A sufficient condition is always a superset of a necessary condition right? — leo

Does this mean that if you enumerated all of the sufficient conditions you would also end up with a necessary condition?

For example, if I enumerated all of the specific locations on earth that are sufficiently on earth, you would arrive at the necessary condition of being on earth? All that amounts to is being on earth is being on earth. So, yes, I think I agree with you? I’m confused.

What we call science can be rather arbitrary. Are the social sciences really science, for example. Do they have all of the necessary conditions to be science or are they missing some? Psychology is science. A dog is a type of cat.

What will the formal structure of a demarcation criterion have to look like if it is to accomplish the tasks for which it is designed? Ideally, it would specify a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for deciding whether an activity or set of statements is scientific or unscientific. — leo

This confuses me. I can see it mattering if a statement is true or if it is adequately justified and documented, but I don't see why it would matter if something is science or not? We were recently discussing similar issues over on the "What are the Philosophical Equivalents of the Laws of Nature" thread. I wrote this:

Let's talk about science for a minute. What is it? (from various places on the web).

[*] The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.
[*] The pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence.
[*] Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

Let's pull out a couple of words I think are important - "systematic" and "methodology." What is the system, the methodology, by which science operates? Well, we call it the scientific method and it involves, as the definitions indicate, observation and experimentation along with a bunch of other stuff. The scientific method is not science, it's how we pursue knowledge and understanding.

As this quoted post indicates, science is the practice of obtaining knowledge using the scientific method. The scientific method is a formal set of procedures to provide justification for knowledge using observation, experimentation, and other techniques.

Why is that hard? The distinction between science and non-science is no more difficult in concept than that between apples and oranges. I acknowledge it might be quite a bit more difficult in practice.

[*] The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.
[*] The pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence.
[*] Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. — T Clark

These are all marks of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry. All three meet these necessary conditions. Yet astrophysicists, for example, might take umbrage calling them science.

My two cents.

Does this mean that if you enumerated all of the sufficient conditions you would also end up with a necessary condition? — Noah Te Stroete

For example, if I enumerated all of the specific locations on earth that are sufficiently on earth, you would arrive at the necessary condition of being on earth? All that amounts to is being on earth is being on earth. So, yes, I think I agree with you? I’m confused. — Noah Te Stroete

By "A sufficient condition is a superset of a necessary condition", I mean that a sufficient condition for something respects all the necessary conditions for that thing. So for instance being in Funny River, Alaska, is a sufficient condition for being on Earth, but it fits all the necessary conditions for being on Earth. A necessary condition for being on Earth is for instance being on a planet around the Sun, it's necessary but it's not sufficient. All locations on Earth are sufficient conditions but each of them is not individually necessary.

To be on Earth it is necessary to be in one location that is on Earth, but that's also sufficient, so this is both a necessary and sufficient condition.

As another example, being a dog is a sufficient condition for being an animal, but it is not necessary since there are other animals that aren't dogs. However a dog fits all necessary conditions for being an animal, the sufficient condition "being a dog" is a superset of the necessary conditions for being an animal: ("being an organism", "being multicellular", ...).

Maybe superset is a misnomer, I'm not sure, I mean it in the sense that in order to be a dog it is necessary to be an organism, to be multicellular, ...

What we call science can be rather arbitrary. Are the social sciences really science, for example. Do they have all of the necessary conditions to be science or are they missing some? Psychology is science. — Noah Te Stroete

The problem is neither scientists nor philosophers can explain why some activity or set of statements is classified as science rather than non-science. I mean sure, people whom we call scientists classify some activity or set of statements as science and some other as non-science, but how do they do it? If we say they do it because of such-and-such criterion, they don't apply that criterion consistently, they classify some other thing as non-science even though it fits the same criterion, the problem is we can't find a criterion or a set of criteria that is consistently applied and that allows to distinguish science from non-science.

And of course my view on why we can't find such criteria (after trying since antiquity) is that they don't exist, or rather that the only one that works consistently is that something is classified as science because the people whom we call scientists decide to classify it as science, and some other thing is classified as non-science because they decide to classify it as non-science, and that what they base their decision on is not some constant set of criteria but rather their own desires and beliefs. If some authoritative figure decides to call something science and some other thing non-science, the herd follows, and then it becomes commonly accepted. People then try to come up with reasons after the fact, but these stated reasons can't be the real reasons since they don't work in other situations, applying the same criteria in other situations leads to classify as science things that are called non-science, or as non-science things that are called science. It's a problem that goes way beyond the social sciences and psychology, it's a problem that concerns the whole of science.

Laudan's paper is really illuminating, he gives a great overview of the problem and how science and the attempts to demarcate science have evolved throughout history.

I misunderstood what you meant by “superset.”

Thank you for the analysis.

