• ModernPAS
    9
    I want to examine an argument for the claim that religion is a conspiracy theory, perhaps the “ultimate” conspiracy theory. I’m bothered by the conclusion of the argument, but I’m not sure how to critique it without begging the question. I’d like some feedback from people.

    I’m making use of Brian Keeley’s discussion of conspiracy theories and what I think his argument is for the claim that conspiracy theories are self-defeating:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory

    https://philpapers.org/rec/KEEOCT

    A reconstruction of Keeley’s argument that we discussed in my Philosophy of Religion class is the following:

    1. If you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll come to doubt various people and institutions that have been set up to generate reliable data and evidence.
    2. If you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll come to doubt various people and institutions that have been set up to generate reliable data and evidence, then you’ll also have good reason to doubt the various people and institutions that generated the data and evidence for the conspiracy theory.
    3. If you have good reason to doubt the various people and institutions that generated the data and evidence for the conspiracy theory, then you’ll have good reason to doubt this conspiracy theory.
    4. Thus, if you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll have good reason to doubt that conspiracy theory. (1-3 HS)
    5. If you have good reason to doubt mature conspiracy theories, then mature conspiracy theories are self-defeating and should be rejected. (3-4 HS)
    6. Thus, mature conspiracy theories are self-defeating and we should reject them. (4, 5 MP)

    I am assuming that the above argument, or something very much like it, succeeds in showing that conspiracy theories are self-defeating. Perhaps others might object to it.

    An analogous argument can be made for the claim that religious belief is self-defeating:

    1. If you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you must doubt the supernatural claims of other religions.
    2. If you must doubt the supernatural claims of other religions, then you must also believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of other religions, for example, that they lack direct, public evidence for their supernatural claims.
    3. If you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the basic claims of other religions—for example, that they lack direct, public evidence for their supernatural claims—then you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of your own religion.
    4. Thus, if you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of that religion. (1-3 HS)
    5. If you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of a religion, then accepting the supernatural claims of that religion is self-defeating, and you should reject these claims. (3, 4 HS)
    6. Thus, if you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you should reject these claims. (4, 5 MP)

    So far, the conclusion appears to be that religious belief is self-defeating. We can add more inferences to make the matter clearer:

    7. Both accepting and rejecting a claim is contradictory.
    8. If a belief is contradictory, then it should be eliminated.
    9. Accepting the supernatural claims of a specific religion is contradictory. (from 6)
    10. Thus, the supernatural claims of a specific religion should be eliminated. (8, 9 MP)

    Focusing on the issue of falsifiability/unfalsifiability, we might conclude further that religion is a kind of conspiracy theory, perhaps the “ultimate” conspiracy theory:

    11. If a belief is contradictory, then it is unfalsifiable.
    12. Thus, the belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is unfalsifiable. (9, 11 MP)
    13. If a belief is about the nature of reality, then it is an “ultimate” belief.
    14. If a belief is unfalsifiable, then it is a kind of conspiracy theory.
    15. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is a kind of conspiracy theory. (12, 14 MP)
    16. Belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is belief about the nature of reality.
    17. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is an “ultimate” belief. (13, 16 MP)
    18. If a belief is both a conspiracy and an “ultimate” belief, then it is an “ultimate conspiracy theory.”
    19. Belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is both a conspiracy theory and an “ultimate” belief. (15, 17 Add)
    20. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is the “ultimate conspiracy theory.” (18, 19 MP)

    I realize that I’m playing loosely with the idea of conspiracy theory. For example, 14 might be challenged on the grounds that not all unfalsifiable beliefs are conspiracy theories, if by “conspiracy theory” we mean something very specific like “belief that there is a small number of people controlling wide-ranging events for nefarious ends.” Assuming a broader conception of “conspiracy theory," however, I think that we can use 14 or something like it. Perhaps others disagree.

