the problem completely slipped my mind and as it turns out is the cornerstone of the issue.

To be frank there is a working principle in the legal systems of the world in re action vs inaction. To take an extreme example, the action of plowing a 747 into a building is murder and the inaction of a plane safety technician who fails to perform his duty and leading to a crash is considered manslaughter; though both murder and manslaughter lead to deaths they aren't equivalent in the eyes of the law. Manslaughter is a lesser crime than murder. Doesn't this indicate that one is held wholly responsible for one's actions but not so for one's inactions? The answer is "yes" and ergo, even if having children or not are both morally bad, the former is worse than the latter based on the preceding distinction between action and inaction.


There also seems to be an additional problem with your argument from comparable suffering which is related to the moral distinction between action and inaction. We already agree that having children leads to suffering. This information is in no way special; everyone knows this for a fact.

However, for the person who refuses to have children to be morally culpable things are a bit complicated for s/he must know that his child will benefit humanity in a big way; after all it is only this way that his inaction/not having children will be bad.Such a person must have foreknowledge of the future and that we know is impossible.

Therefore, since for inaction to be equally culpable as action the requirement is to be some kind of seer which is impossible, inaction is less of a moral transgression than action. Your premise that both having children or not having children produces comparable suffering while true, the person who doesn't have children commits a smaller moral transgression than one who has children.

These two are inconsistent. If it is wrong to have or not have children then we have already committed a moral error if either option obtains and premise 2 (we have not committed a moral blunder) has to be false. — TheMadFool

Yes. That's what I'm saying. Your argument (1-5) is this part:

If it is wrong to have or not have children then we have already committed a moral error if either option obtains — TheMadFool

Where is this "internal inconsistency" or "something wrong" you keep hinting at. Sidenote: We both seem to not recognize that we are in agreement often, I think that's happening again

According to you, having children is immoral AND not having children is immoral. If you think in terms of not having committed an immoral act then you'll need to put a third option on the table. What is it? Bear in mind having children or not having children is a tautology and to negate that, as you must, would entail a contradiction. — TheMadFool

Indeed. I am not the one that's suggesting an inconsistency here.

Manslaughter is a lesser crime than murder. Doesn't this indicate that one is held wholly responsible for one's actions but not so for one's inactions? — TheMadFool

Non sequitor. You can't go from "the law says this" to "Therefore it is immoral". The law also says that suicide is illegal, does that make it immoral?

Ultimately, it boils down to the moral nature of action vs inaction — TheMadFool

That's the intersting part about this. The OP says "The myth of inaction" for a reason. There is no such thing as inaction. Inaction is simply defined as "not doing X" but X can be anything. So having children can be considered inaction when the verb "abstain" is used. You are "not abstaining" when having children, aka a kind of inaction. It all depends on what X is. That's the point my interlocutor made. I'm not sure I fully agree but it does sound convincing. The more you think about it the harder you will find it to tell the difference between "action" and "inaction"

However, for the person who refuses to have children to be morally culpable things are a bit complicated for s/he must know that his child will benefit humanity in a big way — TheMadFool

I don't think so. It's not that he must "know" but have good reason to believe their child will do more good than bad. In moral decisions perfect knowledge is almost never the case, you have to work with what you have. This would imply that a highly intelligent and rich person with a good moral compass WOULD be culpable for not having children (according to my interlocutor) since we can surmise that that person's child IS likely going to help humanity. You don't need "knowledge" you just need a good guess. Similar to how someone can't point a gun at you and pull the trigger, then after you're dead say "I did nothing wrong. After all I didn't KNOW the act would kill him, the gun could have malfunctioned"

Requiring perfect knowledge to access the morality of an act will mean we never get to decide anything ever.

People want to create and achieve, for example. — Coben

am just saying that you seem to be a hedonist, and you assume hedonism is everywhere — Coben

We're not all hedonists or the term would have no meaning. — Coben

All the above, infact anything humans do, are in fact wants/desires or what proceeds from them, which points to a crucial aspect of life but I'll get to that later.

