Well, I think the next move, after assuming "there is existence" would be to ask how we know there is existence. This will give us some idea of what is meant here by "existence". I think that we can go two ways here. We can refer to our senses, outside ourselves, and say that we sense things moving all around us, and this confirms "existence", or we can turn to the inside, like Descartes, looking at the passage of thoughts in the mind, and say that this confirms "existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say we don’t even have to refer to motion, simply the sensation of ‘white’ would count as existence, even if nothing changes about that sensation, even if we think nothing about that sensation, even if absolutely nothing changes whatsoever.

Now I have to admit that this is an idealized situation, and in practice we don’t actually have that kind of experience (nor would we know if we have one, because if we are thinking about a sensation then our thoughts are changing even if the sensation itself doesn’t change, so that wouldn’t be a total absence of change).

So I can agree that “There is existence” and “Existence changes” would refer to the same truth, that existence and change are the same, that through the experience of change we reach the statement that “There is existence, there is change”.

we need to respect the fact that we have nothing but our own experiences with which to judge any conclusions about "existence", so we must give some credence to these generalizations if we even want to start to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, I agree.

This is another principle I find questionable. How could a thing which is not made of parts, change? For a thing to change, at least one part must become something other than it was. How could this happen if the thing had no parts? — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem I see with this is that, if a thing which is not made of parts cannot change, why would a part change? A part of a thing is a thing too. And then we get into an infinite regress where each part of the thing requires parts in order to change, and themselves require parts in order to change and so on.

So I would say that a thing can change, become something other than it was, and a thing may be made of parts which can change. If a thing could not change nothing would ever change, unless we arbitrarily assume that a ‘part’ is fundamentally different from a ‘thing’ but I don’t think we are forced to introduce this complication.

I'm trying to make some general categories by which we can classify things, and this is a distinction between spatial and temporal properties of a thing. Are parts necessarily defined spatially? Is the separation between one part and another, necessarily a spatial separation? Can we consider a temporal separation between parts?

Suppose a changing thing at one time fits one description, and at a later time fits another description. We say that it is throughout the entire time, always the same thing, but it is undergoing some changes. Now we have a period of time in which the thing is existing, and at each moment in that time period, it has a different description. Can we say that at each moment, what is described, is a part of "the object", which exists as the complete temporal extension? If so, then what constitutes the separation between these parts, allowing them to be distinct parts? Don't we generally conceive of such a temporal extension as a continuity of the object, without such separations? However, without such separations within the temporal extension of the object, it appears like change to the object would be impossible. Therefore we must conclude that there is separation between the temporal parts of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering what I said above (that a thing not made of parts can change, and assuming you agree), I think it’s a matter of convention whether we consider that a thing is undergoing temporal change, or whether we say that the thing is its whole temporal extension and that how it is at each moment is a part of the thing. Personally I prefer to see it as a thing undergoing change, since we experience the present, or said differently we simply experience what we experience. I think assuming that we can experience the future or the past would be an unnecessary assumption, since we can simply say that we can experience an image of what we think the future will be like, or an image of what we think the past was like, which is not actually experiencing what we will experience or what we experienced.

both aspects of existence, spatial and temporal, are composed of parts. In the spatial sense, we have the separation which arises from the two ways of apprehending existence, from the inside and from the outside. This produces a spatially defined boundary between the inside of the object and the outside of the object. This implies that the "existence" being described here, has parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

So again assuming you agree with what I said above, we don’t have to assume that the temporal aspect of existence is made of parts, that change is made of parts, we can simply say that there is change, and that the future and the past do not exist in a strict sense, rather they are experiences that are had in the present, they are part of existence now. This is of course not to say that everything that will ever happen and everything that has ever happened is already contained in existence now, but simply that we experience images of what we think will happen or of what we think happened, and these experiences are part of existence as long as they are had.

Regarding the spatial aspect, even without speaking of an inside or an outside, I think we can simply say that what we experience is not uniform, that parts can be distinguished, and even if we assume that these parts are an illusion, if there is such a thing as an illusion then that means there is both illusion and reality, which again are two separate parts, so no matter what existence (the way it is now) is made of parts, it is not one uniform thing, it cannot be reduced to a single thing that isn’t made of parts.


There is a lot I want to say about what a thing is, and its relation to the spatial and temporal aspects of existence, but I’ll save it for a later post as this one is already getting quite long. But basically, to say it succinctly, it seems to me that we couldn’t identify things, we couldn’t identify shapes, if there was no spatial and temporal correlations within existence, if everything was random including our thoughts there would be no shape and we couldn’t experience change, so it seems that the possibility of the very concept of thing requires that there are correlations within existence, which would be an additional truth of existence, that it cannot be completely random.

And if we even go further and use the idea that strictly speaking the future and the past do not exist, that only the present ever exists, a present that changes, then temporal correlations would actually be spatial correlations too, what we interpret as a temporal correlation would be a spatial correlation, in some way we would be creating the future. In some way experiencing an image of what we think the future will be like would contribute to making that future happen. And by using the earlier idea that a thing can change on its own, become something other than it was, then the reason there would be change is not that time exists, but that existence changes, existence becomes. I’m really liking where this is going and I want to keep exploring that further, it all seems to fit together.

Why would it be an issue to see experiences we call ‘love’ or ‘thought’ or ‘Neptune’ as all belonging to existence? — leo

Because the query presupposes without warrant, that existence is that to which it is possible to belong. Logic and parsimony suggest that existence is not that which is belonged to, but rather, is that which belongs.