    Is religion the ultimate self-defeating conspiracy theory? How can one respond to this argument without begging the question by assuming —by appealing to faith—what one is trying to prove? Thanks for your feedback.
  • leo
    882
    A reconstruction of Keeley’s argument that we discussed in my Philosophy of Religion class is the following:ModernPAS

    From what you outlined his argument boils down to "if everything can be doubted then conspiracy theories can be doubted too, and what can be doubted should be rejected so conspiracy theories should be rejected", but those who believe in a conspiracy do not necessarily believe that everything can be doubted, and what can be doubted shouldn't necessarily be rejected, so his argument is self-defeating.

    An analogous argument can be made for the claim that religious belief is self-defeating:ModernPAS

    Same problem with this, one can have good reason to doubt some claims, that doesn't imply one has good reason to doubt every claim. The argument also has the implicit assumption that personal evidence doesn't count as good evidence, obviously if one assumes that personal evidence is worthless and only widely agreed upon evidence matters, then one only ends up believing what the majority believes, it's the ultimate argumentum ad populum.

    Focusing on the issue of falsifiability/unfalsifiability, we might conclude further that religion is a kind of conspiracy theory, perhaps the “ultimate” conspiracy theory:ModernPAS

    If you only count public evidence as evidence (not personal evidence), then if at some point we have public evidence of supernatural phenomena (phenomena beyond the commonly accepted view of the nature of reality), we will come to see these phenomena as part of the nature of reality, and so once again there won't be supernatural phenomena, and so the claim that there are no supernatural phenomena is unfalsifiable.

    So by your 14., belief that "there are no supernatural phenomena" is unfalsifiable, so it is a kind of conspiracy theory, by 13 it is also an ultimate belief since it is a belief about the nature of reality, and so by 18, the belief that there are no supernatural phenomena is the ultimate conspiracy theory.

    So by your argument, belief in supernatural phenomena and belief in the absence of supernatural phenomena are both the ultimate conspiracy theory, and the belief that both are "the ultimate conspiracy theory" is contradictory, so by your 8 that belief should be eliminated, and since that belief is implied by your argument then your argument should be eliminated.
  • HereToDisscuss
    68
    2. If you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll come to doubt various people and institutions that have been set up to generate reliable data and evidence, then you’ll also have good reason to doubt the various people and institutions that generated the data and evidence for the conspiracy theory.ModernPAS

    I would like to see the justification for this. Yes, we would also doubt the data and the evidence for the conspiracy theory, but that assumes that those are the same kinds of doubts and we have the same kinds of evidence for both of them. If they were the same, we would not have believed in the conspiracy theory in the first place. If the evidence for the conspiracy theory outweighs the evidence against it, then this would simply be invalid. (And if the evidence against the conspiracy theory was higher than evidence for it, then we would not have even seriously considered it.)

    3. If you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the basic claims of other religions—for example, that they lack direct, public evidence for their supernatural claims—then you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of your own religion.ModernPAS

    Well, a believer would not say that the other religions are false because they lack direct and public (What is "public" evidence anyways?) evidence, but because they lack more indirect evidence. As for their religion being true, maybe it's because the scriptures have true scientific claims, maybe -for Christanity- because there is historical evidence to suggest the miracles happened, maybe because it says things that make the most sense...

    11. If a belief is contradictory, then it is unfalsifiable.ModernPAS

    Is a belief in (P'^P) unfalsifiable then? Because that is what "contradictory" is and i am sure any contradictory belief is false as, by definiton, they require two opposing propositions that can't be true together to be true together.
    That does not seem to be true to me.
    14. If a belief is unfalsifiable, then it is a kind of conspiracy theory.ModernPAS

    Is every belief that is unfalsifiable a conspiracy theory? For example, let's assume that i believe there is a malicious demon out there that can deceive us anytime he wants. Since we can not prove that this malicious demon does not exist, then it is unfalsifaible and it must be a conspiracy theory. I believe most people would consider this to be false.
  • deletedusercb
    1.7k
    I am assuming that the above argument, or something very much like it, succeeds in showing that conspiracy theories are self-defeating. Perhaps others might object to it.ModernPAS
    Well, a big problem with this theory is that we know it is incorrect. There have been conspiracies. Huge ones. Effective ones.

    One could look at the argument in terms of deductive problems and there are many. But empirically it fails.
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