This confuses me. I can see it mattering if a statement is true or if it is adequately justified and documented, but I don't see why it would matter if something is science or not? — T Clark

Read the beginning and the end of Laudan's paper, he explains it probably better than I could. But in my own words, it matters because scientists dismiss many activities and theories as 'pseudoscience' or 'unscientific' in a derogatory way, as if there was something about these activities and theories that was defective, or wrong, or useless, or unworthy of consideration, while they promote other activities and theories as 'scientific', as hallmarks of truth, knowledge and reason, as something that people ought to believe. In effect they tell people what to believe and what not to believe. That could be fine if there was indeed a fundamental distinction between science and non-science, something that justified the distinction, but if there isn't then these people have no legitimacy to impose their views onto the rest of the world and to dismiss other activities, theories, traditions and cultures the way they do. There is nothing in the label 'scientific' that gives an activity or a theory more legitimacy than one that is labeled 'unscientific', on the basis of that label alone there is no reason to treat them differently.

In his own words:

We live in a society which sets great store by science. Scientific 'experts' play a privileged role in many of our institutions, ranging from the courts of law to the corridors of power. At a more fundamental level, most of us strive to shape our beliefs about the natural world in the 'scientific' image. If scientists say that continents move or that the universe is billions of years old, we generally believe them, however counter-intuitive and implausible their claims might appear to be. Equally, we tend to acquiesce in what scientists tell us not to believe. If, for instance, scientists say that Velikovsky was a crank, that the biblical creation story is hokum, that UFOs do not exist, or that acupuncture is ineffective, then we generally make the scientist's contempt for these things our own, reserving for them those social sanctions and disapprobations which are the just deserts of quacks, charlatans and con-men. In sum, much of our intellectual life, and increasingly large portions of our social and political life, rest on the assumption that we (or, if not we ourselves, then someone whom we trust in these matters) can tell the difference between science and its counterfeit.

It is small wonder, under the circumstances, that the question of the nature of science has loomed so large in Western philosophy. From Plato to Popper, philosophers have sought to identify those epistemic features which mark off science from other sorts of belief and activity. Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that philosophy has largely failed to deliver the relevant goods. Whatever the specific strengths and deficiencies of the numerous well-known efforts at demarcation (several of which will be discussed below), it is probably fair to say that there is no demarcation line between science and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win assent from a majority of philosophers. Nor is there one which should win acceptance from philosophers or anyone else.

What makes a belief well founded (or heuristically fertile)? And what makes a belief scientific? The first set of questions is philosophically interesting and possibly even tractable; the second question is both uninteresting and, judging by its checkered past, intractable. If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscientific' from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us. As such, they are more suited to the rhetoric of politicians and Scottish sociologists of knowledge than to that of empirical researchers. Insofar as our concern is to protect ourselves and our fellows from the cardinal sin of believing what we wish were so rather than what there is substantial evidence for (and surely that is what most forms of 'quackery' come down to), then our focus should be squarely on the empirical and conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The 'scientific' status of those claims is altogether irrelevant.

Let's talk about science for a minute. What is it? (from various places on the web).

[*] The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.
[*] The pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence.
[*] Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. — T Clark

If these were necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate science from non-science, then everything that we call science would satisfy these conditions, and everything that we call pseudoscience or non-science would not satisfy these conditions.

But what is it in these conditions that excludes for instance astrology, ufology, or modern geocentrism? They all could be said to be intellectual and practical activities following a systematic methodology to gain knowledge about the natural world through observation and experiment. So if we want to say that astrology, ufology and geocentrism are pseudoscience or unscientific, these criteria won't do.

Let's pull out a couple of words I think are important - "systematic" and "methodology." What is the system, the methodology, by which science operates? Well, we call it the scientific method and it involves, as the definitions indicate, observation and experimentation along with a bunch of other stuff. The scientific method is not science, it's how we pursue knowledge and understanding.

Science is the practice of obtaining knowledge using the scientific method. The scientific method is formal set of procedures to provide justification for knowledge using observation, experimentation, and other techniques. — T Clark

Here you say that there is a specific methodology, "the scientific method", by which science operates, implying that what we call pseudoscience or non-science doesn't follow that method. You have defined it roughly as involving observation, experimentation and other techniques. But astrology, ufology and geocentrism also follow a method that involves observation, experimentation and other techniques. So what is it about their method that makes them non-science rather than science?

If we can't say, then the distinction isn't justified, and that's the problem of demarcation. Or rather the problem dissolves when we realize that the distinction isn't justified.

These are all marks of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry. All three meet these necessary conditions. Yet astrophysicists, for example, might take umbrage calling them science. — Noah Te Stroete

Then the astrophysicist would have to answer these questions:

• Do you agree with the definition of "science" given? If not, we'll have to negotiate a new meaning we can agree on.
• Do the activities included in the social sciences that you are skeptical about meet that definition? If your answer is "no," show how that is true.

That could be fine if there was indeed a fundamental distinction between science and non-science, something that justified the distinction, but if there isn't then these people have no legitimacy to impose their views onto the rest of the world and to dismiss other activities, theories, traditions and cultures the way they do. There is nothing in the label 'scientific' that gives an activity or a theory more legitimacy than one that is labeled 'unscientific', on the basis of that label alone there is no reason to treat them differently. — leo

As I've discussed, I believe there is a clear, justified distinction and I've tried to describe it. Saying something is not scientific is not saying it's not valuable or that it's not true. There are ways other than science to know the world. On the other hand, following scientific methods can be a very effective way of ensuring the legitimacy of an activity.

