First things first. You clearly have not thought through the meaning of the words "material" and "things." On using those term uncritically, your argument fails. Now lets move on. ("Material" and "things" are abstract terms applied to abstractions.) — tim wood

I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept. If you think that the argument fails due to a misunderstanding of "matter", then you need to present an interpretation of that concept which demonstrates that the argument fails.

Think. e.g., about what a chair is. — tim wood

"What a thing is" refers to a thing's form, and the form of a thing is distinct from its matter. So thinking about "what a chair is" doesn't give me any understanding of matter. The same matter which composes the chair could potentially, exist in many different ways. That's why matter is understood by the concept of "potential".

And this presupposes a first material thing without defining "first." And I'll note right now that my objections would be absurd and ridiculous in most arguments, but are substantial here. — tim wood

I told you, it's a temporal order. "First" means earliest in time. You do understand that "cause" is a temporal concept, or do you not?

And the final cause, intention. I agree immaterial, but a thing-as-idea; i.e., an idea. Your reification of this, if that's what you're doing, is slipshod manipulation of an ancient word thorough multiple filters. But at the same time your usage may be revealing. — tim wood

As a cause, final cause or what we call intention, in Aristotle's principles, is real, just like "the good" is real in Plato's principles. This is very clear in Aristotle's principles. To make intention into something unreal, as you are doing, and accuse me of reification, is a distorted interpretation which leaves the existence of artificial things as unintelligible. The world is full of such things, and if we trace a chain of efficient causes to account for the existence of any such thing, the chain stops at the intent of the creator. The concept of free will disallows that the actions of the creator can be accounted for by efficient causation. So to say that the intent of the creator is not a real cause, is to say that the artificial object just happened, by chance, to get the form which it has, instead of recognizing the reality, of final cause. Then you deny the fact that the form of the object was given to the object by the mind of the creator.

Question: do you hold the Pythagorean theorem to be an immaterial existing thing not a mental construct? — tim wood

I believe the Pythagorean theorem to be a mental construct. But this does not mean that this mental construct (or model of reality) is not intended to represent something real and independent of human minds. The concept's usefulness is dependent on the accuracy of its representation.

Aristotle presents two premises by which Pythagorean idealism (and the idealism of some Platonists he says) is refuted. The first is that these ideas exist only potentially, prior to being actualized by the human mind. Despite the fact that the potential for an idea like the Pythagorean theorem exists prior to it being "discovered" (which Aristotle calls actualized) by the human mind, it is the human mind which gives the idea actual existence. The second premise is Aristotle's cosmological argument. This argument proves that it is impossible for potential to be eternal. Therefore it is impossible that ideas have eternal existence prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, as Pythagorean idealism, and Platonic realism claim.

It is this argument which separates modern Platonic realists from Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians. The Neo-Platonist and Christian theologians respected Aristotle's cosmological argument, and went on to posit separate "Forms". The "Forms" are distinct from human ideas, having actual existence independent from human minds; "form" being actual under Aristotle's principles. It is necessary to respect this separation between ideas and Forms, in order to understand human fallibility. Human ideas have problems because of imperfections in the human mind. Therefore the human ideas do not perfectly map reality as intended. Pythagoras himself was extremely bothered by the "irrational" ratio which relates two perpendicular sides of a square. The square root of two does not resolve and this indicates a fundamental deficiency in the Pythagorean theorem's representation of reality. There is a basic incommensurability between one dimension of space and another (also evident in the irrational nature of pi), which indicates that this way of conceiving "space" is somewhat faulty.

But we need a starting place. Let it be with your first premise and the words therein in question, "material" and "thing" and "material thing." These are all concepts based in practical knowledge. That is, descriptive in functional terms. As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. And that just is that all of these terms are ideas! Now, is that your understanding of God, an understanding of God as God? That is, as a functionality that you attribute to a Him? In short, an idea? — tim wood

Before you can say what a "material thing" is, you need to apprehend the concept of "matter". "Matter", as derived from Aristotle's Physics, is completely theoretical, it is not a practical concept at all. What we observe is that things change as time passes. Logically, if something changes it is no longer the thing which it was; it requires a new description, having a distinct form. In pre-Socratic times, sophists could perform all sorts of magical tricks with this fact. Fundamentally, at every moment of passing time, the existing object ceases to exist, and is replaced with a new distinct object. What we observe however, is a temporal continuity of things staying the same, with only certain aspects changing.

