I don't know what you mean by absolute purity, or by the distinction between ideal and actual pleasure and pain, but so far as I can tell nothing hinges on it or makes reference to it. — The Great Whatever

First, if pleasure and pain are never pure then they cannot be intrinsically good or bad, unless you want to say that something could be intrinsically good or bad, but only to a certain extent. But, to say this would be contradictory, because you would be saying 'X is intrinsically good to some degree, but it also intrinsically bad to an inversely proportionate degree'. The upshot of this would be that X cannot be intrinsically either good or bad, but only extrinsically good and bad to varying degrees.

The point is, to put it simply, that pleasure and pain, are only good or bad in principle. This means that it is only absolute pain (without the slightest degree of pleasure) or absolute pleasure ( without the slightest degree of pain) that can be intrinsically good or bad. But absolute pleasure or pain never obtains and so there can be nothing that is intrinsically good or bad.

I don't understand what you mean by 'pure' or 'absolute' pleasure and pain.

I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt. — The Great Whatever

The point is that the pleasure you might take in hurting others, even if it were 100% pleasure ( which it could never be) cannot in any case be ethically understood in isolation from the entire context in which it is gained.
So the relative badness involved in their getting hurt must be weighed against the relative goodness of the pleasure you derived from it.
Looked at another way, the relative goodness of the pleasure you gain from someone else's suffering must be weighed against the relative badness inherent in being someone who enjoys, to any degree, watching others suffer.
The only way you can avoid the badness inherent in watching someone suffer, in other words to be utterly untroubled by the kind of pain that would be attendant upon considerations about the kind of person you are in doing that, would be to be utterly sociopathic. But this would mean that you are not fit for human society, and for a social creature, surely that would have to be understood to be a bad thing.

I thought I had already explained that pure pleasure would be pleasure not accompanied by any pain, and of course, vice versa.

For example, even the apparently simple pure pleasure of eating a chocolate is accompanied by the pain involved in the inevitable ending of the experience and the fact that it cannot be endlessly repeated without increasing the attendant pain.

I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt. — The Great Whatever

I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..

I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case.

Causing people harm is what villains do. What does it matter whether they take pleasure form it? The harm is the same.

That clearly isn't the case, and I don't know how you can reasonable maintain that. If that were the case, then it wouldn't matter if you cause the harm by accident, from coercion, under distress, for money, out of passionate anger, or whatever reason, when clearly the reason does matter to everyone -- and there is no eviler reason than for the sheer pleasure of it. You know this is true, and you cannot reasonably maintain the contrary.

Are you saying that if someone beat you, it would make you feel better to know they feel guilty about it, or something? You're getting beaten either way.

I don't see this point as seriously disputable.

Alright, bye.

Are you saying that if someone beat you, it would make you feel better to know they feel guilty about it, or something? You're getting beaten either way. — The Great Whatever

I would say if I was being beaten purely for pleasure, I would feel more animosity towards the person inflicting the beating than if they were doing it out of, say, revenge for a beating I had inflicted on them i.e. they had some reason other than the pure pleasure of it. It seems it would also be more humiliating to be abused in that way. And plausible that this emotional response could be considered additive to the purely physical pain inflicted.

I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..

I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case. — Wosret

This doesn't harm the hedonist's position, though. If deriving pleasure from causing harm is more evil than simply causing the harm, it's because the knowledge that someone is deriving pleasure makes us (and perhaps the victim) feel extra shitty, and that's why it's extra bad. It's still pain = evil and pleasure = good.

Well, I can think of situations where getting beaten by someone who wasn't doing it for the pleasure of it would be worse. For example, suppose you're a child and your parent is beating you from a position of authority, believing it to be for your own good, and doing so unimpeachably in the eyes and moral standards of the community. That's a hell of a lot worse situation, because you still take the beating, only the beater is blameless and liable to do it again without reproach. Such is the way of all 'torturing angels...'

No, hedonists can think what they like (though I highly doubt that they'd actually practice that opinion, and would rather viscerally feel this to be the case in the relevant circumstances, if it were happening to them). It clearly doesn't compound the suffering, most cases in which suffering is caused because of suffering, or in ambiguous circumstances where it is difficult to blame the perpetrator, because of brain tumors, terrible upbringings, brain washing, and such makes us feel bad for everyone. We don't feel extra back because the perpetrator is evil, we rather feel vengeful, angry, and seek to feel pleasure from their misfortune.