Because the query presupposes without warrant, that existence is that to which it is possible to belong. Logic and parsimony suggest that existence is not that which is belonged to, but rather, is that which belongs. — Mww

So you are saying existence is a property. So a thing can either have the property of existence, or not have the property of existence. From my readings, this type of position tends to be supported by logico-linguistic arguments, and rely on features of statements. I'd happily concede this kind of 'phantom-existence' to statements. On the other hand, I'd not agree that this is the fundamental or primary category of existence. To wit, say, at any given moment, there is some set of 'things' whose thinghood consists in their simultaneously being real, where each thing stands in a real relationship to at least one other real thing.

Or from a Systems Theoretic perspective, a thing is an existent, which itself has or is the bearer of properties:

"The antonym ‘nothing’ is helpful, however, because it suggests that ‘nothing’ is a special kind of thing, namely a ‘no-thing’. This is perhaps just a quirk of language, but it puts us on the right mental track, because we can now say that a no-thing is something that has no properties.12 If it had any, those properties would indicate what sort of thing it is, in which case it would not be a no-thing. This suggests the idea that to be an existent is to have properties. Properties cannot be free-floating but have to belong to some existent (there are no actual Cheshire cat smiles without Cheshire cats). So this gives us a concise and useful definition: an ‘existent’ is ‘a bearer of properties’, and ‘nothing’ is ‘not a bearer of properties’. "
here https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/6/3/32/htm

On the other hand, I'd not agree that this is the fundamental or primary category of existence. — Pantagruel

As well you shouldn’t, your “this” being understood as the general conception “property”. The fundamental ground of properties is their capacity for measurement, or, the establishment of the inference of some relative quantity. Existence does not carry the burden of being measurable. If, instead, existence is merely a necessary condition, it need not be subject to measurement, nor the ambiguities of logic-linguistic arguments, and above all, properties need not be a fundamental category of existence.

And here’s why: anything ever talked about, or thought about, is from the perspective of human rationality. So everything absolutely must relate to us and us alone. Properties are that which we assign to objects in order, on the one hand, to arbitrate them one from another, or, which is the same thing, how they relate to each other. On the other hand, we assign conceptions to understand how they can be told apart, or, which is the same thing, how they relate to us. We use properties a posteriori for the former, but we use the categories a priori for the latter. Properties can have no bearing on the respective objects to which each set belongs, and the assignment of properties presupposes the objects to which they belong. There is no need to quantize that which doesn’t exist.

Fine. But what tells us it is not a waste of reason to assign properties? We don’t just willy-nilly think....this will be red, that will be 4” long, the other will be 16 lbs. Still fine. But to say we assign properties to that which is met with perception only tells us there is something there, but not whether it is proper that it should be there. Mirages are given properties, because they appear to perception, but experience informs us they do not exist.

OK, so what can we use to tell us that which appears really is something that actually and indubitably deserves the properties reason works so hard assigning to it. In other words, why do we say it is a waste of time talking about something of which we know nothing. And why for some of us, it is a waste of time to talk about that which is either highly unlikely or only possible? Because reason doesn’t want to waste its time, that’s why. (Illustrative figure of speech here; reason doesn’t have wants)

For warrants that reason does not waste its time, there are twelve, but only three have bearing on this dialogue: we may be assured the properties we assign are justified 1.) if that which appears exists, in which case the properties will be dependent, because of cause and effect; 2.) if that which appears necessarily exists, in which case the properties we assign will be certain, because of non-contradiction; and 3.) if that which appears possibly exists, re: mirage/hallucination, physical indiscernibles, in which case the properties will be merely contingent and subject to falsification.

In all those cases, the commonality is the existence of something outside us. Hence, it is logically justified to conclude that existence is the necessary condition for reason to assign properties to things outside us. It follows that things merely thought, residing inside us, not given from sensibility, do not warrant properties, and if they don’t warrant properties, they don’t warrant existence. This is not to say things merely thought are not real in some way, but real with respect to the thought alone, whereas the real with respect to thought AND sensibility, is a different sense of real, which is given the name “existence”.

So to answer your question directly.....no, I most emphatically not saying existence is a property.

BOOM!!!!

So to answer your question directly.....no, I most emphatically not saying existence is a property.

BOOM!!!! — Mww

Ok. I hope you can see the reason for my confusion because what you said here:

Logic and parsimony suggest that existence is not that which is belonged to, but rather, is that which belongs. — Mww

rather explicitly identifies it as a property, "Property, in the abstract, is what belongs to or with something"

No boom.

Once more, this time with bullhorn and amplifier:

And here’s why: anything ever talked about, or thought about, is from the perspective of human rationality. So everything absolutely must relate to us and us alone. Properties are that which we assign to objects in order, on the one hand, to arbitrate them one from another, or, which is the same thing, how they relate to each other. On the other hand, we assign conceptions to understand how they can be told apart, or, which is the same thing, how they relate to us. — Mww

We’re doing the talking, the observing, the understanding, the assigning, the cognizing, the experiencing.
We assign properties a posteriori, we assign conceptions a priori.
Liquidity is assigned as a property of “water” perceived as such, so we do not intuit “dump truck” (relation of objects to each other).
Existence is assigned as a condition of water experienced as such, so we do not think it is an illusion (relation of objects to us).

Now. If you would be so kind. Gimme back my damn BOOM!!!!

Bonus round: why is water as perceived written as “water”, but water as experienced written as water?

We assign properties a posteriori, we assign conceptions a priori. — Mww

I get it, you're a pure rationalist/idealist. I just don't feel the force of your arguments or your examples.

"Existence is assigned as a condition of water experienced as such, so we do not think it is an illusion (relation of objects to us)."