So Aristotle posited the existence of "matter" to account for the continuity of existence, the things which stay the same as time passes. Now, the form of the object might be changing as time passes, but we can still say that it is "the same" object, based on the assumption that the object's matter is not changing. Aristotle has a division of reality into matter and form in order to account for the two aspects, what stays the same as time passes, and what changes as time passes. Form is what is active, actual, and changing, whereas "matter" is a theoretical principle, posited to account for the observed reality that some things do not change as time passes. In Newton's laws, "matter' is replaced by inertia, what he posits as a fundamental property of matter.

These considerations and more are reasons that some - many - most old ideas are suitable for museum cases only. Relegated to the mothballed fleet of curiosities that modernity has ruled will never again - if they ever did - stand in the line of battle where knowledge is won. On your understandings, you cannot even speak intelligibly on these matters. You reject the only possible grounds, yet claim grounds that cannot be. You wave some words around that you cannot use correctly, announce "proved," and think you've done something. — tim wood

Clearly it is you who has not said anything intelligible about what "material" refers to.

And indeed we must - agreed. But this not a warrant to make nonsense of science. And it is you who claim independent real immaterial existence. Throw out the understandings that condition our overall understanding of the world, and you can claim to walk through walls. You can claim anything you like, and adduce "arguments" that will prove every claim. But unless you meet the criteria of reason, they will all be unreasonable nonsense. — tim wood

What Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates (and this is fundamental to his Metaphysics) is that it is impossible for matter to exist without any form. This means that for any material existence, there is always, necessarily, a "what it is". To think otherwise is to think the unintelligible, and to allow yourself to be consumed by contradiction. However, he also explains in his Metaphysics, that the first question of being (ontology), is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, and not something else. And, it is also a case of thinking the unintelligible if we propose that there is no reason (as in cause) for an object being what it is instead of something else. These two principles together indicate that the form of an object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object. This is why post-Aristotelian metaphysicians posited independent Forms. The Neo-Platonists have a procession, or emanation of Forms from the One, whereas the Christians have a hierarchy of angels from God.

I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've said it all here with this. Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue.

I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept.
— Metaphysician Undercover

You've said it all here with this. Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue. — tim wood

:up: :cool:

"Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?"
— 180 Proof

We could start with the cosmological argument ... — Metaphysician Undercover

(a) At best the argument is unsound. (b) Otherwise, it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction from the experience of the cosmos to [wait for it, wait for it] a-cosmos. (c) Also, there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise. (d) Lastly, one of the argument's hidden assumptions - nullifying soundness - is that the cosmos, consisting of cause and effect relations, is itself the effect of a cause (i.e. "First Cause") - compositional fallacy, no? (e) And, nailing this apologia's  coffin shut for good, this purported "First Cause" is not even uniquely, or identifiably, (JCI) theistic, but just as arbitrarily can be attributed to deistic or pandeistic or ... QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic "creation"-concepts. Caveat: And some, or most, of these same objections also defeat the rest of that toothless old quaint Quinque viæ (due, in no small part, to Aristotlean 'teleological' pseudo-physics). :yawn:

So no, MU, like e.g. Spinoza Hume or Kant, I do not find (any version of) the "cosmological argument" to be "compelling evidence" of any thing other than poor reasoning (i.e. ad hockery).

... the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that.

But you, being offended by my claim ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me.

Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue. — tim wood

What's your reasoning for this? Why can't reality be such that human concepts are immaterial things which do not exist independently of the human mind, yet there are other immaterial things which do exist independently of the human mind?

Here's an example. I know there are immaterial things within my mind because I have contact with them, and apprehend them with my mind. I do not however, have direct contact with immaterial things independent from my mind. But I apprehend all sorts of things in my environment, words, writing, and other artificial things, which indicate to me that there are immaterial things which are independent from my own mind, in the minds of others. Even a human being itself, I observe as a material object, but I conclude from this object's activities, and my own experience of immaterial objects, that there is an immaterial cause of these activities. And that immaterial cause is independent of my mind.

Therefore, based on my own experience of immaterial things, and the material evidence of other immaterial things active In the world, the conclusion that there are immaterial things independent of my human mind is very sound. Aquinas' arguments state that based on the evidence of existing material things, we can conclude that there are immaterial things independent of all human minds. This is done in the very same way that I conclude that there are immaterial things independent of my own mind. We see in our environment, the effects of immaterial things, and based on our own experience with immaterial things within our own minds, we conclude that there are immaterial things independent of our minds. On what principles would you base an argument to deny this?

(a) At best the argument is unsound. — 180 Proof

If this is your opinion, let me state to you, a simplified version of Aristotle's cosmological argument, and see if you can tell me why it is unsound. Remember, it is the argument which Aristotle used to refute Pythagorean idealism, what we now call Platonic realism. But it also demonstrates that "prime matter" is an impossibility, as unintelligible.