Does Lauden rigorously define what "science" means in his writing? If not, he is contributing to the demarcation problem.

Equally, we tend to acquiesce in what scientists tell us not to believe. If, for instance, scientists say that Velikovsky was a crank, that the biblical creation story is hokum, that UFOs do not exist, or that acupuncture is ineffective, then we generally make the scientist's contempt for these things our own, reserving for them those social sanctions and disapprobations which are the just deserts of quacks, charlatans and con-men. In sum, much of our intellectual life, and increasingly large portions of our social and political life, rest on the assumption that we (or, if not we ourselves, then someone whom we trust in these matters) can tell the difference between science and its counterfeit. — leo

I think a lot of people would say that this is backwards - that our society is one that does not understand and respect science. Large percentages of people continue to believe in astrology, creationism, UFOs, etc. no matter how scientists wave their arms and gnash their teeth.

Also, as I said, the choice is not between science and counterfeit science. There are legitimate ways of knowing that are non-scientific.

If these were necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate science from non-science, then everything that we call science would satisfy these conditions, and everything that we call pseudoscience or non-science would not satisfy these conditions. — leo

Yes, as long as we can agree that these definitions are correct, then if something meets the definition, it's science and if it doesn't, it's not. That's not to say there is not some additional work required to figure this out. We would have to put together and agree on a set of standards of what is required in the scientific method. That would take time and thought, but I don't think it would be too difficult.

Here you say that there is a specific methodology, "the scientific method", by which science operates, implying that what we call pseudoscience or non-science doesn't follow that method. You have defined it roughly as involving observation, experimentation and other techniques. But astrology, ufology and geocentrism also follow a method that involves observation, experimentation and other techniques. So what is it about their method that makes them non-science rather than science? — leo

Again, a distinction. The important thing about astrology, ESP, ufology, etc isn't that they are not science, it's that they are not true. They have not been been shown to be true by scientific or other legitimate methods. In addition, they have been shown to not be true by scientific or other legitimate methods.

To be clear though, it is perfectly possible and legitimate to study astrology, ESP, UFOs, etc. scientifically. It has been done. Generally speaking, the phenomena studied have not been shown to exist.

Does Lauden rigorously define what "science" means in his writing? If not, he is contributing to the demarcation problem. — T Clark

That's not right, he doesn't have to rigorously define what 'science' is if his point is that it can't be done (or at best that despite all efforts throughout history no one has yet determined its characteristic features), when he uses the word 'science' he refers to the activities and theories that are usually classified as 'science'. The point is why such-and-such activity or theory is labeled science rather than non-science?

I think a lot of people would say that this is backwards - that our society is one that does not understand and respect science. Large percentages of people continue to believe in astrology, creationism, UFOs, etc. no matter how scientists wave their arms and gnash their teeth. — T Clark

That's not my experience. People who believe in theories that scientists despise are usually much more respectful, it's the scientists who attack them ferociously, and then they have to defend themselves. Scientists and their followers do a lot to ridicule and dismiss and silence alternative views by calling them pseudoscience and a lot of other derogatory terms.

Saying something is supported by science or by scientists is a big selling point in advertising and politics, they wouldn't keep doing it if it didn't work on many people.

Then if science cannot be precisely defined beyond saying that "what is science is what scientists call science, and scientists are a community of people who call themselves scientists and who decide who is a scientist and who isn't", we have to wonder why what is called 'science' should be understood and respected more than other activities.

We would have to put together and agree on a set of standards of what is required in the scientific method. That would take time and thought, but I don't think it would be too difficult. — T Clark

Why have all scientists and philosophers failed for centuries then? Laudan addresses how all attempts have failed, his paper is a great read if you give it the time, otherwise there are other resources that mention the long-standing difficulty of this problem:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/

The important thing about astrology, ESP, ufology, etc isn't that they are not science, it's that they are not true — T Clark

They are all called pseudoscience by the scientific community, that is non-science. If you fail to see that then you'll fail to see the demarcation problem.

They have not been been shown to be true by scientific or other legitimate methods. — T Clark

And so-called scientific theories are not shown to be true either, they are shown to fit the evidence, but plenty of different theories fit the same evidence.

In addition, they have been shown to not be true by scientific or other legitimate methods. — T Clark

No they surely haven't been shown to be false. If you care to explain what makes you think that they are false, I can explain why they aren't. Note that falsified doesn't mean proven false, a theory can always be saved from falsification. General relativity could have been considered falsified, it was saved by assuming the existence of invisible dark matter and dark energy. Astrology, ESP and ufology can also be saved from falsification, so they surely haven't been shown to be false.

Generally speaking, the phenomena studied have not been shown to exist. — T Clark

It depends who you ask, observations are interpreted, they can be interpreted in various ways. Also scientists are researching invisible things, namely dark matter and dark energy, they haven't been detected despite countless experiments and enormous resources spent (especially regarding dark matter), scientists could keep researching them forever and never show them to exist and still call their activity science. On the other hand not nearly as much resources are spent on astrology, ESP or ufology to research them more extensively.