What does this even mean? Are you saying that we do not think that our experiences are illusory? Because some experiences are, in fact, illusory. I've never heard of anyone "assigning existence" to anything. Maybe ascribing existence? Even inferring existence. How can you assign existence?

I get it, you're a pure rationalist/idealist. — Pantagruel

Then you got it wrong; no pure idealist, more commonly called a subjective idealist, the domain of The Esteemed Bishop Berkeley, grants the physical existence of material objects as anything other than the machinations of the mind alone. I, on the other hand, do grant material objects an existence completely independent of human experience, while maintaining that knowledge about those objects, is very much solely dependent on the thoroughly human cognitive system that tells us about them, by means of their affect on our sensibility. Most properly, that is known as the transcendental idealist epistemological philosophy. Besides, it’s really absurd to deny materialism, then try to explain to myself that my own body is merely an idea in my mind.
———————-

Because some experiences are, in fact, illusory. — Pantagruel

Of course they are, or can be. But.....why? If everything ever talked about, thought about, cognized, experienced, has primarily to do with us, then illusion must have to do with us as well. Either that, or the determinism of physical science, and the apodeictic truth of mathematics, is forfeit, because we can’t tell wherefrom the illusion arises. We really cannot conceive the forfeiture of determinant physical science, which leaves the fault of illusion manifest in reason.

Reason was never theorized to be perfect; it couldn’t be, without contradicting itself.
————————-

Addendum, re: your added query, added last:

How can you assign existence? — Pantagruel

Short answer: understanding thinks it.

A parking lot full of cars. And the classic example being Einstein’s famous quip, “I refuse to believe the moon is not there if I am not looking at it”. (Or something like that) We grant the reality of the moon without its perception because understanding thinks the moon exists, and thinks such without the aid of immediate experience. Notice this subconscious procedure doesn’t work for that which has never been, nor can ever be, an experience, because understanding does NOT think existence to as-yet or impossible experiences. We never grant existence to anything we cannot cognize, and thus become either experience or possible experience.

As for the row of cars, it is easy to see our attention is drawn to the closer, or the further, but never both simultaneously, but nonetheless reason acknowledges surreptitiously the existence of the remainder of the row not in attention. We know they are there as mere uncognized objects, without ever actually perceiving them. The fact they exist therefore, cannot be given from sense, so the fact of “existence” can only be given from the subjective realm of understanding.

So I can agree that “There is existence” and “Existence changes” would refer to the same truth, that existence and change are the same, that through the experience of change we reach the statement that “There is existence, there is change”. — leo

OK, but this is where we need to be careful in our description. Change requires that there is something which is changing And so we have the dualism problem again. We have the thing and the changes which occur to the thing. If we associate existence with change in the sense of "existence and change are the same", then when we direct our attention to the thing which is changing, we need to us terms other than "existence".in that description.

The problem I see with this is that, if a thing which is not made of parts cannot change, why would a part change? A part of a thing is a thing too. And then we get into an infinite regress where each part of the thing requires parts in order to change, and themselves require parts in order to change and so on. — leo

This is why we need to be careful in our description. A thing is a whole, a unity. Suppose that a thing is made of parts, and the parts are in relations with each other. When the relations between the parts change, the thing changes. but this doesn't necessarily mean that the parts themselves change. If a thing has no parts, there are no internal relations, and the thing does not change. The relations between it and other things might change, but this is not a change to the thing itself, it is a change to some larger unity of this thing and other things (as parts).

It has been common in the past, and remains so, to assume a fundamental "part" or element, to avoid the infinite regress, this was the atom in ancient times, matter, or the fundamental particle. What we have here is a base thing, which does not itself change, but by existing in different relations, it composes all existing things.

So I would say that a thing can change, become something other than it was, and a thing may be made of parts which can change. If a thing could not change nothing would ever change, unless we arbitrarily assume that a ‘part’ is fundamentally different from a ‘thing’ but I don’t think we are forced to introduce this complication. — leo

The problem is that we want to avoid the infinite regress. If a thing can change, and a thing can be a part, then a part can change. Now we have an infinite regress of parts, and it really doesn't make sense to think that there is always smaller parts ad infinitum. So we posit the fundamental part, which has no parts. And, since it has not parts, it cannot change. This fundamental "unit", must be different from other entities, because it is not composed of parts. But this creates other problems such as timelessness, etc. This complication we cannot avoid. We can describe things in terms other than parts and changing relations, but to remain true to real observations, the complication will arise in another way.

So again assuming you agree with what I said above, we don’t have to assume that the temporal aspect of existence is made of parts, that change is made of parts, we can simply say that there is change, and that the future and the past do not exist in a strict sense, rather they are experiences that are had in the present, they are part of existence now. This is of course not to say that everything that will ever happen and everything that has ever happened is already contained in existence now, but simply that we experience images of what we think will happen or of what we think happened, and these experiences are part of existence as long as they are had. — leo

But we must say something about "change", describe it, if we want to understand it. And we cannot do this with assuming multiple things (parts) in relation to each other. So it's pointless to just say "there is change", and therefore avoid talking about parts, because then we cannot understand change.

Because the query presupposes without warrant, that existence is that to which it is possible to belong. Logic and parsimony suggest that existence is not that which is belonged to, but rather, is that which belongs. — Mww

But it’s not a presupposition, it’s a definition, existence is defined here as all that exists. Existence cannot belong to anything else than existence. And what exists belongs to existence by definition. Your position is self-contradictory.

And here’s why: anything ever talked about, or thought about, is from the perspective of human rationality. — Mww

In all those cases, the commonality is the existence of something outside us. — Mww

This thread is about finding truths that are valid now regardless of what we assume. As I said solipsism hasn’t been disproven, yet you assume it is false, you assume humans exist even when they aren’t perceived, you assume things exist beyond experiences that are had, you can believe that if you like, but don’t pretend that your belief is true no matter what.