Through observation we see that the potential for the existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. And, the actual existence of an object requires a prior actuality (this you might interpret as a cause). If the potential for existence of objects preceded the actual existence of objects, and there was nothing actual, then there would always be the potential for existence of objects, and nothing actual. We observe that there is actual existence, therefore there is something actual which is prior to the potential for existence of objects.

Please, point to the fallacies which you claim are inherent within the argument, so that I can rectify my thinking. I will grant you, that the premises can be demonstrated as unsound through a process ontology, which denies the reality of "objects". But process philosophy ends up with the related problem of temporal continuity, the temporal extension of an event or process. So process philosophers end up turning to God to account for the observed continuity (consistency in the observed world) from one moment to the next.

Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that. — 180 Proof

Well of course it is. "Efficacy" means to have an effect on. Clearly the existence of these things, conventions, websites, etc., demonstrate that these concepts... "The Force", etc, have efficacy. the concepts have an effect on the way people behave. C'mon 180 Proof, think about what you are saying for a minute before you blurt it out.

There seems to be a modern determinist/materialist movement to deny the idea that concepts have efficacy. This is pure nonsense, because all we need to do is to look around at all the marvels of the engineered world around us, which couldn't have been accomplished without concepts, to see first hand the efficacy of concepts. That movement is simply determined to isolate concepts and ideas in some Platonic realm of eternal existence, banishing them from our world, such that it is impossible for them to have an effect on our world. This is exactly the type of nonsense which Aristotle's cosmological argument was intended to combat. The cosmological argument brings immaterial objects, human concepts and ideas, right into our world, as natural objects in our world, existing as the property of human beings. This allows for the overwhelming evidence, that these ideas and concepts have causal efficacy in our world. That is the reality at the basis of "ideology".

Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me. — 180 Proof

I invite criticism, that's how we learn. Please, be my guest and criticize the argument. But simply throwing every term for every form of fallacy which you can muster, stating "the argument is unsound", "it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction", "there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise", "compositional fallacy", etc., is just random nonsense.

If you have something constructive to say about the argument, please point to the fallacious parts. I assure you that I can address all of your seemingly random criticisms. Here's an example:

a) The argument appears unsound to you because you misunderstand the premises.
b) The idea that the potential for an object precedes its actual existence is not an incoherent induction. If it were false, there'd either be eternal objects, or objects which come from nothing. Since none of these have been found, and these ideas are unreal, the induction is coherent, and the premise is very sound.
c) I see no attempt to make "a posterior argument justify an a priori premise". That's just a random claim, probably derived from a misunderstanding of the argument.
d) No, there is no composition fallacy. If the argument is applied to "the universe", (which I didn't do in the first place, I referred to a "first object"), then "the universe" refers to an object. The composition fallacy would be associated to a straw man, produced by those who make "the first object" into "the universe", and claim that "the universe" is not a natural whole.
e) The fact that others might refer to God by another name is irrelevant. Aquinas for example concludes that this is what "we call God". There is however, a problem with referring to the conclusion of the cosmological argument as consistent with "QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic". In fact, this is exactly the type of Platonism (giving reality to a statistical model) which the cosmological argument attacks. Symmetry-breaking theoretical systems do not account for "the act" which breaks symmetry, and that is why they are inconsistent with the cosmological argument.

I know there are immaterial things within my mind because I have contact with them, and apprehend them with my mind. I do not however, have direct contact with immaterial things independent from my mind. But I apprehend all sorts of things in my environment, words, writing, and other artificial things, which indicate to me that there are immaterial things which are independent from my own mind, in the minds of others.... the conclusion that there are immaterial things independent of my human mind is very sound. Aquinas' arguments state that based on the evidence of existing material things, we can conclude that there are immaterial things independent of all human minds.... We see in our environment, the effects of immaterial things, and based on our own experience with immaterial things within our own minds, we conclude that there are immaterial things independent of our minds. On what principles would you base an argument to deny this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Lack of evidence, special pleading, lack of definition, equivocation, failure in defining terms, begging the question - really, there is more wrong than I have words to name. In some respects I'm like the horse that refuses to advance over a rickety bridge.

Kindly tell us what immaterial thing is in your mind that is not some sort of idea or mental construct, or in short a product of your mind (being mind, presumably thinking, whether voluntary or involuntary), but that is instead an independently existing thing. And in the mind of others that you deduce from your apprehensions of your environment.

