The paradox of the idea of free will surely is that it envisages the possibility of human autonomy of choice in the context of the scientific finding that every aspect of our perception is determined by the electro-chemical constitution of the brain.

Nonetheless, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that the question of autonomy of choice with which philosophy is specifically concerned is that of moral autonomy of choice; The question of amoral autonomy, primarily appropriate to the discipline of neuro-science – ex: whether I could ‘choose’ to jump into a swimming pool - being of interest to philosophy only indirectly, on the basis of the hypothesis that the means by which any putative capacity of amoral autonomy were possible could conceivably then form the means by which a capacity of moral autonomy would be possible.

However, since the question of moral as opposed to amoral autonomy might plausibly involve the additional consideration of the feasibility of a concept of moral knowledge, then the assumption that the possibility of moral autonomy could justifiably be predicated on that of amoral autonomy can hardly be considered self evident. Perhaps even, regarding the possibility of moral autonomy, there could conceivably exist a means by which the acquisition of objective moral knowledge would supersede the brain-dependent nature of human perception cited as acting to render the idea of amoral autonomy of choice logically meaningless. However of course, given the principle that the brain-dependant nature of our perception does act inescapably as a barrier to the possibility of amoral autonomy then, correspondingly, the feasibility of moral autonomy would seem to require the idea that moral knowledge be acquirable by a means independent of the material brain or, if such were to be proven to be acquirable solely via the material brain, then at least that, once it were rcquired, it be capable of conferring a subsequent independance of brain determined perception - ideas both controversial to put it mildly.

Notwithstanding those objections though, given the validity in principle of the idea of objective moral knowledge, the means by which such a thing might then be acquirable remains an open question and, of course, there does in practice exist numerous assertions claiming to derive from practical experience to the effect that the idea is a meaningful one.

Arguably therefore, it might be more appropriate to frame the free will question in a more reduced and specific form along the lines of, say, 'Do human beings possess a capacity for moral autonomy?