“Existence is made of parts” is true now no matter what is assumed, you disagreed in an earlier post, if you still disagree then show how it could be false now, Metaphysician Undercover and I have proven that it cannot be false now, unless you find a flaw in the proof then you have no ground to say that it is false. And so if you arbitrarily claim that something proven true is false, while claiming that an unproven belief of yours is true, that’s a problem.

And just in case, when I talk of “you”, I’m not presupposing that solipsism is false, because “you” could simply refer to a content of my experiences rather than a human being existing independently of me perceiving it. I do believe other beings exist, but for now we haven’t proven it’s true no matter what we assume, here we’re looking for what’s true now no matter what we assume.

We grant the reality of the moon without its perception because understanding thinks the moon exists, and thinks such without the aid of immediate experience. — Mww

You can think unicorns exist on the moon too, that doesn’t imply unicorns exist on the moon independently of the thought of it. Just because you think things exist beyond your experiences, does not imply in itself that things exist beyond your experiences.

Sorry for the late reply

OK, but this is where we need to be careful in our description. Change requires that there is something which is changing And so we have the dualism problem again. We have the thing and the changes which occur to the thing. If we associate existence with change in the sense of "existence and change are the same", then when we direct our attention to the thing which is changing, we need to us terms other than "existence" in that description. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see where you’re getting at, but do you agree that without the experience of change we wouldn’t even come up with the concept of “existence”? Without the experience of change there wouldn’t be thoughts, there would only be a single thought, or a single color, a single experience that never changes, and we couldn’t even think about that experience. So it seems to me that “change” is more fundamental than a “thing”. There can be change that is so random that no specific thing can be identified within this change, and we can’t identify a thing without change.

In that view then and to avoid confusion, maybe we should talk of change instead of existence?

This is why we need to be careful in our description. A thing is a whole, a unity. Suppose that a thing is made of parts, and the parts are in relations with each other. When the relations between the parts change, the thing changes. but this doesn't necessarily mean that the parts themselves change. If a thing has no parts, there are no internal relations, and the thing does not change. The relations between it and other things might change, but this is not a change to the thing itself, it is a change to some larger unity of this thing and other things (as parts). — Metaphysician Undercover

But what are relations, if not things themselves? It seems you are assuming two fundamental distinct entities: things and relations. You are also assuming that a thing without parts cannot change on its own. Why would a relation without parts be able to change on its own, and not a thing without parts? It seems to me that if you assume a thing without parts cannot change you’re running into the same problem concerning a relation without parts.

Maybe if we start from the concept of change instead of starting from the concepts of things and relations, we won’t run into these problems. Change occurs, and within that change things can be identified, in that they are parts of the change that temporarily do not change in relation to the rest. What do you think of this?

The problem is that we want to avoid the infinite regress. If a thing can change, and a thing can be a part, then a part can change. Now we have an infinite regress of parts, and it really doesn't make sense to think that there is always smaller parts ad infinitum. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t see where there is the infinite regress when we say that a part can change, why would we have to assume that a fundamental part does not change?

But we must say something about "change", describe it, if we want to understand it. And we cannot do this with assuming multiple things (parts) in relation to each other. So it's pointless to just say "there is change", and therefore avoid talking about parts, because then we cannot understand change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes we can describe that change. Let’s say you have the experience of ‘white’ (you’re close to a white wall and you’re only seeing white), you might say this is a thing that doesn’t change, but no there is still change, your thoughts are changing, you only see the white as not changing because your thoughts are changing and allowing you to think that. And there the change can be seen as made of parts, one part is the thoughts that you are having and the other part is the sensation of ‘white’ that is not changing in relation to your thoughts, but they form one whole, you can’t see the ‘white’ as not changing without having changing thoughts at the same time. Do you see where I’m getting at?

I see where you’re getting at, but do you agree that without the experience of change we wouldn’t even come up with the concept of “existence”? Without the experience of change there wouldn’t be thoughts, there would only be a single thought, or a single color, a single experience that never changes, and we couldn’t even think about that experience. So it seems to me that “change” is more fundamental than a “thing”. There can be change that is so random that no specific thing can be identified within this change, and we can’t identify a thing without change.

In that view then and to avoid confusion, maybe we should talk of change instead of existence? — leo

Yes, it doesn't even really make sense to speak of the possibility of experience without change, as change is so fundamental. However, we shouldn't dismiss its dichotomous partner, "being", if we define "being" as remaining the same, through time, continuity, consistency. In experience, we tend to notice things which stay the same for some period of time. In fact, it appear necessary that something stay as it is for some period in order for us to even notice it. Imagine if at every moment, everything nlittle part of existence changed in some completely random fashion. So if we look at the ancient dichotomy of being and becoming (change) it would be difficult to say which is more fundamental to our experience. To notice one seems to require that we notice the other. To get to the bottom of this, we can divide the two in analysis, and see what conditions underlie each of them.

But what are relations, if not things themselves? It seems you are assuming two fundamental distinct entities: things and relations. You are also assuming that a thing without parts cannot change on its own. Why would a relation without parts be able to change on its own, and not a thing without parts? It seems to me that if you assume a thing without parts cannot change you’re running into the same problem concerning a relation without parts. — leo

I don't understand what you could be talking about here. A "relation" requires two things, therefore the relation necessarily has parts. It doesn't make sense to speak of a relation without parts. I definitely was not assuming a relation without parts.

Perhaps you misunderstood the point I was making. If two distinct things are shown to be in a relation to one another, then by virtue of that relation, we have indicated that those two things are parts of a larger thing. If the "relation" is valid then a larger unity is indicated.