I actually do think that all that is relevant for sympathy is the pain of whomever is hurt, and the bad feeling we get from that ought not be effected by the cause -- nor even character of the one in pain -- which is why (as I mentioned before), the hero even feels sympathy for the evil villain, because this is a higher good than deriving pleasure from even their misery.

Notice that, on its face, pleasure derived from misery is evil, whereas feeling empathetic, sympathetic misery for the suffering is good. These are cases in which the supposed absolute value of either are turned on their head. Clearly neither are intrinsically good, but only substantial at all because of a wider context of evaluation.

whereas feeling empathetic, sympathetic misery for the suffering is good. — Wosret

Nietzsche would vehemently disagree. Feeling pity for another person only breeds more suffering. Compassion, not pity, is the good.

"com·pas·sion
kəmˈpaSHən/
noun
sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others." - dictionary.

In any case, quoting authorities aren't arguments, and I've not been making a prescriptive argument in any case, only a descriptive one. Merely pointing out how people tend to perceive and react to these things. Nietzsche by his own accord only reproaches the irreproachable, and counters what is most commonly, and widely believed. Bringing him up is just a point in my favor.

I wasn't citing authority necessarily, just adding to the conversation. I felt it was important to bring to the discussion the difference between pity and compassion in the Nietzschean sense.

Also, a dictionary is not necessarily the best source for definitions in philosophy, since philosophers tend to have slightly different opinions of what a specific word means.

Tell me what the difference is then, you figure? What distinction does he draw? My own view is that Nietzsche shouldn't be taken as endorsing a lack of compassion, or sympathy anyway, this is a gross mischaracterization in my view. It isn't really relevant, but I like Nietzsche a lot, so I'll indulge in the tangent. I believe that Nietzsche is rather saying that the strongest and most healthy human beings are naturally highly compassionate beings, that will be heroic, and self-sacrificing by nature, when they should take more care of themselves. It isn't a critique of compassion at all, in my view, but a call for the strongest and most healthy human beings to also take care of themselves, and to allow themselves selfish pursuits, and maintenance. There is no risk that they should fall into evil, or anti-social, behavior in the first place, compassion overflows from them, and his critique of it has to be taken within this perspective, in my view.

The distinction between pity and compassion is that pity leaves two people in misery, while compassion leaves no people in misery. Both stem from empathy, but pity is simply defeatist while compassion is motivating. The strong should take care of themselves, and help others out of the muck to get them to pursue their Ubermensch.

Oh yeah? Where does he talk about this distinction?

In discussing what can be translated into English alternately as “pity,”
“sympathy,” or “compassion,” Nietzsche almost always uses variations on
the German term Mitleid—literally, “suffering-with”—and only rarely
uses alternative German terms such as Mitempfinden, Mitgefu¨hl (both
“feeling-with”) or Sympathie.

-The Compassion of Zarathustra, p. 60

A true compassion of
strength would not be the distinctive symptom of the imminent demise of
the once strong, but an expression of life and power successfully at work
in the very moment of compassion.

-The Compassion of Zarathustra, p. 66

Hmm, didn't remember him making that point, which is unfortunate. I've heard it made a lot, about how feeling with someone is inferior to being motivated to make a difference, or take action and solve the problem and all of that -- but I disagree. I think that a huge misunderstanding of people, and what they need when they're suffering is for someone to swoop in and solve their problems. They just need someone to feel with them, and I didn't see him as missing this point.

We have enough social justice warriors as it is, we need more sympathy. You don't have to do anything, just feel. Also consider the absurdity of attempting to solve someone's problems, or make the world a better place for them, when you haven't even taken the time to feel what they feel about their situation. Wouldn't want to be dragged down, or made depressed.

Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected.

Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected. — Wosret

I haven't actually read anything specifically by Nietzsche, only commentaries and criticisms like the one produced above. I am by no means an expert on Nietzsche; I'm only parroting what I have read elsewhere. Which actually goes against the Nietzschean idea of making up your own mind... ;)

I really don't like quoting philosophers as a form of argument, but I think this applies well. At least it might stimulate discussion.

The secret of reaping the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from life is to live dangerously.

-Nietzsche

Because really, what do you have to lose?

Pffft, the only ones that live more dangerously than I do are my enemies.

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