Being alive naturally comes with having wants and the satisfaction of these becomes the primary objective of living. What is the nature of these wants? Mainly that they are a source of satisfaction and happiness. Now some have said that there's a difference between satisfaction and happiness and if there is we must, perforce, agree that hedonism isn't universal as you've been saying here; after all people make a goal of satisfaction too.

However, I'm going out on a limb here, if biology is correct there is no biochemical difference between satisfactionand the feeling of joy - the same chemicals, presumably dopamine, is released in both events. Ergo, if there's anything to say of satisfaction then it's that it's a milder version of happiness - not distinct enough to warrant a separate existence.

Separately, in a non-reductive sense, satisfaction is a state of mind engendered when a person's investments matched her returns; there is no net positive/happiness in a hedonistic calculus and the person is simply contented that his input perfectly matches his output. However, realize that even viewed this way, satisafction was a state where happiness matched the suffering; we couldn't, actually it is impossible in my opinion, remove all considerations of happiness from the calculation. Ergo, hedonism is universal in scope.

I'd like to take you back to wants at this point; desire is universal. There seems to be very clear connection between antinatalism and buddhism in that both propose a cessation of birth - the former in a very matter-of-fact way and the latter as some grand state of being - as a solution. Buddhism has as central tenets that 1. desire is the cause of suffering and 2. to sto suffering we must stop desiring. Surely a philosophy with such a claim should find a way to cease all desire and yet this isn't the case for we must want nirvana to achieve it. Wanting/desiring is inescapable - even Buddhism couldn't do it for to stop desire to end suffering is itself a desire. Ergo, desire is universal. Given that is so and taking into account that desire, the fulfillment of which causes happiness or satisfaction and the lack of fulfillment of which results in suffering, it becomes impossible to deny that hedonism is universal. Hedonism is indeed universal.

puritanical perfectionism — Coben

I think hedonism is quite the opposite. It cuts through all the highfalutin stuff and gets down to the basics. Everyone wants happiness - the king the beggar and everyone in between are hedonists. Ergo, hedonism is a more truthful philosophy than anything that denies it. It follows that any corollary of hedonism, antintalism being one, shares this quality of being truthful to the facts as they stand.

That's how precious life is to me. It's despite all the pain precious to me. — Coben

It's great that you value your life. I value your contribution in this discussion.


The difference between action and inaction is critical to your argument because having children is an action and not having children is an inaction.

I used the legal analogy to provide you insight on where our moral intuitions stand on the issue of action vs inaction. Clearly, the legal system, by extension our moral compass, sees the two as different and last I read on the topic, intention is a deciding factor. What's the relationship, if any, between intention and action/inaction? One performs an action with intention right? Of course an inaction could be intentional. In both cases we see that the person, accused of harm via action/inaction must know the consequences of either his action or his inaction. In other words he must be aware of the chain of causation beginning with his action or inaction.

Now consider the having/not having of children in re the argument from comparable suffering. We agree that having children invariably leads to suffering. Ergo, the action of having children is obviously bad because all would-be parents are fully aware of the consequences (here suffering) of being born and having children is an intentional action. So, we have here, in the act of having children, an intention to harm.

What of the inaction of not having children? When does it equal, as a moral transgression, to having children as described above? Well, only when a would-be parent is aware that his child will benefit humanity e.g. the child could discover a cure for cancer. This is impossible isn't it? So, the inaction of not having children can never, unless the parent is clairvoyant, be an intent to do harm; after all to have such an intent one must know beforehand that the child will cure cancer, or stop a war, etc.

The difference between action and inaction is critical to your argument because having children is an action and not having children is an inaction. — TheMadFool

Did you just completely ignore my point? What is an "action" and what is an "inaction" depend on each other. So if I define "abstaining" (not having children) as the "action" then having children is an inaction. That's the point. There is no difference between action and inaction. Inaction is just another kind of action.