That's not right, he doesn't have to rigorously define what 'science' is if his point is that it can't be done (or at best that despite all efforts throughout history no one has yet determined its characteristic features), when he uses the word 'science' he refers to the activities and theories that are usually classified as 'science'. The point is why such-and-such activity or theory is labeled science rather than non-science? — leo

This is deeply ironic. Of course he has to rigorously define the problem. You and Lauden complain about this so-called "demarcation problem" but you aren't willing to do the work to deal with it. People's unwillingness or inability is the demarcation problem.

That's not my experience. People who believe in theories that scientists despise are usually much more respectful, it's the scientists who attack them ferociously, and then they have to defend themselves. Scientists and their followers do a lot to ridicule and dismiss and silence alternative views by calling them pseudoscience and a lot of other derogatory terms.

Saying something is supported by science or by scientists is a big selling point in advertising and politics, they wouldn't keep doing it if it didn't work on many people. — leo

You seem to be arguing against statements I never made and don't endorse. I do agree that some - many, most? - scientists can be arrogant and condescending.

They are all called pseudoscience by the scientific community, that is non-science. If you fail to see that then you'll fail to see the demarcation problem. — leo

They are called pseudoscience because their practitioners pretend that it's science but don't apply the legitimate tools of science. Maybe "pretend" is the wrong word. I don't think most of them are liars, I think they're incompetent and ignorant.

And so-called scientific theories are not shown to be true either, they are shown to fit the evidence, but plenty of different theories fit the same evidence. — leo

I'll use my favorite quote from Stephen Jay Gould again. I've used it at least once this week. He is referring to biological evolution - “In science, ‘fact’ can only mean ‘confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.’”

No, it is not true that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence."

No they surely haven't been shown to be false. If you care to explain what makes you think that they are false, I can explain why they aren't. Note that falsified doesn't mean proven false, a theory can always be saved from falsification. — leo

True, logically (and trivially) you can't prove a negative, but I think Gould's standard applies here as much as it does for positive assertions. False can only mean ‘refuted to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional rejection.’”

Why have all scientists and philosophers failed for centuries then? Laudan addresses how all attempts have failed, his paper is a great read if you give it the time, otherwise there are other resources that mention the long-standing difficulty of this problem: — leo

I don't think it's true that "all scientists and philosophers failed." I don't think it's that hard to reach a consensus on what is included in the scientific method. I think you and I could do it if we approached the question openly.

It depends who you ask, observations are interpreted, they can be interpreted in various ways. Also scientists are researching invisible things, namely dark matter and dark energy, they haven't been detected despite countless experiments and enormous resources spent (especially regarding dark matter), scientists could keep researching them forever and never show them to exist and still call their activity science. — leo

Dark matter is controversial within the scientific community. There are observations that indicate it may exist, i.e. the gravitational behavior of the observable universe appears to require more mass than has been accounted for otherwise. There haven't been "countless experiments" and this aspect of cosmology has many uncertainties. I'm pretty sure that if dark matter can't be confirmed more robustly, it will fall by the wayside. Even if it doesn't, it's not the fruitfulness of the inquiry that makes it science, it's the methods followed.

On the other hand not nearly as much resources are spent on astrology, ESP or ufology to research them more extensively. — leo

There's a pretty extensive literature about studies done to evaluate those subjects. I've read some of it, although not a lot. It is my impression that studies that have been rigorously and scientifically performed do not find convincing evidence for these phenomena and studies that do find evidence have not been rigorously and scientifically performed.

Well, what does it mean to talk of a necessary condition and of a sufficient condition that is separate from it? — leo

Belief is necessary and insufficient for both - true and false - belief. Without belief, there can be neither.

This is deeply ironic. Of course he has to rigorously define the problem. You and Lauden complain about this so-called "demarcation problem" but you aren't willing to do the work to deal with it. People's unwillingness or inability is the demarcation problem. — T Clark

It's Laudan not Lauden (you made the mistake twice so I'm mentioning it).

I don't think you understand the problem if you think that one has to rigorously define 'science' in order to rigorously define the problem.

There are activites and theories that are called 'science'. There are activities and theories that are called 'non-science'. Why the former are called 'science' and why the latter are called 'non-science' is the problem. If there are no consistent criteria that are applied to classify something as 'science' and something else as 'non-science', then that means activities and theories are classified as 'science' or 'non-science' arbitrarily. The problem with that is then that it is not justified to dismiss something by labeling it 'non-science' if that label was assigned arbitrarily, and that knowledge labeled 'scientific' is not inherently more valid than knowledge labeled 'unscientific' so scientists and people should stop pretending that it is.

I don't know why you pretend there is no problem if you're not even willing to read the paper or other sources on the demarcation problem.