And I think you have a profound misunderstanding of Aristotle, (imo) because you attribute to him a kind of thinking that in fact is your 20th century thinking - closer to 19th - marbled through with Aristotelian ideas as you interpret them, in short an engrafted hybrid that's not Aristotle, yours both cross-fertilized and cross-contaminated.

I think of Aristotle as a thinker who, finding himself in a world with few or no good accounts of it, tried to find and provide those accounts, his tools comprising mainly logic and reason as he understood them. If he could craft in words a good account, that would be his account of that part or aspect of the world. And so heavy objects fall faster than light objects, smoke "falls" upwards, & etc. You, near as I can tell, uncritically misuse both the force and substance of those arguments to draw conclusions that only stand within the framework of the thinking that produces them, and not elsewhere.

Christian thinkers didn't fall into that particular trap. They themselves established their own form of the Kantian divide between faith and reason 1500 years before him. It's all faith, and if within the faith some reason can be employed, all the better. And faith can be a very good thing. But at the boundaries, where the iron meets the rest of the world, all is rust and corruption at the hands of people who don't know any better, and as well those who do. And mainly what they do is claim that matters of faith are matters of fact. I do not imagine the phenomena of these corruptions unique to Christianity.

I imagine Aristotle's thinking as being an effort to establish a gear-train of ideas - reasons and reasoning - such that if he "turned" the crank at one end and the gear at the other end turned, he was satisfied. Indeed, that would be about the best he could do (keeping in mind the background of Platonic thinking). But it's just plain the case that modern thinking does not work just that way. And to be sure, precursors of modern thinking co-existed with and preexisted Aristotle. But his was preeminently the effort to explain nature, to make it conform to reason by inventing the reason, but in any case not to "put nature to the question."

Lack of evidence, special pleading, lack of definition, equivocation, failure in defining terms, begging the question - really, there is more wrong than I have words to name. In some respects I'm like the horse that refuses to advance over a rickety bridge. — tim wood

You agreed that there are immaterial things in human minds, called ideas. If you want to take that back, because of the rickety bridge it leads to, then go ahead. But you are in denial.

Kindly tell us what immaterial thing is in your mind that is not some sort of idea or mental construct, or in short a product of your mind (being mind, presumably thinking, whether voluntary or involuntary), but that is instead an independently existing thing. And in the mind of others that you deduce from your apprehensions of your environment. — tim wood

You clearly did not understand what I wrote. Please go back and reread. Or if you prefer, pay attention and I'll state it very simply for you. There are immaterial things in my mind, mental constructs, ideas. From the existence of artificial material things, and the actions of other human beings, which I sense, I deduce that there are immaterial things independent of my mind, i.e. in the minds of others. I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. According to theologians, the existence of natural material things is evidence of immaterial things independent of all human minds.

Why do you see a problem with this? It is very clear that we do not have direct mental access to immaterial things which are independent of our own minds, yet it is very true that there are such things. We logically deduce that there are immaterial things independent of our own minds, through observing the existence of material objects. It is this logical process which leads us to the existence of God.

I think of Aristotle as a thinker who, finding himself in a world with few or no good accounts of it, tried to find and provide those accounts, his tools comprising mainly logic and reason as he understood them. If he could craft in words a good account, that would be his account of that part or aspect of the world. And so heavy objects fall faster than light objects, smoke "falls" upwards, & etc. You, near as I can tell, uncritically misuse both the force and substance of those arguments to draw conclusions that only stand within the framework of the thinking that produces them, and not elsewhere. — tim wood

It appears to me like you haven't read any Aristotle. I've read all his work except some which is debatably not properly attributed to him. And, the majority of his work I've read multiple times. If you think that I attribute to him a kind of thinking which is 20th century thinking, this is simply because his principles are still relevant today.

You seem to have a bias against ancient principles. "If it's ancient then it cannot be of any value." Actually the opposite is true. A principle which was written thousands of years ago, and is still accessible today, has stood the test of time. Principles which have little or no value are dropped and disappear.

Christian thinkers didn't fall into that particular trap. They themselves established their own form of the Kantian divide between faith and reason 1500 years before him. It's all faith, and if within the faith some reason can be employed, all the better. And faith can be a very good thing. But at the boundaries, where the iron meets the rest of the world, all is rust and corruption at the hands of people who don't know any better, and as well those who do. And mainly what they do is claim that matters of faith are matters of fact. I do not imagine the phenomena of these corruptions unique to Christianity. — tim wood

We aren't talking about faith, we are talking about reason. This is the hole which you have dug for yourself, and seem to be incapable of escaping from. Religion is based in reason, not faith. Faith only exists where it's supported by reason. In your deluded state of denial, you refuse to accept this fact.