I used the legal analogy to provide you insight on where our moral intuitions stand on the issue of action vs inaction — TheMadFool

That doesn't matter when you haven't addressed the argument that there is no difference between action and inaction

One performs an action with intention right? — TheMadFool

Not necessarily. Where did you get this? If I accidentally shoot someone, I have indeed committed an action called "shooting"

Did you just completely ignore my point? What is an "action" and what is an "inaction" depend on each other. So if I define "abstaining" (not having children) as the "action" then having children is an inaction. — khaled

:lol: Then you would be equivocating. Look at the OP and then compare it to what you just said.

??????

The objection boils down to saying that "inaction" is just as much an action as any other. — khaled

From the OP. That's what I've been saying all along.

All the above, infact anything humans do, are in fact wants/desires or what proceeds from them, — TheMadFool

Having wants and desires are not the same as hedonism. it depends on what you want.

Being alive naturally comes with having wants and the satisfaction of these becomes the primary objective of living — TheMadFool

You were sliding away from hedonsism in the first sentence, now you are sliding even further. Satisfaction must mean pleasure. I really do understand how some hedonists want to reduce everything to pleasure and pain, but it's not the case. And the sliding in your language shows how you needs to start using new words to swallow different sets of goals and experiences.

However, I'm going out on a limb here, if biology is correct there is no biochemical difference between satisfactionand the feeling of joy - the same chemicals, presumably dopamine, is released in both events. Ergo, if there's anything to say of satisfaction then it's that it's a milder version of happiness - not distinct enough to warrant a separate existence. — TheMadFool

First this is radically oversimplified neurochemistry. Which parallels the radically oversimplified pleasure pain model you have of people's goals. Satisfaction and joy refer to difference experiences that sometimes happen at the same time or are causal of each other. But they are not the same. I use those words to describe different things and this would be reflected in the biochemistry. You don't get to make up biochemistry, at least not in the sense of expecting it to be taken seriously. I know...you said you were going out on a limb. But you just made stuff up. And, then, 'joy' and 'satisfaction' and 'happiness' are not exactly the same as pleasure.

Hedonism is indeed universal. — TheMadFool

You whole buddhist argument shows misunderstandings of Buddhism and an appeal to authority (buddhism). Buddhism does not want to end procreation, it want to end....oh,jesus. Actually research Buddhism. They are certainly not having as a goal the end of experiencing. Which would, in a sense, be the end of the Buddha. So they are not anti-natalists, though I agree there are parallels. Vaguely summarizing buddhism as you did here was an appeal to authority. Desire can be for things other than pain and pleasure. Of course how the Buddhists desire to and according to them get past hedonism (not caring about either pain or pleasure, neither avoiding or trying to get either one) is an irony you seem not to have noticed. Now you will say that this actually gives them pleasure. But I actually know Buddhists and Buddhist masters and that's not what's happened. They have disidentified with that whole part of themselves. They have cut off the limbic system, to a great degree. They are absolutely not hedonists. They are the opposite, even if some hedonistic motivtatoins might have played a role in choosing to do the practices - which are hideously painful. I am not an anti-hedonist. I'm not against experiencing pleasure and of course I prefer it to pain. But they are not how I choose my actions, most of the time.

You just keep spreading things out, sliding into new terms, telling me that they all really break down to pleasure and pain. But I know already that you see the world this way.

Everyone wants happiness - the king the beggar and everyone in between are hedonists. Ergo, hedonism is a more truthful philosophy than anything that denies it. — TheMadFool

I think many people actually have more specific goals, ones that often do not bring them short term happiness or long term happiness and even as they notice this or have this pointed out don't give a shit. Read the lives of artists.

I know what you'll do, you think that artist X, really, deep down, thinks that if she manages to paint that hill in a way she feels is right, she thinks that will give her so much pleasure it will outweigh all the struggle frustration, self-hate, back to stage one pain of the process.

Because you know what she really has as a goal, and if someone could give her a pill that would give her that feeling, she would take it. Test that one out if you can.