However, things and relations are fundamentally distinct. Relations are what we predicate of things, whereas the things themselves are the subject of predication. So a relation is what a thing is said to have, but it does not make the thing itself. Likewise, a thing has parts, but the parts do not make the thing itself, because the parts must exist in specific relations. These are the analyzed principles of the two above mentioned aspects of experience, parts and relations.

Experience, as a thing, the subject of consideration, has two features, parts and relations between the parts. For the sake of understanding, we say that the parts remain the same, as time passes, and all that changes is the relations between the parts. This is Aristotle's matter and form. The matter remains the same while the form changes. The problem is that we always learn to divide the parts further, then it appears like the part is made of parts with changing relations. To end the infinite regress, some will posit a "prime matter", the fundamental part, not composed of parts, therefore not itself changing, as the basis for all existence. Reality would consist of fundamental parts existing in different relations. The problem is that Aristotle demonstrated this prime matter as illogical,

And if we proceed to assume relations as fundamental, then it doesn't make sense to speak of relations without parts. Therefore we are really missing something in our analysis. What has come up, in much metaphysics is that what is missing here is "the cause". If parts exist in relations to each other, there must be a cause of this. It is our failure to address this feature, that leads to the unending analysis of parts and relations, seeking to find the bottom, the most fundamental, when we are actually neglecting the most fundamental thing, which is the cause of this unity between parts and relations, the cause of parts existing in relations. So to avoid the dead end analysis of parts and relations, we need to turn our attention toward "the cause".

Maybe if we start from the concept of change instead of starting from the concepts of things and relations, we won’t run into these problems. Change occurs, and within that change things can be identified, in that they are parts of the change that temporarily do not change in relation to the rest. What do you think of this? — leo

Yes, if we start with "change", we will see that change requires a cause, and so we are on the right track here.

I don’t see where there is the infinite regress when we say that a part can change, why would we have to assume that a fundamental part does not change? — leo

Change is a difference in relations between things. So if a thing changes, the relations between its parts have changed. There is no other way that a thing could change, that is change, a change in relations. But if a part can change, then it must be composed of parts, and so on to infinite regress. To avoid the infinite regress we assume a fundamental part, what the ancient Greeks called atoms, and in modern physics is fundamental particles. Aristotle demonstrated that this is illogical, as "prime matter".

es we can describe that change. Let’s say you have the experience of ‘white’ (you’re close to a white wall and you’re only seeing white), you might say this is a thing that doesn’t change, but no there is still change, your thoughts are changing, you only see the white as not changing because your thoughts are changing and allowing you to think that. And there the change can be seen as made of parts, one part is the thoughts that you are having and the other part is the sensation of ‘white’ that is not changing in relation to your thoughts, but they form one whole, you can’t see the ‘white’ as not changing without having changing thoughts at the same time. Do you see where I’m getting at? — leo

Sorry, I made a typo, I meant to say we cannot do this without assuming parts, instead of saying "with" assuming parts. My mistake. I meant to say that we cannot explain "change" without assuming parts in relation to each other. Change requires parts.

existence is defined here as all that exists. Existence cannot belong to anything else than existence. And what exists belongs to existence by definition. — leo

And with that, I see my effort here is not well-spent.

Carry on.

And with that, I see my effort here is not well-spent.

Carry on. — Mww

Since you don’t address the points I make, I have to agree. You’re not interested in understanding or addressing the points that other people are making in this thread, while I have addressed yours, apparently you’re not looking for a discussion, you don’t want to consider that you may be wrong, you just want people to agree with you, well I explained why I disagree with you, if you’re not liking that and you aren’t willing to explain why you disagree with my explanation then indeed your posts in this thread are a waste of time for both of us.

In experience, we tend to notice things which stay the same for some period of time. In fact, it appear necessary that something stay as it is for some period in order for us to even notice it. Imagine if at every moment, every little part of existence changed in some completely random fashion. So if we look at the ancient dichotomy of being and becoming (change) it would be difficult to say which is more fundamental to our experience. To notice one seems to require that we notice the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that in order to experience change there has to be something that stays the same in relation to what is changing, for instance a thought, because if everything was changing randomly including our thoughts we wouldn’t even have a static thought that would tell us we are experiencing randomness, we wouldn’t have any memory and so on. But even though some things temporarily don’t change in relation to some other change, we don’t have to assume that it is necessary that some thing never changes. We have no evidence that something can never change forever, while we have evidence of change.

We are certain of change but not of being. What we interpret as not changing might be simply change that is not perceived, for instance something might seem unchanging and yet by looking more closely we see change. Also, if one part of experience is not changing while another part is changing, the whole experience is changing as a whole, so again change appears as more fundamental than being. For these reasons I think it will be more fruitful to see change as fundamental rather than being.

I don't understand what you could be talking about here. A "relation" requires two things, therefore the relation necessarily has parts. It doesn't make sense to speak of a relation without parts. I definitely was not assuming a relation without parts.

Perhaps you misunderstood the point I was making. If two distinct things are shown to be in a relation to one another, then by virtue of that relation, we have indicated that those two things are parts of a larger thing. If the "relation" is valid then a larger unity is indicated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you agree with the idea that fundamentally what we call a “relation” is a thought, an experience? The idea that “change occurs” follows from experiences that are seen to change. Where does the idea of a “relation” come from? Doesn’t it come from seeing that some part of experience is correlated with some other, that the two parts change not independently from one another, but together in some way?

