• ovdtogt
    356
    Just because you believe they are not justified to hold a certain belief does not mean they hold unjustified beliefs. What a solipsistic creature you are.
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    Just because you believe they are not justified to hold a certain belief does not mean they hold unjustified beliefs. What a solipsistic creature you are.ovdtogt

    I didn't say that if I believe they hold unjustified beliefs, their beliefs are unjustified. This just underlines my point: you can believe your belief is justified without it being so.

    But even if I did hold the absurd view that if I believe someone is unjustified, necessarily they are unjustified, this would not imply I was a solipsist. Far from it: it would be a belief about the status of someone else's belief, and thus would imply I was not a solipsist.

    I think you'll be getting a bonus from Total Crap Plc this month.
  • ovdtogt
    356
    sometimes we can have knowledge without a justification[/quote]

    So are you going to retract that statement?
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    Er, no. I think it is true and I provided an example of a case in which I might have knowledge yet lack a justification for my true belief. Read my reply to Andrew M above in which I describe it. Then say some crap about it.
  • ovdtogt
    356
    I might have knowledge yet lack a justificationBartricks

    Tell me one belief that you hold that you do not have a justification for.
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    I described a case above. Here's another: there are four mugs in my sink. That's true, but it is too trivial for me to have any reason to believe it. Yet I do believe it, and it is true, and I seem to know it given that I formed it on the basis of the evidence (there appear to be four mugs in my sink).
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    No, I should assume neither until I have good evidence to do so. You are fallaciously mounting a kind of "argument from authority" here.Janus

    He's been all over the place...

    Fun though...
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    This claim:

    Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values

    is 'true'.
    Bartricks



    What makes it so?creativesoul


    See the thread on Truth! And our evidence that such claims are true is that our reason represents them to be.Bartricks

    Looks like you're squirming to me...

    What makes that claim true? What makes the other claim false?

    Straight forward questions. Given that truth is prior to all language, it ought be a pretty straightforward answer.
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    What makes that claim true? What makes the other claim false?creativesoul

    Again: see the thread on truth. This thread is on 'knowledge'.
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    Reason does not use language. All assertion, direction, and prescription is language use. Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe.creativesoul

    Yes she can and does.Bartricks


    It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons.
    — creativesoul

    Yes she is.
    Bartricks

    This is just ridiculous. I cannot take it seriously.
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    This is just ridiculous. I cannot take it seriously.creativesoul

    That's the problem the closed minded have always had with new solutions to old problems
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    You'll have to do better than that...


    JTB is in no need of any solution. There's no problem with it. There are no examples of well grounded true belief that we would be unwilling to call knowledge if we first knew the flaws in both broken clocks and Gettier cases.

    I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.

    We all know this is true.

    It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky.

    And...

    It is just absurd to deny the following...

    Reason is quite simply not the sort of thing that is capable of making assertions. Reason is not equivalent to a person. All Reason is language use. People are not. All Reason owes it's very existence to language use. People do not. People are prior to language use. Reason is not. People are prior to Reason. Reason cannot be equivalent to that which existed in it's entirety prior to it. People did. Reason cannot be equivalent to people.

    Now...

    Can we move on yet?
  • Bartricks
    1.4k
    I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.creativesoul

    Christ, this is tedious. No. You. Haven't.

    Saying 'malpractice' a lot doesn't do anything. I don't have a clue what you mean by it - and nor do you, you just read it on a page on the internet somewhere and thought if you use it you'll sound like you're steeped in the literature.

    As for being well-grounded - well, I refuted that view. That view is refuted by cases in which someone's belief is based on another true belief, but fails to qualify as knowledge.

    here's my characterisation of this debate.

    Bartricks: here's an eye-wateringly brilliant thesis.

    Creativesoul: promising start, but let me teach you. Malpractice. Malpractice. Mally, pracky, tice.

    Bartricks: er, what?

    Creativesoul: grounded. Well grounded. True beliefs that have lots of ground around them are knowledge. There is no problem. I have spoken.

    Bartricks: not sure what you mean by 'well grounded'

    Creativesoul: I mean this. Or that. Or something.

    Bartricks: well, if you mean this, then this case refutes you.