Now perhaps you will be so grand as to concede that the choices they make may lead to more pain than pleasure, but that is simply because they are fallible. (though why didn't you conced this? Why haven't you acknowledged that obviously the choices people make, the values they have often cause them much more pain that other values would? Why does this have to be brought up again?)

But I know: Really, in you mind, that was their goal. We can ignore all that they say and do that contradicts your 'really.....'.

It's not the facts as they stand, it is a radical interpretation with two colors. Someone with black and white vision looking at Van Gogh's paintings.

It's great that you value your life. I value your contribution in this discussion. — TheMadFool

Because it gives you pleasure....only? But, again, I mean, I value life in general, not just my life. I don't think a universe devoid of life is better than one with it. Anti-natalists must think that one is better. And yet their bodies do not stop moving, they do not stop engaging in life, most of them. Should I believe the little thinky bit of the verbal portions of their minds, or should I believe the great bulk of their organisms?

There really is nothing I can possibly say. Because I understand how easy it is to say

really

what you described, Coben,

was someone wanting pleasure.

That is an utterly impervious way of seeing the world, unless, at some time, you drop into your own experiencing and something shifts. No words on a screen will ever change this position.

A bit like how solipsism cannot be countered by words.

Or how scientists who thought animals were machines could not possibly be convinced otherwise (and that lasted for most of the 20th century).

I am going to leave our discussion here, perhaps come back later. But your posts require enormous work to counter them. And you didn't really reply to my counterexamples. I can easily imagine how you would, but you didn't really do it. This last post of yours would require a treatise.

The amazing thing is you see us solving the dilemma in the not too distant future. That we will be able to guarantee more pleasure than pain. But that's an issue I will let the antinatalists take up with you.

I have countered (in my mind at least :)) this line in other posts of mine in other threads and even in this thread in response to Mad Fool to some degree above. But I don't say.....

What you are saying is that YOU X1A' therefore everyone should like X1A'. — schopenhauer1

I wasn't saying, in what you quoted, that others should feel that way. I said that in direct response to Mad Fool saying that I liked life because I had it relatively good. Remember he is using a hedonist argument. If I like life, than I have it better than others. That needs to be the case, for him. I don't think your antinatalism is quite like his. So, don't put my quote out of context as if it is a response to your position. It was a response to his position as he aimed it at me and drew conclusions about me via. IOW that was me saying, no, you don't know me, this individual. Your theory about what must be true about me is not correct. I don't think the fact that my life is precious to me means that others should have or do have the same attitude or should if they have suffered as much or more or less than me. Or anything else. A kind of blunt summary of my reaction to Mad Fool is that he is making a lot of assumptions about anything that comes into to his view (around this issue at least) and I feel a compulsion to say 'no X is not the case' or 'Y is an assumption' 'Z is in fact the opposite' just to see if I can wake him up to the fact that he is happily saying what is true about everyone, including, in this case, me personally. It's the internet. I am not optimistic about the little slap this might be making any difference, but I couldn't help but respond: hey, no, you're wrong.

But in the end there is nothing you can do if someone wants to tell you what you are really feeling, really mean, what your whole life really boils down to, what everyone's life really boils down to.

Now I can imagine you think that implicitly I must be saying the above to people who don't want to live or are suffering more than me, but I am not, not even implicitly. I don't accept some of what I consider the fundamental assumptoins of anti-natalism and I can only refer you my posts in other threads, some of which you must have read, though perhaps not the ones directly addressing this.

I suppose one should tip one's hat to antinatalism as a topic. It requires, it seems to me, enormous posts, by antinatalists, by natalists and by those who are not either of those things. But I am not going to try to recreate those posts here.

And do me a favor, would you keep an eye on Mad Fool's optimism about how in the near future we will be able to guarantee that lives will be good and antinatalism will no longer hold, though he thinks it holds now.

You and I obviously have some fundamental disagreements, but I actually think there is something, well, almost mad, in his idea there. Some fundamental not seeing what life is like, and I think this is coupled with our age's deep religious belief in technology bringing in the Golden Age. It's not the messiah that's coming it's the benevolent AI or something that will make our lives perfect.