Where I’m going with this is that you were saying that a thing without parts cannot change on its own, but if you agree that a relation is fundamentally an experience, a thought, a thing, then again why would that experience or thought or thing change on its own? If you say that this relation is made of parts, and that this is why the relation can change, then we’re back to asking why do the parts of that relation change in the first place?

Basically it seems to me that you can’t escape the fact that a thing without parts can change, that it can become something different than it was, which again leads to the idea that change is more fundamental than being. It seems to me that it is a circular reasoning to say that “a thing with parts can change because the relation between the parts can change”, because in saying that you’re essentially saying that the relation can change on its own, or that the parts of the relation which are themselves not made of parts are changing on their own. Do you see what I mean?

Change is a difference in relations between things. So if a thing changes, the relations between its parts have changed. There is no other way that a thing could change, that is change, a change in relations. But if a part can change, then it must be composed of parts, and so on to infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we see change as more fundamental than being then a thing is simply an absence of change in relation to some other change. And then we don’t have to explain how a thing changes, change is what’s fundamental, a partial absence of change is what has to be explained, and we can explain it simply by seeing it as two opposite changes that cancel one another (or as several changes in equilibrium). Would you agree with that?

And then it isn’t that “change requires parts”, we can simply say that parts of the change are seemingly unchanging in relation to other parts.

I think we could see that as a solid foundation for knowledge and move from there.

I agree that in order to experience change there has to be something that stays the same in relation to what is changing, for instance a thought, because if everything was changing randomly including our thoughts we wouldn’t even have a static thought that would tell us we are experiencing randomness, we wouldn’t have any memory and so on. But even though some things temporarily don’t change in relation to some other change, we don’t have to assume that it is necessary that some thing never changes. We have no evidence that something can never change forever, while we have evidence of change. — leo

Right, I agree with this. But I'd say it's more like this, something unchanging is necessary for experience itself, it's fundamental to experience. And, as you conclude, it is not necessary for this unchanging thing to be never changing. This is why causation becomes paramount. How is it that a thing can be the same for a while, then not be the same. A cause of change is necessary.

The idea of a thing which never changes comes from the necessity of ending the infinite regress. So both ideas, that there is something unchanging, and that there is something which never changes, are produced by logical necessity. To ground experience, and give it reality, we need to assert an underlying consistency, sameness,and also to give reality to the thing which we experience, the sensible world, we assume the existence of an underlying "matter" the fundamental element which never changes.

We are certain of change but not of being. — leo

This is why it appears like we are more certain of change than of being. Change is fundamentally evident to us, while the idea of being is produced by logical necessity. Change is the premise, and that there is something "the same" is the conclusion produced by the fact that not everything changes. Logic proceeds from the more certain to the less certain. But as you'll see below, we can turn around and face those premises, as potentially uncertain themselves, and look for the most certain of all premises.

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What we interpret as not changing might be simply change that is not perceived, for instance something might seem unchanging and yet by looking more closely we see change. Also, if one part of experience is not changing while another part is changing, the whole experience is changing as a whole, so again change appears as more fundamental than being. For these reasons I think it will be more fruitful to see change as fundamental rather than being. — leo

I don't think it is possible that everything is changing. This would mean that from one moment to the next, absolutely everything changes. Then there would be no consistency whatsoever, and the entire world would be complete chaos and randomness. It would be completely impossible for us to understand the world at all, because we could make no principles about how things would be from one moment to the next, because such a principle is based in assuming that something stays the same from one moment to the next.

That is why, despite the fact that we experience things as changing, the most certain of all premises is the premise that something stays the same. This is basically the principle which Plato impressed on us. We must get beyond the illusory world which the senses are handing us, to look at the reality of intelligible principles. All the premises concerning change, which we derive from our sensations of the world, have fundamental uncertainties inherent within. So we must look beyond sensation, toward what makes sensation possible in the first place, to derive the most certain of all premises, from which to build any structure of knowledge.

Would you agree with the idea that fundamentally what we call a “relation” is a thought, an experience? The idea that “change occurs” follows from experiences that are seen to change. Where does the idea of a “relation” come from? Doesn’t it come from seeing that some part of experience is correlated with some other, that the two parts change not independently from one another, but together in some way? — leo

This is exactly why we must place sameness, or being, as the most fundamental principle. If we do not, we cannot get a true perspective of what a "relation" is. You have brought "relation" into the experience, as if it is something which is part of the experience, when in reality we see a "relation" as a part of the thing experienced. Consider the map and the territory analogy. A relation is part of the territory, and we map it using principles. So within the experience, there are principles not relations, and we use the principles to map the relations which are outside the experience as part of the world being sensed.

Now consider principles themselves. We could say that there are relations between principles, but that would imply the principle is an independent thing existing by itself, relative to other principles. However, principles don't really exist like that, they are inherently connected to one another, supporting each other and dependent on each other, so it is somewhat incorrect to portray them as independent objects existing in relations to each other.

Now, see that you and I come to agreement about the nature of our experience. As you say "the two parts change not independently from one another, but together in some way". This is because the "two parts", which I portrayed as "principles" above, do not exist separately from one another, as independent things. There is dependency. So let's say that "parts" do not exist as independent objects, and they do not exist in relations with each other. Let's say that there is a "whole", and the part exists as a part of the whole, and being part of a whole is something other than a relation, it's some sort of dependency.

Where I’m going with this is that you were saying that a thing without parts cannot change on its own, but if you agree that a relation is fundamentally an experience, a thought, a thing, then again why would that experience or thought or thing change on its own? If you say that this relation is made of parts, and that this is why the relation can change, then we’re back to asking why do the parts of that relation change in the first place? — leo

So this is a very good question, and I'll show you how I can resolve it. A relation is now something outside of the thing. There is not "relations" within the thing, but dependency between parts. Within a thing there are parts, but the parts don't exist by relations. The parts are like principles which exist more like in a hierarchy of dependency. Now the question is what causes a thing to change, so we must look to the structure of this hierarchy of principles to understand this.