They are called pseudoscience because their practitioners pretend that it's science but don't apply the legitimate tools of science. Maybe "pretend" is the wrong word. I don't think most of them are liars, I think they're incompetent and ignorant. — T Clark

In order to say that they don't apply the legitimate tools of science, you would have to describe what are these legitimate tools of science, and show that what we call science applies these tools, and that what we call non-science doesn't apply these tools. If we can't do that, if there are things we call science even though they don't apply these tools, or if there are things we call non-science even though they apply these tools, then these tools aren't criteria that distinguish science from non-science, and then it is false to say that something is called pseudoscience because it doesn't apply these tools. Do you not see the problem?

No, it is not true that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence." — T Clark

Considering that "the Earth is at the center of the Universe", "there is no dark matter", "there is no dark energy", "we are brains in vats", "we live in a computer simulation", "the Universe was created 10000 years ago" all can be made to fit the current observations, I would say it is pretty justified to say that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence".

It's called the underdetermination of scientific theories, it is widely acknowledged, but in an ideal world I wouldn't even have to say that it is widely acknowledged in order for my interlocutor to consider it seriously.

It used to be perverse to hold that continents move or that rogue waves exist or that we would ever reach the Moon or that the Earth revolves around the Sun or that clocks run at different rates in different places or that fundamental particles have definite trajectories, now it's perverse to hold the contrary. People like to think they hold truth or a close approximation to the truth, until they don't.

I don't think it's true that "all scientists and philosophers failed." I don't think it's that hard to reach a consensus on what is included in the scientific method. I think you and I could do it if we approached the question openly. — T Clark

But if you don't think it's true why don't you read the paper and the links I've listed? It will give you a lot of information on what has been attempted and on why these attempts don't work.

Sure if you want we can try ourselves. So if we define science as what follows the "scientific method", and non-science as what doesn't follow the "scientific method", then how do we characterize that method so that it includes everything that we call science and excludes everything that we call non-science? If we talk of observations and experiments, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science. If we talk of making hypotheses and comparing predictions and observations, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science as well. If we talk of what can be verified, that excludes what we call science. If we talk of what can be falsified, that excludes what we call science (contrary to popular belief scientific theories can always be saved from falsification). If we talk of accumulating knowledge, that includes a lot of what we call non-science. Where do we go from here?

There haven't been "countless experiments" and this aspect of cosmology has many uncertainties. I'm pretty sure that if dark matter can't be confirmed more robustly, it will fall by the wayside. Even if it doesn't, it's not the fruitfulness of the inquiry that makes it science, it's the methods followed. — T Clark

Not countless but many: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Experiments_for_dark_matter_search

Every time they fail to detect it, they assume it's because it has different properties than they expected, and so they come up with another experiment, it's been going on for over 20 years, they could keep doing that forever. What method do they follow? They make an hypothesis, they come up with an experiment to test it, they compare predictions and observations. The same is done in astrology, ufology, ESP research, telekinesis research, homeopathy, acupuncture, free energy research, Loch Ness research, ...

If you say all of them are science, on what basis do you say that they have been shown to be false but not dark matter? There is a double standard there, if an experiment in one of these fields doesn't match what's predicted then the whole field is dismissed, whereas spending enormous resources for over 20 years on dark matter while systematically failing to detect it doesn't refute dark matter in any way, instead it's a reason to keep making more and more experiments. I'll tell you what the difference is, belief, they believe they will find dark matter, but they don't believe they will find any of the other effects I mentioned, so they research dark matter and not these other phenomena. It's not a difference in methodology, it's not a difference in the fruitfulness (actually there are more fruitful results in many of these fields than in dark matter research), it's belief, they look for what they believe, and they call it science, and they call what they don't believe non-science or pseudoscience.

It's Laudan not Lauden (you made the mistake twice so I'm mentioning it). — leo

I will try to spell it right from now on.

I don't know why you pretend there is no problem if you're not even willing to read the paper or other sources on the demarcation problem. — leo

A reasonable request. I read the entry in Wikipedia. As you suggested, I also read the first several and the concluding paragraphs of the Laudan paper. Then I scanned the rest quickly to see if it covered anything substantially different than Wikipedia.

There are activites and theories that are called 'science'. There are activities and theories that are called 'non-science'. Why the former are called 'science' and why the latter are called 'non-science' is the problem. If there are no consistent criteria that are applied to classify something as 'science' and something else as 'non-science', then that means activities and theories are classified as 'science' or 'non-science' arbitrarily. The problem with that is then that it is not justified to dismiss something by labeling it 'non-science' if that label was assigned arbitrarily, and that knowledge labeled 'scientific' is not inherently more valid than knowledge labeled 'unscientific' so scientists and people should stop pretending that it is. — leo

I don't see calling some things science and some non-science as a problem. One of Laudan's points is that it makes sense to talk about well founded knowledge rather than science. I made it clear in my previous posts that I don't think science is the only legitimate path to knowledge. That doesn't mean making the distinction between science and other knowledge doesn't make sense. I think it does. And as I said, I don't think it's all that hard to do.

Whether or not some activities are identified as science or non-science incorrectly in practice, I don't think it's all that hard in concept. There's science; good science and bad science; and non-science; well-founded and poorly-founded. I don't really like the word pseudo-science, it's too easy to throw around without serious thought, but I understand the point it's users are trying to make, i.e. there are people who use the trappings of science without the rigor to misrepresent the level of justification for their ideas.