But his was preeminently the effort to explain nature, to make it conform to reason by inventing the reason, but in any case not to "put nature to the question." — tim wood

Yes, it's quite clear from this passage that you have not read Aristotle. Precisely what Aristotle did was "put nature to the question". For example, read his Physics, De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. These books very explicitly "put nature to the question". His logical principles are put forward to prepare the student by developing a critical mind. Remember, Aristotle partook in the tradition of Socrates and Plato, criticizing the knowledge of the day. His logic is aimed at the demise of sophism, and this same goal was later maintained by the Skeptics.

You agreed that there are immaterial things in human minds, called ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, if you and I are going to continue it is clear to me we are going to have to start at the very beginning.

For example, I am content to acknowledge there such things as chairs, and this simply as a practical matter. And that the chairs are material things. At the same time I am aware that this language of "chairs" and "material" is equivocal and ambiguous - but not in the practical context of chairs. This language in its context is absolutely meaningful.

I also know that there is love, justice, three, and all abstract ideas. These are all manifestly somethings. Equally manifestly, they are not material. It seems accurate to call them ideas/mental constructs, In the sense of no mind, no idea/mental construct, nor can you ever sit on one. I call them ideas, and for as long as we can keep in mind that our use of the word "thing" has two least two very different referents and thereby avoid confusion, "thing" is a convenient word to use. And this I made clear several post ago

But now you present it as an immaterial thing in minds that we call ideas. Perhaps you mean the same thing I mean, but in inverting the order you make me very suspicious. So let's clear this up. An idea/mental construct is a product of thinking (thinking broadly defined) that is immaterial, and that for convenience we can call it a thing, and that in doing so do not at all imply that ideas are in any way material. Agreed? Or if not we - I - shall have to find another word of convenience if I can, or simply refer to non-material ideas/mental constructs.

And this not even philosophy 101 or language 101. Can we get this far?

I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this. You have every reason. You just make claim upon claim upon claim.

I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. According to theologians, the existence of natural material things is evidence of immaterial things independent of all human minds.

Why do you see a problem with this? It is very clear that we do not have direct mental access to immaterial things which are independent of our own minds, yet it is very true that there are such things. We logically deduce that there are immaterial things independent of our own minds, through observing the existence of material objects. It is this logical process which leads us to the existence of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Very true," "logically deduce," "logical process." You are the one making these claims. I merely trying to get you to put your money where your mouth is. So far you have not. Exhibit these demonstrations for us; let us see how very true they are, how they are logically deduced, the result of logical process. If you cannot or will not - and of course you cannot - then you're just a snake-oil man. a thief of language and ideas, a sophist and not a very good one, a troll, and the only correct thing to do is to challenge you as a seller of nonsense.

MU, if you and I are going to continue it is clear to me we are going to have to start at the very beginning.

For example, I am content to acknowledge there such things as chairs, and this simply as a practical matter. And that the chairs are material things. At the same time I am aware that this language of "chairs" and "material" is equivocal and ambiguous - but not in the practical context of chairs. This language in its context is absolutely meaningful.

I also know that there is love, justice, three, and all abstract ideas. These are all manifestly somethings. Equally manifestly, they are not material. It seems accurate to call them ideas/mental constructs, In the sense of no mind, no idea/mental construct, nor can you ever sit on one. I call them ideas, and for as long as we can keep in mind that our use of the word "thing" has two least two very different referents and thereby avoid confusion, "thing" is a convenient word to use. And this I made clear several post ago — tim wood

OK, I see this as an acceptable starting point. You have described two distinct categories of "things".

But now you present it as an immaterial thing in minds that we call ideas. Perhaps you mean the same thing I mean, but in inverting the order you make me very suspicious. — tim wood

Yes I do invert the order, and there is very good reason for this, clearly explained in Plato's Republic. Do you recognize that the idea of "the chair" exists in the mind of the carpenter before the carpenter builds the material chair? Therefore the material existence of the chair is dependent on the immaterial "chair" in the carpenter's mind.

An idea/mental construct is a product of thinking (thinking broadly defined) that is immaterial, and that for convenience we can call it a thing, and that in doing so do not at all imply that ideas are in any way material. Agreed? — tim wood

I agree with this. Now, do you agree that there are material things which are the product of thinking, just like there are immaterial things which are the product of thinking? We see these engineered, artificial things all over the earth.

Since both types of things, according to your categorization, immaterial and material, may be the product of thinking, the question we need to address is if it is possible that there are any things which are not the product of thinking.

You've defined the immaterial category of "things" in such a way that this type of thing requires a mind. Consequent to this definition (your definition) of "immaterial thing", all immaterial things are the product of thinking.