What is implied here is that we pay attention to Aristotle's distinction between the two ways of depicting change, locomotion (change of place), and internal change. Now we are focused on internal change, and the question is how does a thing change. To understand this we need to understand how a hierarchy of principles exists and changes. Changing a fundamental principle will have a huge effect, while changing a fringe principle will have a minor effect. But the question is what causes a principle to change in the first place.

Basically it seems to me that you can’t escape the fact that a thing without parts can change, that it can become something different than it was, which again leads to the idea that change is more fundamental than being. It seems to me that it is a circular reasoning to say that “a thing with parts can change because the relation between the parts can change”, because in saying that you’re essentially saying that the relation can change on its own, or that the parts of the relation which are themselves not made of parts are changing on their own. Do you see what I mean? — leo

I see what you're saying, but the answer is that there is no such thing as a thing without parts. A thing only exists as such a hierarchy of parts, and without that there is no thing. So you've taken an impossibility "a thing without parts", and asserted that this thing can change. But without parts, there is nothing there, no thing.

The issue is the "circular reasoning", which appears from the hierarchical thinking. The hierarchy of parts implies a top position, or base position depending on your perspective, so let's just call it #1 position. Also, there is no hierarchy unless there is something which follows #1. So "hierarchy" implies more than one, yet #1 implies priority. The circularity is avoided by assigning priority to #1. But there is no hierarchy unless there is more than one, and if there is more than one, how does a specific part acquire the position of #1. Therefore we must look to something other than the parts to assign #1 to, and again we meet with causation. There is a balance between the parts in the hierarchy, which allows them to exist as a unity, and the balance is caused. This cause is what we can assign #1 to. So #1 exists not as a part of the hierarchy, but as the cause of it.

To answer the question we can look to the nature of "cause". "Cause" is a temporal concept, and the cause is always in the past. The past cannot be changed. Therefore the #1, being the thing without parts, and the cause of parts existing in a hierarchical balance, necessarily cannot change or be changed, being in the past. The cause does not exist as a relation to the thing, because it is within the thing, like part of the thing yet still not the same as a part of the thing, because of the priority we must assign to it.

f we see change as more fundamental than being then a thing is simply an absence of change in relation to some other change. And then we don’t have to explain how a thing changes, change is what’s fundamental, a partial absence of change is what has to be explained, and we can explain it simply by seeing it as two opposite changes that cancel one another (or as several changes in equilibrium). Would you agree with that? — leo

As explained above, any premise based in change is less reliable, more uncertain than a premise based in being, or sameness. So your suggested approach cannot give us the required degree of certainty.

Absolute truth: there is at least one mind that is conscious.

That's one of the reasons I'm an idealist. We know absolutely mind(s) and ideas exist. We don't have the same surety regarding physical matter.

I see we’re in disagreement over what is more fundamental, more reliable, more certain: change or being. That’s good, it means if we can uncover the root reason why we disagree we will make progress.

I’m going to (re)state reasons for seeing change as more fundamental and against seeing being as more fundamental, and address your points in that regard, let me know if I missed something important.

(note that when I say that change is more fundamental I’m not saying that there is nothing that temporarily stays the same within the change.)


1. Change is immediately evident to us, you agreed with that, whereas being is not immediately evident.

2. If being (absence of change) was most fundamental then there wouldn’t be change by definition, yet there is change. If being changes it is no more being.

3. Change cannot be an illusion because it would be a changing illusion, and thus there would be change. Whereas absence of change can be an illusion, it can be change appearing to be unchanging.

4. An experience is made of parts, for instance there can be simultaneously a feeling and a thought. There may be one part that is seen to be unchanging, but in order to see it as unchanging there is another part that is changing, for instance a thought that is interpreting some part of experience as unchanging. The thought itself is changing, if it wasn’t changing it wouldn’t come to see the other part as unchanging, it would remain stuck on a past thought. So within experience there is always change, the experience as a whole is changing.

5. As another way to rephrase 4., a part of experience doesn’t exist independently from the other parts, they are parts of one whole, so as long as one part is changing the whole is changing.

6. Even if we can find regularities within the change, these regularities wouldn’t exist without the change. Even if something remains temporarily the same within the change, that doesn’t make it more fundamental than the change. There can be sameness within change but there can’t be change within sameness.

7. You might say that if change was fundamental then fundamentally there wouldn’t be truth, because truth is what remains unchanging. However I would say that what is true now isn’t guaranteed to remain true forever. Something that remains the same while everything else is changing may not remain the same forever. Maybe what remains the same depends on what beings do, and the very continued existence of beings may depend on what they do, and what they do is change.


And to address specific points you made:

8. As a reason against seeing change as fundamental, you said you think if change was fundamental then everything would change and the world would be complete chaos and randomness. However I disagree, because why would we have to assume that everything would be changing randomly? Smooth change still counts as change.

9. You say that “the idea of a thing which never changes comes from the necessity of ending the infinite regress”. As to how that infinite regress arises, you say: “Change is a difference in relations between things. So if a thing changes, the relations between its parts have changed. But if a part can change, then it must be composed of parts, and so on to infinite regress.”. But notice that in this reasoning you assume in the first place that there are unchanging things that exist, which is what you end up concluding. If you don’t assume that unchanging things exist fundamentally, then there is no infinite regress and so no necessity to conclude that there are things which never change.