In order to say that they don't apply the legitimate tools of science, you would have to describe what are these legitimate tools of science, and show that what we call science applies these tools, and that what we call non-science doesn't apply these tools. If we can't do that, if there are things we call science even though they don't apply these tools, or if there are things we call non-science even though they apply these tools, then these tools aren't criteria that distinguish science from non-science, and then it is false to say that something is called pseudoscience because it doesn't apply these tools. Do you not see the problem? — leo

I think I have described the legitimate tools, although not in detail. Going into detail about what constitutes the scientific method is biting off a big chunk. Is this the place to do it?

Considering that "the Earth is at the center of the Universe", "there is no dark matter", "there is no dark energy", "we are brains in vats", "we live in a computer simulation", "the Universe was created 10000 years ago" all can be made to fit the current observations, I would say it is pretty justified to say that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence". — leo

The ideas that the Earth is the center of the universe and the universe was created 10,000 years ago can not "be made to fit the current observations." That's why they are not longer widely accepted as fact. As for brains in vats and computer simulations, those are philosophers fantasies developed to undermine the certainty of all knowledge. That's fine, but it's not what we're talking about. As for dark matter, as I said, there is well-founded observational evidence that there is more matter in the universe than has been observed. That's all the term "dark matter" means. It is a descriptive term. Something of the sort is needed to match current observations. If it doesn't exist, we'll have to abandon or heavily modify other currently well-founded theories, e.g. general relativity or the expansion of the universe. To the best of our current knowledge, it exists. What dark matter is is a big question. Neutrinos have been suggested. Also some exotic not previously observed type of matter. I don't know anything about dark energy, but I think the situation is probably the same.

It's called the underdetermination of scientific theories, it is widely acknowledged, but in an ideal world I wouldn't even have to say that it is widely acknowledged in order for my interlocutor to consider it seriously. — leo

Underdetermination is a weakness in a theory. It indicates it does not correctly address all evidence - that there is uncertainty. Good science acknowledges the weakness and uncertainty in it's conclusions.

The same is done in astrology, ufology, ESP research, telekinesis research, homeopathy, acupuncture, free energy research, Loch Ness research, ... — leo

I believe this is not true. As I indicated previously, I've done some reading in this area, but not a lot. Do you know of specific research that has found well-founded evidence for ESP or telekinesis? If so, let's discuss it.

If you say all of them are science, on what basis do you say that they have been shown to be false but not dark matter? There is a double standard there, if an experiment in one of these fields doesn't match what's predicted then the whole field is dismissed, whereas spending enormous resources for over 20 years on dark matter while systematically failing to detect it doesn't refute dark matter in any way, instead it's a reason to keep making more and more experiments. I'll tell you what the difference is, belief, they believe they will find dark matter, but they don't believe they will find any of the other effects I mentioned, so they research dark matter and not these other phenomena. It's not a difference in methodology, it's not a difference in the fruitfulness (actually there are more fruitful results in many of these fields than in dark matter research), it's belief, they look for what they believe, and they call it science, and they call what they don't believe non-science or pseudoscience. — leo

As I said, there is strong evidence that there is extra matter in the universe that we haven't directly observed. It's been given the name "dark matter" because 1) there is evidence it's there and 2) we can't observe it. As I said, if it's not there, we have to discard very well established scientific principles. It's worth it to keep looking. Show me evidence it's worth it to continue trying to establish ESP or astrology and we can discuss it.

I don't see calling some things science and some non-science as a problem. — T Clark

The problem is not calling some things science and some non-science, it is calling them science or non-science arbitrarily, and then using that label to promote the things labeled 'science' and to ridicule or dismiss the ones labeled 'non-science'. If they are not called science or non-science according to consistent criteria, then they are labeled arbitrarily. You keep implying that such criteria exist, what are they? I described how a lot of 'non-science' follows 'the scientific method', so whether something is called science or non-science isn't determined by whether it follows 'the scientific method'.

The underlying problem of course is that some activities and theories are dismissed arbitrarily, while some others are promoted arbitrarily. People are told that if they believe in something that has been labeled as 'unscientific' then they believe in fairy tales, in falsehoods, that they are delusional, that they are crackpots, simply because some self-important community has decided to label it that way. If you don't see the problem with that then I guess I can't make you see it.

The ideas that the Earth is the center of the universe and the universe was created 10,000 years ago can not "be made to fit the current observations." — T Clark

Yes they can. Tell me what observations you think contradict these ideas, and I will explain how these ideas can be made to fit these observations.

As for brains in vats and computer simulations, those are philosophers fantasies developed to undermine the certainty of all knowledge. — T Clark

They can be considered as theories that can be tested experimentally. There are some papers that showed for instance how particular types of computer simulations would have effects observable in principle.