As much as I can be bothered by antinatalism, I don't consider it a threat. I do consider that kind of techno-faith a threat.

Oh, I think we had some pretty cranky interchanges before. Or, at least, I was cranky. You've been quite pleasant to deal with recently. Or maybe it's me, lol.

I suppose one should tip one's hat to antinatalism as a topic. It requires, it seems to me, enormous posts, by antinatalists, by natalists and by those who are not either of those things. But I am not going to try to recreate those posts here. — Coben

Yes, I think antinatalism does require a lot of "spilled ink" (er, um, bits and bytes?) because it is such an unusual position to those who have not heard of it and there is a lot of nuance and variations and common objections to contend with, etc.

And do me a favor, would you keep an eye on Mad Fool's optimism about how in the near future we will be able to guarantee that lives will be good and antinatalism will no longer hold, though he thinks it holds now. — Coben

I'll try my best haha. I do see the trend there to assume techno-utopian ideas will somehow be a panacea. It will not.

You and I obviously have some fundamental disagreements, but I actually think there is something, well, almost mad, in his idea there. Some fundamental not seeing what life is like, and I think this is coupled with our age's deep religious belief in technology bringing in the Golden Age. It's not the messiah that's coming it's the benevolent AI or something that will make our lives perfect.

As much as I can be bothered by antinatalism, I don't consider it a threat. I do consider that kind of techno-faith a threat. — Coben

I do see a trend in this techno-faith. Besides the climate change thing which I think is a whole separate topic, people discount human nature. I agree with Schopenhauer, human nature is never fully satisfied. I don't care how rich, how technologically advanced we are, as long as human nature is in the equation, there will always be dissatisfaction of some kind.

Oh, I think we had some pretty cranky interchanges before. Or, at least, I was cranky. You've been quite pleasant to deal with recently. Or maybe it's me, lol. — Coben

I think I've always tried to maintain being pleasant. Others though have been vociferous with attacks much of the time, but I try to abide it and be civil. Sometimes it requires forceful replies. It all depends on what the interlocutor wants to make the exchange. From what I've gathered, you seemed quite personally offended by the concept of antinatalism, and thus perhaps you thought I was some boogyman? It looks like now you are kind of understanding antinatalism a bit more and not taking it as personally? I'm not sure, but seems like even if you disagree with it, you are not as personally offended by it. Either way, cheers to being less offended and at least trying to understand the other side.

From the OP. That's what I've been saying all along. — khaled

Merriam-Webster definitions follow:

Action: doing something
Inaction: failure to do something (that should've been done)

Your OP depends on the above difference but your last post sweeps it aside.

Anyway, the difference between the two is immaterial since not having children, call it action or inaction, to be immoral requires knowledge of the future as in you would have to to know your child will be some kind of a superhero to the world and that's impossible. So, whether you want to label it action or inaction, it makes little difference to the fact of the matter which is that not having children is a lesser evil than having children and that's working within the boundaries of comparable suffering you set out in your OP.

This isn't something difficult to grasp. Imagine person Z wants to have a child and there's a chance that the child will cure cancer but it is certain, as your argument depends on it, that the child will both suffer and cause suffering to others. There are now 4 possibilities:

1. Z has the child and the child cures cancer.

2. Z has the child and the child doesn't cure cancer

3. Z doesn't have the child but the child could've cured cancer

4. Z doesn't have the child and the child couldn't have cured cancer

Note: All 4 possibilities involve suffering both for the child and others

When is Z responsible for causing suffering by not having a cancer-curing child? Only option 3, right? However, we can't blame him for an act that is not intentional, right? Yet to have the intention of causing suffering by not letting a cancer-curing child be born requires, as of necessity, that Z know, beforehand, that his child would cure cancer and that is impossible.

So, since Z knows having children involves suffering but he's unsure if his child will cure cancer he would be guilty of intentionally causing harm by having his child but is completely innocent of any suffering in the wake of him not having a cancer-curing child.

:up: Enjoy life. Thanks