So based on all this I still think that we have to see change as a solid foundation for knowledge, rather than being. And the whole quest is to understand how that change evolves, and to change it.

(note that when I say that change is more fundamental I’m not saying that there is nothing that temporarily stays the same within the change.) — leo

Isn't this contradictory though? If there is something which stays the same, within change, then how can change be more fundamental? If "being" is inherent within change, then there is no change without being, and change cannot be more fundamental.

1. Change is immediately evident to us, you agreed with that, whereas being is not immediately evident. — leo

This is a good point, but we must ask why is change immediately evident to us. Then we see that change is only evident against a backdrop of "being". Without that back drop, nothing would be evident. This is the issue that you need to consider more carefully, what makes it possible that change is evident to us. Pure, and absolute change, would be the randomness I described, everything different at every moment. And, you can't just dismiss this by saying that's not the type of change I'm talking about, I'm talking about change that has being within it, because then the change you are talking about cannot be more fundamental.

2. If being (absence of change) was most fundamental then there wouldn’t be change by definition, yet there is change. If being changes it is no more being. — leo

This is not true. As I've described, for being to change all that is required is a cause. This is where I'm trying to lead the discussion, toward "causation", but by insisting that change is fundamental you have no need to consider causation. "Change" just is, being the most fundamental, and there is no need for causation. But when being is placed as more fundamental, then we need a cause of change.

3. Change cannot be an illusion because it would be a changing illusion, and thus there would be change. Whereas absence of change can be an illusion, it can be change appearing to be unchanging. — leo

"Illusion" presupposes a being which suffers the illusion, so this argument is not applicable. You seem to be forgetting, that all these terms we are using are applied by us, human beings. So we cannot remove from the picture, the fact that we are discussing the human perspective. That is why, in response to your #1 above, I said we need to consider why change is most evident to us. It appears like you take the "us" for granted, and want to move on towards analyzing what we perceive, as what is most fundamental, but we can't do that because you've already placed "us" as prerequisite, and therefore the most fundamental.

4. An experience is made of parts, for instance there can be simultaneously a feeling and a thought. There may be one part that is seen to be unchanging, but in order to see it as unchanging there is another part that is changing, for instance a thought that is interpreting some part of experience as unchanging. The thought itself is changing, if it wasn’t changing it wouldn’t come to see the other part as unchanging, it would remain stuck on a past thought. So within experience there is always change, the experience as a whole is changing. — leo

This is fine, but again you need to accept that any appeal to "experience" presupposes something which is experiencing. Therefore the thing which is experiencing is more fundamental than the experience itself, as necessary for the experience.

6. Even if we can find regularities within the change, these regularities wouldn’t exist without the change. Even if something remains temporarily the same within the change, that doesn’t make it more fundamental than the change. There can be sameness within change but there can’t be change within sameness. — leo

So this approach is pointless. We cannot proceed to analyze the thing experienced, "change", as if it is more fundamental than the thing which experiences the change. What you say, that one of these, sameness or change is "within" the other is irrelevant at this point, because it cannot be determined until we establish the proper relation between the two.

"Change" is what we experience, what is immediately evident to us. So this "change" is already "within" us, as that which is experienced within us. The "us" is already more fundamental than the change experienced, so this points us in the direction of looking inside ourselves, to see what constitutes "us", in order to determine what is more fundamental. Therefore to determine whether change is within sameness, or vise versa, we need to look inside ourselves. Instead of looking at the thing observed, we need to look at the observer, because we can only approach the thing observed through the intermediary of the observation, and the observer is presupposed as more fundamental than the observation.

8. As a reason against seeing change as fundamental, you said you think if change was fundamental then everything would change and the world would be complete chaos and randomness. However I disagree, because why would we have to assume that everything would be changing randomly? Smooth change still counts as change. — leo

I see that you don't quite understand this objection. If there is anything which remains unchanged from one moment to the next, this qualifies as sameness. In order to place change as more fundamental, we need to be able to conceive of change complete devoid of sameness, thus demonstrating the priority (fundamentality) of change. Otherwise we have a duality of change and sameness, and no principles whereby the claim that one is more fundamental than the other might be justified.

So, from my perspective, being or sameness is placed as the most fundamental. And, we can conceive of being without change, this is absolute rest. From this point, we need a cause of change. You might argue that the "cause" is itself a change, and therefore the being which is at absolute rest must coexist with this change. However, traditional metaphysics has adopted the principles required to conceive of this cause of change as distinct from change itself, in the same way that a cause is distinct from the effect. From the perspective of "change", cause and effect are inherently tied together as "an event", but from the perspective of "being" the cause and the effect are distinct.

9. You say that “the idea of a thing which never changes comes from the necessity of ending the infinite regress”. As to how that infinite regress arises, you say: “Change is a difference in relations between things. So if a thing changes, the relations between its parts have changed. But if a part can change, then it must be composed of parts, and so on to infinite regress.”. But notice that in this reasoning you assume in the first place that there are unchanging things that exist, which is what you end up concluding. If you don’t assume that unchanging things exist fundamentally, then there is no infinite regress and so no necessity to conclude that there are things which never change. — leo

This would be a valid objection, if you yourself could conceive of change without being, as a starting point. Since you cannot, you have already assumed "that unchanging things exist fundamentally". Therefore my starting premise is acceptable to both of us. Until you can adopt a starting point of absolute change, which is the complete randomness that I described, you cannot dismiss my starting point of "unchanging things that exist fundamentally". Therefore your objection has no place, because you yourself have also assumed that unchanging things exist fundamentally. Once you see that we cannot remove being or sameness in any absolute way, because this is unsupported and irrational, yet we can remove change in an absolute way, then the consequences of this will appear more reasonable to you.