    Creativesoul: answer this question

    Bartricks. Answered

    Creativesoul: Now this one....and this one....aand this one.

    Bartricks. Answered

    Creativesoul: Well, those answers aren't quite right. Now this one, and this one, and this one

    Bartricks: answered - why are you asking me these questions?

    Creativesoul: your view is silly. Ridiculous. Here's an argument against it that has premises that have nothing whatsoever to be said for them.

    Bartricks; Your argument appears to be rubbish.

    Creativesoul: your view is absurd. It isn't on the internet and I can't associate it with a big name. So it is rubbish.

    Bartricks: your argument is rubbish - its premise have nothing to be said for them and appear false on their face - my argument is good, as its premises are self-evidently true or conceptual truths.

    Creativesoul: there's no problem. As I showed you earlier. Yes, you took me to the cleaners, but I can't realise that becsaue I have blinkers on.

    Bartricks: here's my parody of our discussion

    Creativesoul: this is pointless. You can't receive my instruction. You don't listen to me or any of the other intellectual peons on here. You need therapy. You are a terrible person. How dare you use reasoned argument to show things. You are in need of help. Goodbye!!

    Bartricks: bye squidy.
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.
    — creativesoul

    Christ, this is tedious. No. You. Haven't.
    Bartricks


    Did you miss this?

    Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent of "the man" is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.

    Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.

    Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.

    You certainly have not given in subsequent due attention.

    :brow:

    Or this?

    I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.

    We all know this is true.

    It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky.
    creativesoul

    Tedious?

    Fairly straightforward if you ask me. Which part of any of my arguments, in particular, are you objecting to and what are grounds supporting that objection?
  • creativesoul
    6.9k


    That's an odd account of what's taken place here. Accounting malpractice clearly to anyone who looks for themselves.
  • creativesoul
    6.9k
    As for being well-grounded - well, I refuted that view. That view is refuted by cases in which someone's belief is based on another true belief, but fails to qualify as knowledge.Bartricks

    Invalid inferences can be based upon true belief. They are not knowledge.

    So what?

    That's not a problem for well grounded true belief. Invalid inference is not well grounded. You seem to be a bit confused.
  • Athena
    307


    Asking me how I think differently is like asking a person with schizophrenia how s/he thinks differently. The experience of being different is not easy to explain. :lol: How about people have thought I do drugs and I do not, or in forums, people rarely understand my intended meaning. I come to a thought with many different thoughts and I can not understand why others don't get the complexity, while they totally miss what I think is important.

    Kind of like you challenging me on the notion that quantum physics is not dualistic. In my mind, it is not dualistic :lol: Nothing is either/or. It is all this and that and that interacting.

    Is Quantum Physics the End of Dualism?
    by
    Thomas Herold
    Dualism seems to be the biggest concept in history ever. Quantum Physics may lead us to a new paradigm shift in consciousness.

    Our consciousness is programmed with the basic concept of dualism. Either it is this way or it is the other way, either it is good or it is bad. If you think about this you may find hundreds of other examples in your daily life. Wherever you look, look closely and you will find the concept of dualism.

    The belief in matter is another big concept science has come up with. In the last century Newton, Kepler and some other persons made sure this concept made it into every school book in the western world.

    Both concepts, dualism and matter are living on such a big scale that most people don't even realize that they are concepts.

    Is there a Hidden Purpose Behind the Concept of Dualism?
    This is more a philosophical question and it may lead to other concepts and not to the truth. So what is the truth? The truth is that every concept leads to an experience and by experiencing it we may fulfill it's purpose.
    Thomas Herold

    Looks like Plato's perfect forms doesn't it? I thought Plato's perfect forms were just a funky imagination, but now I see, with a different consciousness Plato's perfect forms make sense. When we do not understand something, perhaps we do not come to it with the necessary consciousness?
  • ovdtogt
    356

    Quantum mechanics provides two fundamental examples of the duality between position and momentum, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle ΔxΔp ≥ ħ/2 stating that position and momentum cannot be simultaneously known to arbitrary precision, and the de Broglie relation p = ħk which states the momentum and wavevector of a free particle are proportional to each other.[1] In this context, when it is unambiguous, the terms "momentum" and "wavevector" are used interchangeably. However, the de Broglie relation is not true in a crystal.
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