Now here's the problem. Aristotle demonstrates in his Metaphysics, (and this seems to be where your point of denial lies), how it is necessary to conclude that the "form" of each and every material object is prior in time to the material existence of that object. From this argument, we can conclude that every material thing is dependent for its existence, on an immaterial thing, just like the chair is dependent on the carpenter's idea, in the example above. Incidentally, this fact (where your point of denial lies) is empirically demonstrated by particle physics.

I see two possible solutions to this problem. Either we adjust your definition, allowing that there are immaterial things such as "Forms", which are not the product of a mind, or we propose a "divine mind" to account for the existence of these immaterial things. Choose your poison.

And this. You have every reason. — tim wood

I don't understand how you can make this assertion. Check these reasons:
1) I can only make conclusions concerning the existence of immaterial things based on logic, because I cannot sense immaterial things.
2) There is very strong evidence of immaterial things independent of my mind.
3) There is evidence, not quite so strong, that there are immaterial things in the minds of other animals.
4) Plato, Aristotle, and even modern physicists, have demonstrated the need to assume immaterial things as prior to all material things.
5) You have given me absolutely no reason why we ought to restrict our definition of "immaterial thing" in such a way that immaterial things are necessarily dependent on a human mind.
Therefore, I have no reason to restrict "immaterial thing" in the way you suggest. In fact, I have very strong reason against this. So I just can't understand your assertion that I "have every reason" to do this.

"Very true," "logically deduce," "logical process." You are the one making these claims. I merely trying to get you to put your money where your mouth is. So far you have not. — tim wood

This is false, just like your claim above, that I have "every reason to". I provided the logical argument in a number of different formats. You and 180 have both asserted that it is fallacious, but neither one of you has "put your money where your mouth is".

Exhibit these demonstrations for us; let us see how very true they are, how they are logically deduced, the result of logical process. If you cannot or will not - and of course you cannot - then you're just a snake-oil man. a thief of language and ideas, a sophist and not a very good one, a troll, and the only correct thing to do is to challenge you as a seller of nonsense. — tim wood

You're so fucking full of shit that it frustrates me Woody. I produced the argument at least twice. Each time, you said something like "that argument doesn't cut it", and "I don't buy it". After this, you said "please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to". So I re-presented the argument again, and you said "thank you for re-presenting". Now you're right back to "Exhibit these demonstrations for us". Sometime I feel like I'm "Tied to the whippin' post, tied to the whippin' post."

An idea/mental construct is a product of thinking (thinking broadly defined) that is immaterial, and that for convenience we can call it a thing, and that in doing so do not at all imply that ideas are in any way material. Agreed?
— tim wood

I agree with this. Now, do you agree that there are material things which are the product of thinking, just like there are immaterial things which are the product of thinking? We see these engineered, artificial things all over the earth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not the product of thinking alone. Thinking by itself produces nothing material. The four causes work at this level. Thinking formal and final. Made according to, for this purpose.

You're so fucking full of shit that it frustrates me Woody. I produced the argument at least twice. Each time, you said something like "that argument doesn't cut it", and "I don't buy it". After this, you said "please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to". So I re-presented the argument again, and you said "thank you for re-presenting". Now you're right back to "Exhibit these demonstrations for us". Sometime I feel like I'm "Tied to the whippin' post, tied to the whippin' post." — Metaphysician Undercover

That's because I'm looking for the missing ingredient, and you will not or cannot see that something is missing. In crude terms, like this: you offer me a chair to sit in, but there is no chair. On being apprised, you say, "Well, Aristotle says, and Thomas says, and Plato says, and so therefore it's very truly logically clear that there's a chair here." Or along those lines, but there is no chair. You insist it on it, adducing notions of non-material independently existing "things" without evidence and with arguments that ultimately are sustained either by begging-the-question or a deus-et-machina. While all you have to do is produce the chair.

But no one has ever been able to produce that chair. And a scrutiny of thinking about chairs yields the surprising insight that there cannot be a chair, because a real chair in its being destroys the notion and purpose of the super-natural, or non-material independently existing chair. And yes, in the presence of this kind of argumentation I hope to always earn the obloquy, because otherwise I accede to the lie. And if nothing else, we live even now in a world twisted by lies and sophistry, and that makes me angry.

You and your ideas, in their proper context, are among the world's finest, most durable, productive, and honorable, with a dynamic quality that keeps them alive and relevant century after century, But you abuse them by insisting on their entry into and membership in clubs where they do not being and cannot belong, of real independently existing things. Less interesting than your arguments, really, because they degenerate into arguments in a rubber room, is why you persist with your agenda.