As for dark matter, as I said, there is well-founded observational evidence that there is more matter in the universe than has been observed. That's all the term "dark matter" means. It is a descriptive term. Something of the sort is needed to match current observations. If it doesn't exist, we'll have to abandon or heavily modify other currently well-founded theories, e.g. general relativity or the expansion of the universe. To the best of our current knowledge, it exists. What dark matter is is a big question. Neutrinos have been suggested. Also some exotic not previously observed type of matter. — T Clark

I wholeheartedly disagree that there is well-founded observational evidence for dark matter (in the sense matter that doesn't emit any light). There is evidence general relativity's predictions do not match many observations of stars in other galaxies. General relativity hasn't been tested on large scales. Astrophysicists and cosmologists want to believe that general relativity is accurate on large scales too, that's a belief. The strength of the evidence for dark matter is proportional to the strength of their belief that general relativity accurately describes gravity on large scales. There is no evidence for that belief. In other words, there is no evidence for dark matter.

I believe this is not true. As I indicated previously, I've done some reading in this area, but not a lot. Do you know of specific research that has found well-founded evidence for ESP or telekinesis? If so, let's discuss it. — T Clark

You said "it's not the fruitfulness of the inquiry that makes it science, it's the methods followed", I said that all those fields follow the methods that dark matter research follows, now it seems you're going back to saying that it is fruitfulness that makes something science. Whether ESP or telekinesis research is fruitful or not, it suffices for me to say that they follow the method of making hypotheses and testing them through experiments, like dark matter research.

I think we've taken this discussion as far as we can. I feel that I've made a good case for my position. I'm not sure I can do better. You're unconvinced.

I feel good about our conversation. I got a chance to lay out my own beliefs. I found some weaknesses in my understanding that I plan to work on. All in all, it was satisfying.

Same with me :up:

I feel that I addressed all your points while you didn't address some of mine, but maybe that's how you feel too from your side (that I didn't address some of your points), after all even if I try to put myself in the shoes of others I can't know for sure what it's like.

I believe I had read in another thread that you work in a scientific field (or was it engineering? but engineering looks up to science anyway), so it's understandable that you hold science in high esteem since your education and career revolve around it, and that you have a high incentive to defend it from potential threats to its status. Myself I had an extensive scientific education and then I had started working as an engineer, so I have firsthand experience of what it's like to hold science in high esteem.

(note that when I mention 'science' or 'scientific' I'm simply referring to what is usually called 'science' or 'scientific', I'm not implying it can be precisely defined or characterized beyond that otherwise I would be contradicting my whole point)

So I'm thinking that when we have a high incentive to not see a problem, it's easy to not see it and it's hard to see it.

The reason I noticed the problem (before I knew it had a name in philosophy) is that early on I became critical of the way science is taught in school and presented in the media, I could see statements were presented as truth while they were not certain at all. But what this implied is that alternative theories were presented as false while it was not certain at all that they were false, and so plenty of potentially fruitful alternatives weren't explored, and the curious and intellectually honest people who wanted to explore them were insulted, labeled all sorts of derogatory names, only because they dared to go against the mainstream theories and thought. And then I thought, how does that fit at all the ideal of science that is presented as an open-minded inquiry of nature free of political influence when people are prevented from exploring alternative paths to the mainstream one, when they are bullied into agreeing with the mainstream?

All those theories and activities labeled as 'pseudoscience' are alternative paths, they are not wrong, they are different ways of looking at the phenomena, it could be potentially fruitful to explore any of them further, but the scientific establishment tries to prevent that, because it wants to keep its position of importance, it wants to push the idea that it is working on the important and useful things while everyone else is working on irrelevant and useless things, it wants to push the idea that its members are loyal and noble servants to the truth while the people who go alternative routes are dirty crackpots who want to spread fairy tales and dangerous ideas.

And that's not acceptable. Plenty of people do not like many conclusions of 'science', and they are pressured to agree with them even if it goes against their own theories or beliefs, even if it pushes them into existential despair (for instance the idea of the heat death of the universe is a really depressing one and it is presented as inevitable although that's not certain at all), and that's not acceptable. Scientists have no legitimacy to pressure people to believe what they want them to believe, and no legitimacy to dismiss and ridicule alternative paths to ensure that they don't get funded and don't get explored. If alternative paths were funded as well as dark matter research they would probably have had plenty of interesting and fruitful results, while dark matter research has had pretty much none. Allow me to be blunt, I see it as a fucking disgrace.

edit: double post

Whether a given endeavor or claim is scientific or not is a judgment call.

if the criteria centrally includes very rigorously designed theoretical and/or mathematical constructions, and/or very rigorously designed, implemented, interpreted, and replicated empirical investigations, then. rather than referring to some contentious and elusive clear and distinct line of binary demarcation, we can drop or at least bracket the term science, and judge any given endeavor or claim on a continuum according to the degree that it satisfies these or any other mutually agreed upon criteria.

What we care most about regarding claims about how the physical world works, is how reliably they allow us to interact with the world to achieve our purposes. Thus, the degree of a claim's utility is the degree of its predictive reliability across a general range of interactions. But we have found that a high degree of such predictive reliability is very hard to come by. We've found that it is most reliably achieved via very rigorous logical and/or mathematical constructions and/or very rigorously designed, implemented, interpreted, and replicated empirical investigations. The enterprises that have best and most consistently exemplify this are those we call the sciences, notably the physical sciences.