You want your notions to be non-mentally-constructed, non-material, independently existing real "things." Then make the kind of demonstration that reveals them. That's part of the program of "putting to the question": a compelling to meet a standard; the standard, one hopes, crafted so that with respect to the thing sought, it becomes a sine qua non.
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Do you recognize that the idea of "the chair" exists in the mind of the carpenter before the carpenter builds the material chair? Therefore the material existence of the chair is dependent on the immaterial "chair" in the carpenter's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both a particular chair, to be sure, and very likely some idea of chairs in general. And the idea as blueprint (of sorts, however precise or imprecise) in his mind. My caution here to monitor where "independently existing non-material reality" might slip in, if it does, and if it does, if it should.

Thinking by itself produces nothing material. — tim wood

But this is wrong. With will power we move our bodies and this produces material things. So thinking clearly has a material effect. Thinking produces material things. The evidence for this is all around us in the form of artifacts and engineered things.

But no one has ever been able to produce that chair. — tim wood

Chairs are produced by human beings, and the idea, of what will exist, precedes the material existence of the chair. Do you agree with me?

You want your notions to be non-mentally-constructed, non-material, independently existing real "things." Then make the kind of demonstration that reveals them. That's part of the program of "putting to the question": a compelling to meet a standard; the standard, one hopes, crafted so that with respect to the thing sought, it becomes a sine qua non. — tim wood

This is a misrepresentation. All my ideas are mentally constructed in my own mind, I agree with you on that. However, there are immaterial things independent of my mind, such as the ideas in your mind. How can you not agree with me on this?

But this is wrong. With will power we move our bodies and this produces material things. So thinking clearly has a material effect. Thinking produces material things. The evidence for this is all around us in the form of artifacts and engineered things. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a nutshell, right here. Did you not see and read the "by itself"? What am I to make of this misreading? If nothing else, and as charitably as possible, it's suggestive of a very unrigorous even uncritical and undifferentiated understanding of what a cause is.

Perhaps you deny the point. Well, then, kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. Beyond, that is, possibly a slight variation in the electro-chemical activity of the brain....

there are immaterial things independent of my mind, such as the ideas in your mind. How can you not agree with me on this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I do agree. but you have added the qualification, "such as the ideas in your mind." Until now, your claim as I have read it, is that there are independently existing non-material things that are not ideas/mental constructs. This has been the qualification. Not that the distinction was this mind/that mind, but rather no mind at all. Are you changing the qualification? Or turned onto a different track?

Chairs are produced by human beings, and the idea, of what will exist, precedes the material existence of the chair. Do you agree with me? — Metaphysician Undercover

With respect to particular chairs, that are the result of the process you describe, yes. It seems to me debatable without any conclusion how the first chair, or ideas or notions of chairs, came about. But maybe that's not to the point. Yes, the blueprint for this chair preexists, and the general concept of chair (by now) preexists, any recently made or thing used as a chair.

In a nutshell, right here. Did you not see and read the "by itself"? What am I to make of this misreading? If nothing else, and as charitably as possible, it's suggestive of a very unrigorous even uncritical and undifferentiated understanding of what a cause is. — tim wood

The "by itself" is irrelevant. You're just trying to create a distraction here. No cause works "by itself", it works on what is existing at the time. The cause of free will works from within an existing human being.

Perhaps you deny the point. Well, then, kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. — tim wood

What is the point? It's you who is deny the point. The point is that the world is full of things created by thinking. Why do you deny this fact?

I do agree. but you have added the qualification, "such as the ideas in your mind." Until now, your claim as I have read it, is that there are independently existing non-material things that are not ideas/mental constructs. — tim wood

I added the qualification to get agreement, a starting point. Now let's see if we can proceed slowly and cautiously from this agreed starting point. You agree that there are immaterial things independent of your mind. Do you also agree that you do not have direct access to these other immaterial things (ideas of others)? You conclude that there are other immaterial things, independent of your mind, through judging the material things which you sense. Now, is it not the effects of those other immaterial things, on the material world, things like words, artifacts, and human actions, which justify the conclusion that there are other immaterial things independent of your own mind?

With respect to particular chairs, that are the result of the process you describe, yes. It seems to me debatable without any conclusion how the first chair, or ideas or notions of chairs, came about. But maybe that's not to the point. Yes, the blueprint for this chair preexists, and the general concept of chair (by now) preexists, any recently made or thing used as a chair. — tim wood

OK, that's a start, you agree that the idea pre-exists the chair. Do you also agree that the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the chair? The immaterial thing, the idea, is necessary for the existence of the chair, and is necessarily prior to (pre-exists) the chair. The material chair could not exist if the immaterial idea to make it, was not there first. Doesn't this necessity justify the claim of "cause"?