Other endeavors, such as political science, economic science, psychology, anthropology, sociology, education, nutrition and exercise science--as well as homeopathy, astrology, intelligent design etc.-- aspire to, and often allege, theoretical and empirical rigor, but analysis of their theories, and methodology often reveal lack of rigor, and--most centrally--their results quite often fail to demonstrate generalized predictive reliability or utility. Dismissing any given endeavor or claim as non-science--not to mention "junk science" or "pseudo-science"--strikes me as shorthand indicating a judgment that they fail to satisfy the epistemic criteria to the degree that the physical sciences do.

Dispute about such judgment can be addressed by argument that provides reason and evidence about the degree to which the endeavor did or did not satisfy the criteria, and that the claim is or is not demonstrably reliable--entirely without invoking a contentious science/non-science demarcation.

start quotes

The problem is not calling some things science and some non-science, it is calling them science or non-science arbitrarily, and then using that label to promote the things labeled 'science' and to ridicule or dismiss the ones labeled 'non-science'. If they are not called science or non-science according to consistent criteria, then they are labeled arbitrarily. You keep implying that such criteria exist, what are they? I described how a lot of 'non-science' follows 'the scientific method', so whether something is called science or non-science isn't determined by whether it follows 'the scientific method'.

Sure if you want we can try ourselves. So if we define science as what follows the "scientific method", and non-science as what doesn't follow the "scientific method", then how do we characterize that method so that it includes everything that we call science and excludes everything that we call non-science? If we talk of observations and experiments, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science. If we talk of making hypotheses and comparing predictions and observations, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science as well. If we talk of what can be verified, that excludes what we call science. If we talk of what can be falsified, that excludes what we call science (contrary to popular belief scientific theories can always be saved from falsification). If we talk of accumulating knowledge, that includes a lot of what we call non-science.

I'll use my favorite quote from Stephen Jay Gould again. I've used it at least once this week. He is referring to biological evolution - “In science, ‘fact’ can only mean ‘confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.’”

end quotes

What turns the public off science (without understanding why) is firstly the conflating of necessary and sufficient conditions, or cause and effect, within the subject matter of specific studies.

This has got nothing to do with a demarcation problem as every field of investigation and study falls within “science”, loosely described, if one can apply a system of appropriate methods, experimental, observational, analytical etc. Some people used to contrast “arts” which are creative and also applied technology (these draw on sciences of course).

Secondly they are put off by the image being projected that one has to be so categorical instead of tentative. Gould’s word “provisional” seems to recognise that a little. Talk of revolutions and falsifying can be inappropriate if misused. Yes sudden growth has occurred, yes we should always build into our suppositions an element that can be shown to be different – which mostly happens in the form of nuancing.

We should always keep lots of hypotheses on the table, also plenty of “notions” or “abductions” which are I think the ideas for hypotheses. It is in deciding whether these have been tested that confusion about necessary and sufficient conditions creeps in. Also, one never knows when we need to stop looking into a matter – the answer probably is, never.

I don't ordinarily confess to being both ignorant and stupid, but this seems an interesting topic, and maybe the confession will be my ticket to enter at this late moment - because I do not understand it so far. .

As I read it, bemoaned is the absence of clear boundaries - demarcation - between science and non-science. Question: for whom, exactly, is this a question and why, exactly, do they care?

Not for scientists, and not for non-scientists. For example, lyin' Ted Cruz, when he's denying climate change, I suspect knows exactly what he's doing and why (lyin' for gain), a knowing act of fraud by a liar. Or so-called Creation "scientists" who have merely stolen a word to beguile the already fond.

And science, as I understand it, is the activity of the kitchen, wherein, in the best, a controlled chaos reigns. In this we distinguish between the processes of science and the products of science. The process produces the product, and they're not identical. Is the boundary at the product? Or the process?

It devolves, then, to the question of how the ignorant - the rest of us, ignorance being the universal condition - can tell the difference between science and non-science, the wheat from the chaff? Answer: winnowing, keeping in mind that those who don't know and don't care, won't winnow and won't know. And that those who winnow can tell wheat from chaff.

How can they tell? By the usual means got from education, and from authority, and from experience and good sense. Which ultimately means work: to know means to do the work of knowing and being able to know. This implies that at the core, a science is recognizable as such. It also implies.that at the fringes, mistakes are possible, a poster-child being eugenics, c. 1850-1950. In sum, a work in progress.

And a question as to whether science, or any particular science, can be defined in terms of its effects. Is, for example, all science good and for the good?

Tim, the question was whether the question of what "decides what" "is" science and what "isn't", gets decided by confusion between necessary and sufficient conditions. I saw the real peril as the conflation of the two types of logical conditions WITHIN each field of study, since there is such a lot of overlap in systematic methods in all fields (in otherwords "demarcation" isn't much of an issue for me). It is people who are practising science dishonestly that do harm, not an impersonalised reified "field" itself, but the field of manipulative robotics that is so prominent these days is a field where increasingly, nearly all practise of it is, sad to say, dishonest.