You agree that there are immaterial things independent of your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Twist and twist and twist and rewrite and misread - or don't read at all - and claim and do everything except face the matter square on. Nothing about my point was about my mind or your mind or anyone else's mind. It was about your claim that there exist independent non-material "things" that are not ideas/mental constructs - nothing to do with mind at all. Nor were we talking about causes. Yours is retro-reading into an argument something that was never there, and making chaos of it. And it is deeply disgusting. At the simplest, it mean that your words are not trustworthy,and that you are intellectually dishonest.

I ask you to

kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. — tim wood

and you simply ignore the question and keep on going.

The "by itself" is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right, to refer to anything "by itself" is an irrelevancy. The words might just as well not even be English. What absolute dishonest nonsense, MU. A disgrace.

You win the field, but thanks to you, there's nothing left on it worth even looking back at!

Nothing about my point was about my mind or your mind or anyone else's mind. It was about your claim that there exist independent non-material "things" that are not ideas/mental constructs - nothing to do with mind at all. — tim wood

Right, I have made the conclusion that there are immaterial things which are not mental constructs of human beings. I have produced the argument which necessitates that conclusion. You have rejected the argument and asked me to "exhibit these demonstrations for us". My obligation is to take it very slow and easy to facilitate understanding by even the most simple minded human being. First step, do you agree that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) independent of your own mind?

Nor were we talking about causes. — tim wood

Of course we were talking about causes, where have you been? That's the crux of the argument, as Aquinas said, we can know the existence of God through His effects. Am I talking to a board? Second step, you logically conclude that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) which are independent of your own mind, from sense observations of the effects that the immaterial things have on material things.

I ask you to kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. -and you simply ignore the question and keep on going. — tim wood

I already answered this for you, it's very simple. Thinking moves the human body, producing material change, effect in the material world, creating material things. This is the essence of free will. If you are deterministic, and insist that these actions may be explained by material causes, rather than the immaterial cause of intention or free will, then this explains your stance toward immaterial things.

If that's the case, then I can only tell you that I see inconsistency in your principles. You allow that mental constructs exist as immaterial things, but you deny the efficacy of these immaterial things. How could the material chair come into existence if the immaterial idea does not play a causal role?

So I'll repeat myself. The idea of the chair which the carpenter builds, is necessarily temporally prior to the material chair, and, the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the material chair. This necessity indicates that the idea is a cause of existence of the chair.

To demonstrate causality does not require a demonstration of "how", it just requires a demonstration of necessity. We do not need to demonstrate how cold temperatures freeze water to show that cold temperatures are a cause of water freezing. The immaterial idea is necessary for the existence of the chair, therefore it is a cause of existence of the chair, regardless of whether we can demonstrate how it acts.

How can you make any claim to consistency when one day you write this:

You and your ideas, in their proper context, are among the world's finest, most durable, productive, and honorable... — tim wood

And then you follow it up with this:

What absolute dishonest nonsense, MU. A disgrace. — tim wood

It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one that follows:

1. If there is something that can be used in a discussion to allow it to not fall apart, then that something should be used in every discussion
2. Definitions, when used as starting points, allow a discussion to not fall apart.
3. Therefore, any discussion should require definitions to be used as starting points.

This argument runs a modus ponens to argue that "definitions" are what are needed for a discussion to not fall apart, which seems to be what you are (generally) arguing for. While I agree that definitions, in the way describe them as "Religion is" or "Theology is," can help add some structure to discussions and help discussions from falling apart, I do not think that means that every discussion should use them as starting points or that there could not be discussions that use them and do not still fall apart in the end.
I think an objection arises against premise two of my above argument. Certainly, it is easier to have a discussion that begins with a claim or foundational principle, but does that mean that it will not fall apart? I do not think so, for many people could not understand the definition to begin with, or if they do, then they could eventually stray off topic from what was initially being discussed. I think both of these things, if not addressed and corrected, could cause a discussion to ultimately collapse, though a definition is acting as an established starting point for the discussion.
Because of this objection, I think the argument fails. Maybe a reply to this could be that the argument is not charitable enough, and that this is not in fact what the argument is. I would disagree with this reply, especially in light of the section that we should start all of our discussions with definitions of what "God is," what "Religion is," or what "Theology is." So, ultimately, I think the argument fails.

*Again, thank you to 180 Proof for the g/G notation. — tim wood

:cool: ... yw.